Odober, M. Z. a French Gentleman of respectable character, informed Mr. Gerry, that M. Talleyrand, Minister of foreign relations, who professed to be well disposed towards the United States, had expected to have seen the American. Ministers frequently in their private capacities; and to have conferred with them individually, on the objects of their mission; and had authorized M. Z. to make this communi cation to Mr. Gerry. The latter sent for his colleagues; and a conference was held with M. Z. on the subject; in which General Pinckney and General Marshall expressed their opinions, that not being acquainted with M. Talleyrand, they could not, with propriety, call on him; but that, according to the custom of France, he might expect this of Mr. Gerry, from a previous acquaintance in America. This, Mr. Gerry reluctantly complied with on the 23d, and with M. Z. called on M. Talleyrand, who, not being then at his office, appointed the 28th for the interview. After the first introduction, M. Talleyrand began the conference. He said, that the Directory had passed an arrêté, which he offered for perusal, in which they had demanded of the envoys, an explanation of some parts, and a reparation for others, of the President's speech to Congress, of the 16th of May last: he was sensible, he said, that difficulties would exist on the part of the envoys, relative to this demand; but that by their offering money, he thought he could prevent the effect of the arrété. M. Z. at the request of Mr. Gerry, having stated that the envoys have no such powers, M. Talleyrand replied, they can in such case take a power on themselves; and proposed, that they should make a loan. Mr. Gerry then addressed M. Talleyrand, distinctly in English, which he said, he understood, and stated, that the uneasiness of the Directory, resulting from the President's speech, was a subject unconnected with the objects of the mission; that M. Barras, in his speech to Mr. Munroe, on his recal, had expressed himself in a manner displeasing to the government and citizens of the United States; that the President, as the envoys conceived, had made such observations on M Barras' speech, as were necessary to vindicate the honour of the United States; that this was not considered by our government as a subject of dispute between the two nations; that having no instructions respecting it, we could not make any explanations, or reparations relating to it; and that M. Talleyrand himself, was sufficiently acquainted with the constitution of the United States, to be convinced of the truth of these observations. Mr. Gerry further stated, that the powers

of

of the envoys, as they conceived, were adequate to the discussion and adjustment of all points of real difference between the two nations; that they could alter and amend the treaty; or, if necessary, form a new one; that the United States were anxiously desirous of removing all causes of complaint, between themselves and France, and of renewing their former friendship and intercourse, on terms which should be mutually honourable and beneficial to the two nations; but not on any other terms; that as to a loan, we had no powers whatever to make one; that if we were to attempt it, we should deceive himself and the Directory likewise, which, as men of honour, we could not do ; but, that we could send one of our number for instructions on this proposition, if deemed expedient, provided that the other objects of the negotiation could be discussed and adjusted; that as he had expressed a desire to confer with the envoys individually, it was the wish of Mr. Gerry, that such a conference should take place, and their opinions thus be ascertained, which he conceived corresponded with his own, in the particulars mentioned. M. Talleyrand, in answer said, he should be glad to confer with the other envoys individually, but that this matter about the money must be settled directly, without sending to America; that he would not communicate the arrêté for a week; and, that if we could adjust the difficulty respecting the speech, an application would, nevertheless, go to the United States for a loan. A courier arriving at this moment from Italy, and M. Talleyrand appearing impatient to read the letters, Mr. Gerry took leave of him immediately. He followed to the door, and desired M. Z. to repeat to Mr. Gerry, what he, M. Talleyrand had said to him. Mr. Gerry then returned to his quarters with M. Z., took down the particulars of this interview, as before stated, sent for Generals Pinckney and Marshall, and read it to them in the presence of M. Z. who confirmed it. Generals Pinckney and Marshall, then desired M. Z. to inform M. Talleyrand, that they had nothing to add to this conference, and did not wish that the arrêté might be delayed on their

account.

October 29th.

M. X. again called on us. He said, M. Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of service to us, and had requested that one more effort should be made to induce us to enable him to be so. A great deal of the same conversation which had passed at our former interviews was repeated. The

us.

power and the haughtiness of France was again displayed to We were told, that the destruction of England was inevitable; and that the wealth and arts of that nation, would naturally pass over to America, if that event should find us in peace. To this observation, we replied, that France would probably forbid America to receive them, in like manner, as she had forbid Switzerland to permit the residence in its country, of a British minister. We told him also, that we were sensible of the value of peace, and therefore sought it unremittingly, but that it was real peace we sought for, and real peace only which could be desirable.

The sum of his proposition was, that if we would pay, by way of fees (that was his expression) the sum of money demanded for private use, the Directory would not receive us, but would permit us to remain in Paris as we now were; and we should be received by M. Talleyrand, until one of us could go to America and consult our government on the subject of the loan. These were the circumstances, he said, under which the minister of Portugal had treated. We asked him, if, in the mean time, the Directory would order the American property, not yet passed into the hands of the privateers-men, to be restored? He said, explicitly, that they I would not. We asked him, whether they would suspend further depredations on our commerce? He said, they would not: but, M. Talleyrand observed, that, on this subject, we could not suffer much additional injury, because the winter season was approaching, when few additional captures could be made. We told him, that France had taken violently from America, more than fifteen millions of dollars, and treated us in every respect as enemies, in return for the friendship we had manifested for her; that we had come to endeavour to restore harmony to the two nations, and to obtain compensation for the injuries our countrymen had sustained; and, that in lieu of this compensation, we were told, that if we would pay twelve hundred thousand livres, we might be permitted to remain in Paris; which would only give us the benefit of seeing the plays and operas of Paris for the winter, that we might have time to ask from our country to exhaust her resources for France, whose depredations would be continued. He again stated, that by this procedure, we should suspend a war; and that perhaps in five or six months power might change hands.

We told him that what we wished to see in France, was a temper sincerely friendly to the United States, and really disposed to do us justice; that if we could perceive this, we

might not so much regard a little money, such as he stated to be usual, although we should hazard ourselves by giving it; but that we saw only evidences of the most extreme hostility toward us: war was made upon us so far as France could make it in the present state of things; and it was not even proposed, that on receiving our money this war should cease: we had no reason to believe that a possible benefit could result from it: and we desired him to say that we would not give a shilling, unless American property unjustly captured was previously restored, and further hostilities suspended; and that unless this was done, we did not conceive that we could even consult our government concerning a loan; that if the Directory would receive us and commence negotiations, and any thing occurred which rendered a consultation of the government necessary, one of us would return to America for that purpose. He said that without this money we should be obliged to quit Paris; and that we ought to consider the consequences: the property of the Americans would be confiscated, and their vessels in port embargoed. We told him, that unless there was a hope of a real reconciliation, these evils could not be prevented by us; and the little delay we might obtain would only increase them, that our mission had induced many of our countrymen to trust their vessels in the ports of France, and that if we remained in Paris, that very circumstance would increase the number; and consequently the injury which our countrymen would sustain, if France could permit herself so to violate her own engagements and the laws of nations. He expres

We

sed a wish, that M. Y. should see us once more. told him that a visit from M. Y. as a private gentleman, would always be agreeable to us; but if he came only with the expectation that we should stipulate advances of money, without previously establishing a solid and permanent reconciliation, he might save himself the trouble of the application, because it was a subject we had considered maturely, and on which we were immoveable. He parted with us,

saying, if that was the case, it would not be worth while for M. Y. to come. In the evening, while Gen. Pinckney and Gen. Marshall were absent, M. Y. and M. X. called, and were invited by Mr. Gerry to breakfast with us the next morning.

October 30th.

Immediately after breakfast the subject was resumed. M. Y. spoke without interruption for near an hour. He said

that he was desirous of making a last effort to serve us, by proposing something which might accommodate the differences between the two nations; that what he was now about to mention, had not by any means the approbation of the Directory; nor could M. Talleyrand undertake further than to make from us the proposition to the Directory, and use his influence for its success: that last weck M, Talleyrand could not have ventured to have offered such propositions; but that his situation had been very materially changed by the peace with the emperor: by that peace he had acquired in a high degree the confidence of the Directory, and now possessed great influence with that body; that he was also closely connected with Bonaparte and the generals of the army in Italy; and was to be considered as firmly fixed in his post, at least for five or six months: that under these circumstances he could undertake to offer, in our behalf, propositions which before this increase of influence he could not have hazarded. M. Y. then called our attention to our own situation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us. He said that we were the best judges of our capacity to resist, so far as depended on our own resources, and ought not to deceive ourselves on so interesting a subject. The fate of Venice was one which might befal the United States. But he proceeded to observe, it was probable we might rely on forming a league with England. If we had such a reliance it would fail us. The situation of England was such as to compel Pitt to make peace on the terms of France. A variety of causes were in operation which made such an effect absolutely certain. To say nothing of the opposition in England to the minister and to the war, an opposition which the fears of the nation would increase; to say nothing of a war against England which was preparing in the north; an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, under the command of Bonaparte, spread upon the coast of France, and aided by all the vast resources of his genius, would most probably be enabled to invade England; in which event their government would be overturned: but should this invasion not be absolutely effected, yet the alarm it would spread through the nation, the enormous expense it must produce, would infallibly ruin them, if it was to be continued; and would drive them to save themselves by a peace: that independent of this, France possessed means which would infallibly destroy their bank and their whole paper system. He said he knew very well it was generally conjectured that Bonaparte would not leave