much of Early's disaster in the Valley was due to his alleged intemperance, and that there had been too much "apple-jack" in the campaign But the charge of habitual intemperance was examined by a committee of the Confederate Congress, and disproved. It was not established indeed that Gen. Early was a believer in total abstinence-or as one of his Irish friends remarks, that the man was always "beastly sober "--but it was conclusively shown that in the line of his duty he was never under the influence of drink, and to no such imprudence could be attributed any misfortune of his military life.

of a

The real character of Gen. Early's campaign appears in the narrative. Much of his disaster is to be fairly attributed to lack of numbers, his great disproportion to the enemy in this respect; but at the same time it is not to be denied that his loss of artillery was excessive and peculiar, and that in the field at Cedar Creek he had not shown the nerve and grasp great commander. His loss of artillery was so notorious, that wags in Richmond ticketed guns sent him "to Gen. Sheridan, care of Jubal Early." In a month he lost more than fifty guns. Briefly, it may be said that in the operations in the Valley Gen. Early committed no flagrant error, and did nothing to draw upon him a distinct and severe censure; yet, at the same time, he certainly did not display in this campaign the qualities of a great commander, never rose above mediocrity, and, with a superiour army upon him, went headlong to destruction.

The effect of the Valley campaign on the situation around Richmond may be almost said to have been decisive. The result of it, in this respect, was this: that it released a powerful force and made it available for Grant, while Gen. Lee could only make use of, as a corresponding force, the small remnant of a dispirited army. One of the highest and most intelligent Confederate Generals has not hesitated to express the opinion that "the battle of Winchester was the turning-point of the fortunes of the war in Virginia." The view is not unreasonable when we consider what was the object of Early's campaign. A battle fought in the Valley with decisive results might have relieved Richmond. Such was the idea of Gen. Lee. Battles were fought, but with decisive results for the enemy; and Richmond fell.

ing him close, he was riding with Gen. Breckinridge. It might have been supposed that their conversation would relate to the disastrous events of the day, but Gen. Early did not seem to trouble himself upon that subject. In full retreat as they were, and followed by an enraged enemy, his companion was astounded to hear from Early the cool and nonchalant question: 'Well, Breckinridge, what do you think of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, in its bearings upon the rights of the South in the Territories?' The man who could amuse himself with political discussions between Fisher's Hill and Woodstock on the 22d of September, 1864, must have been of hard stuff or peculiar humour. There were many persons in and out of the army who doubted the soundness of his judgment—there were none who ever called in question the tough fibre of his courage."

A general opinion prevalent at Richmond, and apparently strengthened by the experiences of the Valley campaign, was that the Confederate cavalry in Virginia had become very inefficient and unequal to its early reputation. The report is one of singular injustice, in view of the brilliant record of the cavalry for 1864, especially that part of it under the com mand of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, the compeer and successor of Stuart, a model of chivalry and a leader whose star ascended to the highest realms of glory in the war. We have elsewhere referred generally to the operations of the cavalry in Grant's early combination against Richmond. It is a fact based upon official testimony, that Fitzhugh Lee's command fought nine consecutive days, commencing the day Grant crossed the Rapidan, and in that time lost one-half of its numbers in killed and wounded, its loss in prisoners in the same time being not more than thirty! His command was composed of Virginians, save one gallant company from Maryland. The simple inscription of the fact we have related is an undying title of glory for the cavalry of Virginia, testifying as it does to a courage and devotion, the parallels of which are scarcely to be found out of the pages of fabulous history.

It is to be remarked that the disasters of the Valley campaign were in a great measure due to the extreme numerical inferiority of the Confederate cavalry to that of the enemy. The distribution of our cavalry at this time in Virginia is a curious study and excites criticism. Only two brigades of cavalry were sent to the Valley by Gen. Lee. Gen. Grant sent two large divisions of three brigades each. At Petersburg and Richmond, the numbers of our cavalry exceeded those of the enemy. But unfortu nately, the country in this vicinity (especially in Dinwiddie county) was but little adapted for this superiority to be displayed, it being very wooded and traversed only by narrow roads.

Grant had Gregg's division of two brigades on his left flank on the south side of the James-and four regiments under Kautz on the north side, guarding his right flank. Confronting Kautz, the Confederates had Gary's brigade, and opposite to Gregg, Bulter's division (Hampton's old command) of three brigades, W. H. F. Lee's division, of two brigades, and a detached brigade under Dearing. Rosser's brigade was afterwards sent to the Valley, but not until the battle of Winchester had been fought.

The Valley was especially adapted for the operations of cavalry. It is universally admitted that a preponderating force of cavalry gives immense advantages in a country suitable for its employment; for cavalry can live on the lines of communication of the army opposed to it, easily avoiding any infantry sent after it. In the Valley, where cavalry could be used to advantage, the Federal superiority was some six or seven thousand. Around Petersburg, where cavalry could only fight dismounted, our numbers were

THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY IN VIRGINIA.

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in excess of those of the enemy, but not, it is true, to the degree of the enemy's superiority in the other field of operations. If, however, the proportion had been to some extent reversed, and something like an equal match been made with the enemy's cavalry in the Valley, the result might have been different, or at least there have been one error and its consequences less in that campaign.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

GEN. GANT'S OPINION OF MANOEUVRING.-LEE HIS MASTER IN EVERY BRANCH OF GENERAL SHIP. THE FEDERALS GET POSSESSION OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.--ACTION at REAMS' STATION.-OPERATIONS NORTH OF JAMES RIVER.-SURPRISE AND CAPTURE of fort HABRISON. ATTEMPT OF THE CONFEDERATES TO RETAKE IT DISCONCERTED AND DEFEATED—— GRANT PLANS A GENERAL ADVANCE IN OCTOBER. THREE CORPS OF THE ENEMY IN MOTION. ATTEMPT TO TURN THE CONFEDERATE POSITION ON HATCHER'S RUN, AND SEIZE THE SOUTHSIDE RAILROAD.-DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY AND FRUSTRATION OF HIS PLANSPUBLIC ATTENTION DRAWN TO GEORGIA.-SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.-HE RETURNS FROM GAYLESVILLE TO ATLANTA.-THE WORK OF DESTRUCTION COMMENCED AT ROME.— BURNING OF ATLANTA.-MORE THAN FOUR THOUSAND HOUSES CONSUMED.-OUTLINE OF SHERMAN'S MARCH FROM ATLANTA.-THE COUNTRY IT TRAVERSES FULL OF SUPPLIES.— PILLAGE OF MADISON.-CONCENTRATION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES AT MILLEDGEVILLE— AN AFFAIR OF MILITIA AT GRISWOLDSVILLE.-KILPATRICK'S DEMONSTRATION ON AUGUSTA. STATEMENT OF CONFEDERATE FORCES THERE.-SHERMAN'S MARCH TO MILLEN.-HE MEETS WITH NO RESISTANCE. HIS DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY.-PROWESS OF HIS TROOPS IN PILLAGE AND VILLANY.-NOTHING BUT MILITIA AND HASTY LEVIES TO OPPOSE HIM. SHERMAN'S APPROACH TO SAVANNAH.-FORT M'ALLISTER TAKEN BY ASSAULT GALLANTRY OF THE CONFEDERATE GARRISON.-GEN. HARDEE EVACUATES SAVANNAH. EXTENT OF SHERMAN'S CAPTURES.-HOW MUCH OF HIS ACHIEVEMENTS WAS

66

SIMPLE

WASTE AND DESTRUCTION."-REVIEW OF THE GREAT MARCH."— -ABSURD HISTORICAL COMPARISONS IN THE NORTH.-CHARACTER OF GEN. SHERMAN. HIS CHARLATANISM.-HIS

PROPER PLACE IN HISTORY.

Ir is said that at the opening of the campaign on the Rapidan, Gen Meade, in conversation with Gen. Grant, was telling him that he proposed to manœuvre thus and so; whereupon Gen. Grant stopped him at the word "manœuvre," and said, "Oh! I never manœuvre." We have seen that the famous Federal commander, who thus despised manoeuvring, had failed to destroy Lee's army by "hammering continuously" at it; had failed to take either Richmond or Petersburg by a coup de main. We shall now see that he was no longer unwilling to avail himself of the resource of manoeuvring; and we shall observe that in this resource also, he was overmatched by Lee, who showed himself his master in every art of war,.

CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON.

607 and indeed left Grant not a single branch of generalship in which he might assert his reputation.

For some time after the mine explosion, but little was done by the Federals in front of Petersburg. In the remaining months of summer and autumn, some manoeuvres were executed with more or less breadth of design, which may be briefly stated here in the order of their occurrence.

On the 18th and 19th August, Grant's left under Warren, after a defeat on the first day, succeeded in holding the Weldon Railroad. This line of communication with the South was not of any great importance to Gen. Lee, as long as he held the road to Danville, the main avenue to the fertile grain districts of the South. A series of severe actions, however, ensued to break Warren's hold upon the road; and he maintained his position only after a loss which he himself officially reports as 4,455 killed, wounded, and missing. Meanwhile Hancock's corps was brought in rear of the position held by Warren, and ordered to destroy a southward section of the road. On the 25th August, this force was encountered at Reams' station by A. P. Hill's corps under Wilcox, Heth, and Mahone. A vigorous attack of Heth broke the enemy's line, and drove a division which was in reserve, while one line of breastworks was carried by the Confederate cavalry under Gen. Hampton. The results of the day were, twelve stands of colours captured, and nine pieces of artillery, ten caissons, 2,150 prisoners, and 3,100 stand of small-arms. The Confederate loss was, in cavalry, artillery, and infantry, 720 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Warren, however, still continued to hold the Weldon railroad; but after a sum of disaster, as we have seen, that was a very extravagant price, compared with the little real importance of the acquisition. The road was permanently retained by the enemy; and he now proceeded to form a line of redoubts connecting the new position with the old left of the army on the Jerusalem plank road.

About the close of September, attention was again drawn to operations north of James River, and a movement on Gen. Butler's front resulted in a serious disaster to the Confederates, and, it must be confessed, accomplished one real success for this ill-stared General in the operations against Richmond. On the night of the 28th September, Butler crossed to the north side of the James, with the corps of Birney and Ord, and moved up the river with the design of attacking the very strong fortifications and entrenchments below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison. A portion of Butler's force was moved on the Newmarket road, and while a severe engagement was occurring there, a column of the enemy made a flank movment on Fort Harrison, and practically succeeded in surprising this important work, which surrendered after a very feeble resistance on the part of the artillery, and while a force of Confederates was on the double-quick to reinforce it.