very great extent, and it is not a good reason for withholding the means if the advantages are superior, or the necessities greater, for such works there than at other places. Besides, these two works will cost for the construction less than the aggregate of the cost of four frigates, (if estimated at only $600,000 each;) and it must be remembered that our naval ships ordinarily require in eight years the amount of their prime cost for repairs, refitting, &c.

The objection has also been urged that, if such forts were besieged, there would be difficulty in affording them subsistence or other succor. It is not easy to imagine the probable necessity of such succor, except produced by a course of flagrant negligence and want of precaution, with respect to them, that it is not likely would be pursued by our government in time of war, nor by our army or navy officers. And it is denied, if such were the case, aid could not be rendered from the adjacent coasts, especially if some of the keys (such as Bahia Honda and Key Vacas) nearer the capes are protected by small defences, as should be, and can be done, at trifling expense; and if it can be supposed that there was no naval force of the United States on the gulf competent to repel the enemy. The assertion has been made in crude essays in political newspapers, and it has been elsewhere re-echoed, that Cuba, the Havana, and the Moro Castle, are "the true and only keys to the defence" of the shores of the South, "and to the immense interests there collected," and that Key West and Tortugas were not the controlling positions stated in the documents referred to. It is believed that but a solitary instance exists where such opinion has been acquiesced in by any distinguished naval or military officer.

Such peculiar opinion, with respect to the relative value of these po sitions, and of Cuba, and of the Havana, and of the Moro castle, is unsupported by any sound reasons founded on undisputed facts, and it has generally been urged to sustain ulterior views of policy beyond the mere protection of our commerce. The idea of the Havana being regarded as a key to the gulf, when Key West and Tortugas are fortified and supported by a small naval force, is preposterous. They are to windward of Cuba, and are located at the centre, while the Havana is outside the periphery of the circle of the commerce of the gulf and straits; and they have different channels of ingress and egress to the gulf and the straits, while the Havana has but one, and that to the straits. Vessels bound to or from the gulf, or further south, do not or dinarily pass as near to the Havana as to the Florida keys. They seek to avoid the iron-bound and generally leeward coast of Cuba, and the currents near it.

As points from which to make an offensive or aggressive demonstration by sea, either in the West Indies or to the south, or in the Atlantic beyond the Caribbean sea, as has before been observed, Key West and Tortugas are the most favorable positions in possession of the United States. Foreign statesmen and military and naval officers are not unapprized of this; and hence, upon the breaking out of a war between us and any naval power of Europe, a large naval force will be forthwith despatched by the enemy to their vicinity, and, as was predicted by Commodore Rodgers in 1823, "the first important naval contest in which this country shall be engaged, will be in the neighborhood of this very island," [Key West.]

In confirmation of the correctness of those remarks, it is not inappropriate to refer to debates in the British Parliament more than thirtythree years ago, in which eminent and sagacious British statesmen, who doubtless received the views they expressed from British military and naval officers, (as is the practice of wise British statesmen on such subjects,) unequivocally attest the value to the United States of these positions, obtained by the then recent cessions of the Floridas by Spain. [Vide Lord Lansdowne's speech, in May, 1819, Hans. Parl. Deb., vol. 40, p. 291; Mr. Macdonald's speech, June 3, 1819, ibid., p. 902; Mr. Maryatt's, ibid., p. 893; Sir Robert Wilson's, ibid., p. 871; Lord Carnarvon's, ibid., p. 1413; and Lord George Bentinck's, February 3, 1848, ibid., vol. 96, pp. 7 to 42.]

This is not the only time similar views were expressed in the British Parliament; and it has been stated on good authority, that, anterior to the cession of 1819, an eminent, watchful, and far-seeing English statesman called public attention to the importance of the Tortugas, and to the expediency of the British government taking possession of and fortifying those islands.

One of the most useful public undertakings in the Union is the "Coast Survey." Its labors on the Florida reef, keys, and coasts were commenced in 1848, and are extending up the gulf and Atlantic coasts. Appended to a statement of wrecks at Key West in 1847, (published p. 105, Sen. Doc. No. 242, 1st sess. 20th Cong.,) is the following printed note, made by one of the then Senators from Florida:

[NOTE BY J. D. W. IN 1848.]—"It is not a little surprising that, in the twenty-seven years Florida has been held by the United States, no complete nautical survey has been made of the 'Florida reef. During such time the British government has had ships-of-war, (among them the brig Bustard,) with scientific officers, engaged for months in such surveys; and even in surveying the harbor of Key West, and other of our harbors there! The charts used by our navigators are the old Spanish charts, and those made by the British from 1763 to 1784, and of the recent British surveys alluded to, and compilations of them by Blunt and others-all imperfect in many particulars, and erroneous in others. We have no original American chart of all the reefs and keys! That accomplished and scientific officer at the head of the 'Coast Survey,' Professor Bache, has informed me, that if the means were appropriated by Congress, the entire reef and all the keys, from the Tortugas up to Cape Sable, could be surveyed in one season. The expense, to enable the work to be finished in one season, might not fall short of $100,000; as, to effect it, three or four different parties of officers must be employed. But the benefits of such work would greatly outweigh this amount; and it will not cost less, to devote two or three years to it."

No intelligent man, after investigation and reflection, can question the great value of the "coast surveys." They have been prosecuted with diligence on this coast, as the results show, since the first appropriation of $7,500 was made in 1848. The annexed map, showing the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and also the relative positions of Cape Catoche and of Cuba, and of the Bahama banks and islands, to the peninsula, and to the islands, keys, and reefs of Florida, and also of

the Atlantic coast as far north as Charleston, has been furnished from the "Coast Survey" office, upon request, expressly for this report. It will be found to be highly useful. Some portions of the coasts therein delineated have not as yet been fully surveyed, though the work, as it respects the coasts of the United States, is progressing as rapidly as the limited means yielded will allow. The parts unsurveyed have been laid down from the former surveys alluded to, and from the partial, or preliminary, reconnaissances made by the Coast Survey officers. The beneficial effects of the labors of this valuable public establishment (characterized as those labors are by that perfect accuracy attainable only by the highest degree of science and professional skill) should be conceded by all, though it seems such is not the case. It is to be lamented, as a drawback to these and all similar works for the preven tion of casualties of any kind, and particularly those by shipwreck, that they are not generally appreciated. Their salutary results are silently effected, and therefore unperceived by many. Even the merchant, whose property is saved from destruction by the charts of hidden dangers, and of safe channels and harbors, furnished by the "Coast Survey," reflects but little to whom he owes its preservation. But the tempest-tossed mariner, when his ship and his life are in peril, from which there is no escape except by the aid these charts give him, then feels their inestimable value, and cherishes the guide there found as his best friend.

WRECKS.

The following statement has been compiled from Sen. Doc. No. 242, 1st session 30th Congress, pp. 25, 26, and ibid., pp. 99 to 105; also Sen. Doc. No. 3, 2d session 30th Congress, 1848, pp. 30, 31, &c.; also Sen. Doc. No. 42, 1st session 32d Congress, 1851-52, p. 11; and other documents referred to in the foregoing paper, and in Mr. Cabell's letter, which precedes it. See also Mr. Hoyt's (agent) report to "Board of Underwriters" in New York, for 1852:

Wrecks on Florida reefs from 1844 to December 15, 1852.

The foreign vessels are not included in the above, except in the three first years, when there were 17 British, and 84 American, and 6 of other nations. Foreign vessels included, since 1847 the number of wrecks is altogether about 290 vessels. The expenses are distinct from salvage, being charges against vessels, &c., in port, as harbor fees, wharfage, storage, auction commissions, exchange, commissions for advances, support of crews, repairs, refitting, &c.

THE COTTON CROP OF THE UNITED STATES.

This paper paper is not intended to be an essay upon the questions respecting which much has been written as to the time when, and by what people, "cotton-wool" was first used for making cloth; or when, or by whom, it was first cultivated for use; or when, and with what nations, it first became an article of commerce. Several different and various publications, official and unofficial, readily attainable in most parts of this country, each, afford all the information on these points that can, in any degree, be practically useful to any person. Nor is it intended to discuss in this paper, or even to intimate an opinion respecting those topics of political economy connected with the different "cotton interests," which have divided public sentiment in this country in years past. The sole object is to present data, gathered and compiled from authentic sources, relating to the cultivation and production of cotton-its past increase in the United States as an article of commerce, and its probable still greater importance and value.

Two kinds of cotton are grown in the United States.

1. That indifferently called "long staple," "black seed," "lowland," or "sea-island." When raised inland, it is sometimes called "Mains." 2. The "short staple," "green seed," "upland," also sometimes called "petit gulf," or "Mexican."

The first generally commands twice or thrice the price of the latter kind, and superior sea-island often brings a much higher amount. Very choice qualities of sea-island cotton have commanded upwards of a dollar per pound. Sea-island cotton is prepared for market with great care, being mostly cleaned by hand, or by the "roller" gin; the "saw" gin, used to separate the wool of the "short staple" from its seed, injuring the fibre of the "long staple." The long staple is usually put in round bags, not exceeding 350 pounds in weight, whilst the short staple is, in late years, compressed into square bales of generally 450 or 500 pounds each, and in some States more. The annual yield of the long staple is generally from 75 to 150 pounds of cleaned cotton to each acre of average good land cultivated, or from one to one and a half and two bags of 300 pounds to each able plantation hand employed; whilst the short staple yields from 150 to 250 pounds of cleaned cotton to the acre, or from three to seven bales of 400 pounds to each hand. In the best seasons, upon land of the first quality, and with good cultivation, eight, nine, and sometimes ten bales of upland cotton, to the hand, have been produced. The hands employed in the cultivation of cotton, and the product of whose labor is thus estimated, are estimated as if not engaged in the cultivation of corn, potatoes, and other products, &c., for the support of the plantation.

The regions in the United States adapted to the profitable raising of sea-island cotton are not so extensive as those in which the short staple can be advantageously cultivated, and the crop of sea-island has consequently not increased in the same proportion as the short staple. And the demand for sea-island is not so great, as it is chiefly used for the manufacture of laces, fine cotton threads, and cotton cambrics of the most delicate texture. It is now also used with silk in the manufacture of several articles passed off as silk goods. No country has produced

any cotton equal in fineness, length, and strength of fibre, and of such whiteness, as the sea-island of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. This superiority is doubtless, in a degree, owing to the peculiar adaptation of the climate and soil of parts of those States to the favorable production of that kind of cotton; but it is also attributable to the great attention given to its cultivation by intelligent and observing planters, availing themselves of the aids of chemical and agricultural science— making experiments from year to year for improving the processes of cultivation, and for increasing the excellence as well as the quantity of the product; and who profit by the practical experience of their antecessors of more than half a century.

The treasury accounts exhibit the progress of the "sea-island" cotton crop of this country from 1805 to 1852 inclusive, fuller than they do the progress of the crop of "upland" cotton, for the reason that the former has been mostly exported, whilst a large portion of the latter has always been consumed in the United States. Prior to 1805, no distinction was made in the treasury reports between the "sea-island" and "other cotton," styled, in a treasury report of 1836, "common cotton."

The treasury accounts show, that during the years 1790, '91, and '92, about 733,044 pounds of cotton of all kinds, foreign and domestic, valued at $137,737, were exported from the United States. There had been imported into the United States previously, and during that period, foreign cotton to a considerable amount. The importations within the years named were about 889,111 pounds, which, valued at the same price as that exported, amounted to $202,014. The importations of foreign raw cotton during those three years exceed the exportations 156,067 pounds; and, consequently, either the whole of the domestic crops, and likewise that much of the foreign (and imported) raw cotton, was then consumed in the United States; or a portion of the domestic crops was exported, and a greater amount than is above stated of the foreign raw cotton was consumed in the United States. The quantity of foreign raw cotton consumed in the United States in these three years is, however, estimated in a treasury report of 1801 at 270,720 pounds, which would make the exportation of domestic cotton in those years 114,653 pounds. It is known that some, though limited quantities of domestic raw cotton were sent to Great Britain in the years specified; but the correct accounts thereof cannot now be obtained, and therefore, with this explanation, it has been deemed proper to state all the exportations for those years as foreign cotton, as in fact most of them

were.

The only accounts of the entire annual crops of the United States that can be obtained are unofficial, except the decennial census statements. The "commercial" accounts are usually stated as from the first of September of each year, to the 31st of August following; it being presumed that, by the day last mentioned, the entire crop of the previous will have been received in the home market; and the amount of such receipts, consequently, affords tolerably correct data for estimating the "entire crop" of that year. The official or treasury accounts, ending each year on the 30th day of June, (the last day of the fiscal year of the federal government,) and before the entire crop of the previous

year