imply at once that the act was past and the deception incomplete. He therefore used the aorist of the middle, evσaobai, "to put a deception on." Why did Satan fill thy heart, that thou shouldest put a deception on the Holy Spirit? .... Thou didst not lie (eúdoμai with dative, its usual sense) to man, but to God." The use of the same word in the Troades of Euripides, line 1181, admits of a similar explanation. Hecuba says to Astyanax ἐψεύσω μ ̓, ὅτ' ἐσπίπτων πέπλους, ὦ μήτερ, ηύδας, κ.τ.λ. "You put a deception on me, when running into my garments, you said, Mother, I will do so and so." It will, however, be more satisfactory if we support our view of the difference between evoai and fevoaobai by a quotation from Dr. Donaldson's Grammar, p. 436, "The appropriative middle has several particular applications. The middle verb often expresses a mental act or operation. Thus opiw means 'I define, mark out, or appoint something for another person,' as Eurip., Iph., T. 979: μîv wpiσev σwτnpíav‘[God] has appointed safety for us;' but opiceola in the middle, besides its strictly appropriative sense, 'I mark out or appoint for myself,' 'I claim' (as in Esch., Suppl., 256) means 'I estimate, define, or settle in my own mind,' as Arist., Pol., v. 9: kaкŵs Ópíšovтαι Tò éλEÚOepov: they make a faulty estimate of freedom.' Simiἑλεύθερον larly ȧpioμeîv is 'to count or reckon,' but åpilμeîσlai is 'to reckon in one's mind,' (Plat., Phædr., p. 270 D.): σтalμâv, 'to measure an object,' (Eurip., Ion., 1137;) but oralμâσlaι, 'to calculate in one's mind,' (Herod., ii., 150;) Stoikeîv is 'to manage or regulate externally,' as dioikeîv Tηv Tóλiv (Thucyd., viii., 21), but Sioikeîolai is 'to arrange a thing in one's own mind.' Ex animi suá sententiâ aliquid gerere constituere, præsertim machinari, as Dem., Phil., p. 93, 8, πάνθ' ὅσα βούλεται Φίλιππος διοικήσεται.” Upon these principles yeûoat, the active, would mean "to deceive another person;" fevoaodat, the middle, "to deceive another in one's own mind," "to put a deception upon him," whether that deception were effectual or not. ACTS vii. 53. Some light may be thrown upon the use of eis in the difficult passage, οἵτινες ἐλάβετε τὸν νόμον εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων, by Thucydides, vii., 15, ὅ τι δὲ μέλλετε, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ávaẞoλàs πрáσσere, "But what you intend to do, do immediately with the spring, and without delays." Dr. Arnold's note on this runs : Compare Herodotus, viii., 21, οὐκέτι ἐς ἀναβολὰς ἐποιεῦντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ; and ii., 121, οὐκ ἐς μακρὴν ἔργου exeo@al. In all these cases the preposition refers properly to some word understood, such as TреTóμevot, as in the well known expression, és aλкην трÉжеσÐαι. And thus in Thucydides, iii., ἀλκὴν τρέπεσθαι. 108, μήτε ἐς ἀλκὴν ὑπομεῖναι; the expression, if written at length, would probably have been, és аλкǹν тρаπоμéνονs vπоpeîval." But in the decline of a language the origin of such compound expressions is frequently lost sight of, and only their adverbial force remains. "Who received the law at injunctions of angels," is probably as exact and literal a version as the English admits of. Dean Alford of course refers to Matt. xii. 41, μετενόησαν εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰωνᾶ, “repented at the preaching of Jonah:" to which we would add, Heb. vi. 6, Táλiv ávaкaivičew [τὴν διαθήκην] εἰς μετάνοιαν, “ to renew again [their covenant] on repentance." ROMANS ii. 27. There is no doubt a certain amount of ambiguity in this passage, which according to the ordinary rules of the best grammars, e.g., that of Dr. Donaldson, must be translated, "And shall not uncircumcision, which is by nature, if it fulfil the law, judge thee, who with the letter and circumcision dost transgress the law?" where Teλoûσa is taken as a secondary predicate to ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία. This is certainly a clumsy construction, and Professor Jowett offers us an alternative in, “And shall not the uncircumcision, which by nature fulfils the law, judge thee, who by the letter and circumcision dost transgress the law ?” where ἡ ἐκ φύσεως τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα is the epithet of ȧkρoßvoτía. We are inclined to agree with the alternative presented by Professor Jowett, but we should have gladly found him enunciating or explaining the principle upon which Teλoûσa is taken as part of the epithet, instead of being considered as a secondary predicate. Dr. Donaldson in his Greek Grammar has cited several similar passages, and endeavoured, as we think, without success to bring them under the laws of the secondary predicate. We will first enunciate the principle upon which we propose to justify Professor Jowett's alternative, and then go through Dr. Donaldson's passages seriatim, shewing how easily it is applicable to, and explains them all. It is undoubtedly true, as a general rule, that words in agreement with a substantive placed between the article and that substantive are regularly its epithets or parts of its epithet, while similar words placed elsewhere are secondary predicates. But when there is a compound epithet, sometimes a part only of the epithet is placed between the article and the substantive, and the rest, for euphonic reasons, is allowed to stand elsewhere. Thus, instead of writing ἡ ἐκ φύσεως τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα ἀκροβυστία, St Paul has for euphonic reason written ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα, whence an ambiguity arises as to the construction, although the general sense is not materially affected. If we take Dr. Donaldson's passages, we shall find that it is only owing to the unbending nature of his otherwise most correct theory of the secondary predicate, that (Gr. Gram., p. 370) "the participle at the end causes the greatest difficulty, and can hardly be explained without supposing that the noun which precedes the participle is not only an apposition, but affects by a sort of attraction the gender of the article.” In Thucydides, i., 11, δηλοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα τῆς φήμης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς λόγου κατεσχηκότος, it is surely plain that the strictly proper place of κατεσχηκότος is immediately before λόγου, and that for euphonic reasons Thucydides has put it out of its proper place. No ambiguity can here arise, because νῦν, which is manifestly closely connected with κατεσχηκότος, is placed between the article and its noun, and determines the grammatical construction of κατεσχηκότος as part of the epithet of λόγου. A similar remark will apply to ταχθείς, as determined by πρῶτος in ἦν δ ̓ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα, Thucyd., i., 96; to καθεστῶτα determined by πᾶσι in Thucyd., iii., 56, § 1; αὐτοὺς ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, and ούσης determined by νῦν in Thucyd., v., 11, § 1; τὸν Βρασίδαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης. In Soph. Philoct., 1316: ἀνθρώποισι τὰς μὲν ἐκ θεῶν τύχας δοθείσας ἐστ ̓ ἀναγκαῖον φέρειν, ἐκ θεῶν shews plainly that δοθείσας is part of the epithet of τύχας. Similarly, we conceive, that the construction of τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα is determined by ἐκ φύσεως in the passage of Romans under consideration, and that euphonic reasons, as we have already said, induced St. Paul to write ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα, instead of ἡ ἐκ φύσεως τὸν νόμων τελοῦσα ἀκροβυστία. 2 Cor. iv. 15. The difficulties in this verse can scarcely be satisfactorily surmounted, unless recourse be had to the principle involved in the phenomena noticed in our July number, p. 275. We there endeavoured to shew, that in three passages the context It irresistibly leads the reader to understand oi Teioves in the sense of οἱ τοσούτῳ πλείονες, the proportionately more. matters little, whether we take Teploσevon transitively, and consider Tv Evxapioríav as its direct object, or whether we take it intransitively, and consider Tv evxapioríav as its cognate or improper object. We would translate: "For all things (or all the things [above mentioned]) are for your sakes, that grace may multiply, and through proportionately more persons make thanksgiving abound (or abound with thanksgiving) to the glory of God." , Thucydides will also bear us out in this interpretation. In Thucyd., iv., 61, we find Hermocrates represented as saying, ἀξιῶ . . . μὴ τοὺς ἐναντίους οὕτω κακῶς δρᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸς τὰ πλείω BráπTEσ0αι, where he surely means to imply, "I think it proper not to injure my enemies in such a manner as myself to receive proportionately more (Tà Tλeiw) injuries." Also in iv., 117, we have the words: Λακεδαιμόνιοι... τοὺς Αθηναίους ἡγούμενοι · · μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν αὐτοὺς . . . ξυναλλαγῆναί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας σφισὶν ἀποδόντας σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πλείω Xpovov: "The Lacedæmonians, thinking that the Athenians would themselves be more eager both to be reconciled, and giving back the prisoners to them, to make a treaty also for a proportionately longer time," where it is much more natural to take τὸν πλείω χρόνον as equivalent to τὸν τοσούτῳ πλείω χρόνον, than, with Dr. Arnold, to oppose "the longer time generally stipulated by a treaty of peace to the brief interval of a mere truce." For we do not find any definite expression like o μelwv Xpóvos to which mental reference can be made in the passage, whereas all is simple and easy under the principle which we are advocating. 1 THESS. iv. 4. It is useless to attempt to argue the grand question of the meaning of σkevos in this passage with any pretence of originality. Suffice it to say, that De Wette and others have abundantly proved that Tò avтоû σкevos can mean nothing but a man's own wife, or rather partner in the fulfilment of the great command, "Increase and multiply;" and that an excellent summary of the arguments to this effect is to be found in Bishop Ellicott's edition of this epistle. Still we cannot but remark on the curious tergiversation of Dr. Wordsworth, who appears to dislike this interpretation, and therefore endeavours to do violence to his somewhat rebellious scholarship. His words are: "With regard to the sense of тâσOαι, even if it be allowed that it must mean to ACQUIRE, yet it includes the meaning of keeping, as is evident from the boast of the Pharisee (Luke xviii. 12), ἀποδεκατῶ πάντα ὅσα κτῶμαι.” On referring to Dr. Wordsworth's own note on this passage, we find no doubt apparent as to whether it should or should not " be allowed that κтâσlaι must mean to acquire;" on the contrary, without any difficulty, he gives the unhesitating translation, "whatsoever I ACQUIRE. Evidently the Pharisee did not tithe his principal, but his acquisitions, whether in the form of a regular income or in that of the gains of trade. It is absurd to pretend that a man is not in possession of his own body. He cannot be otherwise, unless he has had a paralytic stroke. How can he be said, Kтâo@ai, to get possession of that which he already, Kékтηтαι, is in possession of? But it is argued that though he possesses it in one sense, he does not in another; that he possesses it by way of ownership, but not ev ἀγιωσύνῃ καὶ τιμῇ, as a Christian man ought to possess it; that he possesses it, in fact, by way of ownership, but it is not yet broken in, so as to be properly serviceable to him as a Christian. And κTâσlaι is assumed to indicate this gaining a mastery over or breaking in the body (Conybeare and Howson). It might as well be said, that, when a man acquires (тâтα) a horse by purchase, he does not fully possess it (KÉKTηTα), until it has been properly broken in, and, therefore, the word ктâσlai must be taken to include the breaking in. To such shifts are those put, who reject the plain grammatical meaning of a word (ктâσ0αι) (even allowing that σKevos is equivocal), simply because (e.g., Conybeare and Howson, and even Vaughan), they do not like to find St. Paul using so coarse a term as σkeûos of one standing in so holy a relation as that of wife. A similar feeling appears to have caused the mistranslation of ȧπокó↓оνтαι in Gal. v. 12 in the Authorized Version, contrary to the comments of the majority of the fathers. A. H. W. NEW SERIES.-VOL. VI., NO. XII. A A |