did not have to wait long for a practical illustration. After the capture of the Alabama, the enemy appears to have had an increased desire for the other important Confederate cruiser, the Florida, carrying eight guns. She had eluded the Kearsarge at Brest, and since then had ventured within sixty miles of New York, chasing the war steamer Ericsson, and capturing the steamer Electric Spark on the route to New Orleans. She was next heard from at Teneriffe, and subsequently entered the Bay of San Salvador, Brazil.

The Wachusett, a Federal steamer, was also in this neutral port; and her commander, Napoleon Collins, conceived the utterly outrageous and dastardly design of sinking the Confederate vessel at her anchorage, or capturing her by stealing upon her in an unguarded moment, and towing her out to sea. The circumstances of the outrage were of peculiar atrocity. A little past midnight of 6th October, the Wachusett slipped her cables, and bore down upon the Florida, when about one half the crew of the unsuspecting vessel were ashore. The Florida's officer on deck, when he saw the approach of the Wachusett, actually hailed her to avoid an accidental collision as he feared; little supposing that the Federal vessel was coming down under a full head of steam with the diabolical design of sinking a defenceless vessel with her crew asleep beneath her decks. The blow, however, was not well delivered, striking the Florida in the stern and not amidships as intended. As the Wachusett drew off, she demanded the surrender of the vessel, incapable of resistance, and having in a few mo ments boarded her, attached a hawser, and moving at the top of her speed. towed the Florida rapidly out to sea. The outrage was not discovered by the Brazilian fleet until the Wachusett with her prize had got out to sea, and then some harmless shots were fired, which passed over her pennant.

Of course Mr. Seward had to apologize to the Brazilian Government, and Capt. Collins had to go through certain forms of censure. But this was of no importance. The diplomatic apology did not prevent the Florida from being held as a prize, and afterwards being "accidentally " sunk in Hampton Roads. And the official affectation with Capt. Collins did not prevent the press from lauding him, and the New York Herald from saying: " Certainly, no page of history can show a more daring achievement "—another illustration, by the way, of how the North has measured glory in the war by the very degrees of wantonness and outrage.

INVASION OF MISSOURI BY GEN. PRICE.

In the close of this chapter and in the group of events of the war, in 1864, outside of the grand campaigns of Virginia and Georgia, we may

properly place here a brief record of what was the most important of the detached military operations of 1864. This was a movement in the TransMississippi, the invasion of Missouri by Gen. Price. It appears to have been altogether a detached operation, having no relation to the campaigns east of the Mississippi, and with but little effect on the general issues of the war. It is therefore narrated in a small space.

About the middle of September, Gen. Price entered Missouri, crossing the State line from Arkansas, by the way of Pocahontas and Poplar Bluff. He had about ten thousand men under the command of Gens. Shelby, Marmaduke, and Fagan. From Poplar Bluff, Price advanced, by the way of Bloomfield, to Pilot Knob, driving before him the various outpost garrisons, and threatening Cape Girardeau. Pilot Knob was evacuated, and Price thus obtained a strongly fortified position, eighty-six miles south of St. Louis, the terminus of the railroad, and the depot for supply of the lower outposts.

Gen. Rosecrans, the Federal commander in the Department of Missouri, was largely superiour in force to Price; but he appears to have been unable to concentrate or handle his troops, and the country was surprised to find Gen. Price moving almost without molestation through the large State of Missouri, doing incalculable mischief, and kindling the hopes of the Confederates with another campaign of wonders in this remote region of the war. From Pilot Knob Gen. Price moved north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. Gen. Custis, commanding the Department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion; while four brigades of Federal cavalry, numbering about eight thousand men and eight rifled guns, were operating in Price's rear. On the 23d October, Gen. Price was brought to battle on the Big Blue, and defeated, Gens. Marmaduke and Cabell being taken prisoners, and the Confederates losing nearly all of their artillery. On the following day, Price was again attacked, near Fort Scott, and obliged hurriedly to retreat into Kansas. He then turned down to the south, and crossed the Arkansas River, above Fort Smith, into the Indian Territory. He subsequently went into winter quarters in the south of Arkansas, his men in worse plight than when they started from that State, and the conclusion of his campaign an undoubted failure.

The fact is that Gen. Price had retreated from Missouri, not so much under the stress of the enemy's arms as from inherent faults in his own enterprise. He had declared that his invasion was not a raid, that he came to possess Missouri; but the breadth of the excursion, its indefiniteness, and the failure to concentrate on important points, ruined him. While his command roamed through the State, his men, brought to the vicinity of their old homes, which they had not seen for several years, were ex

PRICE'S RETREAT FROM MISSOURI.

555

posed to unusual temptations to desert; and instead of being reinforced by recruits, his command was diminished by desertions at every step of the march, and almost ran through his fingers before he left the State. With this sad conclusion of Gen. Price's expedition, the last hope was banished from the Southern mind of possessing Missouri; and the operations of the Trans-Mississippi may be said now to have made their last figure of importance in the war.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS OF 1864 IN THE NORTH.-ITS RELATIONS TO THE MILITARY CAM PAIGN.-REVIEW OF PARTIES IN THE NORTH.—A GENERAL DISTINCTION FOUNDED ON TWO QUESTIONS.-COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY OPPOSING MR. LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION.— THE DOCTRINES OF THE BLACK REPUBLICAN PARTY IMPOSSIBLE TO BE DEFINED.-HOW THE PARTY CHANGED AND SHIFTED THROUGH THE WAR.-OPINIONS OF MR. WEBSTER AND MR. CLAY.-MODERN VERIFICATION OF MR. CLAY'S CHARGE OF AMALGAMATION."POLICY OF THE BLACK REPUBLICAN PARTY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.-MR. LINCOLN'S INSTINCTS OF UNWORTHINESS.-HOW THE PEACE PARTY IN THE NORTH MADE THE FIRST FALSE STEP.-GROWTH OF THE POWER OF LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION. ITS MEASURES OF TERROUR.-MODERATION OF THE CONFEDERACY TOWARDS

AND

UNION MEN DISSENTIENTS. SOME ACCOUNT OF ARRESTS IN THE NORTH.-LINCOLN'S DETECTIVE SYSTEM.-COMPARATIVE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING AN OPPOSITION PARTY

แ

66

66

IN THE

RECON

PLAT

NORTH.-INFAMOUS CONDUCT OF WAR DEMOCRATS."-THE CONSERVATIVE PHALANX IN
THE CONGRESS AT WASHINGTON.-A RECORD OF ITS VOTES.-REASSURANCE OF THE CON
SERVATIVE PARTY IN 1864.-THE PARTY ISSUES OF 1864, WITH REFERENCE TO
STRUCTION."-CONVENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY AT BALTIMORE.—ITS
FORM."—PRETERMISSION OF THE CONDITION OF STATE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY.—HOW
THIS CONDITION WAS AFTERWARDS INSERTED.—MR. LINCOLN'S RESCRIPT,
"TO WHOM IT
MAY CONCERN."—HISTORY OF THE NIAGARA FALLS COMMISSION. HOW MR. LINCOLN'S
PASSPORT WAS MADE A POLITICAL CARD.-DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION AT CHICAGO.—ITS
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.—M'OLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.-SLAVERY NO

LONGER AN ISSUE IN THE WAR.-THE CONSTITUTIONAL POINT AT ISSUE BETWEEN M

"OLEL

THE

NEGRO

LAN AND LINCOLN. THE RADICAL WING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.—THE CLEVELAND CONVENTION. THE ISSUES OF THE CANVASS AS BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, GOVERNMENT PARTY, AND THE RADICAL PARTY.-HOW THE TWO LAST INSTEAD OF THE TWO FIRST COALESCED." RECONSTRUCTION ANTE-DATED.-A FAINT HINT OF SUFFRAGE. THE WRITTEN ISSUES OF THE CANVASS BUT LITTLE CONSIDERED. THE CONTEST MAINLY ON THE FOURTH RESOLUTION OF THE CHICAGO "PLATFORM."—ELOQUENOS OF THE M'CLELLAN CAMPAIGN PAPERS. THE ELECTION OF M'OLELLAN IMPOSSIBLE IN VIEW OF THE FEDERAL VICTORIES OF 1864.—TRIUMPH OF MR. LINCOLN AND HIS PAKTY.— ANALYSIS OF THE POPULAR VOTE IN HIS ELECTION.—A LARGE ELEMENT OF ENCOURAGE

MENT IN IT.-THE VICTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION POSTPONED.

We have already referred to the great consideration which attached to the Presidential contest in the North which was now to take place; have stated that it gave a new hope for the South in 1864; and

we

We

have

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE NORTH.

557

indicated that the political campaign of this year was, in the minds of the Confederate leaders, scarcely less important than the military. Indeed, the two were indissolubly connected; and the calculation in Richmond was that if military matters could even be held in a negative condition, the Democratic party in the North would have the opportunity of appealing to the popular impatience of the war, and bringing it to a close on terms acceptable to the great mass of the Southern people.

For a thorough discussion of this political campaign it will be well to make a rapid review and analysis of parties in the North, even at the risk of some repetition to the reader.

Parties in the North were divided by very distinct lines. There were two questions upon which the division took place. One of these referred to the supremacy of the Constitution as opposed to military necessity-real or pretended. The other had reference to the relative powers of the Union and the States. On both these questions the party in power. held loose and careless opinions, employing force wherever it would avail for military or partisan advantage. The opposition contended for a strict observance of the provisions of the Constitution and of the rights of the States. This was the general distinction.

But widely as the theories of these two parties separated them on questions touching the sanctity and scope of the Constitution, there was still a margin of difference left between the views of the Northern Democratic party and the Southern doctrines upon which the right of Secession was founded. The difference, however, concerned only the last alternative of Secession. According to the Northern view, the Union was inviolable and perpetual, and all grievances must be redressed within the Union by remedies which respected its integrity. According to the Southern view, Secession was a rightful remedy for evils otherwise incurable, sanctioned by the precedent and precepts of the men of 1776.

This latter doctrine had so limited a support at the North, however, that it was totally unknown in the controversies of parties. There, all, or nearly all, assumed that the Union was permanent and inviolable--differences of opinion turning upon the powers of the Union; the powers of the Federal Government; the rightfulness of extra-constitutional measures in time of war; and the expediency, and most judicious means of coercion.

The party in opposition to Mr. Lincoln's Administration-most properly designated as the Constitutional party-was composed chiefly of Democrats, but largely interspersed with Whigs of the stamp of Wm. B. Reed of Philadelphia, Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, Wm. B. Crittenden, and the like. In partisan pariance they were called "Copperheads," and they were reinforced in the debates, though generally opposed in the votes, by a class of men who had split away from the Democratic party, called "War Democrats."