1 tionably true. And it is equally true, that if it were a union of individuals, it might be as rightfully dissolved by those individuals. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall,. 'the question whether the people may resume and modify the powers granted to government, does not remain to be settled in this country.' Neither man, humanity, nor political states, can create what cannot be destroyed.. 'The United States' may be possibly destroyed by an amendment to the federal constitution-carried by a strict party vote in three-fourths of the state legislatures! Let us hope that the spirit of our people will brook no such usurpations upon their sovereign will. It has also been said, that if the union be only a union of states, a single state may rightfully dissolve it at pleasure. This is not true. Let us carefully examine the argument for this position, and we shall find that it rests on a misapplication of the principle that a sovereign is bound by no law but his will. That a sovereign is bound by no law but his will, is true, in the relations of men to one another, only in one sense; that is, as applied to internal self-government. It means that a man has a right to do as he wills concerning the direction and control of his own internal affairs, affairs relating to none but himself. As extended to the sovereign power of a state, it means that that power may do as it wills in relation to the internal government of the state. If it were true in any other sense, then, among equals, one were subject to the government of another: a flat contradiction of terms would emerge. The power of a sovereign legislature to repeal its enactments, is deduced from this internal right of self-government. Yet this is construed as a warrant for a state to repeal its original ratification of the federal constitution, and to so attempt a dissolution of the union; as though that were a matter concerning no one but itself! As well might a man, by virtue of his right of internal self-government, attempt the dissolution of the state of which he is a member-do as he wills, and bid defiance to its laws. 14 Wheat. 404. In support of the so-called right of secession, great importance is attached to the argument, that it was only by its ordinance of ratification that any one state became a party to the federal constitution; that therefore it may, by a repealing ordinance of a convention of its people, rescind the ordinance of ratification, and dissolve its relations and connections with the union. As a maxim of universal law, it is everywhere admitted, that 'Nothing is so consonant to natural equity as that every compact should be dissolved by the same means that rendered it binding.' But is it strictly true, that it was only by its own ordinance that any state became a party to the constitution? It will be remembered, that the last article of the instrument contained a condition upon which it should become binding, viz., that it be ratified by nine states at least; so that, had it been ratified by eight only, their ratifications could have had no effect. Did the ratification of the ninth state, in and of itself, make it binding upon all? Certainly not; that ratification was of no higher authority than any of the others; it only fulfilled the condition upon which one and. all had agreed to be bound. When two or more have made a contract, it is certainly not for any one to say that he made it and may therefore annul it. The constitution was indeed a compact, to which it was necessary, by its terms, that nine should accede, and to which, in fact, the thirteen states assented. Now apply the maxim. The means that rendered the constitution binding, was the ASSENT OF ALL THE PARTIES. By the ASSENT OF ALL THE PARTIES, then, it may be dissolved. So long as it is considered a compact, so long we are clear of the argument for secession. For no one ever imagined that a compact or contract could be rightfully dissolved by one of the parties to it, without the assent of the others. Natural equity requires, that whatever affects or concerns all, should have the approbation of all. And this is a maxim of universal law, no less than the one first mentioned. In fine, independently of compact, no state or nation can rightfully determine, by any mere act of its 1 See Stevens's Constitutional View of the War, Vol. 1, pp. 19-20, et seq. 138. The right to resume the pow ers of govern ment. own, any one matter or thing, in relation to which, others But was not the right of the people of each state, to resume the powers of government, by some of the states expressly reserved in their ordinances of ratification? The first amendment of the federal constitution proposed by the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, was in these words: That it [the Constitution] explicitly declare, that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several states to be by them exercised.' South Carolina (in her ordinance) declared, 'that no section or paragraph of the said Constitution warrants a construction that the States do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them and vested in the General Government of the Union.' Virginia, 'that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury and oppression.' New York, 'that the powers of Government may be re-assumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective State Governments, to whom they may have granted the same: . . . . . Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments which have been proposed to the said Constitution will receive an early and mature consideration: We, the said Delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of the State of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the said Constitution.' North Carolina declared, that 'each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the Constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the general Government; nor shall the said Congress, nor any department of the said Government, exercise any act of authority over any individual in any of the said States, but such as can be justified under some power particularly given in the Constitution; but the said Constitution shall be considered at all times a solemn instrument defining the extent of their authority.' Rhode Island, 'that the powers of government may be resumed by the people, whensoever it shall be necessary to their happiness;' etc. etc., following in the very same language of New York.1 The foregoing declarations of Massachusetts, New Hamp- 139. shire, and North Carolina, were made by way of proposing amendments; those of South Carolina, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, by way of declaring the 'impres sions' under which they acted in ratifying the instrument. As responsive to those proposing amendments ought to be considered the first ten amendments to the instrument, the ninth and tenth of which are these:-The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.' 'The powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. To the states respectively, or to the people. The states' here intended, are the state governments. The people' intended, are 'the people' who ratified the constitution, the body of electors composing any one state, and speaking in their ordinance of ratification; that is to say, the people of each state: for the people of the United States, as one political body, had, as 1 See the several ordinances of ratification, ante, ?? 85-86. 140. we have seen, nothing whatever to do with establishing either the federal or the state constitutions, and never once, in fact, were known in our political history. Even the assent of the American people as one body, is as clearly unevidenced as the assent of the European people as one body, to the European governments. In connection with the declarations of the 'impressions' under which the states acted, in ratifying the constitution, should also be considered the declarations of sovereign rights by the states themselves in their several state constitutions;1 as well as the fact that the section of the federal constitution concerning the mode of amending that instrument, was a part of the original in view of which those 'impressions' were declared, and that therefore the declarations of the right to resume the powers delegated, could not have been made with reference to any action by way of amendment. But if any one of the states, or the people of any one state, can be said to have reserved a power, jurisdiction or right, the same must be said of every other: for, as in a union or state composed of free persons, so in a union of states, all are necessarily equal in right. Partisans tell us that the question is settled, and forever put at rest, by the results of the war for the suppression of the late rebellion. Would they have us believe that ours is a government of force, and not of common consent? What assurance have they that a government founded in force will not be soon overturned, and its founders and supporters brought to the bar of the people? Let us stand on safer ground. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution." Whether the right in question, the right to resume the delegated powers, was 6 1 See 'Declaration or Bill of Rights,' to the General Form of a State Constitution, under ? 75, ante. 2 Nor can congress incorporate into an act admitting a new state, conditions which would place the state in an unequal position with the other :states. 3 How. U. S. 212. 'John Jay, in No. 1 of The Federalist. |