Keyes' Report. base slope about one hundred | turned upon the loss of Rickett's and Grif yards, when I ordered them fin's batteries. Porter states that they were to lie down at a point offering a small protec-ordered by the Commanding-General to the tion, and load. I then ordered them to advance top of the hill on the right." Major Barry again, which they did in the face of a movable bat- confirms the statement, saying he "received tery of eight pieces and a large body of infantry toan order from General McDowell to advance wards the top of a hill. As we moved forward we two batteries to an eminence specially designacame under the fire of other large bodies of the ted by him about eight hundred yards in front of the line previously occupied by the enemy's batteries." enemy posted behind breastworks, and on reaching the summit of the hill the firing became so hot that an exposure to it of five minutes would have annihilated my whole line. "As the enemy had withdrawn to a height beyond, and to the support of additional troops, I ordered the Maine regiment to face by the left flank and move to a wooded slope, across an open field, to which point I followed them. The balance of the brigade soon regained me, and after a few moments' rest I again put it in motion and moved forward to find another opportunity to charge. The enemy had a light battery, which he manoeuvred with extraordinary skill, and his shot fell often among and near us. I advanced generally just under the brow of the hill, by a flank movement, until I found myself about half a mile below the Stone Bridge. Our advance caused the rebels to retire from the abattis, and enabled Captain Alexander, of the engineers, to clean it away. In a short time the enemy moved the battery to a point which enabled him to enfilade my whole line; but as he pointed his guns too far to the right, and only improved his aim gradually, I had time to withdraw my brigade, by a flank movement, around the base This relieves the Chief-of-Ar tillery (Major Barry) of the charge repeated in many of the newspaper reports, of having planted the batteries too far in advance, thereby challenging the enemy to take them, which they did after a terrible struggle. Porter, referring to the incidents of that furious handto-hand fight, said: Struggle for the "Griffin's and Rickett's batteries were ordered by the Commanding-General to the top of the hill on our right, supporting them with the Fire Zouaves and marines, while the Fourteenth entered the skirt of the wood on their right to protect that flank, and a column of the Twenty-seventh New York and Eleventh and Fifth Massachusetts, Second Minnesota and Sixty-ninth New York moved up towards the left flank of the batteries; but so soon as they were in position, and before the flanking supports had reached them, a murderous fire of musketry and rifles of a hill, in time to avoid a raking fire. At this time a lull in the discharge of our artillery, and an appa-opened at pistol range, and cut down every rent change of position of the enemy's left flank, made me apprehensive that all was not right. I continued my march, and sent my aid, Lieutenant Walter, to the rear to inquire of General McDowell how the day was going. The discontinuance of the firing in our lines becoming more and more apparent, I inclined to the right, and after marching six hun dred or seven hundred yards further, I was met by Lieutenant Uptown, aid to General Tyler, and ordered to file to the right, as our troops were retreating. cannonier and a large number of horses. The fire came from some infantry of the enemy which had been mistaken for our own forces, an officer on the field having stated that it was a regiment sent by Colonel Heintzelman to support the batteries. The evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy's cavalry, which took place immediately. The marines, also, in spite of the exertions of their gallant officers, gave way in disorder. The Fourteenth on the right and the column on the left hesitatingly retired, with the exception of the Sixty-ninth and Thirty-ninth New York, who nobly stood and returned the fire of the enemy for fifteen minutes. Soon the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized The fortunes of the day appear to have forces, while riderless horses and artillery I moved on at an ordinary pace, and fell into the retiring current about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of General McDowell and staff. Before crossing Bull Run, and until my brigade mingled with the retreating mass, it maintained perfect freedom from panic, and at the moment I received the order to retreat, and for some time afterwards, it was in as good order as in the morning on the road. Half an hour earlier I supposed the victory to be Ours." OPERATIONS OF RICHARDSON AND DAVIES. teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. All further efforts were futile. The words, gestures and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body. Some of our noblest and best officers lost their lives in the trial to rally them upon our first position. The Twenty-seventh was the first to rally under the command of Major Bartlett, and around it the other regiments engaged and soon collected their scattered fragments. The battalion of regulars in the mean time moved steadily across the fields to the right, and took up a position where it held the entire forces of the rebels in check until our forces were somewhat rallied. The Commanding-General then ordered a retreat upon Centreville, at the same time directing me to cover it with the battalion of regulars, the cavalry and a section of artillery." The Retreat not a Rout. This brings the narrative up to the moment of retreat, which, it has been represented, was a disgraceful rout. It was not a rout in the terms employed by many, and particularly by the correspondent of the London Times, who was present. The regiments of Heintzelman's division, already referred to as disorganized during the fight, and particularly the "Fire Zouaves," left the field in great disorder; and Sherman's brigade, from being very badly cut to pieces, was not brought off whole; but, the great mass moved off in clean lines by brigades or sections, covered, to the crossing at the Stone Bridge by Porter and Keyes; and, after that, by Schenck's brigade, which fell, in good order, with Ayres' battery, back upon Centreville, while Blenker advanced from that place towards the Warrenton Bridge, the more perfectly to secure order in the withdrawing regiments and to hold in check any possible attack by the enemy. 267 Richardson's and Davies' Operations. brigade had bivouacked After the movements of the First, Second and Third divisions, on the morning of the 21st, Davies advanced his brigade beyond Richardson's position, on his left, having with him a twenty-pounder battery of rifled guns, under Lieutenant Benjamin. Together, the guns of the two brigade batteries opened on the Blackburn Ford position of the enemy, but, after a cannonade of an hour, suspended fire, having drawn no return. Colonel Davies assumed direction of the operations of the two brigades, being the senior, by date of commission, of Richardson. His troops were so disposed as to hold the Blackburn Ford approach and the road leading in from Union Mills, up which it was expected the enemy might demonstrate. After this disposition Colonel Miles arrived on the groundhis first appearance - when considerable change was made in the location of the regi ments. He then left for Centreville, where Davies proceeded to protect his own flank— now exposed by Miles having withdrawn two regiments from the Union Mills road—by felling trees across the dangerous and open Richardson, after his sharp conflict of the approach. This precaution was timely, for 18th, retired to Centreville, but soon re-it arrested a heavy force of the enemy's cavturned and reoccupied the hill whereon his alry, which, as the advance of General D. B. But, before recording the incidents and the conduct of that retreat, we should advert to the not unexciting nor unimportant services performed by the brigades placed to guard the left approach to Centreville by Blackburn's Ford and Union Mills. ty-pound shot, which he did, knocking a borse and his rider in air, and starting at a double-quick the rear of the column into the valley. I then ordered the whole artillery to pour grape and canister into the valley, and at every fire there went up a tremendous howl from the enemy. During all this time the enemy poured volleys of musketry over the heads of our prostrate men. This firing continued for twenty-five or thirty minutes. A portion of the enemy rushed into a barn, from which a few well directed shots brought them out in great haste." Jones' brigade, came dashing up to reconnoitre. A charge of grape and canister from the three batteries sent the cavalry flying. This retarded Jones' operations in that direction, although his brigade was advanced over Bull Run on the Union Mills road. Davies knew of his presence; but Miles' peremptory orders,* to simply hold his position and not to attack, compelled the impatient Davies and Richardson to rest nervously in their well-chosen camps. Miles visited the camps early in the afternoon for a few moThe enemy was checked and discomfited ments, and then returned to Centreville, by this spirited reception, and soon retired compelled, as he states, to remain at head- altogether in the direction of Union Mills. quarters in consequence of illness. After he The brigade of Richardson was in reserve for had left, Davies arranged to prevent a sur- the expected attack upon Davies, but waited prise, and to repel an attack which he ex- in vain-the Colonel very properly employpected at any moment. Great clouds of dusting his time in throwing up earth-works and erecting abattis to render his position secure. He could and would have held it against triple numbers. and the sight of passing columns led him to believe that heavy bodies were gathering on his left. He said, in his report: "I threw out two companies Davies' Report. of skirmishers to our rear, and ordered the Thirty-second New York forward to support them. About four o'clock we saw the enemy approaching down a gorge leading into a valley which lay directly to our left about five hundred yards distant. The field in which I was ordered to remain was enclosed on two sides by dense woods and covered by light bushes toward the valley. After the enemy were discovered filing into the valley, no movement was made for some time. When it was supposed, from the appearance of things, that the last of the column was entering the valley, I ordered all the artillery (six pieces) to change front to the left, but not to fire until the rear of the column was seen. I placed the artillery, with a company of infantry with each piece, and changed the battle front of the two regiments (the Sixteenth and Thirtyfirst New York) supporting the artillery to the left, on a line with them. I then ordered every man to lie down and reserve his fire. “During the whole time that this order was being carried out, the enemy's troops were still advanc ing down the hill four abreast and at right shoulder shift.' I gave orders to Lieutenant Edwards, when I saw the rear of the column, to give it a solid twen *Miles, in his report, states that such were his orders from the commanding General. The verdict of the Court Martial which afterwards sat on his case, was to the effect that he was under the influence of liquor, but not so much so as to unfit him for command. Richardson and Davies regarded him as decidedly drunk. The Retreat to Fairfax and the Potomac. It is unnecessary here to detail the order of the retreat to Centreville and the rapid march back to the Potomac fortifications. Blenker's brigade-a corps of men composed of splendid fighting material-pushed forward from their posts at Centreville toward the Stone Bridge, and covered the retreat in a very effective manner. At the crossing, the enemy's cavalry (Scott's) pressed our disordered ranks very closely, when Ayres' and Carlisle's guns, spiritedly and coolly served, kept them at bay. Walker's battery of Holmes' (rebel) brigade — which had been detailed for the morning movement on the Federal left-arrived in time to worry the retreat extremely, and much of the most painful slaughter of the day took place at the vicinity of the Stone Bridge and the crossing of Cub Run from these guns. After passing Bull Run, several of the brigades preserved but little order. Many regiments seemed to take it for granted that they were at liberty to retire Washington-ward at their pleasure, and did so. Honorable exception should, however, be made in the case of the brigades of Keyes, Davies, Richardson and Blenker-all of whose ranks carefully preserved their formation, brought off their trains, stores and artillery, and constantly presented an effective front for fight, had the DEFENSE OF GENERAL MCDOWELL. 269 The Retreat to Fairfax and the Potomac. sue. McDowell's Statement pursuit been pressed. These was given me by the Generalbrigades left Centreville du- in-Chief and heads of the Adring the night of the 21st-ministrative departments in making the necessary Blenker bringing up the rear in excellent preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowstyle.* The troops of this command were ly. Many of them did not come across till eight feverishly anxious that the enemy should purThere was no pursuit, however, of any or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went account, after the troops had fairly passed the Run. The enemy had two fresh brigades (Ewell's and Holmes'), besides reserves from Johnston's forces then still arriving; but the knowledge of McDowell's strength at Centreville, and the presence of Runyon's brigade beyond, induced Beauregard to refrain from periling his dearly-bought victory by pressing the retreat. He was content to pass over the Run, after the evacuation of Centreville, there to gather up the spoils which the teamsters, in their disgraceful and causeless panic, had left behind. Many a wagon of precious freight stood in its ruts around Centreville that should have been brought leisurely away; but, like the want of rigid discipline in the army, the transportation service was without system, without a head on the ground; and, as a consequence, each particular teamster cared for himself rather than for his goods. A few well-timed shots at the flying rogues would have relieved horses of cowardly riders, and thus have saved teams to bear away many a wagon of stores and "As my position may warrant even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, so far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle. When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July, Monday. Every facility possible Several parties claim the honor of "bringing up the rear." Richardson states positively that his brigade was last over the ground and last to arrive at Arlington. We believe we are correct, however, in awarding the honors of "positively the last" to Blenker. forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reenforcements to General Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster - General, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer that Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. "I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles further to Centreville-in all, a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace at which we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of light marching order. "We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth division (Miles' and Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brigade, of Tyler's division, on the left of the road, near the Stone Bridge, not par McDowell's Statement the communication and interviews between the ticipating in the main action. | the events of the 21st ult., that the general order The numbers opposed to us for the battle to which I referred was, with slight have been variously estimated; I may safely modification, literally conformed to; that the corps say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggera- were brought over Bull Run in the manner propos tion, that the enemy brought up all he could which ed, and put into action as before arranged, and that up to late in the afternoon every movement ordered were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that was carrying us successfully to the object we had time up to the 21st to bring up whatever he had. proposed before starting-that of getting to the railIt is known that in estimating the force to go against road leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, Manassas I engaged not to have to do with the and going on it far enough to break up and destroy enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major-General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could not be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, if I knew them all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say-certainly much more than we attacked them with. "I could not, as I have said, more early push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three months' volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. But in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle. these troops moved to the rear, to the sound of the enemy's cannon. "In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost 10,000 of the best armed, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker. forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston. And could we have fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is everything to show how we could have continued successful, even against the odds with which we contended." He did not engage to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston"-that is his best defense. All other facts cited are only forcible for extenuation, but that disclaimer against fighting two fine armies instead of one, is his justification, and fixes the responsibility upon the Pennsylvania General for his non-action and want of vigilance. That the enemy only played with the cau tious old General (Patterson) is evident from the fact, as elsewhere stated, that the rebel Generals, without any reference to Patterson, had arranged to throw Johnston's army upon McDowell at Centreville, from the north, as early as the 18th or 19th, but could not move in that direction quickly enough owing to lack of transportation. Patterson, on the 18th, was treated to the following reminder to duty: General Patterson's Responsibility for the Defeat. "CHARLESTOWN, July 18th, 1861. "COLONEL E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G., &c. : Telegram of to-day received. The enemy has stolen no "In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to march upon me. I have kept him actively employ |