He really accomplished nothing which the General -in-Chief expected of him. Scott said, in his testimony before the Investigating Committee: "Although General Patterson was never specifically ordered to attack the enemy, he certainly was told and expected, even with inferior numbers,* to hold the rebel army in his front on the alert, and to prevent it from reenforcing Manassas Junction, by threatening manoeuvres and demonstrations; results often obtained in war with half numbers. After a time General Patterson moved from Bunker Hill, and then fell off upon Charlestown, whence he seems to have made no other demonstration that did not look like a retreat out of Virginia. From that moment Johnston was at liberty to join Beauregard with any part of the army of Winchester." Yes, more than this: Johnston, at any moment, was at liberty to join Beauregard so far as Patterson was concerned; and only failed to leave Winchester on the 17th, because of his want of conveyance. He understood the Federal commander more fully than the Department at Washington. Had he moved off on the 17th, Patterson's orders were to push for Leesburg and force a march after him to Centreville; but, it is highly probable that the story of Centreville and Bull Run would have become history before he should have appeared in view of Fairfax Court-House. Views Regarding the Plan of the Battle. As to the plan of the advance, we believe it to have been well ordered. It already has been stated that Heintzelman was to strike off from Sangster's Station, to threaten Manassas by Brentsville, while McDowell should "feel" of Beauregard at Bull Run, and approach Manassas, at the same time, by way of Union Mills and Blackburn's Ford. This Major Barnard refers to in his re* See Appendix, page for citations of evidence before the Committee, regarding the inferiority of Johnston's force to that of Patterson. port, as having been the original design, characterizing the movement upon Centreville as a mere "demonstration." It was all changed by Tyler's "reconnoissance" of the 18th, by which he brought on the conflict at Blackburn's Ford, on that day. Fearing the worst, that Beauregard was in force at that point, ready to press back the advance if not to occupy Centreville, McDowell hastily left Sangster's for Centreville, ordering Heintzelman to follow with all speed. The flank movement by Brentsville was instantly abandoned. After the 18th, reconnoissances followed; and, from what was learned by them, as well as from residents and scouts, McDowell so far modified his original programme for the descent upon Manassas Junction, as to determine him to turn Beauregard's position at Bull Run, by the right. This would strike the rebel line of reenforcements, and, with McDowell's then disposable strength, would force his enemy back upon Manassas. It was a clear, sensible, well-arranged proceeding, and only failed of success from his having to cope with two well-ordered armies instead of one As to whether the battle could or could not have been fought a day or two days earlier, is a question for military experts to decide. If the battle had resulted favorably to our arms, every movement unquestionably would have been commended as marked by prudence and military sagacity; and, if victory would have resulted had Patterson's army done its allotted duty, it is but fair to give to McDowell the credit of having well performed his part. The great, glaring The Great Evil. blemish which stands out all over the history of that brief campaign, is the want of discipline among officers as well as troops. With Colonels in command of brigades with a Brigadier-General in chief command, there was, from the very date of organization of the several corps, a want of unity, an absence of radical subordination. The prime defect lay in the military system then in force, rendering volunteer commands of the same grade subordinate to those of the regular service, thus creating enmities, conflicts of authority and military jealousies enough to distract any well-laid scheme. It was a withering must have been the iron shower | rebel horseman wade the for the prize corps. Heintzelman wrote: "I then led up the Minnesota regiment, which was also repulsed, but retired in tolerably good order. It did good service in the woods on our right flank, and was among the last to retire, moving off the field with the Third United States infantry. Next was led forward the First Michigan, which was also repulsed, and retired in considerable confusion. They were rallied and helped to hold the woods on the right. The Brooklyn Fourteenth then appeared upon the ground, coming forward in gallant style. I led them forward to the left, where the Alabama regiment had been posted in the early part of the action. It had now disappeared, but I soon came in sight of the line of the enemy drawn up beyond the clump of trees. Soon after the firing commenced this regiment broke and ran. I considered it useless to attempt to rally them. The want of discipline in these regiments was so great that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear, and continue to fire-fortunately for the braver ones-very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat. During this time Rickett's battery had been taken and retaken three times by us, but was finally lost, most of the horses having been killed-Captain Rickett being wounded, and First Lieutenant D. Ramsay killed. Lieutenant Kirby behaved very gallantly, and succeeded in carrying off one caisson. Before this time heavy reenforcements of the enemy were dis tinctly seen approaching by two roads, extending and outflanking us on the right." stream. No opposition Tyler's Division. He was offered, but the steep bank precluded Ayres from dragging up it his guns. therefore remained to operate as circumstances might demand at the Stone Bridge. Sherman-after a slight "brush" with a retreating battalion, in which the brave Lieutenant-Colonel (Haggerty) of the New York Sixty-ninth was killed-pushed with great Caution direct for the battle-field, the New York Sixty-ninth (Colonel Corcoran) on the advance. The field was reached in safety, and the brigade formed for battle in the rear of Colonel Porter's men. This was at the moment indicated by Heintzelman when his regiments were consecutively retiring from before the enemy, and the struggle for the Rickett's battery was going on. Sherman reported: "Placing Colonel Quimby's regiment of rifles (the New York Thirteenth) in front, in column by division, I directed the other regiments to follow in line of battle in the order of the Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth and Sixty-ninth Quimby's regi ment advanced steadily down the hill and upthe ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on the ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way till the head of the column reached the point near which Rickett's battery was so severeThe other regiments descended the hill in A recurrence to Beauregard's report, at this y cut up. point, will serve to impress the reader with line of battle, under a severe cannonading, and the ground affording comparative shelter against the the terrific fury which reigned over that nar-enemy's artillery, they changed directions by the row field-how narrow, the rebel General's right flank and followed the road before mentioned. graphic narrative particularly states. But, Heintzelman's corps was not alone in that almost hand-to hand carnage. Keyes' and Sherman's brigades were at hand, sharing alike the dangers, the glories and the disasters of the field. Schenck's brigade, with its light artillery battery and a thirty-pounder Parrot gun under Lieutenant Haines, was detailed by General Tyler to operate on the Stone Bridge (Warrenton road) position of the enemy; while Sherman and Keyes were left to await the special calls of the day. When it was apparent that Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions had come to a stand, Sherman was ordered on to join in the struggle. He crossed the Run, at a point where he had seen a Tyler's Division. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our left point, the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalions of marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, re ceived the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire. This regi ment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment filed in confusion and retreat OPERATIONS OF KEYES AND SHERMAN. 265 ed towards the road, there Sherman's Report. was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its Colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held their ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder. "All this time Quimby's regiment occupied another ridge to our left, overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged. Here (about half past three P. M.) began the scene of disorder and confusion that characterized the remainder of the day." Operations of Keyes' Brigade. Keyes' brigade followed Sherman over the stream and thence to the battle field. General Tyler, who commanded in person, in his report acknowledges its gallantry and effectiveness, saying: "I ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of his column a little to the right of the line of march taken by Sherman's brigade to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and reIsulted in closing on the rear of Sherman's brigade; and, on reaching the high ground, I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and came into conflict on its right with the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back, until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings standing on the heights above the road leading to Bull Run. The charge was here ordered, and the Second Maine and Third Connecticut regiments, which were opposed to this part of the enemy's line, pressed forward to the top of the hill until they reached the buildings which were held by the enemy, drove them out, and for a moment had them in possession. At this point, finding the brigade under the fire of a strong force behind breast works, the order was given to march by the left flank across an open field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull Ron, along which the march was conducted, with a view to turn the battery which the enemy had placed on the hill below the point at which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the Stone Bridge, causing the enemy to retire and giving Captain Alexander an opportunity to pass the bridge, cut out the abattis which had been placed there, and prepared the way for Schenck's brigade and the two batteries to pass over. Before the contemplated movement could be made on the enemy's battery, it was removed and placed in a position to threaten our line; but before the correct range could be obtained, Colonel Keyes carried his brigade, by a flank movement, around the base of the hill, and was on the point of ascending it in time to get at the battery, when I discovered that our troops were on the retreat, and that, unless a rapid movement to the rear was made, we should be cut off, and through my aid, Lieutenant Upton, Colonel Keyes was ordered to file to the right and join the retreating column. The order was executed without the least confusion, and the brigade joined the retreating The Numbers Engaged on Both Sides. painful spectacle to read official reports where- | engaged, six regiments of in crimination and gross charges against su- Miles' division, and the five periors or equals found place; wherein a regiments of Runyon's briMajor assumed the character of censor and gade, from which we have neither sound nor critic even of the plans and orders of the wounded prisoners. Making all allowances Commanding General; and, when we are for mistakes, we are warranted in saying further informed that, at the council of war that the Federal army consisted of at least called on the evening of the 20th, even new-fifty-five regiments of volunteers, eight comly-made Colonels opposed the plans for the advance, we can scarcely wonder if what left Washington as an army should have returned a rabble. The Numbers Engaged on Both Sides. panies of regular infantry, four of marines, nine of regular cavalry, and twelve batteries, one hundred and nineteen guns." But, taking his own estimate of eight hun on the One good came of that defeat: the coun-dred to a regiment, after deducting the sixtry was made to realize the importance of a teen regiments of reserves-nine in Miles' thorough reorganization of our Army Sys- division, six in Runyon's and one in Tyler's tem-the necessity for discipline and drill--we have but thirty-two thousand as his the futility of the "On to Richmond" cry estimate of the Federal force in action. This until a clear, straight-forward and palpable is overstated about eight thousand: not to policy was ordained in Administration circles. exceed twenty-four thousand were The number engaged has field, we are sure. been so variously stated, Of the strength of his own force we are that it is now, and doubt- left in much doubt. He states positively less ever will be, a matter of some specula- that he had, on the 21st, twenty-seven thoution. McDowell named eighteen thousand sand effectives, which included sixty-two as the actual number of those who cross-hundred from Johnston's army and seventeen ed Bull Run; but this, we surmise, rep-hundred from Fredericksburg. resented the divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman alone-those who first crossed. Adding the brigades of Sherman and Keyes, afterwards sent over, and we have, for the actual Federal force engaged, about twenty-two hundred, shows how much of the truth four thousand troops, exclusive of the artillery. This would leave fifteen thousand to represent the number of the reserves, considering the entire army to have aggregated forty thousand, which, we believe, was the force set apart for the advance. This did not include the reenforcements dispatched by the Secretary of War after his return to Washington, on the evening of the 20th, but which had not passed Fairfax when the retreat was sounded. Beauregard places the numbers of McDowell at over fifty thousand. He arrives at his estimates in the following manner: "To serve the future historian of this war, I will note the fact that among the captured Federalists are officers and men of forty-seren regiments of volunteers, besides from some nine different regiments of regular troops, detachments of which were engaged. From their official reports we learn of a regiment of volunteers But, the enumeration of his brigades and regiments conclusively proves these figures to be an under-estimate; while the fact that Johnston's reenforcement is set down as but sixty was suppressed-that reenforcement actually amounting to seventeen thousand effective men. It was the arrival on the ground, at three o'clock in the afternoon, of a fresh body of these men, (about five thousand strong,) which gave the Confederates the victory.* * Jefferson Davis, in his speech at Richmond, announcing the victory and its results, stated the Con federate force engaged to have been but eighteen thousand. How near this was to the truth, may be inferred from his further statement, that the captures included "sixty pieces of splendid artillery" and "provisions enough to feed an army of fifty thousand men for twelve months." As the entire Federal artillery on the field consisted of but twentytwo pieces, [See Major Barry's Official Report.] and as McDowell had to keep open his communications with Washington in order to obtain his daily subsistence, the statements of the President may be pronounced so at variance with the truth as to be surprising even for him. ADDRESS OF THE REBEL GENERALS. 273 The Losses on Both The Spoils. rounds of small-arms' am- Of the actual losses we are equally uncertain. There is much discrepancy in the statements of the two commanders, while there are good reasons to doubt the correctness of either. Thus McDowell said: "It will be seen that our killed amounted to nineteen officers and four hundred and sixty-two non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to sixty-four officers and nine hundred and forty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under one thousand. The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington-many of the Zouaves to New York. In one brigade, the number originally reported six hundred and sixteen, was yesterday reduced to one hundred and seventy-four. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made." That correct return never was made, though the figures were given, eventually, as four hundred and seventy-nine killed, one thousand and eleven wounded, and about one thousand five hundred taken prisoners. Beauregard, giving the data for his estimates, made the Federal loss to have been over four thousand five hundred. His report was accompanied by a list of one thousand four hundred and sixty of the wounded and prisoners. As his report was made out over a month after the battle, the list must have contained every Federal in his hands. If so, his confident assumption that our loss exceeded four thousand five hundred, would make the list of killed reach the extra-field pieces," was a fiction. If his other spoils ordinary number of three thousand. dwindled down in proportion, the captures killed, as ascertained by company returns were not enough to enrich his treasury. and by a comparison with the lists from Richmond, only reached the figures given above, viz. four hundred and seventy-nine. Beauregard stated his captures of spoils to have included, in part, "some twenty-eight field pieces of the best character of arm, with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, thirty-seven caissons, six forges, four battery wagons, sixty-four artillery horses, "One week ago a countless host of men, organcompletely equipped, five hundred thousandized into an army, with all the appointments which The Congratulatory Address of the Rebel Generals. We are prepared, after this sifting of "official" statements, to lay before the reader the Address issued by the two rebel Generals to their troops. It read: “ HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, |