and Raccoon Ford roads, and orders were sent to the Fifth and Sixth corps to move over toward Robertson's Tavern, which order was executed by daylight the next morning, twentyeighth ultimo. On this day (the twenty-eighth) disposition was made to attack the enemy, but on driving in his pickets it was found he had retired during the night. Pursuit was immediate by the enemy; that the left-hand road led to Robertson's Tavern, and also in the direction of Warren's firing, which he plainly heard. For these reasons General Prince was satisfied he should take the left-hand road, and so reported to General French, and awaited orders. After a delay of two hours, he was finally ordered to take the other road, which he did, his skirmishers soon encountering the enemy. He there rely made, the Second corps in advance, when, ports he was ordered to cease operations, as he was on the wrong road; and after another delay, he was again ordered forward with the information that he was on the right road. Soon after advancing the second time, Carr's division being deployed on his left, the enemy opened a warm fire, and General Prince reports his line fell back a short distance, till they uncovered a battery he had posted in the only open ground that was in the rear. The line rallied and re-formed behind the battery, the fire from which checked the advancing enemy, when the line advanced to its former position and halted, the action ceasing, as it was then dark. General Carr, on the left of General Prince, had one of his brigades driven back, and his other brigades relieved by Birney's division after exhausting their ammunition. Birney's division, formed in rear of Carr's, soon relieved the latter, repulsing all the attacks of the enemy, and finally, toward dark, advancing its line of skirmishers over the battle-field. after a march of about two miles, the enemy was found in position on the west bank of Mine Run. A severe storm of rain had set in, delaying the marching of the troops, particularly the artillery, and preventing a position being taken up till after dark, at which time the Second, Sixth, First, and part of the Third corps were in line fronting the enemy. A reconnoissance of the enemy's position showed it to be extremely formidable. The western bank of Mine Run, with an elevation of over one hundred feet, had a gentle and smooth slope to the creek, averaging over a thousand yards of cleared ground. The summit, on which was the enemy's line of battle, was already crowned with infantry parapets, abattis, epaulements for batteries. The creek itself was a considerable obstacle, in many places swampy and impassable. A careful examination, made personally and by engineer officers, convinced me there was no probability of success in an attack in our immediate front in the I have been thus minute in the details of the vicinity of the turnpike. It was therefore demovements of the Third corps, because in my termined, on the evening of the twenty-eighth, opinion the unnecessary delay in the progress of to send Major-General Warren, with the Second this corps, and the failure to attack the enemy as corps and a division of the Sixth corps, to move soon as he was encountered, deploying to the to our left, to feel for the enemy's right flank, left, and allowing the Sixth corps to pass, and and turn him, if practicable; at the same time continue the line to Warren, was the cause orders were given to each corps commander to that a junction of the centre and right columns critically examine his front, and ascertain the was not made early in the morning of the twen- practicability of an assault. The twenty-ninth ty-seventh, and was one of the primary causes was spent in the reconnoissance and the moveof the failure of the whole movement. In con- ment of General Warren. About six P.M. Brisequence of this delay, Warren remained on the gadier-General Wright, commanding division in defensive all day, and toward evening, being the Sixth corps, reported to me he had discovered pressed by the enemy, and I being anxious to a point, on our extreme right, where the obstacles hold Robertson's Tavern, the centre and key- to be overcome were much less than in our impoint of my position, sent orders for the First mediate front, and where an assault, he thought, corps to move over from the plank-road to the was practicable with inconsiderable loss. support of Warren, the corps arriving at Robert- the same time Captain Michler, engineer, reportson's Tavern about dark of the twenty-seventh. ed that an assault in front of the Third corps, The Fifth corps moved early in the morning though hazardous, was not impracticable. I also after a slight delay to permit Gregg's division of learned from Major Ludlow, A. D. C., just recavalry to precede it on the plank-road. Gregg turned from General Warren's column, that Genadvanced as far as Hope Church, where he had eral Warren had moved up the plank-road, driva severe engagement with the enemy's cavalry, ing in the enemy's skirmishers, till he developed in which he was successful in driving them, un- their line of battle, and had taken a position til they were strongly reënforced by infantry, which outflanked the enemy, and from which when Gregg fell back, and was relieved by Major- there was no difficulty of assaulting and turning General Sykes, commanding the Fifth corps, who the enemy's flank. These favorable reports by this time had been advised of the failure of caused me to decide on making three assaultsthe Third corps to connect with the Second, and one on the enemy's left flank, with the Sixth and who was accordingly instructed not to advance Fifth corps; one in the centre, with the Third beyond the crossing of the road from Robertson's and First corps; and one on the enemy's right, Tavern, near which is Hope Church. From the by the force under General Warren, consisting reports of the force in front of Major-Generals of the Second corps and one division of the French and Warren, there was reason to believe Sixth. At eight P.M., General Warren reported the enemy were concentrating on the turnpike in person, confirming all Major Ludlow had re At ported, and expressing such confidence in his ability to carry every thing before him, as to induce him to give the opinion that he did not believe the enemy would remain over night, so completely did he command him. less to make any attack. It was too late to move the troops back and make an attack on the centre that day, and General Warren was already so far separated from the right, that his movement to turn the enemy's right could not The earnest confidence that General Warren be continued without moving up the rest of the expressed of his ability to carry every thing be- army in support, and abandoning the turnpike fore him, and the reliance I placed on that offi- road, our main line of communications. Nothcer's judgment, together with the fact that ing further could be done this day, and at night Major-General French had given an adverse the two divisions of the Third corps returned to opinion to assaulting in his front, induced me to the centre, and the Fifth and Sixth corps remodify my plan so far as to abandon the centre turned to their former positions. It was then attack, and reënforce Warren's column with two reported to me that the opening of our batteries divisions of the Third corps, which would give in the morning had exposed to the enemy our him six divisions-nearly half the infantry force threatened attack on his left, and that he could under my command; orders were accordingly be seen strengthening the position by earthissued to that effect. The batteries of the cen- work, abattis, putting guns in position, etc., so tre and right were to open at eight o'clock, at that by night-fall the chances of success had which time Warren was to make the main at- been materially diminished; and knowing he tack, and at nine o'clock Sedgwick was to assault would work all night, I felt satisfied that by with his column; and when these attacks proved morning the proposed point of attack, which successful, the three divisions of the Third and had been weak, would be as strong as any other First corps, left to hold the centre, would assault part of his line. Under these circumstances, I in conjunction with the others, after making de- could see no other course to pursue than either monstrations in their fronts at eight o'clock. to hazard an assault, which I knew to be hopeThe division of cavalry, commanded by Briga- less, and which I believed would be attended dier-General Gregg, held the plank-road in rear with certain disaster, or acknowledging the of the infantry, and repulsed several attempts whole movement a failure, withdraw the army of the enemy's cavalry to break through his to the south bank of the Rapidan. To have atlines, for the purpose of reaching our communi- tempted any further flank movement would have cations. The division of cavalry commanded by required the abandoning the turnpike and plankBrigadier-General Custer, charged with the duty roads, and involved the necessity of bringing of holding the upper fords of the Rapidan, was across the river and up to my lines the supplyvery active, and crossed the river and followed trains of the army, which till now had remained up the enemy wherever he fell back from his at Richardsville. I was precluded from attemptworks. On the thirtieth, the batteries opened ing this by the knowledge that a day's storm at eight o'clock A.M.; the skirmishers of the First would prevent this train and the artillery from and Third corps advanced across Mine Run, and returning, and that in the event of disaster, I drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and every should have to abandon both. Besides, an inpreparation was made by Sedgwick for his at- spection of the map will show that all the roads tack, having moved his column during the night, in this part of the country run nearly east and and massed them out of view of the enemy. west, connecting Gordonsville and Orange CourtWhen about ten minutes before nine I received House with Fredericksburgh; whereas, in mova despatch from General Warren to the effecting in around the enemy I should have to take a "that the position and strength of the enemy seem so formidable in my present front, that I advise against making the attack here. The full light of the sun shows me I cannot succeed." The staff-officer who brought this despatch fur ther reported that General Warren had suspended his attack, and would not make it without further orders. As Sedgwick's attack was subsidiary to Warren's, and as owing to Warren's confidence of the night before, I had given him so large a part of the army, that I had not the means of supporting Sedgwick in case of a repulse, or reenforcing him in the event of success, I was obliged to suspend the attack of Sedgwick on the enemy's left, which I did just in time, and immediately proceeded to General Warren's column, some four miles distant, in the hope of arranging some plan by which the two attacks might yet take place in the afternoon. I reached General Warren between nine and ten A.M., and found his views were unchangeable, and that it was his decided opinion it was hope southerly direction, and would be obliged to make roads across the country, not only the work of time, but at this period of frosts, from the character of the soil, impracticable. In full view of the consequences, after mature deliberation, I determined to withdraw the army. But for the restrictions imposed upon me by the General-in-Chief, I should in retiring have taken up a position in front of Fredericksburgh, and I cannot but think that substantial advantages would have resulted from such a disposition of the army. I am free to admit that the movement across the Rapidan was a failure; but I respectfully submit that the causes of this failure, à careful perusal of the foregoing report will show, were beyond my control. I maintain my plan was a feasible one. Had the columns made the prog ress I anticipated, and effected a junction on the night of the twenty-sixth, at and near Robertson's Tavern, the advance the next day would either have passed the formidable position of Mine Run without opposition, or had Ewell attempted to check the movement, he would have been overwhelmed before reënforced by Hill. Prisoners reported that Hill did not come up till the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, so that if the movements of the Third corps had been prompt and vigorous on the twenty-seventh, assisted by the Sixth and Second, there was every teenth, 1862, and the surbordinate reports apper. } COMMUNICATION FROM SECRETARY OF WAR. CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, VA., Dec. 21, 1863. To His Excellency the President: for the information of Congress, General Lee's SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit, report of operations of the army of Northern Virginia, from the date of his assumption of command to and including the battle of Fredericksburgh, December thirteenth, 1863, and the subordinate reports appertaining thereto. reason to believe Ewell could have been overcome before the arrival of Hill. And after the enemy, through these culpable delays, had been permitted to concentrate on Mine Run, I have reason to believe, but for the unfortunate error of judgment of Major-General Warren, my original plan of attack in three columns would have This includes the report of operations before been successful, or at least, under the view I Richmond, submitted at the last session, but took of it, would certainly have been tried. It procured from the congressional files, that the may be said I should not depend upon the judg- consecutive narrative might be formed in accordment of others; but it is impossible a command-ance with General Lee's written request. ing general can reconnoitre in person a line of I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient JAMES A. SEDDON, over seven miles in extent, and act on his own servant, Secretary of War. judgment as to the expediency of attacking or not. Again it may be said, that the effort should have been made to test the value of my judgment, or, in other words, I should encounter what I believed to be certain defeat so as to prove conclusively that victory was impossible. Considering how sacred is the trust of the lives of the brave men under my command, but, willing as I am to shed their blood, and my own where duty requires and my judgment dictates that the sacrifice will not be in vain, I cannot be a party to a wanton slaughter of my troops for any mere personal end. The reports of the corps commanders, with those of such of the division commanders as accompany them, together with the list of the casualties, are all herewith submitted, except those from the cavalry, not yet received. I also send a sketch prepared by the engineer, showing the routes taken by each column. The point marked Widow Morris is where the roads fork, the left-hand fork being the one the Third corps should have taken. The point marked "Tom Morris" is the scene of the action of the twenty-seventh ultimo. Very respectfully, etc., GEORGE G. MEADE, Doc. 13. GENERAL LEE'S REPORT. HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA, March 6, 1863. General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va. : SIR: After the battle of Seven Pines, the Federal army, under General McClellan, preparatory to an advance upon Richmond, proceeded to fortify its position on the Chickahominy, and to perfect the communications, with its base of supplies near the head of York River. Its left was established south of the Chickahominy, between White Oak Swamp and New Bridge, defended by a line of strong works, access to which, except by a few narrow roads, was obstructed by felling the dense forests in front. These roads were commanded for a great distance by the heavy guns in the fortifications. The right wing lay north of the Chickahominy, extending beyond Mechanicsville, and the approaches from the south side were strongly defended by intrenchments. Our army was around Richmond. The divisions of Huger and Magruder, supported by those of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, in front of the enemy's left, and that of A. P. Hill extending from Magruder's left beyond Meadow Bridge. The command of General Jackson, including Ewell's division, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, had succeeded in diverting the army of McDowell, at Fredericksburgh, from uniting with that of McClellan. To render this diversion more decided, and effectually mask OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY. his withdrawal from the valley at the proper OFFICIAL CONFEDERATE REPORTS. MESSAGE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. RICHMOND, VA., December 28, 1863. To the Senate and House of Representatives: I HEREWITH transmit for your information a communication from the Secretary of War, covering General Lee's report of the operations of the army of Northern Virginia, from the date of his assumption of command to and including the battle of Fredericksburgh, December thir time, Jackson, after the defeat of Fremont and Shields, was reënforced by Whiting's division, composed of Hood's Texas brigade and his own, under Colonel Law, from Richmond, and that of Lawton, from the South. The intention of the enemy seemed to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. The strength of his left wing rendered a direct assault injudicious if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to cross the Chickahominy and Mechanicsville. After a sharp conflict, he drove operate on the north bank. By sweeping down the enemy from his intrenchments, and forced the river on that side, and threatening his com- him to take refuge in his works, on the left bank munications with York River, it was thought of Beaver Dam, about a mile distant. This posithat the enemy would be compelled to retreat or tion was a strong one, the banks of the creek in give battle out of his intrenchments. The plan front being high and almost perpendicular, and was submitted to his Excellency the President, the approach to it over open fields, commanded who was repeatedly on the field in the course of by the fire of artillery and infantry intrenched its execution. While preparations were in prog- on the opposite side. The difficulty of crossing ress, a cavalry expedition, under General Stuart, the stream had been increased by felling the was made around the rear of the Federal army, woods on its banks and destroying the bridges. to ascertain its position and movements. This Jackson being expected to pass Beaver Dam was executed with great address and daring by above, and turn the enemy's right, a direct atthat accomplished officer. As soon as the defen- tack was not made by General Hill. One of his sive works were sufficiently advanced, General regiments on the left of his line crossed the creek Jackson was directed to move rapidly and se- to communicate with Jackson, and remained uncretly from the valley, so as to arrive in the til after dark, when it was withdrawn. Longvicinity of Ashland by the twenty-fourth of street and D. H. Hill crossed the Mechanicsville June. The enemy appeared to be unaware of bridge as soon as it was uncovered and could be our purpose, and on the twenty-sixth attacked repaired; but it was late before they reached the General Huger, on the Williamsburgh road, with north bank of the Chickahominy. D. H. Hill's the intention, as appeared by a despatch from leading brigade, under Ripley, advanced to the General McClellan, of securing his advance to- support of the troops engaged, and at a late hour ward Richmond. The effort was successfully united with Pender's brigade, of A. P. Hill's diresisted and our line maintained. vision, in an effort to turn the enemy's left; but the troops were unable, in the growing darkness, to overcome the obstructions, and after sustaining a destructive fire of musketry and artillery at short-range, were withdrawn. The fire was continued until about nine P.M., when the engagement ceased. Our troops retained the ground on the right bank, from which the enemy had been driven. Ripley was relieved at three P.M. on the twenty-seventh by two of Longstreet's brigades, which were subsequently reënforced. In expectation of Jackson's arrival on the enemy's right, the battle was renewed at dawn, and continued with animation for about two hours, during which the passage of the creek was attempted, and our troops forced their way to its banks, where their progress was arrested by the nature of the stream. They maintained their position, while preparations were being made to cross at another point nearer the Chickahominy. Before they were completed, Jackson crossed Beaver Dam above, and the enemy abandoned his intrenchments and retired rapidly down the river, destroying a great deal of property, but leaving much in his deserted camps. BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE. According to the general order of battle, a copy of which is annexed, General Jackson was to march from Ashland on the twenty-fifth, in the direction of Slash Church, encamping for the night west of the Central Railroad, and to advance at three A.M. on the twenty-sixth, and turn Beaver Dam. A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, when Jack son's advance beyond that point should be known, and move directly upon Mechanicsville. As soon as the Mechanicsville bridge should be uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the latter to proceed to the support of Jackson, and the former to that of A. P. Hill. The four commands were directed to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy, toward the York River Railroad, Jackson on the left and in advance, Longstreet nearest the river and in the rear. Huger and Magruder were ordered to hold their positions against any assault of the enemy, to observe his movements, and follow him closely should he retreat. General Stuart, with the cavalry, was thrown out on Jackson's left, to guard his flank, and give notice of the enemy's movements. Brigadier-General Pendleton was directed to employ the reserve artillery so as to resist any approach of the enemy toward Richmond, to superintend that portion of it posted to aid in the operations on the north bank, and hold the remainder ready for use when it might be required. In consequence of unavoidable delays, the whole of General Jackson's command did not arrive at Ashland in time to enable him to reach the point designated on the twenty-fifth. His march on the twenty-sixth was consequently longer than had been anticipated, and his progress being also retarded by the enemy, A. P. Hill did not begin his movement until three P.M., hen he crossed the river and advanced upon BATTLE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY. After repairing the bridges over Beaver Dam, the several columns resumed their march, as nearly as possible, as prescribed in the order. Jackson, with whom D. H. Hill had united, bore to the left in order to cut off reënforcements to the enemy, or intercept his retreat in that direction. Longstreet and A. P. Hill moved nearer the Chickahominy. Many prisoners were taken in their progress, and the conflagrations of wagons and stores marked the way of the retreating army. Longstreet and Hill reached the vicinity of New-Bridge about noon. It was ascertained that the enemy had taken a position behind Powhite Creek, prepared to dispute our progress. He oc cupied a range of hills, with his right resting in feint must be converted into an attack. He rethe vicinity of McGehee's house, and his left solved, with characteristic promptness, to carry near that of Dr. Gaines, on a wooded bluff, which the heights by assault. His column was quickly rose abruptly from a deep ravine. The ravine formed near the open ground, and as his preparwas filled with sharp-shooters, to whom its banks ations were completed Jackson arrived, and his gave protection. A second line of infantry was right division, that of Whiting, took position on stationed on the side of the hill, behind a breast- the left of Longstreet. At the same time D. H. work of trees, above the first. A third occupied Hill formed on our extreme left, and after a short the crest, strengthened with rifle-trenches, and but bloody conflict, forced his way through the crowned with artillery. The approach to this morass and obstructions, and drove the enemy position was over an open plain, about a quarter from the woods on the opposite side. Ewell adof a mile wide, commanded by this triple line of vanced on Hill's right and engaged the enemy fire, and swept by the heavy batteries south of furiously. The first and fourth brigades of the Chickahominy. In front of his centre and Jackson's own division filled the interval be right the ground was generally open, bounded tween Ewell and A. P. Hill. The second and on the side of our approach by a wood, with dense third were sent to the right. The arrival of these and tangled undergrowth, and traversed by a fresh troops enabled A. P. Hill to withdraw some sluggish stream, which converted the soil into a of his brigades, wearied and reduced by their deep morass. The woods on the further side of long and arduous conflict. The line being now the swamp were occupied by sharp-shooters, and complete, a general advance from right to left was trees had been felled to increase the difficulty of ordered. On the right the troops moved forward its passage and detain our advancing columns, with steadiness, unchecked by the terrible fire under the fire of infantry, massed on the slopes from the triple lines of infantry on the hill, and of the opposite hills, and of their batteries on the cannon on both sides of the river, which their crests. Pressing on toward the York River burst upon them as they emerged upon the plain. Railroad, A. P. Hill, who was in advance, reached The dead and wounded marked the way of their the vicinity of New Cold Harbor about two P.M., intrepid advance; the brave Texans leading, where he encountered the enemy. He immedi- closely followed by their no less daring comrades. ately formed his line nearly parallel to the road The enemy were driven from the ravine to the leading from that place toward McGehee's house, first line of breastworks, over which our impetuand soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of ous column dashed up to the intrenchments on Jackson on our left was momentarily expected, the crest. These were quickly stormed, fourteen and it was supposed that his approach would cause pieces of artillery captured, and the enemy driven the extension of the enemy's line in that direc- into the field beyond. Fresh troops came to his tion. Under this impression Longstreet was held support, and he endeavored repeatedly to rally, back until this movement should commence. but in vain. He was forced back with great The principal part of the Federal army was now slaughter until he reached the woods on the on the north side of the Chickahominy. Hill's banks of the Chickahominy, and night put an single division met this large force with the im- end to the pursuit. Long lines of dead and petuous courage for which that officer and his wounded marked each stand made by the enemy troops are distinguished. They drove the enemy in his stubborn resistance, and the field over back and assailed him in his strong position on which he retreated was strewn with the slain. the ridge. The battle raged fiercely, and with On the left the attack was no less vigorous and varying fortune, more than two hours. Three successful. D. H. Hill charged across the open regiments pierced the enemy's line and forced ground in his front, one of his regiments having their way to the crest of the hill on his left, but first bravely carried a battery whose fire enfiladed were compelled to fall back before overwhelming his advance. Gallantly supported by the troops numbers. The superior force of the enemy, as- on his right, who pressed forward with unfaltersisted by the fire of his batteries south of the ing resolution, he reached the crest of the ridge, Chickahominy, which played incessantly on our and after a sanguinary struggle, broke the enecolumns, as they pressed through the difficulties my's line, captured several of his batteries, and that obstructed their way, caused them to recoil. drove him in confusion toward the Chickahominy, Though most of the men had never been under until darkness rendered further pursuit impossifire until the day before, they were rallied, and ble. Our troops remained in undisturbed possesin return repelled the advance of the enemy. sion of the field covered with the Federal dead Some brigades were broken; others stubbornly and wounded, and their broken forces fled to the maintained their positions; but it became appar- river or wandered through the woods. Owing ent that the enemy were gradually gaining to the nature of the country, the cavalry was ground. The attack on our left being delayed by the length of Jackson's march and the obstacles he encountered, Longstreet was ordered to make a diversion in Hill's favor, by a feint on the enemy's left. In making this demonstration, the great strength of the position already described was discovered, and General Longstreet perceived that, to render the diversion effectual, the unable to participate in the general engagement. It rendered valuable services in guarding Jackson's flank, and took a large number of prisoners. On the morning of the twenty-eighth it was ascertained that none of the enemy remained in our front north of the Chickahominy. As he might yet intend to give battle to preserve his communications, the Ninth cavalry, supported by |