CHAPTER VIII.

PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AND FREE TRADE.

Speculations of Various Authors-Tariff for Revenue, with Protection the Incident, Democratic Doctrine-The Reverse that of its Opponents-Changed Positions of Leading Statesmen on the Quest onViews of John Stuart Mill-Extracts.

THE science of political economy has attracted much attention, and exhaustive speculations without number have been indulged by many dif ferent writers, without having thus far clucidated much of value. There being no agreement on the definition of the term, upon the subjects which it ought to include, or in the conclusions arrived at, the whole science, if indeed it be a science, is involved in obscurity, and the efforts of Malthus, of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Say, Ricardo, Carey and others, have been only productive of about as many different theories. These writers, instead of establishing facts, have only succeded in making darkness still more visible.

By most of those who have given the subject close attention, it is understood to include the causes of national wealth, and the laws which appear to govern its accumulation or distribution, and they have consequently attempted to lay down rules by which the commercial

intercourse between nations ought to be governed. Here a very wide difference of opinion has at once been manifested; some contending that no obstruction whatsoever to the, cxchange of the products of industry ought to be permitted; some advocating a tax to be imposed on most descriptions of property in transit from one country to another, for revenue purposes, and some favoring the idea that this tax should be laid upon those articles exclusively which compete with "home" manufactures, for the purpose of giving to the latter a monopoly. The first of these classes are known "free trade" advocates; the second as favoring a tariff for revenue only, while the latter are for a tariff for protection.

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The "free trade" advocates insist that the principal reason for the unparalleled prosperity of the United States, is that there has been unrestricted trade between the States, and that the same principle carried into our foreign trade would produce equally favorable results. The advocates of this policy are generally of three classes the agriculturists; those manufacturers, the price of whose products are not affected by foreign competition, and merchants, with whom may be included all owners or employers of railroads, steamboats, etc. Comprising, as these classes do, more than three-fourths of the inhab itants of the United States, their interests would dictate free trade at once, if it were not for

one fact-the necessity for revenue to meet the large expenditures of the general government. This introduces a tariff for revenue.

Having a large public debt, $1,850,000,000— the interest on which, added to the expense of running our government, amounting to about $275,000,000 per annum, must be provided for. There is no escape apparently from a heavy import tax, in addition to the direct tax upon real estate and personal property, and upon tobacco, liquors, matches, etc. It is claimed by some political economists that a a tax tax upon imports is more easily collected, and that the burden is more universally distributed among all classes of citizens than can be done by any other mode. Being paid in the slightly increased cost of our almost daily purchases at the stores, the time of its payment, as well as the amount, is so divided and uncertain that it is almost unnoticed. Thus an amount of blood can be drawn in the course of a year which would kill the patient if all were taken at once.

It is objected that this plan of raising revenue is expensive, necessitating custom houses, revenue officers and other complications of government, particularly undesirable in a republic; and that, at least in one serious respect, it is unequal-it compels the man who may have the largest family to pay the greatest tax, thereby reducing his ability to raise his children properly, and obliging him who is least able to do it, to pay the most taxes, which is manifestly unjust.

An incidental benefit of a tax on importations occurs in the increasing of prices, so as to enable home manufacturers to extend their

business and give employment to many hands, who would otherwise be compelled to seekand who would of course depress wages-other fields of labor. In this view i would seem eminently just and proper, that in arranging the terms of a tariff, a discrimination should be made in favor of those industries which only need a start to enable them to become firmly established and able to compete in the markets of the world. It is sometimes necessary for farmers to nurse a lamb until it can go alone. But in these days of cheap transportation it is folly to attempt to overcome the effects of natural laws. It is better for Ohio to send its flour and meat to Florida, and get her oranges and tropical fruits in return, even though the construction and care cf hot houses would create a considerable demand for home labor. It is better that manufactures should be carried. on where the conditions of cheap food, good laws, good labor, healthy climate, natural water power or cheap fuel, and cheap transportation all occur, than to attempt to force an unhealthy growth under adverse circumstances by subsidies and government aid.

There is nothing to be said in favor of a tariff act so high that it stops importation altogether. In this case the government gets no

revenue, and the only effect of the arrangement is to tax everybody for the direct benefit of a few. The present tax on salt is an instance in point.

The questions of high tariff, low tariff, and no tariff at all have frequently received the attention of our law-makers.

The first tariff act, originated by Alexander Hamilton, was enacted in 1790 by the Federal party, then in the majority, though it was opposed by Madison, Jefferson and other prominent Democrats. Its provisions were few, placing a light duty on a few articles, but the duties were soon increased, until in 1815 it was the principal measure before Congress. It is somewhat remarkable that at that time the bill under consideration was supported by J. C. Calhoun, afterwards its principal opponent, and was opposed by Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, who also afterwards reversed their positions. It is said that the speech of Mr. Clay on this occasion was unanswerable, and was mainly relied upon by his opponents in after years to offset his arguments in favor of a protective tariff. The bill was vetoed by President Madison, but the next year, some of its features having been modified, it was supported by Webster and approved by the President.

The war of 1812-14 had left the country in debt, which made it necessary to increase the duties at that time. But the debt having been