505

and centre on the enemy at Centreville, took up a position on the Union Mills and Centreville .road, more than a mile in advance of the Run. Ordered back in consequence of miscarriage of the orders to General Ewell, the retrograde movement was necessarily made under a sharp fire of artillery.

At noon this brigade, in obedience to new instructions, was again thrown across Bull Run to make demonstrations. Unsupported by other troops, the advance was gallantly made until within musket range of the enemy's force-Colonel Davis' brigade in position near Rocky Run and under the concentrated fire of their artillery. In this affair the Fifth, Jenkins' South Carolina, and Captain Fontaine's company of the Eighteenth Mississippi regiment, are mentioned by General Jones as having shown conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and discipline under a combined fire of infantry and artillery. Not only did the return fire of the brigade drive to cover the enemy's infantry, but the movement unquestionably spread through the enemy's ranks a sense of insecurity and danger from an attack by that route on their rear at Centreville, which served to augment the extraordinary panic which we know disbanded the entire Federal army for the time. This is evident from the fact that Colonel Davies, the immediate adversary's commander, in his official report, was induced to magnify one small company of our cavalry which accompanied the brigade into a force of two thousand men; and Colonel Miles, the commander of the Federal reserves at Centreville, says the movement "caused painful apprehensions for the left wing" of their army.

General Ewell, occupying for the time the right of the lines of Bull Run at Union Mills ford, after the miscarriage of my orders for his advance upon Centreville, in the afternoon was ordered by General Johnston to bring up his brigade into battle, then raging on the left flank. Promptly executed as this, movement was, the brigade after a severe march reached the field too late to share the glories, as they had the labors, of the day. As the important position at the Union Mills had been left with but a slender guard, General Ewell was at once ordered to retrace his steps and resume his position to prevent the possibility of its seizure by any force of the enemy in that quarter.

Brigadier-General Holmes, left with his brigade as a support to the same position in the original plan of battle, had also been called to the left, whither he marched with the utmost speed, but not in time to join actively in the battle.

Walker's rifle guns of the brigade, however, came up in time to be fired with precision and decided execution at the retreating enemy, and Scott's cav

alry, joining in the pursuit, assisted in the capture of prisoners of war and munitions.

This victory, the details of which I have thus sought to chronicle as fully as were fitting an official report, it remains to record, was dearly won by the death of many officers and men of inestimable value belonging to all grades of our society.

In connection with the unfortunate casualties of the day--that is, the miscarriage of the orders sent by courier to Generals Holmes and Ewell to attack the enemy in flank and reverse at Centreville, through which the triumph of our arms was prevented from being still more decisive-I regard it in place to say, a divisional organization, with officers it command of divisions, with appropiate ranks as in European services, would greatly reduce the risk of such mishaps, and would advantageously simplify the communications of a General in command of a field with his troops.

While glorious for our people and of crushing effect upon the morale of our hitherto confident and overweening adversary, as were the events of the battle of Manassas, the field was only won by stout fighting, and, as before stated, with much loss, as is precisely exhibited in the papers here with marked F, G, and H, and being lists of the killed and wounded. The killed outright numbered two hundred and sixty-nine, the wounded one thousand four hundred and thirty-eight--making an aggregate of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two.

The actual loss of the enemy will never be known; it may now only be conjectured. Their abandoned dead, as they were buried by our people where they fell, unfortunately were not enumerated; but many parts of the field were thick with their corpses, as but few battle-fields have ever been. The official reports of the enemy are studiously silent on this point, but still afford us data for an approximate estimate. Left almost in the dark in respect to the losses of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisionsfirst, longest and most hotly engaged we are informed that Sherman's brigade-Tyler's division-suffered in killed, wounded, and missing, six hundred and nine-that is, about eighteen per cent. of the brigade. A regiment of Franklin's brigade-Gorman's-lost twenty-one per cent., Griffin's (battery) loss was thirty per cent., and that of Keyes'brigade, which was so handled by its commander as to be exposed to only occasional volleys from our troops, was at least ten per cent. To these facts, and the repeated references in the report of the more re ticent commanders, to the "murderous" fire to

arms' ammunition, four thousand five hundred sets of accoutrements, over five hundred muskets, some nine regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence.

A list appended exhibits some fourteen hundred and sixty of their wounded and others who fell into our hands, and were sent to Richmond. Some were sent to other points, so that the number of prisoners, including wounded who did not die, may be set down at not less than sixteen hundred. Besides these, a considerable number who could not be removed from the field, died at several farm-houses and field-hospitals within ten days following the

battle.

To serve the future historian of this war, I will note the fact that among the captured Federalists are officers and men of forty-seven regiments of volunteers, besides from some nine different regiments of regular troops, detachments of which were engaged. From their official reports we learn of a regiment of volunteers engaged, six regiments of Miles' division, and the five regiments of Runyon's brigade, from which we have neither sound nor wounded prisoners. Making all allowances for mistakes, we are warranted in say ing that the Federal army consisted of at least fiftyfive regiments of volunteers, eight companies of regular infantry, four of marines, nine of regular, cavalry, and twelve batteries, one hundred and nineteen guns. These regiments, at one time, as will appear from a published list appended, marked" K," numbered in the aggregate, fifty-four thousand one hundred and forty, and average nine hundred and sixty-four each; from an order of the enemy's commander, however, dated July 13th, we learn that one hundred men from each regiment were ordered to remain in charge of respective camps. Some allowance must further be made for the sick and details, which would reduce the average to eight hundred -adding the regular cavalry, infantry, and artillery present, an estimate of their force may be made.

A paper appended, marked "L," exhibits, in part, the ordnance and supplies captured, including some twenty-eight field pieces of the best character of arm, with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, thirty-seven caissons, six forges, four battery wagons, sixty-four artillery horses, completely

Added to these results may rightly be noticed here that by this battle an invading army superbly equipped, within twenty miles of their base of operations, has been converted into one virtually besieged, and exclusively occupied for months in the construction of a stupendous series of fortifications for the protection of its own capital.

I beg to call attention to the reports of the several subordinate commanders for reference to the signal parts played by individuals of their respective commands. Contradictory statements, found in these reports, should not excite surprise, when we remember how difficult, if not impossible, it is to reconcile the narrations of bystanders, or participants in even the most inconsiderable affair, much less the shifting, thrilling scenes of a battle-field.

Accompanying are maps showing the position of the armies on the morning of the 21st July, and of three several stages of the battle; also, of the line of Bull Run north of Blackburn's Ford. These maps, from actual surveys made by Captain D. B. Harrison, assisted by Mr. John Grant, were drawn by the lat ter with a rare delicacy worthy of high commendation.

In conclusion it is proper, and doubtless expected, that through this report my countrymen should be made acquainted with some of the sufficient causes that prevented the advance of our forces, and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War Departinent has been fully advised long since of all of those causes, some of which only are proper to be here communicated. An army which had fought like ours on that day against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle.

On the following day an unusually heavy and un intermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance with reasonable prospect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers, made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility. Your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General Commanding. To General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector. General, Richmond, Va.

R. H. CHILTON, Adjutant.

THE BATTLE

OF BULL RUN.

507

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN-CAUSE OF ITS DISASTER.

Extracts from the Speech of United States Senator Chandler, July 16th, 1862.

2. The second cause of this disaster was the failure to attack on Friday before the arrival of the enemy's reenforcements, instead of on Sunday, after they had arrived. Why was not this done? It is averred that the fault was in the Quarter-master's Department, in not furnishing transportation at the proper time and place.

General Heintzelman says:

"The delay at Centreville, I suppose, was principally waiting for provisions, and for information of the position of the enemy.

"The day after we left Alexandria the provision train was to start. The wagons had not yet been collected, as I understood, and the consequence was that they did not start the next day, but the day after."

General Franklin states, in relation to the delay of the army at Centreville from Thursday to Sunday:

"My impression is that it was on account of the nonarrival of the supplies for the army until some time on Saturday."

General McDowell states that he was forced to leave to those in the city the duty of forwarding provisions to him, but there was delay in doing so. 3. The delay of the whole army for three hours on Sunday morning in consequence of the delay of Keyes' brigade, in Tyler's division, in getting into the assigned position. The enemy was defeated at two o'clock, and but for the timely arrival of a portion of Johnston's force, their rout would have been complete. The three hours lost in the early morning could not be regained. The men were fatigued and over-worked in the heat, and the precious moment for a crushing blow passed. ell says on this point:

General McDow

"Tyler was to move at half-past two o'clock A. M., and Hunter was to move half an hour earlier so that he might close up on Tyler's division. Heintzelman was to move at half-past two o'clock A. M., so as to fall in the rear of Hunter's division. Tyler was expected to get over the ground between the encampment of his advanced brigade, and where the road turned off to the right, at the blacksmith's

shop, in time to offer no obstructions to the road to be used in common by all the divisions.

"I was sick during the night and morning, and did not leave my head-quarters-a little over a mile, perhaps a mile and a quarter, east of Centreville-until I thought all the divisions were fully in motion, so as to give myself as much rest as possible. When I had got beyond Centreville about a mile, I passed the troops lying down and sitting down on the way-side. Upon asking why they did not move forward, the reply came to me that the road was blocked up. I saw some men coming from the left of the road through a cornfield into the road. When I asked to what regiment they belonged, they said the Second New York, which formed a part of Schenck's brigade (Tyler's di vision.) I went forward, urging the troops to move on, un

til I got to the blacksmith's shop, where the road turned off to Sudley's Springs. I was making evey effort, personally and by my aids, to have the road cleared, in order that Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions might take up their march to the right, by way of Sudley's Springs, to carry out the plan of battle."

In reply to the question, "Whose division blocked up the road?" General McDowell says:

"The First division; General Tyler's division. Majornow General-Barnard, who was the Chief of Engineers on my staff, in his report to me, dated July 29, 1861, says as

follows:

"You are aware of the unexpected delay. The two leading brigades of Tyler's did not clear the road for Hunter to this point (blacksmith's shop), where the road turned to the right, until half-past five,'

"That was three hours after the time fixed to start. "Colonel Heintzelman-now General Heintzelman-in bis report to me of July 31, states as follows:

"At Centreville we found the road filled with the troops, and were detained three hours to allow the divisions of Generals Tyler and Hunter to pass. I followed them with my division, immediately in rear of the latter.'"

General Heintzelman says:

"The next morning (Sunday), precisely at the hour fixed, I left. The head of the column got to Centreville, and found the road obstructed with troops. General Tyler's division had not passed yet. I waited three hours for Tyler's and Hunter's divisions to pass "

General Andrew Porter, who succeeded to the command of General Hunter's division when he was wounded, says:

"Our orders were to get under way at two or half-past two in the morning. We got into the road, and were delayed a great while there. We were formed on the road in front of my camp. I had the reserve brigade in the rear. After some delay we then moved on at some distance, and halted again. And we kept pottering along, pottering along in that way, instead of being fairly on the road. It was intended that we should turn their position at daylight, as we could have done very easily but for the delay."

4. The advancing of our batteries one thousand yards without adequate support, and the unfortunate mistaking of a rebel regiment for the batteries' support, was the fourth cause of that disaster. If these guns had not been captured and turned upon our own troops, the strong probabilities are, that we should at least have held the field, and that no panic would have ensued.

Captain Griffin, of Griffin's battery, who had been placed in this advanced position, says:

"After I had been there about five minutes, a regiment of Confederates got over a fence on my front, and some offlcer-I took it to be the Colonel-stepped out in front of the regiment, between it and my battery, and commenced making a speech to them. I gave the command to one of my officers to fire upon them. He loaded the cannon with canister, and was just ready to fire on them when Major Barry rode up to me and said, 'Captain, don't fire there! those are your battery support' I said, 'They are Confed. erates; as certain as the world, they are Confederates.' He replied, I know they are your battery support.' I sprang to my pieces, and told my officer not to fire there. He threw down the canister, and commenced firing again in

the former direction. After the officer who had been talking to the regiment had got through, he faced them to the left and marched them about fifty yards to the woods, then faced them to the right and marched them about forty yards towards us, and then opened fire upon us, and that

was the last of us.

"Before this occurred, I started to limber-up my pieces, so thoroughly convinced was I that they were the Confederates. But, as the chief of artillery told me that they were my battery support, I was afraid to fire upon them. Major Barry said, 'I know it is the battery support; it is the regiment taken there by Colonel Very well,' said I, and gave the order to fire in another direction with the battery; but I never delivered the fire-for we were all cut down.'"

Colonel Averill says:

"In going down the hill, after the general break, I saw

an officer galloping along in front of me. I recognized Major Barry, and cried out, Hulloa! Barry-is that you?' He said, 'Yes.' I said, Where is Griffin ?' He said, 'I am afraid he is killed.' I said, That battery is lost. I am afraid we are gone up,' or some remark to that effect. Bar

Parsons occupied a high ridge in the prairie, about nine miles from Carthage, their cavalry extending along the rear and on the flank, their artillery of one twenty-four-pounder in the centre, supported by two six-pounders on each side, as represented. The position was a well chosen and strong one.

Colonel Siegel displayed his force of about one thousand two hundred men to the very best advantage, four pieces of artillery in the centre, and two pieces at the extreme of each flank, the infantry stationed in columns on the right and left, and in the rear. In this condition the fight began, and continued for about three hours, when the rebels' artillery, having been dismounted, and their centre broken, they commenced flank movements with their cavalry, threatening an attack in the rear, and the capture of Colonel Siegel's baggage train three miles behind. The Colonel sent back one piece of artil

put Griffin there myself.""

SIEGEL'S RETREAT AT CARTHAGE. Siegel's retreat at Carthage from before the combined forces of Parsons, Rains, Slack and Jackson was a most masterly affair. That with an army of twelve hundred and but a mere handful of cavalry he should have retreated successfully before an army of five thousand-nearly one third of which was cavalry is evidence of high military capacity. The positions of the forces and the incidents of the allday fighting retreat merit this further notice.

This Diagram represents the respective positions of the contending forces when the battle begun. The stars represent the cavalry, dots the infantry, daggers the artillery and parallels the wagons:

and then commenced a retrograde movement with his entire command, at the same time dispatching an order for the advance of the baggage wagons. In this movement he preserved the order of his columns until the baggage train was reached, when he immediately made the following admirable dispo sition of his forces, as seen by this Diagram: One Battalion of Siegel.

In the order as presented in the above, Colonel Salomon's battalion leading the front, the retreat was continued from about midday until five o'clock P. M., the enemy threatening on all sides, but being constantly repulsed by the well handled artillery and serried front of the infantry. The baggage wagons numbered about fifty, and were moved in columns of eight.

At five o'clock Siegel's force came to a small creek, just beyond which was a bluff, intersected by the road to Carthage, along which he was moving. On the two sides of this divided bluff eight hundred of the rebel cavalry took position, prepared to resist the passage of the creek and road. The posi tion was one of difficulty, and would have seriously perplexed any less skillful officer than Colonel Siegel. His head was cool, however, and to gain the advantage he resorted to stratagem, which placed his foes entirely at his mercy, and eventually secur ed the unimpeded movements of his command. He