1. An accomplice in a crime is not disqualified from being a witness, but his evidence is to be received with great caution, and, as a general rule, especially in crimes involving great moral turpitude, is to be wholly disregarded as unworthy of credit, unless corroborated by credible testimony. United States v. Harries, 311.
2. The evidence of an accomplice in the crime charged, is to be received with great caution, and, as a general rule, will be rejected, unless corroborated, as to the material facts stated by him, by credible wit- nesses. United States v. Smith, 323.
1. If, in a joint action of tort, a verdict is rendered against all the de- fendants, when as to one there was no evidence, it is a verdict against evidence, and may be set aside on that ground. United States v. Chaffee, 147.
2. Where, in an action in tort against several defendants, they sever in their pleas, and assert different defenses to the suit, if a verdict is returned against all, and there is no testimony against one, the case may be non prossed as to him, and judgment entered against the others. Ib.
3. There are authorities that, where the plea is joint, this may be done, but as to that point there is some conflict. If this was the only ground of exception to this verdict, the court would overrule it, and refuse a new trial, upon the agreement of the district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi as to William M. Chaffee. Ib.
4. A right of action for a tort is not assignable by operation of law or otherwise, and an action for damages resulting from a tort can only be sustained by the person directly injured thereby, and not by one alleging a collateral or resulting injury. Ware v. Brown, 267.
5. No right of action exists against a notary public for an alleged official malfeasance, in corruptly and falsely certifying to the execution and acknowledgment of an assignment of an interest in real estate in favor of a purchaser under such fraudulent assignment, for damages resulting from his defective title, arising from the malfeasance of the notary public. Ib.
6. The redress for the malfeasance of the notary can only be obtained by the person to whom the fraudulent assignment was made, and whose title was thereby invalidated. Ib.
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
ADOPTION. See INTERNAL Revenue.
ADMIRALTY. See INSPECTION; SALVAGE; COMMON CARRIERS; FERRY-BOATS; STEAMBOATS; LIEN; PARTIES; LOOK-OUT.
AMENDMENT. See INTERNAL REVENUE.
APPEARANCE. See EQUITY (Injunction).
ASSIGNEE. See PARTIES; BANKRUPTCY.
1. Payments of money to preferred creditors, or transfers or conveyances of property, by one adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition, made before the passage of the bankrupt act of March 2, 1867, though fraudulent, are not a bar to the discharge of the bankrupt. In the matter of Hollenshade, 210.
2. Section 29 of the act, specifying what shall be a bar to a discharge, clearly distinguishes between fraudulent acts committed before and after the passage of the act. Ib.
3. As to fraudulent transfers prior to the passage of the act, section 35 shows it was not the intention of Congress they should, with one ex- ception, constitute a bar to a discharge. That section provides that all fraudulent transfers, etc., shall be void, and makes it the duty of the assignee to sue for and recover, for the benefit of creditors, all property of the bankrupt fraudulently assigned or conveyed. Ib.
4. Under section 29 of the bankrupt act, the failure of a merchant or tradesman to keep proper books of accounts, is a bar to a discharge in bankruptcy. In the matter of Jorey & Sons, 336.
5. Where a member of an insolvent firm executed a note to a creditor, payable one day after date, with a power of attorney to confess judgment, the creditor knowing the insolvency of the firm, and of the member of the firm giving the note and cognovit, and judgment was entered on the note and the property of the debtor seized on execution by the sheriff, and the debtor soon after applied for the benefit of the bankrupt law, and an assignee was appointed: Held, in an action of replevin brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against the sheriff to recover possession of the property of the bank- rupt, levied on to satisfy the execution:
1. That the giving of the note by the bankrupt firm, with a cognovit to confess judgment, was a fraudulent preference of a creditor within the meaning of section 35 of the bankrupt act.
2. That such preference being in fraud of the act, the note, warrant of attorney, judgment, and execution were nullities, and that the title to the property levied on, vested in the assignee in bankruptcy, who had a right to its possession, to be disposed of for the equal benefit of all the creditors. Haughey v. Albin, 244.
6. A payment by the maker of a promissory note to an indorser, the maker knowing his insolvency at the time, and the indorser receiv- ing such payment, having reasonable cause to believe the maker to be insolvent, is a fraudulent preference of such indorser within the meaning of section 35 of the bankrupt act; and the assignee in bank- ruptcy may sue for and recover the amount so paid for the benefit of all the creditors. Ahl v. Thorner, 287.
7. Where a chattel mortgage was given, to secure payment of a promis- sory note, payable one day after date, and the mortgaged property, being books, stationery, etc., remains in possession of the mortgagor, who carries on his business as a retail bookseller, as before the mort- gage, selling the stock mortgaged, and replacing it by the purchase of other stock, until there can be no identification of the articles specified in the mortgage, and the mortgagee assents, for years, to this course, such mortgagee, when proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced against the mortgagor, has no right, under the mortgage, to the possession of the stock in his possession at the time of the bankruptcy. In the matter of Manly, 261.
8. Under the facts stated, the mortgagee has no lien on the stock, and can only share pro rata with other creditors, in the proceeds of the sale of the stock. Ib.
9. The clause of section 39 of the bankrupt act, providing that a creditor of a bankrupt, who, knowing the insolvency of the debtor, receives money or property from him in payment, "shall not be allowed to prove his debt in bankrupty," does not apply, if the creditor, before presenting his claim to the assignee in bankrupty, makes a full sur- render of the money or property transferred to him. In the matter of Reece & Brother, 359.
10. Section 23 of the bankrupt act, by clear implication, allows the cred- itor to make such surrender, and on doing so, permits him to prove his claim against the bankrupt's estate, and entitles him to his divi- dends as a creditor.
11. The clause above quoted from section 39 is limited in its operation to cases where the assignee in bankruptcy is compelled to resort to legal measures for the recovery of the property illegally transferred to the creditor. Ib.
BEER. See INTERNAL REVENUE.
BOND. See INTERNAL REVENUE; SURETIES; DECLARATION; REVENUE; POSTMASTER.
BONDED WAREHOUSE. See INTERNAL Revenue.
BUSINESS. See INTERNAL REVENUE.
A farmer purchasing stock to consume the products of his farm, though with the intention of selling it, is not a cattle broker within the statute. United States v. Kenton, 97.
Proof of the good character of the party charged with crime, if there is doubt of his guilt upon the evidence, may afford good ground for a presumption of innocence, but will not be available to overcome or set aside satisfactory proof of criminality. United States v. Smith,
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