rote of thanks, founded on the skill, bravery, and enterprize of the officers employed in a service where no such talents and qualities were wanted. It was incumbent on a British house of commons, particularly in times like the present, to assert its dignity, and to maintain the credit attached to its opinion of what constitutes a great national exploit. Neither did he conceive, from what he knew of the two Boble lords who were embarked in the expedition, that they would think the present worthy to be ranked among the achievements of their former life. There was nothing in the name of Copenhagen, (which signifies literally a harbour of merchants) calculated to call forth the energies of a soldier, the son of a soldier, and the father of a soldier, like lord Cathcart, whose former services were well known, and with justice highly appreciated. And the very circumstance of admiral Gambier's having advantageously distinguished himself as a captain in the glorious action of the first of June, was sufficient of itself to make him sel, comparatively, but a small value on his services on the present occasion.

Mr. Windham next drew the attention of the house to the conduct of ministers in moving such a reso lation, the effect of which was, not indeed to encrease the taxes on the people, but what was still a more serious evil, if the people could only be brought to understand it, to diminish the great fund of honour, the best incentive to honourable exertions, and what was worse still, not only to apply it injudiciously, but to destroy the value of the whole capital. Grauting that an Grauting that an improvident pension was had, be

cause it was squandering away the public money; still, though one pension was granted improperly, the next was not the worse on that account. But when honour was once depreciated, its value was altogether lost. It was not difficult however to perceive the object ministers had in view, in thus heaping rewards on those who had a part in the service. It was to give it a fictitious value, and an importance in the eyes of the public that did not belong to it. Mr. Windham concluded, with solemnly protesting against this misapplication of the sacred deposit committed to the house, of dealing out with fairness and impartiality expressions of the public gratitude to those who were employed in its service.

Mr. Brand, after adverting to the alledged weakness of Denmark to defend herself, had she been attacked by France, conceived that it would be altogether inconsistent to pass a vote of thanks for a service which derives its principal importance from the degree of resistance which those employed in it had to encounter.

The chancellor of the exchequer thought, that if Mr. W's. objections to giving thanks in certain cases were admitted, they would be very prejudicial to the service. Mr. W. had admitted, that it was highly meritorious, by a judicious retreat, to secure the safety of an army or a navy; but that the house had never contemplated such a service as a proper object of their thanks. The right honourable gentleman seemed to have forgotten the ease of admiral Cornwallis, who had received the thanks of parliament, not for a victory, but a retreat, "for the ability, judginent [C 4]

and

parting from its neutrality, its inability to resist the operation of external influence. With regard to the disposition of Denmark previeas to hostilities, the object of his resolutions would be, to put the house in possession of all reports made to the government of this country, relative to all attempts on the part of Denmark to encrease ber naval power, to supply her arsenals, to equip her navy, to man the fleet, for instance, which we subsequently seized on. It was a well known practice in the Danish marine, that every seaman was obliged, on entering into the Datish service, to inscribe his name in a book, to state also the name of the vessel in which he embarks, to particularize the destination, and to state on what service bound. Therefore, Denmark would find extreme difficulty in secretly increasing her naval force. Still more difficult, if not impossible, would it be for that power to raise a considerable fleet in a short time. For it was not there as in England, where there constantly abounds such an immense population of seamen, and where a mighty naval power could be suddenly called into action, not only by resorting to the great resources immediately in our power, but by the compulsive operation of an impressment, throwing at once into the hands of the executive government a power that might, on the instant, be wielded with effect. Mr. P. therefore contended, that if Denmark projected such designs against this country as had been alledged, she must have proceeded to the necessary preparatious, and that if she Lad entered on such preparations, she must have betrayed some demonalations of them, long before my

lord Gambier arrived in the Sound. The house was in possession of the evidence offered in proof of the hostile intentions of Denmark towards this country; that is no evidence whatever: precisely as much he believed, as ministers themselves had.

But what was the evidence on the other side? When vague rumour first excited the alarm of the Danish captains, they made a formal application to the Danish consul, wishing to ascertain whether the alarm excited by the report of an intended expedition was well or ill founded. The Danish consul applied in their behalf to the council of commerce, an institution which formed a part of the Danish government. What was the answer to the Danish consul? That there was not the slightest ground for apprehension. on the part of the Danish captains. And at this period of Denmark's unsuspecting confidence in us, there was no less a number than three hundred Danish ships in our harbours. Supposing Denmark willing, though unable to preserve her neutrality, no man, who had read the law of nations, or any cases at all, would pretend to justify an attack upon a neutral power merely because it was weak, unless upon the principle of self-preservation. But how was this to be made out? By proving the absolute determination of France to seize on the Danish feet, for the purpose of directing that force against us; and also by proving the incompetency of Denmark to defend herself against such an attempt on the part of France; by proving too, her indisposition to resist such an attempt, and particularly the certainty of her yielding to superior force; in all which cases we were without even the

shadow

shadow of a circumstantial proof. As to the means of France for compelling Denmark to take a part in the maritime confederation against this country, in what circumstances did those two powers appear to the world in relation to each other? A considerable part of the Danish force was encamped in Holstein, not very far from the same place where the French troops had assumed a menacing position. What were the most considerable territorial possessions of Denmark, on what is called the continent of Europe? Holstein, Jutland, Norway; but above all the Danish isles, in one of which was her capital. And was it likely that with such means, she would have suddenly compromised her independence as a nation? What would have been her auswer to any proposal on the part of France, compelling her to enter into hostility with this country?" You have no right to compel me; but if I must be compelled to depart from my system of neutrality, and to make a choice, I will prefer friendship with England, because she can secure to me what you can never take from me; whereas war with England would expose me to many dangers from which her friendship can protect me." But it might be objected, why did not Denmark accept our proffered treaty? Because we made no proposal that it was possible for an independent nation to accept.Mr. Ponsonby returning from this digression to the disposition of Denmark, asked what were the means of France to compel Denmark to act against England. He had heard a great deal about armies marching over the Baltic, and had made much inquiry on the subject. He

had read many books upon it; and he was warranted in saying, that an army had not passed over the Baltic upon the ice for the last hundred and fifty years. Cold was not now what it then was. The coldness of a climate was not always regulated by its latitude. There were a variety of local causes that might in a given time sensibly ameliorate the natural coldness of a country; such, for instance, as cutting down forests, draining morasses, exposing a country to open air, &c. &c. But even admitting the practicability of the French passing over the ice; were they to encounter no obstacle from the thirty-five thousand men, that were then encamped in Holstein, when those thirty-five thou sand men were brought to co-operate with the thirty thousand that lord Castlereagh had told them, the other night, were in the island of Zealand? Could the French, supposing them, against all probability, to have got into Zealand, have made the slightest stand against the united efforts of the armies of Sweden, Denmark, and England?

As to the conduct of Russia, subsequent to the treaty of Tilsit, and how far that conduct justified the suspicion of her joining the supposed marine confederacy against this country; when the news of the treaty of Tilsit first arrived, we heard of nothing but immediate hostilities on the part of Russia: and yet the Russian fleet was suffered to roam through the sea at its pleasure, while that of Denmark, in professed neutrality, was attacked and seized on. That the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit were not the primary cause of the Danish expedition, he inferred from a minute and accurate review of

the

the dispatches from lord Leveson Gower, the British minister at Petersburgh. The expedition was arowedly set on foot to defeat the three great projects attributed to the enemy, 1st. That of excluding Great Britain from all accustomed channels of communication with the continent; 2dly, of inducing or compelling the court of Denmark to shut the Sound against us; and, 3dly, of using the Danish marine in the invasion of these islands. Of these three projects we had effected the two first. We were excluded from the continent, and the Sound was shut. But was it imagined, that the mere capture of the ships rendered the Danes defenceless? Or, if the necessity did justify the expedition, why not make the most of it? Why not, when we had Zealand, keep it as conquerors, with our 30,000 troops, which had beat their 35,000? Would Buonaparte have stopped half way? If necessity justified the attack at all, the same necessity justified our making the most of it. If necessity compelled us to provoke a power, we should have gone on till we had rendered it incapable of injuring us. There was the utmost danger in doing ill by halves. But we had got a few ships-France had got Zealand, the best possible place she could have for nursing her marine, and maturing it to a formidable strength. And in what difficulty had this involved our faithful ally, the king of Sweden? Exposed to an attack on every side. By Denmark from Norway and her isles; by Russia from Finland; and by France from a variety of different positions. Mr. Ponsonby proceeded to arraign the monstrous doctrine, which had been resorted to in defence of the expedition, that

statesmen are absolved from those immutable and eternal laws of morality, which the providence that rules the universe prescribes alike to men and nations, and to shew the evils naturally arising to states, and that had in fact sprung out of a departure from those rules of justice, liberty, and patriotism. He e then concluded with moving his resolutions. The first motion was, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to cause to be laid before the house, the substance and dates of their information, sent by our ministers at Copenhagen, relative to the naval force of Denmark, and the measures taken to augment that force."

Mr. Canning, after many observations in the way of sarcasm or irony, the subject of which was the conduct of the late administration respecting foreign powers, compared with that of the present, came at last to the question before the house; which, he admitted, had been fairly stated by Mr. Ponsonby; the disposition of Denmark, and of Russia, and the means of France. He had admitted the designs of France, without any other evidence than that contained in his majesty's speech. As to Denmark, though he (Mr. C.) did not impute to that country a disposition to go to war with this, he protested against the advantage which was taken of this admission, when it was asserted, that we had the hearts of the Danes, and that we had forfeited them. From the moment of the armed neutrality in 1780, there had been a feeling towards this country on the part of Denmark; not of direct hostility, but certainly not of very cordial friendship. Was it not probable that a league of

much