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ingly glad to see Slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to abolish it. Yet, as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present views, be in favor of andeavoring to abolish Slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon these conditions: First, that the abolition should be gradual. Second, that it should be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the District; and Third, that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish Slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our Capital that foul blot upon our nation."

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here, that as to the question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had sufficient time, to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject; but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade among the different States, I should still not be in favor of the exercise of that power unless upon some conservative principle as I conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia.

My answer as to whether 1 desire that Slavery should be prohibited in all the Territories of the United States, is full and explicit within itself, and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any more territory unless Slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself better understood, than the answer which I have placed in writing.

believe, that those resolutions were never passed in any Convention held in Springfield. It turns out that they were never passed at any Convention or any public meeting that I had any part in. I believe it turns out in addition to all this, that there was not, in the fall of 1854, any Convention holding a session at Springfield calling itself a Republican State Convention; yet it is true there was a Convention, or assemblage of men calling themseives a Convention, at Springfield, that did pass some resolutions. But so little did I really know of the proceedings of that Convention, or what set of resolutions they had passed, though having a general knowledge that there had been such an assemblage of men there, that when Judge Douglas read the resolutions, I really did not know but they had been the resolutions passed then and there. I did not question that they were the resolutions adopted. For I could not bring myself to suppose that Judge Douglas could say what he did upon this subject without knowing that it was true. I contented myself, on that occasion, with denying, as I truly could, all connection with them, not denying or affirming whether they were passed at Springfield. Now it turns out that he had got hold of some resolutions passed at some Convention or public meeting in Kane County. I wish to say here, that I don't conceive that in any fair and just mind this discovery relieves me at all. I had just as much to do with the Convention in Kane County as that at Springfield. I am just as much responsible for the resolutions at Kane County as those at Springfield, the amount of the responsibility being exactly nothing in either case: no more than there would be in regard to a set of resolutions passed in the moon.

I allude to this extraordinary matter in this canvass for some further purpose than anything yet advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his statement upon that occasion as matters that he believed to be true, but he stated them roundly as being true, in such form as to pledge his veracity for their truth. When the whole matter turns out as it does, and when we consider who Judge Douglas is-that he is a distinguished Senator of the United States-that he has served nearly twelve years as such-that his character is not at all limited as an ordinary Senator of the United States, but that his Now in all this, the Judge has me, and he has me on name has become of world-wide renown-it is most exthe record. I suppose he had flattered himself that I was traordinary that he should so far forget all the suggesreally entertaining one set of opinions for one place and tions of justice to an adversary, or of prudence to himanother set for another place-that I was afraid to say self, as to venture upon the assertion of that which the at one place what I uttered at another. What I am say-slightest investigation would have shown him to be wholly ing aere I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly false. I can only account for his having done so upon tending to Abolitionism as any audience in the State of the supposition that that evil genius which has attended Illinois, and I believe I am saying that which, if it would him through his life, giving to him an apparent astonishbe offensive to any persons and render them enemies to ing prosperity, such as to lead very many good men to myself, would be offensive to persons in this audience. doubt there being any advantage in virtue over vice-I say I can only account for it on the supposition that that evil genius has at last made up its mind to forsake him.

I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories, so far as I have framed them. I will bring forward a new installment when I get them ready. I will bring them forward now, only reaching to number four. The first one is :

Question 1. If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State Constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite number of inhabitants according to the English bill-some ninety-three thousand-will you vote to

admit them?

Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude Slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?

Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot exclude Slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting and following such decision as a rule of political action?

Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the Slavery question?

As introductory to these interrogatories which Judge Douglas propounded to me at Ottawa, he read a set of resolutions which he said Judge Trumbull and myself had participated in adopting, in the first Republican State Convention, held at Springfield, in October, 1854. He insisted that I and Judge Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican party, were responsible for the doctrines contained in the set of resolutions which he read, and I understand that it was from that set of resolutions that he deduced the interrogatories which he propounded to me, using these resolutions as a sort of authority for propounding those questions to me. Now I say here today that I do not answer his interrogatories because of their springing at all from that set of resolutions which he read. I answered them because Judge Douglas thought at to ask them. I do not now, nor never did, recognize any responsibility upon myself in that set of resolutions. When I replied to him on that occasion, I assured him that I never had anything to do with them. I repeat here to-day, that I never, in any possible form, had any king to do with that set of resolutions. It turns out, I

And I may add that another extraordinary feature of the Judge's conduct in this canvass-made more extraordinary by this incident-is, that he is in the habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charging falsehood upon his adversaries, myself and others. I now ask whether he is able to find in anything that Judge Trumbull, for instance, has said, or in anything that I have said, a justification at all compared with what we have, in

this instance, for that sort of vulgarity.

MR. DOUGLAS' REPLY.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I am glad that at last I have brought Mr. Lincoln to the conclusion that he had better define his position on certain political questions to which I called his attention at Ottawa. He there showed no disposition, no inclination, to answer them. I did not present idle questions for him to answer merely for my gratification. I laid the foundation for those interrogatories by showing that they constituted the platform of the party whose nominee he is for the Senate. I did not presume that I had the right to catechise him as I saw proper, unless I showed that his party, or a majority of it, stood upon the platform and were in favor of the propositions upon which my questions were based. I desired simply to know, inasmuch as he had been nominated as the first, last, and only choice of his party, whether he concurred in the platform which that party had adopted for its government. In a few moments I will proceed to review the answers which he has given to these interrogatories; but in order to relieve his anxiety I will irst respond to these which he has presented to me. Mark you, he has not presented interrogatories which have ever received the sanotion of the party with which I am acting, and hence he has no other foundation for them than his own curiosity.

First, he desires to know if the people of Kansas shall form a Constitution by means entirely proper and unob

posed that he would be ashamed to press that question further. He is a lawyer, and has been a member of Con gress, and has occupied his time and amused you by tell ing you about parliamentary proceeding. He ought to have known better than to try to palm off his miserable impositions upon this intelligent audience. The Nebraska bill provided that the legislative power and authority of the said Territory should extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the organic act and the Constitution of the United States. It did not make any exception as to Slavery, but gave all the power that it was possible for Congress to give, without violating the Constitution, to the Territorial Legislature, with no exception or limitation on the subject of Slavery at all. The language of that bill which I have quoted, gave the full power and the full authority over the subject of Slavery, affirmatively and negatively, to introduce it or exclude it, so far as the Constitution of the United States would permit. What more could Mr. Chase give by his amendment? Nothing. He offered his amendment for the identical purpose for which Mr. Lincoln is using it, to enable demagogues in the country to try and deceive the people.

fectionable and ask admission into the Union as a State, before they have the requisite population for a member of Congress, whether I will vote for that admission. Well now, I regret exceedingly that he did not answer that interrogatory himself before he put it to me, in order that we might understand, and not be left to infer on which side he is. Mr. Trumbull, during the last session of Congress, voted from the beginning to the end against the admission of Oregon, although a free State, because she had not the requisite population for a member of Congress. Mr. Trumbull would not consent, under any circumstances, to let a State, free or slave, come into the Union until it had the requisite population. As Mr. Trumbull is in the field, fighting for Mr. Lincoln, I would like to have Mr. Lincoln answer his own question and tell me whether he is fighting Trumbull on that issue or not But I will answer his question. In reference to Kansas, it is my opinion, that as she has population enough to constitute a slave State, she has people enough for a Free State. I will not make Kansas an exceptionable case to the other States of the Union. I hold it to be a sound rule of universal application to require a Territory to contain the requisite population for a member of Con- His amendment was to this effect. It provided that the gress, before it is admitted as a State into the Union. I Legislature should have the power to exclude Slavery: made that proposition in the Senate in 1856, and I renew-and General Cass suggested, "why not give the power to ed it during the last session, in a bill providing that no introduce as well as exclude?" The answer was, they have Territory of the United States should form a Constitution the power already in the bill to do both. Chase was afraid and apply for admission until it had the requisite popu- his amendment would be adopted if he put the alternative lation. On another occasion I proposed that neither proposition and so make it fair both ways, but would not Kansas, or any other Territory, should be admitted until yield. He offered it for the purpose of having it rejected. it had the requisite population. Congress did not adopt He offered it, as he has himself avowed over and over any of my propositions containing this general rule, but again, simply to make capital out of it for the stump. He did make an exception of Kansas. I will stand by that expected that it would be capital for small politicans in the exception. Either Kansas must come in as a Free State, country, and that they would make an effort to deceive the with whatever population she may have, or the rule must people with it; and he was not mistaken, for Lincoln is be applied to all the other territories alike. I therefore carrying out the plan admirably. Lincoln knows that the answer at once, that it having been decided that Kansas Nebraska bill, without Chase's amendment, gave all the has people enough for a Slave State, I hold that she has power which the Constitution would permit. Could Conenough for a Free State. I hope Mr. Lincoln is satisfied gress confer any more? Could Congress go beyond the with my answer; and now I would like to get his answer Constitution of the country? We gave all a full grant to his own interrogatory-whether or not he will vote to with no exception in regard to Slavery one way or the admit Kansas before she has the requisite population. other. We left that question, as we left all others, to be deI want to know whether he will vote to admit Oregon cided by the people for themselves, just as they pleased. before that Territory has the requisite population. Mr. I will not occupy my time on this question. I have argued Trumbull will not, and the same reason that commits Mr. it before all over Illinois. I have argued it in this beauti Trumbull against the admission of Oregon, commits him ful city of Freeport; I have argued it in-the North, the against Kansas, even if she should apply for admission South, the East, and the West, avowing the same sentias a Free State. If there is any sincerity, any truth, in ments and the same principles. I have not been afraid to the argument of Mr. Trumbull in the Senate, against the avow my sentiments up here for fear I would be trotted admission of Oregon because she had not 93,420 people, down into Egypt. although her population was larger than that ef Kansas, he stands pledged against the admission of both Oregon and Kansas until they have 93,420 inhabitants. I would like Mr. Lincoln to answer this question. I would like him to take his own medicine. If he differs with Mr. Trumbull let him answer his argument against the admis-school-boy does know better.) Mr. Lincoln's object is to sion of Oregon, instead of poking questions at me.

The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, can the people of the Territory in any lawful way, against the wishes of any citizen of the United States, exclude Slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude Slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State constitution. Mr. Lincoln knew that I had answered that question over and over again. He heard me argue the Nebraska bili on that principle all over the State in 1854, in 1855, and in 1856; and he has no excuse for pretending to be in doubt as to my position on hat question. It matters not what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether Slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution; the people have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude it as they please, for the reason that Slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local poilce regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local legislature; and if the people are opposed to Slavery they will elect representatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point.

In this connection, I will notice the charge which he has introduced in relation to Mr. Chase's amendment. I thought that I had chased that amendment out of Mr. Lincoln's brain at Ottawa; but it seems that still haunts his imagination, and he is not yet satisfied. I had sup

The third question which Mr. Lincoln presented is, if the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that a State of this Union cannot exclude Slavery from its own limits, will I submit to it? I am amazed that Lincoln should ask such a question. ("A school-boy knows better.") Yes, a

cast an imputation upon the Supreme Court. He knows that there never was but one man in America, claiming any degree of intelligence or decency, who ever for a moment pretended such a thing. It is true that the Washington Union, in an article published on the 17th of last December, did put forth that doctrine, and I denounced the article on the floor of the Senate, in a speech which Mr. Lincoln now pretends was against the President. The Union had claimed that Slavery had a right to go into the free States, and that any provision in the Constitution or laws of the Free States to the contrary were null and void. I denounced it in the Senate, as I said before, and I was the first man who did. Lincoln's friends, Trumbull, and Seward, and Hale, and Wilson, and the whole Black Republican side of the Senate, were silent. They left it to me to denounce it. And what was the reply made to me on that occasion? Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, got up and undertook to lecture me on the ground that I ought not to have deemed the article worthy of notice, and ought not to have replied to it; that there was not one man, woman, or child south of the Potomac, in any Slave State, who did not repudiate any such pretension. Mr. Lincoln knows that that reply was made on the spot, and yet now he asks this question. He might as well ask me, Suppose Mr. Lincoln should steal a horse, would I sanction it; and it would be as genteel in me to ask him, in the event he stole a horse, what ought to be done with him. He casts an imputation upon the Supreme Court of the United States, by supposing that they would violate the Constitution of the United States. I tell him that such a thing is not possible. It would be an act of moral treason that no man on on the bench could ever descend to. Mr. Lincoln himself, would never, in his partisan feelings, so far forget what was right as to be guilty of such an act.

The fourth question of Mr. Lincoln is, are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard as to how such acquisition may affect the Union on the slavery

question! This question is very ingeniously and cunningly put.

must burst and be rent asunder, or the child must die. So it would te with this great nation With our natural The Black Republican creed lays it down expressly, increase, growing with a rapidity unknown in any other that under no circumstances shall we acquire any more part of the globe, with the tide of emigration that is fleeterritory unless Slavery is first prohibited in the country. ing from despotism in the old world to seek refuge in I ask Mr. Lincoln whether Le is in favor of that proposi- our own, there is a constant torrent pouring into this tion. Are you (addressing Mr. Lincoln) opposed to the country that requires more land, more territory upon acquisition of any more territory, under any ci cum- which to settle, and just as fast as our interests and our stances, unless Slavery is prohibited in it? That he does destiny require additional territory n the North, in the not like to answer. When I ask him whether he stands South, or on the Islands of the ocean, I am for it, and up to that article in the platform of his party, he turns, when we acquire it, will leave the people, according to Yankee-fashion, and without answering it, asks me the Neb aska bill, free to do as they please on the subwhether I am in favor of acquiring territory without re-ject of Slavery and every other question. ga d to how it may affect the Union on the Slavery question. I answer that whenever it becomes necessary, in our growth and progress, to acquire more teritory, that I am in favor of it, without reference to the question of Slave y, and when we have acquired it, I will leave the people free to do as they please, either to make it slave or free territory, as they prefer. It is idle to tell me or you that we have territory enough Our fathers supposed that we had enough when our ter.itory extended to the Mississippi River, but a few years' growth and expansion satisfied them that we needed more, and the Louisiana territory, from the west branch of the Mississippi to the British possessions, was acquired. Then we acquired Oregon, then California and New Mexico. We have enough now for the present, but this is a young and a growing nation It swarms as often as a hive of bees, and as new swarms are tu ned out each year, there must be hives in which they can gather and make their honey. In less than fifteen years, if the same progress that has distinguished this country for the last fifteen years continues, every foot of vacant land between this and the Pacific Ocean, owned by the United States, will be occupied. Will you not continue to increase at the end of fifteen years as well as now? I tell you, increase, and multiply, and expand, is the law of this nation's existence. You cannot limit this g eat Republic by mere boundary lines, saying, "thus far shalt thou go, and no further." Any one of you gentlemen might as well say to a son twelve years old that he is big enough, and must not grow any larger, and in order to prevent his growth put a hoop around him to keep him to his preBent size. What would be the result? Either the hoop

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I trust now that Mr. Lincoln will deem himself answered on his four points. He racked his brain so much in devising these four questions that he exhausted himself, and had not strength enough to invent the others As soon as he is able to hold a council with his advise:s, Lovejoy, Fa nsworth, and Fred Douglass, he will fame and propound others. ("Good, good.") You Black Republicans who say good, I have no doubt think that they are all good men. I have reason to recollect that some people in this country think that Fred Douglass is a very good man. The last time I came here to make a speech, while talking from the stand to you, people of Freeport, as I am doing to-day, I saw a carriage, and a magnificent one it was, drive up and take a position on the outside of the crowd; a beautiful young lady was sitting on the box-seat, whil-t Fred Douglass and her mother recl ned inside, and the owner of the carriage acted as driver. I saw this in your own town ("What of it?") All I have to say of it is this, that if you, Black Republicans, think that the negro ought to be on a social equality with your wives and daughters, and ride in a carriage with your wife, whilst you drive the team, you have perfect light to do so. I am told that one of Fred Douglass's kinsmen, another rich black negro, is now traveling in this part of the State making speeches for his friend Lincoln as the champion of black men. ("What have you to say against it?") All I have to say on that subject is, that those of you who believe that the negro is your equal and ought to be on an equality with you socially, politically, and legally, have a right to en tertain those opinions, and of course will vote for Mr Lincoln.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE TERRITORIES.

BY

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS.

From Harper's Magazine, 1859.

free labor and slave labor, Free States and Slave States, which is irreconcilable, and must continue to rage with increasing fury until the one shall become universal by the annihilation of the other. In the language of the most eminent and authoritative expounder of their political faith,

"It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces; and it means that the United States nust and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slave holding nation or entirely a free-labor nation. Either the cotton and rice will ultimately be tilled by free labor, and Charleston and fields of South Carolina, and the sugar plantations of Louisiana New-Orleans become marts for legitimate merchandise alone, or else the rye fields and wheat fields of Massachusetts and y-New-York must again be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves, and Boston and New-York become once more markets for trade in the bodies and souls of men."

UNDER Our complex system of government it is the first duty of American statesmen to mark distinctly the dividing line between Federal and Local Authority. To do this with accuracy involves an inquiry, not only into the powers and duties of the Federal Government under the Constitution, but also into the rights, privileges, and immunities of the people of the Territories, as well as of the States composing the Union. The relative powers and functions of the Federal and State governments have become well understood and clearly defined by their practical operation and harmonious action for a long series of years; while the disputed question-involving the right of the people of the Territories to govern them. selves in respect to their local affairs and internal poli remains a fruitful source of partisan strife and sectional controversy. The political organization which was formed in 1854, and has assumed the name of the Republican Party, is based on the theory that Af can Slavery, as it exists in this country, is an evil of such magnitude social, moral, and political-as to justify and require the exertion of the entire power and influence of the Federal Government to the full extent that the Constitution, according to their interpretation, will permit for its ultimate extinction. In the platform of principles adopted at Philadelphia by the Republican National Convention in 1856, it is affirmed:

"That the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign power over the Territories of the United States for their government, and that in the exercise of this power it is both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and Slavery."

According to the theory of the Republican party there is an irrepressibie conflict between Freedom and Slavery,

In the Illinois canvass of 1858 the same proposition was advocated and defended by the distinguished Republican standard-bearer in these words:

"In my opinion it (the Slavery agitation) will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A House divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the House to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of Slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinc ion, or its advocates will push forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States oli as well as new, North as well as South."

Thus it will be seen, that under the auspices of a political party, which claims sovereignty in Congress over the subject of Slavery there can be no peace on the

Slavery question-no truce in the sectional strife-no fraternity between the North and South, so long as this Union remains as our fathers made it-divided into free and slave States, with the right on the part of each to retain Slavery so long as it chooses, and to abolish it whenever it pleases.

the creator; and that Congress, not possessing the power to legislate in respect to African Slavery in the Territories, cannot delegate to a Territorial Legislature any power which it does not itself possess."

This proposition is as plausible as it is fallacious. But the reverse of it is true as a general rule. Congress canOn the other hand, it would be uncandid to deny that, not delegate to a Territorial Legislature, or to any other while the Democratic party is a unit in its irreconcilable body of men whatsoever, any power which the Constituopposition to the doctrines and principles of the Repub- tion has vested in Congress. In other words: Every lican party, there are radical differences of opinion in power conferred on Congress by the Constitution respect to the powe s and duties of Congress, and the must be exercised by Congress in the mode prescribed rights and immunities of the people of the Territories in the Constitution. under the Federal Constitution, which seriously disturb Let us test the correctness of this proposition by refer its harmony and threaten its integrity. These differen-ence to the powers of Congress as defined in the Constituces of opinion arise from the different interpretations placed on the Constitution by persons who belong to one of the following classes:

First.-Those who believe that the Constitution of the United States neither establishes nor prohibits Slavery in the States or Territories beyond the power of the people legally to control it, but leaves the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

Second.-Those who believe that the Constitution establishes Slavery in the Territories, and withholds from Congress and the Territorial Legislature the power to control it; and who insist that, in the event the Territorial Legislature fails to enact the requisite laws for its protection, it becomes the imperative duty of Congress to interpose its authority and furnish such protection. Third.-Those who, while professing to believe that the Constitution establishes Slavery in the Territories beyond the power of Congress or the Territorial Legislature to control it, at the same time protest against the duty of Congress to interfere for its protection; but insist that it is the duty of the Judiciary to protect and maintain slavery in the Territories without any law upon the subject.

By a careful examination of the second and third propositions, it will be seen that the advocates of each agree on the theoretical question, that the Constitution establishes Slavery in the Territories, and compels them to have it whether they want it or not; and differ on the practical point, whether a right secured by the Constitution shall be protected by an act of Congress when all ober remedies fail. The reason assigned for not protecting by law a right secured by the Constitution is, that it is the duty of the Courts to protect Slavery in the Territories without any legislation upon the subject. How the Courts are to afford protection to slaves or any other property, where there is no law providing remedies and imposing penalties and conferring jurisdiction upon the courts to hear and determine the cases as they arise, remains to be explained

The acts of Congress, establishing the several Territories of the United States, provide that: "The jurisdiction of the several Courts herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the Probate Courts and Justices of the Peace shall be limited by law"-meaning such laws as the Territorial Legislatures shall from time to time enact. It will be seen that the judicial tribunals of the Territories have just such jurisdiction, and only such, in respect to the rights of persons and property pertaining to the citizens of the Territory as the Territorial Legislature shall see fit to confer; and consequently, that the Courts can afford protection to persons and property no further than the Legislature shall, by law, confer the jurisdiction, and prescribe the remedies, penalties, and modes of proceeding.

It is difficult to conceive how any person who believes that the Constitution confers the right of protection in the enjoyment of slave property in the Territories, regardless of the wishes of the people and of the action of the Territorial Legislature, can satisfy his conscience and his oath of fidelity to the Constitution in withholding such Congressional legislation as may be essential to the enjoyment of such right under the Constitution. Under this view of the subject it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, if the Constitution does establish Slavery in the Territories, beyond the power of the people to control it by law, it is the imperative duty of Congress to supply all the legislation necessary to its protection; and if this proposition is not true, it necessarily results that the Constitution neither establishes nor prohibits Slavery anywhere, but leaves the people of each State and Territory entirely free to form and regulate their domestic affairs to suit themselves, without the intervention of Congress or any other power whatsoever.

But it is urged with great plausibility by those who have entire faith in the soundness of the proposition, that "a Territory is the mere creature of Congress; that the creature cannot be clothed with any powers not possessed by

tion:

"The Congress shall have power

"To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," etc.;

"To borrow money on the credit of the United States ;"
"To regulate commerce and foreign nations," etc.;
"To establish a uniform rule of naturalization," etc.;
"To coin money, and regulate the value thereof;"
"To establish post-offices and post-roads ;"

"To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court ;" "To declare war," etc.;

"To provide and maintain a navy."

This list might be extended so as to embrace all the power conferred on Congress by the Constitution; but enough has been cited to test the principle. Will it be contended that Congress can delegate any one of these powers to a Territorial Legislature, or to any tribunal whatever? Can Congress delegate to Kansas the power to "regulate commerce,' or to Nebraska the power "to establish uniform rules of naturalization," or to Illinois the power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof," or to Virginia the power "to establish post-offices and post-roads?"

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The mere statement of the question carries with it the emphatic answer, that Congress cannot delegate any power which it does not possess; but that every power conferred on Congress by the Constitution must be exercised by Congress in the manner prescribed in that instrument.

On the other hand, there are cases in which Congress may establish tribunals and local governments, and invest them with powers which Congress does not possess, and cannot exercise under the Constitution. For instance, Congress may establish courts inferior to the Supren.c Court, and confer upon them the power to hear and dictermine cases, and render judgments affecting the life, liberty, and property of the citizen, without itself having the power to hear and determine such causes, render judgments, or revise or annul the same. In like manner Congress may institute governments for the Territories, composed of an executive, judicial, and legislative department; and may confer upon the Governor all the executive powers and functions of the Territory, without having the right to exercise any one of those powers or functions itself.

Congress may confer upon the judicial department all the judicial powers and functions of the Territory, without having the right to hear and determine a cause, or render a judgment, or to revise or annul any decision made by the courts so established by Congress. Congress may also confer upon the legislative department of the Territory certain legislative powers which it can not itself exercise, and only such as Congress cannot exercise under the Constitution. The powers which Congress may thus confer, but cannot exercise, are such as relate to the domestic affairs and internal polity of the Territory, and do not affect the general welfare of the Republic.

This dividing line between Federal and Local authority was familiar to the framers of the Constitution. It is clearly defined and distinctly marked on every page of history which records the great events of that immortal struggle between the American Colonies and the British Government, which resulted in the establishment of our national independence. In the beginning of that struggle the Colonies neither contemplated nor desired independence. In all their addresses to the Crown, and to the Parliament, and to the people of Great Britain, as well as to the people of America, they averred that as loyal British subjects they deplored the causes which impelled their separation from the parent country. They were strongly and affectionately attached to the Constitution, civil and political institutions and jurisprudence of Great Britain, which they proudly claimed as the birthright of all Englishmen; and desired to transmit them unimpaired as a precious legacy to their posterity. For a long series of years they remonstrated against the violation of their inalienable rights of self-government under the British Constitution, and humbly petitioned for the redress of their griev.

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tion to the Constitution of Great Britain; and their only
complaint was that they were not permitted to enjoy the
rights and privileges of self-government, in the manage-
ment of their internal affairs and domestic concerns, in ac-
cordance with the guaranties of that Constitution and of the
colonial charters granted by the Crown in pursuance of it.
They conceded the right of the Imperial Government to
make all laws and perform all acts concerning the Colo-
aies, which were in their nature Imperial and not Colo-
nial which affected the general welfare of the Empire,
and did not interfere with the "internal polity" of the
Colonies. They recognized the right of the Imperial Go-
vernment to declare war and make peace; to coin money
and determine its value; to make treaties and conduct in-
tercourse with foreign nations; to regulate commerce be-
tween the several colonies, and between each colony and
the parent country, and with foreign countries; and in
general they recognized the right of the Imperial Govern-
ment of Great Britain to exercise all the powers and au-
thority which, under our Federal Constitution, are
gated by the people of the several States to the Govern-
ment of the United States.

always considered this as one of the questions affecting her "internal polity," over which she, in common with the other colonies, claimed "the right of exclusive legislation in their provincial legislatures" within their respective limits. Some of these acts, particularly those which were enacted prior to the year 1699, were evidently intended to foster and encourage, as well as to regulate and control, African Slavery, as one of the domestic institutions of the colony. The act of 1699, and most of the enactments subsequent to that date, were as obviously designed to restrain and check the growth of the institution, with the view of confining it within the limit of the actual neces sities of the community, or its ultimate extinction, as might be deemed most conducive to the public interests, by a system of unfriendly legislation, such as imposing a tax on all slaves introduced into the colony, which was increased and renewed from time to time, as occasion required, until the period of the Revolution. Many of these acts never took effect, in consequence of the king withdele-holding his assent, even after the governor had approved the enactment, in cases where it contained a clause suspending its operation until his majesty's pleasure should be made known in the premises.

In 1772, the provincial legislature of Virginia, after inposing another tax of five per cent. on all slaves imported into the colony, petitioned the king to remove all those restraints which inhibited his majesty's governors assenting to such laws as might check so very pernicious a coinmerce as Slavery. Of this petition Judge Tucker says:

Recognizing and conceding to the Imperial Government all these powers, including the right to institute governments for the colonies, by granting charters under which the inhabitants residing within the limits of any specified territory might be organized into a political community, with a government consisting of its appropriate departments, executive, legislative, and judicial; conceding all these powers, the Colonies emphatically denied that the Imperial Government had any rightful authority to impose taxes upon them without their consent, or to interfere with their internal polity; claiming that it was the birth-ject of Slavery at that period: right of all Englishmen-inalienable when formed into a political community-to exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, and immunities of self-government in respect to all matters and things which were local and not general -internal and not external-colonial and not imperialas fully as if they were inhabitants of England, with a fair representation in Parliament.

Thus it appears that our fathers of the Revolution were ontending, not for independence in the first instance, but for the inestimable right of local self-government under the British Constitution; the right of every distinct political tommunity-dependent colonies, territories, provinces, as well as sovereign States-to make their own local laws, form their own domestic institutions, and manage their own internal affairs in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of Great Britain as the paramount law of the empire.

The government of Great Britain had violated this inalienable right of local self-government by a long series of acts on a great variety of subjects. The first serious point of controversy arose on the Slavery question as early as 1699, which continued a fruitful source of irritation until the Revolution, and formed one of the causes for the separation of the Colonies from the British crown.

"The following extract from a petition to the Throne, presented from the House of Burgesses of Virginia, April 1st, 1772, will show the sense of the people of Virginia on the sub"The importation of slaves into the colony from the coast of Africa hath long been considered as a trade of great inhumuch reason to fear will endanger the very existence of your manity; and under its present encouragement we have too Majesty's American dominions.""

Mark the ominous words! Virginia tells the king of England in 1772, four years prior to the Declaration of Independence, that his Majesty's American dominions are in danger: not because of the Stamp duties-not because of the tax on tea-not because of his attempts to collect revenue in America! These have since been deemed sufficient to justify rebellion and revolution. But none of these are referred to by Virginia in her address to the Throne-there being another wrong which in magnitude and enormity, so far exceeded these and all other causes of complaint, that the very existence of his Majesty's American dominions depended upon it! That wrong consisted in forcing African Slavery upon a dependent colony without her consent, and in opposition to the wishes of her own people!

The people of Virginia not being convinced by this process of reasoning, still adhered to the doctrine which they held in common with their sister colonies, that it was the birthright of all freemen-inalienable when formed into political communities-to exercise exclusive legislation in respect to all matters pertaining to their internal polity-Slavery not excepted; and rather than surrender this great right, they were prepared to withdraw their allegiance from the crown.

Again referring to this petition to the king, the same learned judge adds:

The people of Virginia at that day did not appreciate the force of the argument used by the British merchants, who were engaged in the African slave-trade, and which was afterward indorsed, at least by implication, by the For more than forty years the provincial legislature of king and his ministers; that the Colonies were the common property of the empire-acquired by the common Virginia had passed laws for the protection and encourage-blood and treasure-and therefore all British subjects had ment of African Slavery within her limits. This policy the right to carry their slaves into the colonies, and hold was steadily pursued until the white inhabitants of Virgi- them in defiance of the local law aud in contempt of the nia became alarmed for their own safety, in view of the wishes and safety of the Colonies. numerous and formidable tribes of Indian savages which surrounded and threatened the feeble white settlements, while ship-loads of African savages were being daily landed in their midst. In order to check and restrain a policy which seemed to threaten the very existence of the colony, the provincial legislature enacted a law imposing a tax upon every slave who should be brought into Virginia. The British merchants, who were engaged in the African slave-trade, regarding this legislation as injurious to their interests and in violation of their rights, petitioned the King of England and his majesty's ministers to annul the obnoxious law, and protect them in their right to carry their slaves into Virginia and all other British colonies which were the common property of the empire-acquired by the common blood and common treasure-and from which a few adventurers, who had settled on the imperial domain by his majesty's sufferance, had no right to exclude them, or discriminate against their property by a This clause in the Constitution of Virginia, referring to mere provincial enactment. Upon a full consideration of the inhuman use of the royal negative, in refusing the the subject, the king graciously granted the prayer of the Colony of Virginia permission to exclude Slavery from her petitioners; and accordingly issued peremptory orders to limits by law, as one of the reasons for separating from the royal governor of Virginia, and to the governors of all Great Britain, was adopted on the 12th day of June, the other British colonies in America, forbidding them to 1776, three weeks and one day previous to the Declarasign or approve any colonial or provincial enactment inju- tion of Independence by the Continental Congress; and rious to the African slave-trade, unless such enactment after remaining in force as a part of the Constitution should contain a clause suspending its operation until his for a period of fifty-four years, was re-adopted, without majesty's pleasure should be made known in the premises. alteration, by the Convention which framed the new Judge Tucker, in his Appendix to Blackstone, refers to Constitution in 1830, and then ratified by the people as a thirty-one acts of the provincial legislature of Virginia, part of the new Constitution; and was again re-adopted passed at various periods from 1662 to 1772, upon the sub- by the Convention which amended the Constitution in ject of African Slavery, showing conclusively that Virginia | 1850, and again ratified by the people as a part of the

clause of our (Virginia) Constitution, where, among other "This petition produced no effect, as appears from the first acts of misrule, the inhuman use of the royal negative in refusing us (the people of Virginia) permission to exclude Slavery from us by law, is enumerated among the reasons or separating from Great Britain."

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