terposing obstacles to the free exchange of products. It is difficult to estimate the extent of loss resulting from this cause; but there can be no doubt it amounts to a vast sum. This tax on exchanges is a great obstacle to the highest development of our industrial resources. To form some idea of the loss occasioned to the country by the obstacles interposed to free exchanges by the tariff system, take the following esti. mate: In 1856 the cotton, woolen, and iron manufactures and sugar produced and consumed in the United States were enhanced in price by the tariff $39,975,985. This was the amount of the indirect tax paid to the home producers of the above articles. In 1846 the Secretary of the Treasury estimated the indirect tax then paid on the enhanced prices of home products, caused by the tariff, at $50,000,000. To be within moderate limits, we have reduced the estimate to $30,000,000. In 1832 it was estimated that the amount of indirect tax paid up to that time to the home producers of protected products was $240,000,000. Starting with that estimate, and putting the amount to this indirect tax down to only $30,000,000 per annum since that time, we have, in round numbers, up to the present time, as the total amount of the indirect tax, $1,000,000,000, which the consumers of the United States have had to pay for the luxury of persisting in an industrial blunder.

As regards the navigation laws, we do not think it necessary to go into a detailed examination of their various provisions, especially as a bill has been reported to the House, and is now before it, from one of the standing committees, for the purpose of perfecting the details of the present code of navigation laws. In general terms, however, we would say that the present regulations are unnecessarily complex, and might, with great advantage, be simplified. There are, however, several defects in principle, as we conceive, in the navigation laws, to which we propose to call attention; those defects are as follows:

1. The requisition that American vessels engaged in the coasting trade should pay 50 cents per ton, unless "threefourths of the crew are American citizens, then only 6 cents per ton;" and the further provision that American vessels, entering from foreign ports, to pay 50 cents per ton unless "the officers and two-thirds of the crew are American citizens."

2. The exclusion of foreign built vessels, though owned by American citizens, from engaging, with entire equality, in the coasting and other trade of the United States.

3. The entire exclusion of foreign vessels, owned by foreigners, from the coasting trade.

The object of the requisition that a certain proportion of the crews of American vessels should be Americans, was, no doubt, intended to accomplish a political purpose, eminently proper in itself, to provide an American marine in time of war. We find no fault with the motive, but we think this provision, which operates frequently as a great practical inconvenience, is unnecessary. The occupation of a sea-faring life should be left, like all other employments, to the inclinations or interests of the people. If it is to the interests of our population that they should go to sea, they will do so; otherwise, we should not endeavor to compel them. There is no danger that we should suffer in case of war from repealing this provision. That patriotic class of our citizens who have, on all occasions, honorably sustained the glory of our flag on the sea, do not take their inspiration from this provision. We have no fear but that, with or without this provision, there will be always the material out of which to organize a warlike marine, necessary to the wants of the country, under the most trying circumstances that can arise. Even with this provision a large per centage, 45 or 50 per cent., of our sea-faring men are foreigners. This provision, then, operates only as an unnecessary burden on the country during peace, without promising any adequate compensating result in time of war. Further, it may admit of grave consideration whether we would not strengthen ourselves, in case of war, by encouraging foreign sailors to come into our marine, as, once entered, they become, for all practical purposes, American sailors. Advancing firmly in the line of industrial freedom, and with a view of throwing off every possible shackle on the idustrial energies of the country, we think this provision should be rescinded.

As regards the second defect alluded to in the law, by which foreign built vessels, though owned by American citizens, are not admitted to entire equality, unless purchased after shipwreck, and repaired to the extent of three-fourths of their cost, we consider this rests upon a totally indefensible principle. It is giving to American ship-builders a perfect monopoly. We can see no ground of justice upon which this monopoly can rest. Every American citizen ought to have the privilege to buy ships wherever he can buy them to the best advantage. To compel him to buy from American shipbuilders at an enhanced price is, to the extent of that enhanced price, to confiscate his property, and transfer it to another. Such a monopoly is utterly inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions. Our ship-builders have a right to equality; they have no right to exclusive privileges. As a question of expediency, it seems equally indefensible. Either

American built ships are cheaper or dearer than foreign built. If they are cheaper, they do not need this prohibition of foreign purchase. If they are dearer, they do not deserve it. It is the interest of the great mass of the people of the United States, both producers and consumers, to have ships cheap, for the price of ships enters as an element in the cost of transportation. This monopoly either makes ships dearer, and enhances the cost of transportation, or it is useless. If it makes ships dearer, and enhances the cost of transportation, it should be abolished, If it accomplishes nothing, it is useless, and should not encumber the statute books. We have reason to believe the removal of this monopoly would permit ships to be bought cheaper. In a debate upon this subject, growing out of certain propositions made by the British Government to our Government on this and kindred subjects, it was conceded in debate here, by a distinguished member from the city of New York, (Hon. E. BROOKS,) that ships could be built in the British provinces "some twenty per cent. or more cheaper than in New England or New York." This monopoly ought to be abolished in the interest of the commerce, manufactures, and agriculture of the country.

As regards the next defect in our navigation laws--the prohibition of the coasting trade to foreign ships-this is another monopoly which we conceive to be unjust and inexpedient, and which ought to be abolished.

If there be any one thing in which all the people of the United States, all classes, and all industrial pursuits of all sections except the one class of ship owners, are interested in, it is in cheap sea transportation. When we consider the vast value of the products of the United States which are carried by water coastwise on both our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the Gulf of Mexico, and the great lakes-some estimate of which may be formed from considering that the amount of tonnage engaged in this transportation is 2,247,663 74 tons, nearly one-half of the total tonnage of the United States-we can readily see how important is the element of cheap transportation. The only practical mode of attaining this result is competition, and yet we resolutely turn our backs upon this principle and persevere in a monopoly. We are clear that our navigation laws should be modified in this respect.

The policy of our navigation laws was borrowed from England, where their wisdom, though in violation, confessedly, of the great principles he announced, was sustained even by Adam Smith, the great architect of the modern system of political economy. Yet England, after clinging to these laws for centuries as one of the anchors of her safety, has within a few

DEFECTS OF OUR TARIFF SYSTEM.

years, under the influence of more enlightened principles, abandoned them.

As regards the present tariff, we think its principal defects

are

1. That too large a proportion of the duties is thrown on articles of prime necessity. For instance, nearly one-half of the present revenue is raised from duties on cotton, woolen, iron manufactures, and sugar. These articles are indispensable to the great mass of the people-the laboring classes--so that an undue portion of the burden of taxation is thrown on the. laboring classes. To reduce duties on articles of necessity, is,. in effect, to increase wages, as the same wages will go fur

ther.

2. It is protective in its character, as is obvious from the following considerations: Ordinary cotton manufactures pay 24 percent., bagging pays 15, but all bleached, printed, painted or dyed cotton goods and de laines pay 30 per cent. Manufactures of iron pay 24; pig, bar, sheet, and all other iron, 24. Woolen manufactures pay 24, except flannels and baizes, which pay 19. Sugars of all kinds, 24 per cent. Manufac tures of silks pay 19 per cent. Adzes pay 24 per cent. Blacksmiths hammers and sledges, 24; boots and bootees, for men or women, 24. The fact that silk manufactures, used by the rich, pay 19 per cent., and cotton, woolen, iron manufactures manufactures indispensable to the industry of the coun-try-pay 24 and 30 per cent., when 20 per cent may be assumed as the highest revenue standard of duty on these articles, indicate the deference paid to the principle of protection. A minute analysis of the present tariff will only further illustrate this fact.

3. There are certain imposts on the free list which should not be there, as, for instance, tea and coffee. These articles," tea and coffee, are peculiarly suited for taxation. They are not produced in this country, therefore there would be no indirect tax paid on them. They are of general consumption,. and a tax upon them, besides furnishing an addition to our income, now much needed, would fall equally on all classes and sections.

The reason of placing these articles on the free list is obvious enough. It is to prevent the necessity of reduction on such articles introduced from abroad as enter into competitien with similar home products. By diminishing the free list, we could diminish the general rate of duty on many articles entering into universal consumption.

If the policy of collecting the revenue of the government by duties on imports is to be continued, we think the tariff should be modified on the following principles:

1. A total abandonment of the policy of protection. No duty should be laid with the view of protecting any form of industry. The tariff should be considered purely as a fiscal instrumentality. We have no idea that any tariff can be instituted that will not in some degree, either more or less, operate in a protective character. Such will be the unavoidable effect of all duties on articles of a similar nature to home products. And the production of this effect becomes constantly greater, from the fact that the cost of production is steadily decreasing in this country, from the increase of population and capital, aided by the increase of skill and improvements in the processes of production. From this cause a lower rate of duty will operate protectively now, to what it did twenty years ago. The operation of this principle constitutes one of our objections to any tariff, as we would wish so to regulate taxation as that no class should, in any degree, derive benefit from it as a bounty.

2. Articles of prime necessity should be taxed at the lowest rate of duty, and articles of luxury at the highest revenue standard. The reasons of this are so obvious that we do not think it necessary to enlarge upon them. Our purpose would be to relieve the producing classes as much as possible from the burdens of taxation.

3. The free list should be confined to such articles as furnish so inconsiderable an amount of revenue as not to remunerate for the trouble and expense of collection, and the raw material of domestic manufactures. According to this principle, tea and coffee should be required to pay duty. As regards the exemption of the raw materials of manufactures, this, while a benefit to the home manufacturer, would operate no injury to any class, as the effect would only be to cheapen production, an advantage which would be shared by all the consumers-that is, by the great mass of the people. Upon this point of the free list, we submit the following statement showing what amount of revenue might be derived from laying a duty of 20 per cent. on certain articles which now pay no duty. Statement exhibiting the amount of duties that would have accrued upon "certain articles of general consumption," admitted free of duty during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1857, had 20 per centum ad valorem been charged upon them.