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so decisive a part at the Washington unchecked chaos of native misrule and Conference.

Prior to the opening of that Conference- that is to say, in November 1921 -the editor of the Atlantic, greatly daring, had accepted for publication an outspoken article in which I endeavored to define the dominant factors of the Chinese problem, as it then stood, and to suggest a basis of international remedial action whereby it might be solved to the mutual advantage of the Powers concerned and of the sorely harassed Chinese people. That seed fell also upon stony ground. Its immediate and only noticeable result was to bring down upon the editor criticism and rebukes for allowing the Atlantic to be used as a medium for the dissemination of skeptical opinions so heterodox and depressing. So the voice in the wilderness was stilled.

Much water and a great deal of innocent blood have flowed beneath the bridges of China during the five years which have elapsed since the representatives of nine nations affixed their signatures to the Washington Agreements. And now once more, with the patient editor's permission, I propose to analyze the present critical position of affairs and to draw attention to the dangers which menace China more imminently than ever, as the result of idealism in high places and of the continued failure of the American and British Governments to face them fairly and squarely.

II

What's done is done. No good purpose will be served by crying over spilt milk or by demonstrating how easily intelligent anticipation and concerted action at Canton two years ago might have nipped in the bud the evil growth of Bolshevism à l'orientale which now threatens to lay waste the land. Let me only say that, as the result of the

of the new disruptive elements that have been introduced by the emissaries of Moscow, the problem of China is a much more serious metter to-day than it was five years ago....

When writing on the subject in 1921, I expressed the opinion that unless steps were speedily taken, under an international agreement, for the restoration of law and order by concerted action of the Powers there could be no possible prospect of any permanent settlement of the Far Eastern question; furthermore, that only by active participation in such an agreement could America ever hope to carry out her benevolent ideas of friendly coöperation for China's benefit; and finally that, 'failing active American participation, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance appears to offer the only alternative solution of the problem.' At that time there was every reason to believe that the Japanese Government was prepared to welcome an AmericanAnglo-Japanese understanding having as its avowed object the restoration of financial and administrative order in China, with all due regard to her sovereign rights; it was manifestly futile, then as now, to talk of restoring the unfettered authority of the Chinese Government until financial and administrative measures had been taken to make an effective government possible. For these and other reasons there seemed to be valid grounds for hoping that the Conference might produce results immediately beneficial to the Chinese people, and ultimately to the world at large, if only responsible American opinion were not misled by the specious pleadings of China's representatives.

It was a big 'if.' No special gift of prophecy was needed to predict the policy which those astute diplomats, Mr. Alfred Sze and Mr. Wellington

Koo, would adopt at the Conference. I make no apology for quoting the following passage from my article in the Atlantic of November 1921, because, in addition to having anticipated their line of action at the Conference in every particular, it still constitutes an accurate presentment of the Cantonese Government's extremely effective propaganda abroad.

They will undoubtedly present a glowing picture of the Chinese Republic, successfully progressing toward Utopia by the development of liberal ideas and democratic institutions, all regardless of the fact that these are as remote as the planet Mars from

all the realities of the situation in China. They will make eloquent appeal to the sympathies of the civilized world, in the name of Democracy, on behalf of Young China's chimerical Republic, and of its splendid programme of purely imaginary reforms.

They will continue to describe the social activities and academic theories of a few thousand 'Western-learning' students and journalists as truly representative of the political convictions and institutions of the Chinese people.

And all the while they will complacently ignore the lamentable and notorious facts of China's actual position, the utter demoralization and inevitable bankruptcy of the Peking Government, the lawlessness and insatiable greed of the military chieftains,

whose rabble armies have devastated the

country for the last ten years, and the untold sufferings of the defenseless people, more pitiful to-day than ever they were under the Manchus. . . . They will earnestly invoke the assistance of America and England against Japan, for the restoration of China's rights in Shantung, and of her unfettered sovereignty over the Northern dependencies; but they will say nothing of the lamentable fact that, since the death of Yuan Shih-k’ai (1916), the several political factions that have struggled for mastery at Peking have vied with each other in mortgaging to Japan, in return for subsidies and loans, many rights, privileges, and concessions calculated to jeopardize their country's political independence.

The real Far Eastern question, as it stood when the Washington Conference was convened, was whether, by virtue of a new policy of self-denying cooperation, it might be possible for the Powers to arrest the process of disintegration wrought in China by various disruptive influences, of which (though the fact is not generally admitted) the most formidable is the influence of 'Western learning.' The Far Eastern question, as it came to be discussed by the Powers in Conference, contained little or no reference to any unpleasant topics such as processes of disintegration. Thanks to the exigencies of domestic politics in the United States, and to the skill with which the Chinese delegates availed themselves of these, and of the jealousies and rivalries of the commercial Powers, the immediate aim and object of the Conference (to quote Senator Lodge) was 'to render such aid to China as may help her to secure real independence.' The ninePower treaties and four-Power agreements in which the resolutions of the Conference were finally recorded had little or no bearing upon the facts of the case. They reflected, in the first place, the determination of President Harding and his advisers to conciliate an important element of public opinion by expiating Mr. Wilson's failure at idealism in world politics. Secondly, Versailles and vindicating American they bore unmistakable testimony to the fact that Great Britain, having decided to abandon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was prepared to follow the American lead in China and to adopt a policy of 'patience and conciliation,' even though it might involve the sacrifice of important national interests. In the words of Colonel Harvey, late Ambassador at the Court of St. James, it was henceforth to be a cardinal principle of British policy, under the avowed headship of the

King, to do nothing which might impair the friendliness of, or give offense to, the United States."

Such success as the Conference achieved was chiefly due, as Senator Lodge observed, to the fact that its scope was strictly limited to matters of immediate concern to the United States. The avowed purpose of the Administration was to revitalize the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China, and, with that end in view, to substitute for the AngloJapanese Alliance a new alignment of the Powers in which American leadership would be tacitly admitted.

As the policy expounded by Secretary Hughes began to take definite outlines, those who looked beyond the benevolent aspirations of the proposed agreements to the probable results of the new alignment perceived that, owing to the increasing disorganization of China, the principles upon which stress was laid were rapidly ceasing to have any real significance. Furthermore, it became manifest to close watchers of the political skies that beneath the attempt to revitalize these dry bones there lay a very definite, though unexpressed, intention to establish an Anglo-Saxon moral guardianship over China and at the same time to limit Japanese expansion on the Asiatic mainland. As the result of the atmosphere thus created, and of the attitude adopted by the Chinese delegates, the position in which Japan found herself at the Conference was plainly that of a defendant at the bar of international opinion. Baron Shidehara and the other Japanese delegates, accepting the situation, cheerfully subscribed yet once again to the principle of the Open Door. Also they tactfully refrained from any reference to that aspect of the doctrine of equal opportunity which arises out of the White. Races' Asiatic Exclusion Acts.

Smiling, as is their wont, they went their ways, to ponder at leisure over Mr. Harding's valedictory assurance that 'no seeds of conflict had been sown at the Conference, the very atmosphere of which was such as to drive national selfishness into retreat.'

But the watchers of the skies aforesaid, looking ahead, saw clearly that, with the close of the Conference, the Far Eastern problem had entered upon a new phase, of which the finally dominant factor must be Russia. Upon the determination of that undiscussed and unknown factor Japan's future policy must eventually depend. Until such time as, out of the chaos of Bolshevism, a government shall emerge in Russia with which Japan can safely deal, her attitude must perforce be, as it was at the beginning of the century, one of watchful waiting, combined with vigilant protection of the special position and economic interests in Manchuria which are of vital importance to her national security. Inasmuch as the Conference had done nothing to stem the tide of anarchy in China, and as, on the contrary, by proclaiming its belief in the policy of noninterference, it had ensured an acceleration of the process of disintegration, there was nothing for Japan to do (confronted with the possibility of isolation as the result of the new alignment of the Powers) but lie low and bide her time. The unconcealed purpose of China's diplomats and Westernized students to incite public opinion in America against Japan produced a widespread and unmistakable effect in evangelical and educational circles; but the tactful quiescence of Dai-Nippon's farseeing statesmen cut the ground from under the Chinese attempt to create strained relations. These were avoided; but American policy, at and after the Conference, became centred in the endeavor to win the good will of China, and a

position of diplomatic advantage at Peking, by supporting the opinions and ambitions of the ultramodern school of Chinese intellectuals and especially those who, having been trained to the profession of American democratic ideas in American universities, might therefore be expected to promote American interests.

China's representatives left the Conference convinced, by all that they had seen and heard, that they might now proceed with impunity to abolish the unequal treaties' and the foreigner's extraterritorial rights, inasmuch as none of the Powers concerned were likely henceforth to invoke the argument of force for their protection. They too went their ways smiling, fully prepared to take advantage of that post-war development of the public conscience in England and America which has made it increasingly sensitive, humane, and sympathetic toward the rights of weaker nations. They themselves had helped to sow the good seed which had come to fruition in the

ascendancy of a new democratic theory, prepared to credit uncivilized, or politically unconscious, nations with the qualities requisite for the successful working of democratic institutions. (To the influence of this strange theory the present parlous condition of China is very largely due.)

III

It is not necessary, for the purposes of this article, to recapitulate the course of events which, since the close of the Conference, have made civil war the only profitable profession in China, inspired her students and politicians with a spirit of unreasoning hostility to the foreigner, and finally led the Cantonese 'National' Party, struggling for supremacy over its Northern rivals, to accept the doctrines and dollars of

Bolshevism. The political record of these five years has been ably and concisely summarized in a work quite recently published by the American Geographical Society - namely, Mr. Walter H. Mallory's inquiry into the causes and results of chronic famine conditions in China. The following passage from this work is well worth quoting, particularly because of the vital truth contained in its concluding sentence:

The central authority has grown weaker and weaker until at present its mandates are practically without effect. In the meantime the military leaders in the various provinces, realizing their power and subject to no restraining influence, have worked each for himself, rising and falling like the tide. Temporary combinations are effected for the purpose of eliminating anyone who appears to be gaining the ascendancy; but when this is accomplished the allies split up to fight among themselves, until the time is ripe for another effort at military consolidation.

All men are equal; all claim the same privilege of preying on their fellows. The idea of responsibility to the State, in the absence of a monarch, is not yet envisaged; it hardly enters at all into the consideration of modern Chinese leaders, for the reason that the old spirit of family enrichment at the expense of other families is the paramount motive.

To this lucid exposition of the situation may be added the following brief quotation from a recent British Blue Book, wherein His Majesty's Consul at Foochow describes the appalling conditions to which, in the absence of efficient government, the common people have been reduced:

The Government of Foochow has for the

past two years been bandied about from one

set of adventurers to another. It has never

for a moment enjoyed the stability necessary for carrying out reformatory measures. It has subsisted by levying arbitrary loans,

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The real abuses under which China labors are nepotism and corruption.

If we contrast these dispassionate statements of the true condition of affairs in China (which might be multiplied indefinitely) with the pious aspirations and abstract moralities recorded in the Washington Agreements, it must, I think, be admitted that, by common consent, the Conference ignored the real 'crux' of the Far Eastern problem. In its zeal for 'adventures in liberal action' it overlooked the undeniable fact that the widespread and increasing rapacity of the official class is the chief cause of China's national weakness and an insuperable obstacle to the creation of that 'stable and effective government' for which the Conference was to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity.' The AgreeThe Agree ments solemnly recorded China's 'intention and capacity to protect the lives and property of foreigners in China,' her earnest desire to bring her judicial system into accord with that of Western nations,' and other stereotyped sterilities, but the proceedings of the Conference entirely ignored the lamentable and all-important truth that the new class of semi-Westernized officials which has come to the front since the Revolution of 1911 has not produced any public-spirited and efficient administrators, or even a single leader, in whom the nation can trust. Since then, thanks to the skillful propaganda of a number of able Chinese diplomats and publicists, and to the powerful influence of religious and educational societies, public opinion throughout America, and to a great extent in England, has been

deluded into the belief that the political activities of the Cantonese faction represent a real awakening of national consciousness and genuine patriotic ideals. It is a delusion to which missionaries and educationists are vocationally liable, if only because acceptance of Young China's promises and professions implies the belief that Western education can implant in the Oriental mind the Anglo-Saxon's standards of conduct and religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the incontestable truth remains that the acquisition of foreign university degrees has never yet modified in any perceptible way the traditional methods and paramount motives of Chinese officials.

During the five years which have elapsed since the Conference, America's policy has been to gain the confidence and friendship of the Chinese by 'liberality in policy and generosity in action.' England, following this lead, has persisted, at no small cost to British interests, in her attitude of 'patience and conciliation.' In both cases the assumption underlying the policy adopted is that out of the present chaos a stable and effective government will in time emerge, suited to the character and needs of the nation. It is an assumption that can only be maintained by turning a blind eye to all the unpleasant facts of a situation which has steadily gone from bad to worse since the leaders of the Cantonese Party made the amazing discovery that the foreigner is prepared to surrender his treaty rights and valuable vested interests to mob violence and organized intimidation. It is an assumption which errs, first from well-meaning but misguided sentimentalism, and secondly from failure to appreciate the social, political, and economic conditions reflected in the soul of the Chinese people.

How can it profit us, or the Chinese,

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