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bed of the stream, and rendering it impenetrable lected for this purpose did not exceed twelve or to our boats, and requiring the labor of months to open it for navigation. The troops were engaged in this work most of the month of Feb

ruary.

fourteen thousand men. To withdraw the force of Weitzel from Berwick's Bay would open the La Fourche to the enemy, who had ten or fifteen thousand men upon the Teche, and the withdrawal During the operations on Bayou Plaquemine of the forces from New Orleans would expose and the Atchafalaya, news was received of the that city to the assault of the enemy from every capture by the enemy of the steamers "Queen point. The strength of the enemy at Port Hudof the West" and "De Soto," which had run son was then believed to be from eighteen to past the batteries at Vicksburg. This event was twenty thousand. It is now known, with abso deemed of sufficient importance, by Admiral Far-lute certainty, that the garrison on the night of ragut, to demand the occupation of the Missis- the fourteenth of March, 1863, was not less than sippi between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, by sixteen thousand effective troops. The staterunning the batteries on the river at Port Hud-ment of the General-in-Chief of the army in his son, in order to destroy these boats, and cut off report of the fifteenth of November, 1863, that, the enemy's communication by the Red River had our forces invested Port Hudson at this time, with Vicksburg and Port Hudson, thus accom- it could have been easily reduced, as its garrison plishing, by a swifter course, the object of our was weak, was without any just foundation. Incampaign west of the river. The army was formation received from Brigadier-General W. W. called upon to make a demonstration against the R. Beall, one of the officers in command of Port fortifications at Port Hudson, while the fleet Hudson at this time, as well as from other offi should run the batteries upon the river. All the cers, justifies this opinion. It was unadvisable, disposable force of the department was moved to therefore, to make an attack upon Port Hudson, Baton Rouge for this purpose, early in March. either by assault or siege, with any expectation On the thirteenth of March the troops moved out of a successful issue. Operations, therefore, on to the rear of Port Hudson, about twelve thou- the waters west of the Mississippi, were immedisand strong. The pickets of the enemy were ately resumed. encountered near Baton Rouge, and a consider- While at Baton Rouge, an attempt was made able force in the vicinity of Port Hudson, which to force a passage to the upper river, across a was quickly driven in. The army reached the point of land opposite to Port Hudson. This rear of the works on the night of the four-was successfully accomplished after some days, teenth, and made a demonstration as for an attack on the works the next morning. The arrangement between the Admiral and myself that the passage of the batteries by the navy should be attempted in the "gray of the morning," the army making a simultaneous attack on the fortifications in the rear. But affairs appearing to be more favorable to the fleet than was anticipated, the object was accomplished in the evening and during the night of the fourteenth. Naval history scarcely presents a more brilliant act than the passage of these formidable batteries. The army returned to Baton Rouge the next day, the object of the expedition having been announced, in General Orders, as completely accomplished. Our loss in this affair was very slight, the enemy not resisting us with any determination until we were in the vicinity of their outer works. Colonel John S. Clark, of my staff, received a wound while closely reconnoitring the position of the enemy, which disabled him from further participation in the campaign.

was,

but without establishing communication with the Admiral, who had moved to the Red River. In one of these expeditions, the chief signal officer and a party of his men were taken prisoners opposite Port Hudson.

Orders were given on the twenty-fifth of March to take up the line of march for Brashear City. The rebel steamers "Queen of the West" and

66

Webb" were reported at Butte à la Rose on the Atchafalaya, and it was understood that the enemy, supposing my command to be fixed at Port Hudson, threatened to move at once upon the Lafourche and New Orleans. Weitzel reached Brashear City on the eighth of April, and Grover and Emory on the ninth and tenth. They commenced crossing Berwick's Bay on the ninth. It was a very slow process, on account of the want of transportation; but Weitzel and Emory succeeded in crossing by dark on the tenth, their transportation and supplies being sent over the same night and the following morning. General Grover arrived on the tenth, in the Pending these general movements, a force un- evening, and his command was immediately put der command of Colonel Thomas S. Clark, of the on board the transports of my command, and Sixth Michigan volunteers, was sent out from sent up the Atchafalaya and Grand Lake to turn New Orleans to destroy the bridge at Ponchatou- the enemy's position; landing his force at Indian la, and a small force under Colonel F. S. Nicker- Bend, above Fort Bisland. It was estimated that son, of the Fourteenth Maine volunteers, to de- his movement and landing would require about stroy the enemy's communication by the Jackson twelve hours; but the difficulties of navigating Railroad, and the bridges on the Amite River. unknown rivers made his voyage longer than Both these objects were successfully accomplished. was anticipated. His boats could not come withEndeavors were made at this time to collect at in a mile and a quarter of the shore, on account Baton Rouge a sufficient force to justify an at- of shoal water, and he was obliged to use flattack upon Port Hudson, either by assault or boats to land his men and artillery. After Grosiege; but the utmost force that could be col-ver's departure, we advanced directly upon

Franklin, a distance of twenty miles, encountering Dwight pursued him nearly to Grand Ecore, so small bodies of the enemy during the march. On thoroughly dispersing him that he was unable to rethe thirteenth, we had advanced within four organize a respectable force until July, more than hundred yards of his works, on both sides of the five weeks after we had completed the investment Bayou Teche, driving him to his fortifications, of Port Hudson. During these operations on and destroying the gunboat "Diana," which he the Teche, we captured over two thousand prishad captured from us a short time before. This oners and twenty-two guns; destroyed three battle lasted the whole day. We captured many gunboats and eight steamers; captured large prisoners. Our troops were ready for an assault quantities of small arms, ammunition, mails, and upon the works in the evening; but it not being other public property, and the steamers "Ellen" certain that Grover had reached the position as- and "Cornie," which were of great service to us signed him for the purpose of intercepting the in the campaign. A letter from General Taylor, retreat of the enemy, it was deferred until the commanding at Fort Bisland, was captured with morning of the fourteenth. During the night, an officer of the "Queen of the West," which the enemy, learning of Grover's successful land- informed us that the enemy had contemplated ing, sent a large part of his force to attack him an attack upon our forces at Brashear City on at Irish Bend. The fight was very severe. The the twelfth of April, the day before the assault enemy was defeated, but Grover was unable to was made by us upon Fort Bisland; and a subget into such position as to cut off his retreat. sequent despatch from Governor Moore to General Early on the following morning the balance of the Taylor was intercepted by General Dwight, in enemy's forces evacuated Fort Bisland, which which Taylor was directed, in case he was purwas immediately occupied by our troops, and we sued beyond Alexandria, to fall back into Texas pursued the enemy with great vigor, capturing with such of his forces as he could keep together. many prisoners. The enemy's forces in this The purpose of the enemy in retreating up the affair were commanded by Generals Taylor, Sib- Teche was to draw off toward Texas, on our ley, and Mouton. They retreated toward Ope- left flank, for the purpose of cutting off our suplousas, making a strong resistance at Vermilion plies by the Teche. But the capture of Butte à Bayou, from which position they were quickly la Rose, enabled us to open a new line of comdriven. The gunboats, in the mean time, had munication, through the Atchafalaya and Courtaencountered the steamer "Queen of the West" bleu, direct to Washington and Barre's Landing, on Grand Lake, destroying her and capturing within six miles of Opelousas; and upon reaching her officers and crew. Alexandria, we were enabled to establish a third line of communication by the Atchafalaya and Red Rivers. These were interior waters, wholly inaccessible to the enemy, and made perfectly safe lines of communication during our occupation of that country.

We reached Opelousas on the twentieth of April, the enemy retreating toward Alexandria in disorder, and destroying the bridges in his flight. The same day the gunboats, under command of Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, assisted by four companies of infantry, captured the works at Butte à la Rose, which contained two heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition, and was garrisoned by a force of sixty men, all of whom were captured. These works constituted the key of the Atchafalaya, and being in our possession, opened the way to Red River.

On the second of May we established communication with Admiral Farragut at the mouth of Red River, through the Atchafalaya, by the gunboat "Arizona," Captain Upton commanding, accompanied by Captain R. T. Dunham, of my

staff.

The fifth of May, our headquarters at Opelousas were broken up, and the troops moved for Alexandria, a distance of from ninety to one hundred miles, making this march in three days and four hours. Moving rapidly to the rear of Fort De Russey, a strong work on Red River, we compelled the immediate evacuation of that post by the enemy, and enabled the fleet of gunboats, under Admiral Porter, to pass up to Alexandria without firing a guh. The army reached Alexandria the ninth of May, in the evening, the navy having reached there the morning of the same day. The enemy continued his retreat in the direction of Shreveport.

In order to completely disperse the forces of the enemy, a force under Generals Weitzel and

While at Brashear City, I had received a despatch from Admiral Farragut, by Mr. Gabaudau, his secretary, informing me that General Grant would send twenty thousand men by the first of May, through the Tensas, Black, and Red Rivers, for the purpose of uniting with us in the reduction of Port Hudson. It was felt that this reenforcement was necessary, and would secure the speedy reduction of that position. On reaching Alexandria, I received two despatches from General Grant, one dated the twenty-third of April, stating that he could spare us a reenforcement of twenty thousand men if we could supply them; and the other, dated the fifth of May, proposing to send one army corps to Bayou Sara by the twenty-fifth of May, and asking that I should then send all the troops I could spare to Vicksburg, after the reduction of Port Hudson. To both. of these plans I consented, and answered, that we could supply them from New Orleans, and that this force would insure the capture of Port Hudson. But I was afterward informed by a despatch, dated Auburn, May tenth, which I received May twelfth, that he had crossed the Mississippi, landing his forces at Grand Gulf, and was then in close pursuit of the enemy, under such circumstances that he could not retrace his steps, nor send me the forces he had contemplated, and requesting me to join his command at

works at Port Hudson. a distance of fifteen miles - on the twenty-fourth of May.

Major-General C. C. Augur, commanding the forces at Baton Rouge, about three thousand five hundred men, had been directed to effect a junction with our forces in the rear of Port Hudson. He encountered the enemy at Plain's store, about four miles from Port Hudson, repulsing him with a loss of one hundred and fifty killed, wounded, and prisoners, and effected a junction with the rest of our forces on the twenty-fifth. Our right wing, under Generals Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight, who had succeeded General Emory, encountered the enemy outside of his works on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, and, after a very sharp fight, drove him to his outer line of intrenchments. On the twenty-fifth, the junction of all the forces having been completed, the works of the enemy were invested.

Vicksburg. This change in his plans was a cause of serious embarrassment. There were three courses open to my command: first, to pursue the enemy to Shreveport, which would be without public advantage, as his army had been captured or completely routed; second, to join General Grant at Vicksburg; and third, to invest Port Hudson with such forces as I had at my command. It was impossible for me to move my forces to General Grant at Vicksburg, for want of sufficient water transportation. I had barely steamers enough to put my troops across Berwick's Bay and the Atchafalaya, and on the morning after the passage of the bay, when our forces had turned the enemy's position, and the troops under Emory and Weitzel had advanced directly upon his works, there was not a single boat of any kind left with which I could communicate with Brashear City across the bay. It seemed impossible for me, at that time, to trans- Preparations were immediately made for an port any portion of my troops and artillery to assault. Rumors had been circulated, for several General Grant, without leaving my trains, and days previous, that the enemy had abandoned the six thousand fugitive negroes who had come position, and it was impossible to obtain definite within our lines, to the chances of capture by the information of his strength. It was generally enemy. Besides, it was perfectly clear that, in supposed, however, that the force had been the event of the movement of my forces to Vicks- greatly diminished, and that an assault would reburg, unless that post should immediately fall, sult in its capture. A very thorough preparation the rebel garrison at Port Hudson, then sixteen was made on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth; to eighteen thousand strong, would prevent our and on the twenty-seventh of May, a desperate communication with New Orleans, and, in the attack upon the works was made - Generals event of any disaster by which we should be de- Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight commanding our tained at Vicksburg, would hold that city at its right, General Augur the centre, and General T. mercy. The force west of the Mississippi, which W. Sherman the left. The plan of attack conI had dispersed, would reorganize by reenforce- templated simultaneous movements on the right ments from Texas, and move directly upon the and left of our lines. The attack upon the right Lafourche, and Algiers, opposite New Orleans, commenced with vigor early in the morning both of which were nearly defenceless. This Had the movement upon the left been executed was so apparent to my mind, that I felt that a at the same time, it is possible the assault compliance with the request of General Grant might have been successful. But the garrison would result in the loss of my trains, the recap- was much stronger than had been represented, ture of the negroes who were following the army, and the enemy was found able to defend his and the probable loss of New Orleans. This works at all points. The conduct of the troops conclusion was justified by the subsequent inva- was admirable, and most important advantages sion and occupation of the west bank of the were gained, which contributed to the success of river, and a most desperate attack by the Louisi- | all subsequent movements. At one time our adana and Texas forces, twelve thousand strong, on the works at Donaldsonville, the twenty-eighth of June. I therefore concluded to move immediately against Port Hudson, and to take my chances for the reduction of that post. To avoid mistake, I directed Brigadier-General William Dwight to report our condition to General Grant in person, and solicit his counsel. General Dwight returned with the advice that I attack Port Hudson without delay, and that he would send me five thousand men, but that I should not wait for them.

vance had reached the interior line of the enemy, but were unable to hold their position. Nothing but the assault would have satisfied the troops of the presence or strength of the enemy and his works. Our loss in this engagement was two hundred and ninety-three killed, and one thousand five hundred and forty-nine wounded. We were unable to estimate with accuracy the loss of the enemy, but it was very severe. In one regiment, the Fifteenth Arkansas, out of two hundred and ninety-two officers and men, the My command moved from Alexandria on the loss sustained during the siege, according to a fourteenth and fifteenth of May, a portion going history of the defence by a rebel officer, was one down the river, and the remainder marching by hundred and thirty-two, of whom seventy-six fell land to Simmsport, crossing the Atchafalaya at on the twenty-seventh of May. The force of that point with great difficulty, by means of our the enemy within the fortifications numbered transports and the steamers we had captured, and from seven to eight thousand, with two thousand from thence moved down the right bank of the five hundred cavalry in our rear at Clinton, and a Mississippi to Bayou Sara, crossing the Mis- small force on the west side of the river, comsissippi at that point on the night of the twenty-manding a point opposite the enemy's batteries; third, and moving directly upon the enemy's making, all together, between ten and eleven

tain operations of the siege were commenced.

thousand men engaged in the defence of the of great importance; but it was now felt that our position inside and outside the works. The force was unequal to the task of carrying the operations in the Teche country, with the losses works by assault, and the slower but more cersustained in battle, and sickness occasioned by rapid and exhausting marches, had reduced my The fighting had been incessant, night and day, effective force to less than thirteen thousand, in- for a period of twenty-one days and nights, givcluding Augur's command. Of these, twenty ing the enemy neither rest nor sleep. During regiments were nine months' men, whose terms these operations, the nine months' men, whose began to expire in May, and all expired in Au- term had expired, or was about to expire, were gust. This was not an adequate force for the dissatisfied with their situation, and unwilling capture of the place. There ought not to have to enter upon duty involving danger. Great been less than three to one for this purpose. The embarrassment and trouble was caused by the force that we had anticipated receiving from Gen- conduct of some of these troops, one regiment eral Grant, promised in the several communica- the Fourth Massachusetts-being in open mutions to which I have referred, would have enabled us on the twenty-seventh, beyond any question, to have completed the capture of the works and garrison, when we could have immediately moved to Vicksburg, to aid him in his attack on that place, without exposing New Orleans, or any other post on the lower Mississippi, to capture by the enemy.

tiny.

The siege operations were pursued with the greatest vigor. On the right we had completed our saps up to the very line of the enemy's fortifications. On the left a mine had been prepared for a charge of thirty barrels of powder, in such position as made the destruction of the "Citadel" inevitable.

Communication had been regular with General Grant at Vicksburg during the progress of the siege, and on the sixth of July we received information of the surrender of that post. MajorGeneral Frank Gardner, in command of the post, asked for an official statement of the report of the capture of Vicksburg, which had been circu

On the night of the twenty-seventh, the army rested within rifle-shot of the enemy's works, and commenced the construction of works of defence. The enemy's interior line extended from four to five miles, from river to river. The line occupied by us necessarily covered from seven to eight miles. Our greater length of line made the enemy equal, if not superior, in numbers, in any at-lated throughout his command, and I sent him a tack that could be made by us upon them.

From the night of the twenty-seventh of May until the fourteenth of June we occupied this line. Another partially successful assault was then made. An incessant and harassing fire was kept up upon the enemy night and day, leaving him without rest or sleep. On the tenth of June a heavy artillery fire was kept up, and at three o'clock in the morning of the eleventh we endeavored to get within attacking distance of the works, in order to avoid the terrible losses incurred in moving over the ground in front of the works. But the enemy discovered the movement before daybreak. A portion of the troops worked their way through the abatis to the lines, but were repulsed with the loss of several prisoners.

The fourteenth of June a second general assault was made at daybreak. A column of a division was posted on the left, under General Dwight, with the intention of getting an entrance to the works by passing a ravine, while the main attack on the right was made by the commands of Grover and Weitzel. Neither column was successful in fully gaining its object, but our lines were advanced from a distance of three hundred yards to distances of from fifty to two hundred yards from the enemy's line of fortifications, where the troops intrenched themselves, and commenced the construction of new batteries. On the left an eminence was gained which commanded a strong point held by the enemy, called the "Citadel," and which later enabled us to get possession of a point of the same bluff upon which the Citadel was constructed, within ten yards of the enemy's lines. This day's work was

copy of that portion of the official despatch of General Grant relating to the surrender of Vicksburg, and received, on the night of the sixth of July, a request that there might be a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an agreement of terms of a surrender. This was declined. He then made known, officially, his determination to surrender the post and garrison. A conference was appointed to agree upon the terms, which resulted in the unconditional surrender of the works and garrison, which was formally executed on the eighth of July, and our troops entered and took possession of the works on the morning of the ninth. General Gardner, in commending the gallantry of his men for their unwearied labors in the defence, which all our troops readily acknowledged, stated emphatically, as if he desired it to be understood, that his surrender was not on account of the fall of Vicksburg, or the want of ammunition or provisions, but from the exhaustion of his men, who had been without rest for more than six weeks, and who could not resist another attack. Though they might have held out a day or two longer, the attempt would have been at the expense of a useless effusion of blood.

During the investment and siege of Port Hudson, the enemy west of the Mississippi had been concentrating, and on the eighteenth of June, one regiment of infantry, and two of cavalry, under command of Colonel Major, captured and burned two of our small steamers at Plaquemine, taking sixty-eight prisoners, mostly convalescents, of the Twenty-eighth Maine volunteers. The same force then passed down the river and Bayou Lafourche, avoiding Donaldsonville, and attacked

and the fourteenth of June, sustaining, besides,, several desperate sorties of the enemy, particu larly directed against them, with bravery and success. The new regiments of General Ullmarc's brigade, which had been raised during the campaign, also shared the labors of the siege and the honors of the final victory.

our forces on the twentieth, at Lafourche, cross- During the siege the colored troops held the ing on the Opelousas Railway, cutting off commu- extreme right of our line on the river, and shared nication between Brashear City and New Orleans. in all the dangers of the twenty-seventh of May They were, however, finally repulsed; but renewed their attack on the twenty-first, which resulted in their again being repulsed, leaving fifty-three of their dead upon the field, and sixteen prisoners in our hands. Our loss was eight killed and sixteen wounded. Reenforcements were sent from New Orleans, but the enemy did not renew the attack. Our forces were under Colonel B. F. Grierson, commanding the Sixth command of Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Stickney, and Seventh regiments of Illinois cavalry, arrived Forty-seventh Massachusetts volunteers. Sub- at Baton Rouge, in April, from La Grange, Tensequently, they fell back to Algiers. Orders had nessee, and joined us with his force at Port Hudbeen sent to Brashear City to remove all stores, son, covering our rear during the siege, and reand hold the position, with the aid of the gunboats dering most important services. His officers and to the last. But the enemy succeeded in crossing men were constantly on duty, regardless of toil Grand Lake by means of rafts, and surprised and and danger. They covered our foraging parties, captured the garrison on the twenty-second of dispersed the cavalry forces of the enemy, when June, consisting of about three hundred men, they concentrated, and contributed in a great detwo thirty pounder Parrott guns, and six twenty-gree to the reduction of the post. Our deficiency four pounders. The enemy, greatly increased in in cavalry made his assistance of the utmost im numbers, then attacked the works at Donaldson-portance. With the exception of this command, ville, on the Mississippi, which were defended by much reduced by long journeys, our mounted force a garrison of two hundred and twenty-five men, consisted chiefly of infantry mounted on the including convalescents, commanded by Major J. horses of the country collected during the camD. Bullen, Twenty-eighth Maine volunteers. paign. The attack was made at half past four in the morning of the twenty-eighth of June, and lasted until daylight. The garrison made a splendid defence, killing and wounding more than their own number, and capturing as many officers, and nearly as many men as their garrison numbered. The enemy's troops were under command of General Greene, of Texas, and consisted of the Louisiana troops under General Taylor, and five thousand Texas cavalry, making a force of nine to twelve thousand in all that vicinity. The troops engaged in these different operations left but four hundred men in New Orleans. The vigor and strength of the enemy in these several attacks show that, with the aid of the garrison at Port Hudson, New Orleans could not have been defended, had my command been involved in the operations against Vicksburg.

Upon the surrender of Port Hudson, it was found that the enemy had established batteries below on the river, cutting off our communication with New Orleans, making it necessary to send a large force to dislodge them. The troops, exhausted by the labors of the long campaign, including nine months' men and the regiments of colored troops, which had been organized, during the campaign, from the negroes of the country, did It

not number ten thousand effective men.
was impossible to drive the enemy from the river
below and leave troops enough at Port Hudson to
maintain the position and guard between six and
seven thousand prisoners. For these reasons,
the privates were paroled, and the officers sent to
New Orleans.

On the ninth of July, seven transports, containing all my available force, were sent below against the enemy, in the vicinity of Donaldsonville. The country was speedily freed from his presence, and Brashear City was recaptured on the twenty-second of July.

The cooperation of the fleet under Rear Admiral Farragut, on the waters west of the Mississippi, as well as at Port Hudson, was harmonious and effective, and contributed greatly to the success of our arms. A battery of heavy guns was established in the rear of the works, by one of the officers of the navy, the fire of which was most constant and effective.

The signal corps, under command of Captain Rowley, and subsequently under Captain Roe, and the telegraphic corps, under Captain Bulkley, rendered every assistance possible to these branches of the service. By means of signals and telegraphs, a perfect communication was maintained at all times, night and day, between the fleet and the army, and with the different portions of the army.

The rebels admitted, after the close of the siege, that they had lost in killed and wounded, during the siege, six hundred and ten men; but they underrated the number of prisoners and guns they surrendered, and their loss in killed and wounded was larger than was admitted by them. It could not have been less than eight hundred or one thousand men. Five hundred men were found in the hospitals. The wounds were mostly in the head, from the fire of sharpshooters, and very severe. A small portion of the troops composing the garrison at Port Hudson were ordered to Vicksburg, to strengthen the command of General Pemberton, subsequent to the attack in March. This gave rise to the report that the place had been evacuated; and it was only after the unsuccessful assaults of the twenty-seventh of May and fourteenth of June, that the strength of the fortifications and garrison was appreciated, and all parties were satisfied that our force was insufficient to effect the capture by assault. The uncertainty as to the movements of Johnston's command, which was known to be in the.rear of

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