appear to have done. The Body of Liberties, which was adopted in 1641, expressly declares that "There shall never be any Bond Slavery, Villinage, or Captivity amongst us, unless it be lawful Captives taken in just Wars, and such strangers as willingly sell themselves, or are sold to us,” — a provision of which the obvious intent was to exclude from slavery all persons born on the soil of Massachusetts. Whether any person ever sold himself into slavery under the second of the above provisions is not known; but there are some instances in which criminals were sold as a punishment, and a considerable number of captives taken in war were likewise reduced to bondage. But at no time was the number of slaves large. In 1680, half a century after the settlement of Boston, the number is stated by Governor Bradstreet to have been about one hundred or one hundred and twenty. In 1708 the number had increased, according to Governor Dudley's estimate, to four hundred and fifty. In 1745, when their number is supposed to have been the largest, Dr. Belknap thinks their proportion to the whites was as one to forty. From that time slavery in Massachusetts began to decline; and in 1763 the proportion had fallen to one in forty-five. At that time there were in Virginia five blacks to four whites. In 1780, slavery was virtually abolished by the adoption of the State Constitution; and after the final decision in the case of Quork Walker, in 1783, it ceased to exist, having fallen under a public sentiment which had existed from the first, but had grown so rapidly during the struggle with the mother country, that Burke, in his speech on "Conciliation with America," enumerated it among the causes of the quarrel. As Dr. Belknap remarked seventy-five years ago, "It appears that slavery did exist in a small proportion; that the laws discountenanced it, and the public sentiment was against it; but that the evil was not eradicated."

These are the chief points in the early history of Massachusetts about which there has been the most controversy; and in respect to each of them we may say, that the more the subject is investigated the less ground will be found for criticism on the Fathers. So long as the controversy deals only

with their legal rights under the charter, the position which they maintained cannot be successfully assailed. When it approaches their purposes in coming here, we have their own explicit declarations as to their objects and aims. When it touches the expediency and justice of their laws and the penalties which they inflicted for the various infringements of those laws, we must be careful not to carry the ideas and principles of the nineteenth century into the seventeenth; but judging them by the opinions prevalent in their own age, and by the light which they themselves enjoyed, there will be no need to apologize for their undeniable mistakes, and for their failure to realize the true idea of a Christian Commonwealth.

Prize Essays of The Loyal League of Philadelphia. Published in 1868.

THE Philadelphia Loyal League published, a few months ago, four prize essays upon "The Legal Organization of the People to select Candidates for Office," in other words, the legalization of caucuses, as a means of securing the nomination of better and more competent men as candidates. The essays received considerable attention and some commendation at the time; but they soon passed from the mind of the public, and, as a practical remedy for notorious abuses, may be pronounced a failure. It could hardly have been otherwise. If caucuses were made legal bodies, and invested with legal powers, it is obvious that they would have the same relation to the people that the elections have now, and would themselves be controlled by preliminary meetings of precisely the same irresponsible character with the present caucuses. The only result would be, that there would be one more medium through which to strain the popular will: whether it would be purified and made more energetic by this, may well be doubted.

The need of reform is apparent enough. The people, who wish to be well governed, seem powerless and inert in the midst of corruption and misgovernment. We welcomed, last winter, the incoming of a new administration, which was untrammelled by party traditions, and would be able, it was hoped, to govern the country for itself, not in the interest of politicians. In this, we have been partially disappointed. The administration has been itself uncorrupt and sagacious; it promises good work, honesty and economy. But in regard to appointments to office, it has been too much under the control of politicians, and has disgraced itself by more indiscriminate removals and more unfit appointments than even the average of administrations have been guilty of. With what face can Republicans criticise the corruptions of Democratic administrations, when their own President has sent a city politician of the lowest type, who stands publicly charged with every crime, from debauchery and murder down to petty swindling, distinguished by eminence neither as a civilian nor as a soldier, to represent us at the proud and ancient court of Spain? General Sickles can hardly have been selected for Madrid in the hope that his presence, as a representative of republicanism, would turn the wavering scale in favor of the institutions of his own country. We have, ourselves, no knowledge whatever of the truth of the charges against him. But, for the credit of the government, and in the interest of public morals, they should receive some better answer than his seasonable services to the Republican party.

The difficulty is to get the community thoroughly aroused to the need of reform. The natural indolence and indifference of most men, in regard to every thing which does not immediately touch their private interests, all play directly into the hands of the politicians. Most men are conservative in matters of form: there are theories, too, that have a strong hold on the popular mind, and are a great obstacle to reform. laisser faire doctrine is held in a vague way by many who do not give themselves the trouble to ask what it really means, and what are its necessary limitations. Things will settle themselves in the long-run, it is held, by the unrestrained workings

The

of natural laws. But what if natural laws have no room for free working? It is the easiest thing in the world thus to throw off responsibility: it is not so easy to define the responsibility, to distinguish between those natural laws which will have their way in spite of us and those which may be neutralized by our neglect or opposition. No doubt, gold will flow to the country where its purchasing-power is greatest; prices will fluctuate with supply and demand; wages will be determined by the proportion of labor and capital: these are things that no legislation can control. But hostile legislation might prevent the freedmen of the South from becoming land-owners; although no positive legislation is required to make them such, in a country where land is cheap and abundant and population sparse. So in politics: laws cannot make men honest and intelligent, it is true; but they can provide institutions which shall give an advantage to rogues, rather than free play to honesty and intelligence. This is what we have done.

This indolent theory sometimes finds expression in Pope's oft-quoted lines,

"For forms of government let fools contest;
That which is best administered is best."

As well say that it makes no difference what steam-engine the manufacturer purchases, or what ship the merchant sends his goods in, all depends on the skill of the engineer and captain. Most certainly the best ship and the best engine can do nothing unless well managed; but, as certainly, in the most skilful hands the worn-out boiler will explode, and the unseaworthy ship founder. Natural laws, and the habits and dispositions of the people, will do much; but, after all, the object a good government is not attained, unless the machinery is good by which the popular will is brought to bear upon affairs of state.

The machinery which we use now in this country, for the purpose of guiding the popular action and bringing it to bear upon the objects desired, and in the way desired, is the system of caucuses or primary meetings; further developed

into the larger institutions, of conventions, and standing committees of party-managers. And some machinery of essentially this nature we must have. It needs to be said with emphasis, that, in a democracy, the government is vested in the hands of persons with whom it is a matter of secondary interest. The first business of every man is to provide himself with the means of living: when this is done, he may look after the public welfare. In this fact lies the great obstacle to the successful working of democratic institutions. In our feverish modern civilization, the sense of strong personal interest in good government hardly exists. Our business-men — the very ones who ought to govern the country-feel, whether rightly or wrongly, that they cannot spare the time from their business, to attend to public affairs. All that they are willing to do is, once or twice in the year to designate those whom they wish to have attend to these matters for them. It is all very well to say that this ought not to be so; that they ought to be willing to sacrifice a portion of their profits to the public welfare. The fact is, that they will not do this. And, as a result of this state of feeling, we see that the citizens of towns which have reached such a size that the amount and the complication of business engross businessmen unduly, have devised a form of city government designed to meet just this state of feeling, by relieving citizens of all duties except voting. Perhaps it would have been possible to secure this relief without surrendering the active participation in public affairs so completely. The main fact remains, that the inhabitants of small places have the leisure to govern themselves, while the inhabitants of large places have not; or think they have not, which amounts in practice to the same thing.

The same policy is followed in regard to the entire administration of State and national affairs, which are exclusively intrusted by our people, through periodical elections, to persons who, for the time being, make it their business to manage them. In these concerns we all admit that the citizen can do nothing but vote for names, except indeed in those rare cases in which an important statute is submitted to the