of Frederick City, Maryland, which resulted in the battle of Monocacy, fought ninth July last. The informal report telegraphed Major-General Halleck from Ellicott's Mills, during the retreat, is appended hereto, and will serve to make the record complete. The situation in the department of West Virginia about the beginning of July was very uncertain. Major-General Hunter had retreated westwardly from Lynchburg, leaving open the Shenandoah Valley, up which a column of rebels of unknown strength had marched, and thrown General Sigel back from Martinsburg to Williamsport, thence down the left bank of the Potomac to Maryland Heights, where, with his command, he was supposed to be besieged. The strength of the invading column, by whom it was commanded, what its objects were, the means provided to repel it-everything, in fact, connected with it-were on my part purely conjectural. All that I was certain of was that my own department was seriously threatened. July fifth, information was brought to my headquarters in Baltimore that a column of rebel cavalry-the same that had been raiding in the border counties of Pennsylvania—was in the Middletown Valley, moving eastwardly. Taking this report as true, the enemy had turned his back upon the department of MajorGeneral Couch, and reduced his probable objectives to Washington, Baltimore, or Maryland Heights. their scouting parties had even advanced to within three miles of Frederick City. By the evening of the sixth all my available troops were concentrated under General Tyler, making a force of scant twenty-five hundred men of all arms, and composed as follows: Third regiment (Md.) Potomac Home Brigade, Colonel Charles Gilpin; Eleventh (Md.) infantry, Colonel Landstreet; seven companies of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth, and three companies of the Hundred and Fifty-ninth Ohio National Guard, consolidated, temporarily, under Colonel A. L. Brown; Captain Alexander's (Md.) battery, and one hundred men of the Hundred and Fiftyninth Ohio National Guard, serving as mounted infantry, and commanded by Captain E. H. Lieb, Fifth United States Cavalry, and Captain N. S. Allen. In addition, I had the service of Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin's squadron of cavalry, two hundred and fifty men, and four companies of the First regiment (Md.) Potomac Home Brigade, about two hundred strong, under Captain Brown. Of this force, it is proper to add, the Eleventh Maryland, and all the Ohio troops, were "hundred-days men." On the night of the sixth Colonel Clendenin received my order to take the pike to Middletown, and follow it until he found the enemy, and ascertained the strength and composition of his column. Leaving Frederick City at daybreak next morning (the seventh) with his cavalry, and a section of Alexander's battery, he drove in a rebel outpost stationed in the mountain pass, and gained Middletown, where he was stopped by a body of cavalry largely superior to his own, commanded by General Bradley T. John After a smart skirmish, in which both sides used artillery, Clendenin was forced back by movements on his flanks. About ten o'clock he reported the rebels one thousand strong, pushing him slowly to Frederick City, which they would reach in two hours, unless I intended its defence. Though out of my depart ment, it had become my duty to save the town, if possible, and as it was but three miles distant, I thought that could be done without jeopardizing the position at the railroad bridge. By direction, therefore, General Tyler sent Colonel Gilpin, with his regiment and another gun, to support Clendenin, and engage the enemy. The company of mounted infantry also went forward. In this movement the railroad was very useful. In this situation I felt it my duty to concentrate that portion of my scanty command available for field operations at some point on the Monocacy river, the western limit of the Middle Department. With an enemy north of the Poto-son. mac, and approaching from the west, having in view any or all the objectives mentioned, the importance of the position on which I ultimately gave battle, cannot be over-estimated. There, within the space of two miles, converge the pikes to Washington and Baltimore, and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; there, also, is the iron bridge over the Monocacy, upon which depends railroad communication to Harper's Ferry. Moreover, as a defensive position for an army seeking to cover the cities above named against a force marching from the direction I was threatened, the point is very strong; the river covers its entire front: in a low stage of water, the fords are few, and particularly difficult for artillery; and the commanding heights are all on the eastern bank, while the ground on the opposite side is level and almost without obstructions. At all events, I was confident of ability to repel any ordinary column of cavalry that might be bold enough to attack me there; and if the position should be turned on the right, I was not necessarily disabled from defending Baltimore; in that contingency, I had only to take care of the railroad, and use it at the right time. Accordingly, I went out and joined General Tyler at the railroad bridge. The information received in Baltimore was confirmed; rebel cavalry had seized Middletown; Colonel Gilpin reached the town in good time, and deployed his command in skirmish order across the Hagerstown pike, half a mile west of the suburbs. Clendenin fell back and joined him. About four o'clock P. M. the enemy opened the fight with three pieces of artillery. The lines engaged shortly after. At six o'clock Captain Alexander, personally in charge of his pieces, dismounted one of Johnson's guns. A little before dark Gilpin charged, and drove the rebels, who, under cover of night, finally withdrew to the mountain. You will find the locality of this action indi cated on the map herewith forwarded. The forces opposed, it is worthy remark, were about equal in number, yet Johnson had the advantage; his men were veterans, while Gilpin's. with the exception of Clendenin's squadron, had not before been under fire, a circumstance much enhancing the credit gained by them. Relying upon intelligence received the evening the above affair took place, that a division of veterans of the Sixth corps was coming by rail to my reinforcement, about midnight General Tyler was sent to Frederick City with Colonel Brown's command, to prepare for what might occur in the morning. About daybreak a portion of the First brigade of the veterans arrived under Colonel Henry, which was also sent to Frederick. The reports of the enemy continued conflicting as before; some stated that Johnson's cavalry, already whipped by Colonel Gilpin, were all the rebels north of the Potomac; others that McCausland, with a like column, was marching to join Johnson; others again represented Early and Breckinridge behind the Catoctin mountain, with thirty thousand men, moving upon Frederick City. In short, the most reliable intelligence was of a character that reduced the defence of that town to a secondary consideration; if the enemy's force was correctly reported, his designs were upon Washington or Baltimore. In the hope of evolving something definite out of the confusion of news, I went in person to Frederick City, leaving my Inspector-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Catlin, at the railroad bridge to stop such of the veteran regiments as arrived there. The Eleventh Maryland remained with him. My purpose was to conduct a reconnoissance over the mountain, to brush aside, if possible, the curtain that seemed to overhang it. In the midst of preparation for this movement, a telegram from Major-General Sigel reached me, stating that the enemy had that morning retired from before Maryland Heights, and was marching with his main body up the Middletown Valley toward Boonesboro. The question then was-were the rebels marching for Pennsylvania, or coming eastward by the Jefferson or Middletown pikes? I concluded to await events in Frederick City, satisfied they would not be long delayed. As Johnson still held the mountain pass to Middletown, the day (eighth) was spent in trying to draw him into the valley, with such reinforcements as he might have received. A feigned retreat from the town was but partially successful; he came down, but under fire of Alexander's guns, galloped back again. About six o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel Catlin telegraphed me that a heavy force of rebel infantry was moving toward Urbana by the Buckeystown road. This threatened my lines of retreat and the position at Monocacy bridge; what was more serious, it seemed to disclose a purpose to obtain the pike to Wash ington, important to the enemy for several causes, but especially so if his designs embraced that city, then in no condition, as I understood it, to resist an army like that attributed to Early by General Sigel. I claim no credit for understanding my duty in such a situation; it was self-apparent. There was no force that could be thrown in time between the capital and the rebels but mine, which was probably too small to defeat them, but certainly strong enough to gain time, and compel them to expose their strength. If they were weak, by going back to the bridge I could keep open the communication with General Sigel; on the other hand, if they were ever so strong, it was not possible to drive me from that position, except by turning one of my flanks; if my right, retreat was open by the Washington pike; if my left, the retirement could be by the pike to Baltimore. I made up my mind to fight, and accordingly telegraphed General Halleck: "I shall withdraw immediately from Frederick City, and put myself in position to cover road to Washington, if necessary." This was done by marching in the night to the railroad bridge, where BrigadierGeneral Ricketts was in waiting. I had then the following regiments of his division: First brigade, Colonel W. S. Truax commanding, seventeen hundred and fifty strong: One Hundred and Sixth New York, Captain Payne commanding; One Hundred and Fifty-first New York. Colonel Emerson; Fourteenth New Jersey, Lieutenant-Colonel Hall; Tenth Vermont, Colonel Henry; Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Stahl. Second brigade, sixteen hundred men, Colonel McClannan commanding: One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Pennsylvania, -- ; Ninth New York, Colonel Seward; One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Ebright; One Hundred and Tenth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Binkley. The residue of the division it was reported would be up next day. Early in the morning of the ninth disposition for battle was made. The right, forming an extended line from the railroad, was given General Tyler, who, by direction, had left Colonel Brown at the stone bridge on the Baltimore pike, with his command and the company of mounted infantry. Upon the holding that bridge depended the security of my right flank, and the line of retreat to Baltimore. Three companies of Colonel Gilpin's regiment were posted to defend Crum's ford, midway the stone bridge and railroad; Landstreet and Gilpin were held in reserve at the railroad. The battery was divided-Ricketts and Tyler each received three guns. On the left, as it was likely to be the main point of attack, I directed General Ricketts to form his command in two lines across the Washington pike, so as to hold the rising ground south of it and the wooden bridge across the river. Still further to the left, Colonel Clendenin took post, to watch that flank, and guard the lower splendid behavior of Ricketts and his men infords with such detachments as he could spare.spired me with confidence. One o'clock came, On the western bank of the river, Captain but not the reinforcements; and it was imposBrown's detachment, of the First regiment Po-sible to get an order to them-my telegraph tomac Home Brigade, was deployed as skir-operator, and the railroad agent, with both his mishers, in a line three quarters of a mile to the front. A twenty-four-pound howitzer was left in a rude earthwork near the blockhouse by the railroad, where it could be used to defend the two bridges, and cover the retirement and crossing of the skirmishers. While this disposition was going on, the railroad agent informed me that two more troop trains were on the road, and would arrive by one o'clock. These were the residue of General Ricketts' division, three regiments-making a very important reinforcement. trains, had run away. An hour and a half later I saw the third line of rebels move out of the woods, and down the hill behind which they made their formation; right after it came the fourth. It was time to get away. Accordingly, I ordered General Ricketts to make preparation, and retire to the Baltimore pike. About four o'clock he began the execution of the order. The stone bridge held by Colonel Brown now became all-important; its loss was the loss of my line of retreat; and I had reason to believe that the enemy, successful on my left, would redouble his efforts against the right. General About eight o'clock A. M., the enemy marched Tyler had already marched with his reserves to by the pike from Frederick, and threw out skir- Brown's assistance; but on receipt of notice of mishers, behind whom he put his guns in posi- my intention, without waiting for Gilpin and tion, and began the engagement. His columns Landstreet, he galloped to the bridge, and took followed a little after nine o'clock. Passing the command in person. After the disengagethrough the fields, just out of range of my pieces, ment of Ricketts' line, when the head of the rewithout attempting to drive in my skirmishers, treating column reached the pike, I rode to the they moved rapidly around to the left, and forced bridge, and ordered it to be held at all hazards a passage of the river at a ford about one mile by the force then there, until the enemy should below Ricketts. From nine o'clock to half-past be found in its rear-at least, until the last ten the action was little more than a warm skir-regiment had cleared the country road by which mish and experimental cannonading, in which, the retreat was being effected. This order Genhowever, the enemy's superiority in the number and calibre of his guns was fully shown. Against my six three-inch rifles he opposed not less than sixteen Napoleons. In this time, also, the fighting at the stone bridge assumed serious proportions. Colonel Brown held his position with great difficulty. About half-past ten o'clock the enemy's first line of battle made its appearance, and moved against Ricketts, who, meantime, had changed front to the left, so that his right rested upon the river bank. This change unavoidably subJected his regiments to an unintermitted enfilading fire from the batteries across the stream, So great was the rebel front, also, that I was compelled to order the whole division into one line, thus leaving it without reserves. Still the enemy's front was greatest. Two more guns were sent to Ricketts. Finally, by burning the wooden bridge and the blockhouse at its further end, thus releasing the force left to defend them, I put into the engagement every available man, except Tyler's reserves, which, from the messages arriving, I expected momentarily to have to despatch to Colonel Brown's assistance. eral Tyler obeyed. A little after five o'clock, when my column was well on the march toward New Market, an attack on his rear convinced him of the impracticability of longer maintaining his post. Many of his men then took to the woods, but, by his direction, the greater part kept their ranks, and manfully fought their way through. In this way Colonel Brown escaped. General Tyler, finding himself cut off, dashed into the woods, with the officers of his staff, and was happily saved. His gallantry and self-sacrificing devotion are above all commendation of words. The enemy seems to have stopped pursuit at the stone bridge. A few cavalry followed my rear guard to within a couple of miles of New Market, where they established a picket post. The explanation of their failure to harass my column lies in facts that have since come to my knowledge, viz.: Johnson's cavalry was marching, at the time of the battle, toward Baltimore, via the Liberty road, while McCausland's was too badly cut up in the fight for anything like immediate and vigorous action after it. To have cut my column off at New Market, the rebels had only to move their cavalry round my right by way of Urbana and Monrovia; susThe enemy's first line was badly defeated. pecting such was his plan, I used the utmost His second line then advanced and was re-expedition to pass the command beyond that pulsed, but after a fierce and continuous strug-point. The danger proved imaginary. The regle. In the time this occupied I could probably inforcements, for which I waited so anxiously have retired without much trouble, as the rebels the last two hours of the engagement, reaching were badly punished; the main objects of the Monrovia in good time to have joined me, haltbattle, however, were unaccomplished-the re-ed there-a singular proceeding, for which no bel strength was not yet developed. At one o'clock the three reinforcing regiments of veterans would be on the ground; and then the explanation has as yet been furnished me. Monrovia is but eight, miles from the battleground. The commanding officer at that place must, therefore, have heard the guns. But, besides this, Colonel Clendenin was effectually contesting the road which offered the enemy the advantage I have mentioned. That gallant offi-point on the pike at which it was possible to recer-as true a cavalry soldier as ever mounted a horse-while fighting on Ricketts' extreme left, found himself cut off from the main body at the time the retreat began. Throwing himself into the village of Urbana, he repeatedly repulsed the pursuing rebels, and, in one bold charge, sabre in hand, captured the battle-flag of the Seventeenth Virginia. The three regiments in Monrovia joined me at New Market, and afterward served a good purpose in covering the march of the weary column, which bivouacked for the night about twelve miles from the battle-field. It would be a difficult task to say too much in praise of the veterans who made this fight. For their reputation, and for the truth's sake, I wish it distinctly understood that, though the appearance of the enemy's fourth line of battle made their ultimate defeat certain, they were not whipped on the contrary, they were fighting steadily in unbroken front when I ordered their retirement; all the shame of which, if shame there was, is mine, not theirs. The nine regiments enumerated, as those participating in the action, represented but thirty-three hundred and fifty men, of whom over sixteen hundred were missing three days after-killed, wounded, or prisoners lost on the field. The fact speaks for itself. Monocacy" on their flags cannot be a word of dishonor. 66 As to General Ricketts, attention is respectfully called to the mention made of him in the telegraphic report subjoined. Every word of it is as deserved as it was bravely earned. If we had had intrenching tools in time, no doubt the losses of the veterans would have been greatly lessened. Another deficiency existed in the want of ambulances and wagons; but this I designed remedying by the use of the cars. That the dead and so many of the wounded were left suffering on the field, and in the hands of the enemy, is justly attribtableu to the base desertion of the railroad agent. I will also add that my despatches would have reached the War Office several hours sooner, if the telegraph operator had remained at his post, or within calling distance. My intention, upon leaving the battle-field, was to march the troops directly to Baltimore, which, by the concentration at Monocacy, bad been left almost defenceless. Had this purpose been carried out, they would have reached the city on the evening of the tenth, in time to have driven off the marauders, who, under Johnson, had moved by the Liberty road from Frederick City, and taken post in the vicinity of Cockeysville. Such a result would very probably have saved the bridges on the Philadelphia railroad. But, under an order, received while en route to Ellicott's mills, directing me to "rally my forces and make every possible effort to retard the enemy's march on Baltimore," I thought it my duty to halt Ricketts' division, with the cavalry and battery, at the mills, that being the first supply the men with rations and ammunition. In doing this, however, I was careful to leave General Ricketts trains sufficient to bring his whole force away at a moment's notice; and as soon as it was certainly known that the enemy had marched against Washington, I ordered him to Baltimore. Before he arrived, however, I was temporarily superseded in the command of the troops by Major-General Ord. The evening of the tenth I returned to Baltimore, and found the city very naturally in a state of alarm, occasioned by the approach of Johnson's cavalry. Thanks, however, to the energy of Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Lawrence, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Wooldey, Provost-Marshal, every measure of safety had been taken that intelligence could suggest. The railroad communications north had been the subject of the former's special care. The means of defense for the city, as already remarked, were very meagre; but the direc tion of them had, as soon as intelligence of the result on the Monocacy was received, very properly been assumed by Brigadier-Generals Lockwood and Morris, whose military experience was of very great value. To the former I feel particularly grateful. Loyal citizens took up arms by the thousands, were organized; manned the works; and did soldiers' duty nobly. Besides the officers mentioned in my informal report of tenth July, the following deserve similar notice, for their excellent behavior in action and the services they rendered: Lieutenant-Colonel Lynde Catlin, As istant Inspector-General; Major Max. Woodhull, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General; and Major James R. Ross, senior Aid-de-Camp-all of my staff. Also, Captain W. H. Weigle, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Tyler; Captain Adam E. King, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Ricketts; Captain Brown, First (Maryland) Potomac Home Brigade, and Captain N. H. Allen, of the company serving as mounted infantry. General Ricketts has not yet forwarded his official report; when received, I shall promptly transmit it to the War Office. It will, doubtless, disclose many other officers properly entitled to special mention. At this time, I can only speak of commandants of brigades, and regiments, whose names have been alrea ly given, and repeat the commendation they have won from commanding officers in many a former battle. They are of the soldiers whose skill and courage have ennobled, not merely themselves, but the army they have belonged to so long. The subjoined report gives my opinion of the rebel strength forwarded by telegram the day after the battle. Information, since obtained, The aggregate shows a heavy loss, illustrat- Early in the morning of the ninth instant the ing the obstinate valor of the command. I am enemy moved out of Frederick City, and in skirsatisfied, however, that the casualties of the reb-mish order, began to fight. els exceeded mine. To reach this conclusion, one has only to make a calculation, based upon the fact that the day after the battle over four hundred men, too seriously wounded to be carried away, were captured in the hospital at Frederick City. Orders have been given to collect the bodies of our dead in one burial-ground on the battlefield, suitable for a monument, upon which I propose to write-These men died to save the national capital, and they did save it. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, LEW. WALLACE, Major-General Commanding HEADQUARTERS, ELLICOTT'S MILLS, 2:05 P. M., July 10, 1864. } Major-General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff at Washington City: I have the honor to report that I have reached this point with my column. As I telegraphed you on the evening of the eighth instant, I left Frederick, and by a night march, took position on the left bank of the Monocacy, with my left on the south side of the Washington pike, and my right covering the bridge on the Baltimore pike, about two miles and a half from Frederick City. About nine o'clock, he opened on me with artillery, his guns being Napoleons or twelve-pounder howitzers, and mine (one six-gun battery) three-inch rifles, with one twenty-four-pounder howitzer. His columns of cavalry and artillery worked rapidly round to my left, and crossed the river in face of my guard, and charged confidently upon Brigadier-General Ricketts Third division Sixth Army Corps. The General changed front and repulsed them, and charged in turn, and drove them gallantly. The enemy then advanced a second line; this the General also repulsed and drove. Meantime the enemy placed at least two batteries in positions, so that when he made his final charge, with four lines of infantry, about 3:30 P. M. the resistance of Ricketts' division was under an enfilading fire of shells really terrific. The moment I saw the third rebel line advance, I ordered the General to make such preparations as he could, and retire his command by a county road up the river to the Baltimore pike. This was accomplished with an extraordinary steadiness, The men of the third division were not whipped, but retired reluctantly, under my order. They bore the brunt of the battle with |