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McDowell's Official Report.

the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were in consequence between two and three hours behind the time appointed-a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton Turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road, and we having the obtuse angle on our side.

"General Tyler commenced with his artillery at half-past six A. M., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve in case we should have to send any troops back to reenforce Miles' division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford, at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink.

"At this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp was sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley's Spring south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford, thickly wooded, while on the right of the road for about the same distance, the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the road the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile further large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the valley of a small water course, a tributary of Bull Run.

Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached this open space, and while others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery, and following it up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it

McDowell's Official Report.

well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades, of Tyler's division, to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side. While this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream, and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had, early in the day, some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from the hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land.

"The hottest part of the contest was for the pos session of this hill, with a house on it. The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade, and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the center and up the road, while Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the Stone Bridge. The Rhode Island battery of Burnside's brigade also participated in the attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston. Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service, and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery. on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded —our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it--in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by dif ferent corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a haif, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession, from the Stone Bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abattis across the road, to allow our reenforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.

"The enemy was evidently disheartened and

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Giving the

disposition of the forces [::::::::::::] the night before the battle, and the position assumed

on the field by the several divisions and batteries. The line of retreat of the Union forces was by the direct routes to the Potomac by which the divisions marched on to Centreville.

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OFFICIAL MAP OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

GENERAL MCDOWELL'S OFFICIAL MAP OF THE BATTLE

FOUGHT JULY 21ST, 1861.

OF BULL RUN,

257

[graphic]

the point where the road to
the right left the main road.

McDowell's Official
Report.

"By referring to the general order it will be seen that, while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's)

broken. But we had been fightMcDowell's Official ing since half past ten o'clock in Report. the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, although the long-stationed there. A reference to his report, and to est distance gone over was not more than nine and a half miles; and although they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were, therefore, without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.

"It was at this time that the enemy's reenforcements came to his aid from the railroadt rain, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army. They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and toward the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house on it, and there maintained tself until our men could get down to and cross the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.

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Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties. without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.

"Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as

that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, and in keeping in check a considerable part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particu. larly destructive.

At the time of our retreat, secing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columus of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed. After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, on the march, under the orders from the Division Commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defense across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in per son the command of this part of the army, I caused such disposition of the forces which had been added to by the First and Second NewJersey and the DeKalb regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve, before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the Ford as far as Cub Run, and owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.

"By sundown most of our men had got behind Centreville Ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and con sequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted -division and brigade commanders and staff-to

THE FIRST GREAT

SHORTCOMING.

259

admit of no alternative but to fall back, the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then in possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left. On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops. most of those who had come in from the front being

already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.

“At — o'clock, the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax Station leaving by the cars took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, stayed at Fairfax Court-House till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary. and worn-out soldiers were not left behind."

The Ensemble.

The first Great Shortcoming.

The plan of the battle was well ordered. If executed as it was planned, all might have gone favorably: by ten o'clock victory doubtless would have been won to the Federal arms, and the army never would have known the fearful fatigues of that six

hours' conflict. McDowell states that "there was delay in the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three hours, behind the time appointed—a great misfortune, as events turned out." It was indeed a great misfortune. The "delay" illustrates what already has been said of the want of experience-amounting, actually, to inefficiency of the leaders of that splendid host. The nature of, and the astonishing

This conveys a very good, length of time consumed by, that detention

of the divisions upon which the most important work of the day devolved, will be fully understood by reference to the citations of evidence, before the Investigating Committee, given in Appendix, page Instead of opening fire" by daybreak," as per General Order for the battle, Tyler's artillery was not ready for its work until half-past six o'clock;

if not vivid, idea of that day's work. It is the background of the crimson picture. The reports of division and brigade commanders came forward to fill in the central field, and to indicate the perspective gradations; while, crowded into the near foreground we have the innumerable records of sub-reports, newspaper narratives, letters from civilians and the stories of individual experiences-each and all of which throw into the picture great masses of color and strength of action, all toned, harmonized and distributed by the General-in-Command's matter-of-fact expression. The third paragraph gives (with the accompanying map) a correct exposition of the disposition of the several divisions; the fourth paragraph de-nity of Sudley's Spring (where it was to cross

fines the line of action adopted.*

It will be seen by reference to Beauregard's official report, as given in the Appendix, that the rebel commander was fully aware of McDowell's disposition of force and the programme for his advance. His (Beauregard's) forces were so disposed as to confront the Federals at the very point where they hoped to effect a partial surprise. How the rebel leader became so well informed respecting the programme of McDowell has never been explained. His (Beauregard's) report so speaks of the Federal movements, and adverts to the counter positions of his own brigades with such precision, as to leave no doubt of his possessing the fullest and most minute information from McDowell's headquarters. Official investigation has thrown no light upon this feature of the history.

and Hunter's division-which was to detour

to the north, three miles, (making a march of over seven miles,) to get at the enemy's left flank and rear, while Tyler should arrest

the rebels' attention in front, at the Warren

ton road bridge-did not leave Centreville until an hour after sunrise, nor reach the vici

Bull Run) until four hours later-so wretch-
edly were affairs affected by that simple
When the division
blocking up of a road.
arrived at Sudley's Spring, it was to find the
enemy in sight in heavy force. The rebels
had then become fully apprised of Tyler's
feint, and left his front to resist Hunter's ad-
vance. This fact is thus clearly stated in
the report of Beauregard :

"By half-past eight A. M., Colonel Evans having become satisfied of the counterfeit character of the movement on his front, and persuaded of an attempt to turn his left flank, decided to change his position to meet the enemy, and for this purpose immedi ately put in motion to his left and rear six companies of Sloan's Fourth South Carolina regiment, Wheat's Louisiana battalions, five companies, and two six-pounders of Latham's battery, leaving four

companies of Sloan's regiment under cover as the sole immediate defense of the Stone Bridge, but giving information to General Cocke of his change of position and the reasons that impelled it."

A Confederate Counter Stroke.

Hunter should have been over the stream and on the enemy before half-past eight, but was not; and had to fight his way to the position which he should have marched to, had the programme of orders been fulfilled. It was not well for the Federal fortunes of the day that the Confederates also experienced a disappointment, which forced the abandonment of a counter stroke against the Federal left. Beauregard stated: "In my opinion the most effective method of relieving that flank, (his left, which Hunter proposed to turn,) was by a rapid, determined attack with my right wing and centre on the enemy's flank and rear at Centreville, with due precautions against the advance of his reserves from the direction of Washington. By such a movement," he added, "I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by twelve o'clock M. These new dispositions were submitted to 'General Johnston, who fully approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued. Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet and Bonham, respectively, supported by their several appointed reserves. The cavalry, under Stuart and Radford, were to be held in hand, subject to future orders and ready for employment as might be required by the exigencies of the battle." This well-conceived assault only miscarried from the nonreception, by General Ewell, of his orders. Beauregard said:

"At half-past ten in the morning, however, this expectation was dissipated, from Brigadier-General 5 well informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried, but

that, in consequence of a communication from General D. R. Jones, he had just thrown his brigade

across the stream at Union Mills. But, in my judg. ment, it was now too late for the effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack; therefore, it became imme

diately necessary to depend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded with the sanction of General John. ston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle." The Federal commander, it will be seen by reference to his report (6th paragraph), had prepared for such a movement, though it is to be doubted if he anticipated the great strength of the demonstration. Had Ewell precipitated his forces upon Blackburn's, the have rendered it necessary for Tyler and extended length of McDowell's lines would Miles to have fought one battle while Hunter and Heintzelman fought another, three miles bility, have relieved his left, as hoped by away. Beauregard would not, in all probahim; for Tyler and Miles, with the brigade retained by McDowell from Heintzelman's division, as well as with Runyon's six regihave crushed Ewell, Jones and Longstreet, ments still in reserve, undoubtedly would with their lines exposed to the terrible artillery of Ayres, Carlisle, Edwards, Tidball, Hunt and Green. The assault would, also, have engaged a large portion of the Federal army, which was very fresh and well prepared for action-the fine brigades of Richardson, Davies, Schenck and Blenker-none of which were permitted to take part in the stubborn conflict going on over the stream.

Disposition of the

Brigades.

After the abandonment, by Beauregard, of his attempt upon the Federal left, he moved all his disposable forces up to the vicinity of the Warrenton road, and toward the Sudley's Spring crossing-throwing upon Hunter and Heintzelman the flower of his army. Tyler's brigades were, ere long, engaged Sherman and Keyes pressing, in the order named, over the river, while Schenck fought the enemy's strong batteries and supports which protected the Warrenton road bridge (Stone Bridge). This left Miles' command-composed of the brigades of Blenker, Richardson and Davies-at Centreville heights and on the Blackburn's Ford road, Richardson occupying his old position on the hill covering the Ford. Runyon was seven miles in the rear of Centreville, cover

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