before Buell's arrival? With his superior force, by surprising Grant he might completely crush him; for he was between two creeks, with a deep river behind him, and no means of escape. It was the unanimous opinion of the Confederate generals that Grant should be attacked. Johnston hoped to be ready to move on April 1st, but was not. It was ten o'clock on the evening of the 2d when a messenger from General Cheatham, who was north of Corinth, came to Beauregard with the information that the Union army was divided, that one division was north of Snake Creek. "Now is the time to strike," said Beauregard. Johnston hesitated; said that the army was not ready. His adjutant, General Jordan, was earnest for the movement, and finally persuaded him to issue the order. The troops were to take three days' cooked rations in their haversacks, and three days' uncooked in wagons.

Drums were beating the next morning at Corinth. The Third Corps, under General Hardee, filed out from its camp and took the lead. General Hardee was from South Carolina; he had been educated at West Point. The Second Corps followed, under General Braxton Bragg, born in North Carolina and educated at West Point. He was in the battle of Buena Vista, in Mexico, and commanded a battery which did excellent service. When the war began, in 1861, he was a planter in Louisiana, raising cotton and sugar-cane. He was brave and energetic, but had such a temper that his officers did not always find it easy to get on with him. The First Corps, under General Polk, came next, followed by the reserves, under General Breckinridge. There had been heavy rains, and the roads were deep with mire. It was Thursday morning. Johnston expected to be ready to strike the blow on Saturday morning, but it rained on Friday, and when the sun went down at night the army was not in position to fall upon the unsuspecting Union troops.

One division of the Union army, commanded by Lew. Wallace, is north of Snake Creek, to protect the provisions at Crump's Landing; one brigade down by the river, one two miles out, and the third one mile beyond, towards the town of Purdy. General Wallace has constructed a bridge across Snake Creek, north of Shiloh church. Starting at Pittsburg Landing, we can turn to the right, cross the creek, on the road leading to Crump's, or we can go on towards the church and turn north, and cross the new bridge, and so reach the position occupied by Wallace's second brigade. It is between nine and ten miles by either road. Two brigades of General Sherman's division are around the church. General McClernand's is in Sherman's rear about half a mile; General Prentiss's is three-quarters of a mile south-east of Sherman; General Hurlbut's and General W. H. L.

Wallace's divisions are towards the landing. Stuart's brigade, of Sherman's division, is east of Prentiss, guarding the ford over Lick Creek. Sherman, Prentiss, and Stuart form the front line. It is just about three miles from where Stuart stood to Owl Creek. This is the only place where the Confederates can strike their contemplated blow, for the water is high in the Tennessee, and has flowed back into the creeks, so that the attack, if made, must be directly in front, and not by any flank movement. To be successful, the attack must be a surprise.

General Grant knew that a large Confederate army had gathered at Corinth, but he did not expect that Johnston and Beauregard were about to fall upon him. The success at Donelson had made the Union army over-confident; officers and soldiers alike had unbounded faith in themselves. Precautions which were taken later in the war-the throwing up of breastworks-were not thought of at Pittsburg Landing. The army

was getting ready to move to Corinth, and was not expecting to be attacked by the Confederates. The divisions were not stationed with any reference to a battle line. There was no forethought of battle. The headquarters of General Grant was at Savannah. The immunity from attack on either flank had somewhat to do with the feeling of security which pervaded the army, from the generals to the men in the ranks. General Grant had very little cavalry, and his information in regard to the Confederates had to be obtained mostly through spies and infantry His picket lines were not as far out as they might have been. On Thursday and Friday General Buckland went out with a brigade five miles to the farm of Mr. Michey, when suddenly the Confederate cavalry swooped down upon his videttes and captured a lieutenant and seven men. Buckland did not like that, and pushed out two miles farther, where he found himself confronted by cavalry and artillery. He did not know that

scouts.

he had encountered Cleburne's brigade, of Hardee's corps, advancing from Corinth. In the skirmish Major Crockett of Buckland's command was killed, but ten Confederates were captured. On Saturday morning Captain Mason, of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, saw squirrels and rabbits coming through the woods from the south-west, as if suddenly startled from their haunts. He had a suspicion that something was going on beyond the picket line, and reported to General Sherman, who sent out several companies to strengthen the pickets.

General Lew. Wallace had two scouts whom he relied upon for information. One of them was Mr. Carpenter, who obtained his information from the negroes on the farms in the vicinity, who were, in turn, in communication with the negroes in the Confederate army-the servants who waited upon the Confederate officers, and who were doing work in the

camp. He instructed them to keep their ears and eyes wide open to hear all that was said by the Confederate officers at dinner, or in consultation over maps, and to make a note of what was going on. The Confederate officers little knew that the slaves, brushing their clothes, blacking their boots, or waiting upon them at the mess table, were listening intently to their conversation, and that a few hours later it would be reported to a Union officer. Mr. Carpenter did not accept all that the negroes reported, but by comparing the different accounts was able to arrive at the probable truth. General Wallace's other scout was a very shrewd man, who was in the pay not only of General Wallace but of General Johnston. General Wallace accepted his reports as truthful because they were corroborated by the accounts brought by the negroes. At two o'clock on Saturday afternoon the scout Carpenter came in through the picket line and reported to General Wallace that the whole Confederate army was advancing. Two hours later the other scout came in with the same information, which was sent to General Grant. In many of the first accounts of the battle of Shiloh it is represented that the army under General Grant was taken completely by surprise, but it is now known that the division commanders understood that the Confederates were not far away. General Grant knew that a large body of the enemy was in front of him. He was most apprehensive for the safety of Crump's Landing, where nearly all of his supplies were stored. He feared that a rapid dash might be made upon Lew. Wallace, and the supplies destroyed before the main body of the army could be brought to Wallace's assistance. He expected that some sort of a movement would be made by the Confederates. He remained at Savannah to meet Buell, whom he was hourly expecting. While General Grant was riding towards the front on Friday he was severely injured by his horse falling, and for two or three days was unable to walk except with crutches. On Saturday, April 5th, General Nelson's division of Buell's army, which had forded Duck Creek, arrived at Savannah. General Grant ordered him to move up the east bank of the river to a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's Landing or to Pittsburg, as he might be needed. General Buell arrived at Savannah on the same evening, but did not inform General Grant, who did not learn of his arrival until after the battle had begun on Sunday morning. All through Saturday there was skirmishing between the Union and the Confederate pickets. Although the signs were multiplying that the Confederates were advancing, there was no preparation for a great battle on the part of General Grant or his division commanders, but at the same time there was a growing apprehension that something might happen.