departure of General Wright, General Hunter had force enough to hold the enemy, should he return upon us? It was answered that if the enemy should return in full force, we had not troops enough to hold him: but our best information indicated that he was falling back under orders; and that Averell's cavalry had reconnoitred as far south as Strasburg without discovering any force. his main force at Bunker Hill. It was proposed to attack him between Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus cuting his army in two. On Saturday, July thirty, it was intensely hot; the trains of the Sixth corps still passing through toward Halltown. About mid-day we received news from Washington that the enemy had entered Chambersburg, and that the remaining divisions of the Nineteenth corps were A telegram from General Halleck indicated en route to reinforce us. Immediately afterGeneral Grant's views in regard to the valley. ward orders were issued directing the whole He desired that the line of the Potomac should force to fall back to Middletown valley, in Mabe held with a view to the protection of Wash-ryland; these orders, I understood, came from ington, in case of necessity. The line of the Ma- Washington. A retrograde movement was imnassas Gap railroad and Cedar creek was sug-mediately commenced, and by the following day gested; it was considered more judicious to establish a line near the base of supplies, and that of Aldie, Snicker's Gap, Berryville, and Winchester was decided upon. It was the decided opinion of officers who had had experience in the valley of the Shenandoah, and were well acquainted with its topography, that there was no line of defence which could be advantageously maintained against an army marching from the south, and that the idea of holding it by fortified posts was equally futile; they were liable to be penetrated and evaded with but little risk, even by an inferior enemy, and liable to be cut off, isolated, and entrapped by a superior force. The difficulty of maintaining communication was almost insurmountable. It was urged that the only mode of holding the line of the Potomac and the valley of the Shenandoah securely, was to confront the enemy with a predominating force, and drive him out or destroy him. the whole army was in Maryland, with headquarters in Frederick City, leaving, however, a strong garrison at Harper's Ferry, under the command of General Howe. I have never been able to understand the motive of this movement, and have always considered it a most unfortunate one. The position of our troops at Halltown and Bolivar Heights was unassailable by such a force as Early commanded. It was most convenient for active operations against the enemy in any direction, and was believed to interpose an effectual check on any movement of his main body toward the invasion of Maryland or toward Washington by way of Snicker's ferry, as was apprehended in some quarters. An attempt on his part to move in either direction would have exposed his flank and rear to advantageous attack by our superior force, and have left his communications entirely at our mercy. Our retrograde movement left the whole country open to him. In obedience to orders, General Crook (now Major-General by brevet), took command of the August first we received information that forces in the field, and occupied Winchester McCausland had entered Chambersburg at the with fourteen thousand men. On Sunday, twenty- head of two thousand cavalry, and after burnfourth, General Early suddenly returned ining and sacking the town, moved westward, heavy force, and falling upon Crook, near Kerns- followed by Averell, with an inferior force. Duftown, defeated him, putting about a thousand fie was ordered to unite with Averell in the men hors de combat. General Crook fell back pursuit. behind the Potomac, saving all his guns and material. On the twenty-seventh his command moved down on the Maryland side of the Potomac, and took position in Pleasant Valley, nearly opposite Harper's Ferry; Averell reported the enemy crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, destroying the railroad and canal, and menacing both Cumberland and Chambersburg; General Wright at Monocacy, with the Sixth corps, and General Emory coming up with the nineteenth. On the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth the whole force crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and took position in Halltown and vicinity. The combined force amounted to about thirty thousand men, and eighty or ninety guns. It was reported that the enemy was crossing with all arms at Williamsport, and driving Averell back on Chambersburg. This was believed to be only a cavalry force, and Early was supposed to be lying along the turnpike, between Martinsburg and Winchester; August second information was received by telegraph from Washington that a heavy column of the enemy was moving on that city, via Rockville. Marching orders were promptly issued, and subsequently countermanded, when it was ascertained that the alarm had originated from the appearance of a squad of United States cavalry scouting near Rockville. Headquarters were moved to the Thomas farm, on the east side of the Monocacy. News received that General Kelly had handsomely repulsed, McCausland's attack on Cumberland; Early's main body still lying between Martinsburg and Winchester; small foraging parties of rebels crossing occasionally at Antietam ford, Shepherdstown, and Williamsport. August fourth General Howe telegraphs that the enemy are menacing Harper's Ferry; General Emory, with the Nineteenth corps, ten thousand strong, was sent there during the night. August fifth, in the afternoon, General Grant in person visited headquarters, and had a con ference with General Hunter. It was understood that General Phil. Sheridan was to be assigned to the command of the troops in the departments of Washington, Susquehanna and West Virginia, and an official order to that effect was promulgated a few days after. The troops were immediately returned to their positions at Bolivar Heights and Halltown. On the last day of August General Hunter, at his own oft-repeated request, was officially relieved of command in West Virginia. At the same time, worn out with fatigue and exposure, I resigned my commission in the volunteer service, and about the first of September received an honorable discharge from the department commander. modest wreath for that gallant Army of West I am, General, with high respect, your obe- Adjutant-General's Office, Nov. 18, 1865. Doc. 76. OPERATIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND N. CAROLINA, ARMY OF THE JAMES, IN THE FIELD, January 3, 1865. GENERAL: On the seventh of December last, in obedience to your orders, I moved a force of General Ames' division of the Twenty-fourth corps and General Paine's division of the Twen ty-fifth corps, under command of Major-General Weitzel, to an encampment near Bermuda. On the eighth the troops embarked for Fortress Monroe. On the ninth, Friday, I reported to RearAdmiral Porter that the army portion of the conjoint expedition directed against Wilmington was ready to proceed. We waited there Saturday the tenth, Sunday the eleventh, and Monday the twelfth. On the twelfth Rear-Admiral Porter informed me that the naval fleet would sail on the thirteenth, but would be obliged to put into Beaufort to take on board ammunition for the mon itors.* I have thus given a brief sketch of military movements and events participated in by the Army of West Virginia while under your command, from the twenty-first day of May, 1864, to the ninth of August. I have always considered the movement on Lynchburg as one of the bold-sixty-five hundred efficient men, consisting of est and best-conducted campaigns of the war; that the motives which dictated it fully justified the hazard incurred, and that the results obtained by very inadequate forces have been fully acknowledged by those who best understood their real value. Lieutenant-General Grant handsomely acknowledges that "all had been accomplished that was possible under the circumstances, and more than could have been hoped for." Jefferson Davis, in his speech to the people of Georgia, after the fall of Atlanta, informed them that "an audacious movement of the enemy up to the very walls of Lynchburg had rendered it necessary that the government should send a formidable body of troops to cover that vital point, which had otherwise been intended for the relief of Atlanta." The vital importance of Lynchburg as a reserve depot and proposed place of retreat, in case of the abandonment of Richmond, was fully appreciated by the rebel authorities; by the United States it was either not fully understood, or the approach deemed too hazardous. When the enemy saw, therefore, their fatal weakness was discovered, and the approaches already reconnoitred, he was obliged to despatch a force to protect it at all hazards; nearly one third of the flower of Lee's army, under Early, was detached for this purpose. Thus the great result was accomplished. Atlanta, unrelieved, fell before the conquering arms of Sherman. Lee's army, thus enfeebled, remained imprisoned in Richmond, and was never afterward able to hazard an active demonstration. Early's presence in the valley of the Shenandoah convinced the government of the United States of the only effectual policy to be pursued in that quarter. He was confronted by a superior army, attacked and annihilated. The subsequent movements of Generals Grant and Sherman brought the war to a full and fortunate conclusion. While rejoicing in the honors accorded to those great soldiers, whose fortune it has been to gather in the glorious harvest, I still feel it my duty to claim a The expedition having become the subject of remark, fearing lest its destination should get to the enemy, in order to divert from it all attention, on the morning of Tuesday the thirteenth, at three o'clock, I ordered the transport fleet to proceed up the Potomac during the day to Matthias Point, so as to be plainly visible to the scouts and signal men of the enemy on the northern neck, and to retrace their course at night and anchor under the lee of Cape Charles. Having given the navy thirty-six hours' start, at twelve o'clock noon of the fourteenth, Wednesday, I joined the transport fleet off Cape Henry, and put to sea, arriving at the place of rendezvous of New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the fifteenth, Thursday. We there waited for the navy Friday the sixteenth, Saturday the seventeeth, and Sunday the eighteenth, during which days we had the finest possible weather and the smoothest sea. On the evening of the eighteenth Admiral Porter came from Beaufort to the place of rendezvous. That evening the sea became rough, and on Monday, the nineteenth, the wind sprang up freshly, so that it was impossible to land * See General Terry's Report, page 426, ante. troops; and by the advice of Admiral Porter, communicated to me by letter, I directed the transport fleet to rendezvous at Beaufort. This was a matter of necessity, because the transport fleet, being coaled and watered for ten days, had already waited that time, to wit: from the ninth, the day on which we were ready to sail, to the nineteenth. Sunday, Captain Glisson, commanding the covering divisions of the fleet, reported the batteries silenced and his vessels in position to cover our landing. The transport fleet, following my flag-ship, stood in within eight hundred yards of the beach, and at once commenced debarking. The landing was successfully effected. Finding that the On the twentieth, Tuesday; twenty-first,Wed- reconnoitring party just landed could hold the nesday; twenty-second, Thursday; and twenty-shore, I determined to land a force with which third, Friday, it blew a gale. I was occupied an assault might be attempted. in coaling and watering the transport fleet at Beaufort. The Baltic, having a large supply of coal, was enabled to remain at the place of rendezvous, with a brigade on board of twelve hundred men, and General Ames reported to Admiral Porter that he would co-operate with him. Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, who deserves well for his gallantry, immediately pushed up his brigade within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, capturing the Half-Moon battery and its men, who were taken off by the boats of the navy. This skirmish line advanced to within sevenOn the twenty-third I sent Captain Clark, of my ty-five yards of the fort, protected by the glacis staff, from Beaufort on the fast-sailing armed which had been thrown up in such form as to steamer Chamberlain, to Admiral Porter to in- give cover, the garrison being completely kept form him that on the evening of the twenty-in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, fourth I would again be at the rendezvous with which was very rapid and continuous, their the transport fleet, for the purpose of commenc- shells bursting over the work with very coning the attack, the weather permitting. siderable accuracy. At this time we lost ten At four o'clock on the evening of the twenty-men wounded on the skirmish line by the shells fourth I came in sight of Fort Fisher, and found from the fleet. the naval fleet engaged in bombarding it, the powder-vessel having been exploded on the morning previous, about one o'clock. Through General Weitzel I arranged with Admiral Porter to commence the landing under cover of the gunboats as early as eight o'clock the next morning, if possible, as soon as the fire of the Half-Moon and Flag-pond Hill batteries had been silenced. These are up the shore some two or three miles above Fort Fisher. Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the fort into Cape Fear river, and then the troops could land and hold the beach without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboats (the Tallahassee being seen in the river). It is to be remarked that Admiral Farragut, even, had never taken a fort except by running by and cutting it off from all prospects of reinforcements, as at Fort Jackson and Fort Morgan, and that no casemated fort had been silenced by naval fire during the war. That if the Admiral would put his ships in the river the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to do Farragut at Fort St. Philip. That at least the blockade at Wilmington would be thus effectual, even if we did not capture the fort. To that the Admiral replied that he should probably lose a boat by torpedoes if he attempted to run by. He was reminded that the army might lose five hundred men by the assault, and that his boat would not weigh in the balance, even in a money point of view, for a moment, with the lives of the men. The Admiral declined going by, and the expedition was deprived of that essential element of success. At twelve o'clock noon of the twenty-fifth, Quitting my flag-ship I went on board the Chamberlain and ran in within a few hundred yards of the fort, so that it was plainly visible. It appeared to be a square bastioned work of very high relief, say fifteen feet, surrounded by a wet ditch some fifteen feet wide. I was protected from being enveloped by an assaulting force by a stockade which extended from the fort to the sea on the one side, and from the marshes of Cape Fear river to the salient on the other. No material damage to the fort, as a defensive work, had been done. Seventeen heavy guns bore up the beach, protected from the fire of the navy by traverses eight or ten feet high, which were undoubtedly bomb-proof shelters for the garrison. With the garrision kept within their bombproofs it was easy to maintain this position; but the shells of the navy, which kept the enemy in their bomb-proofs, would keep my troops out. When those ceased falling the parapet was fully manned. Lieutenant Walling, of the One Hundred and Forty-second New York, pressed up to the edge of the ditch, and captured a flag which had been cut down by a shell from the navy. It is a mistake, as was at first reported to me, that any soldier entered the fort. An orderly was killed about a third of a mile from the fort and his horse taken. In the meantime the remainder of Ames' division had captured two hundred and eighteen men and ten commissioned officers of the North Carolina reserves and other prisoners. From them I learned that Kirkland's and Hagood's brigade of Hoke's division had left the front of the Army of the James, near Richmond, and were then within two miles of the rear of my forces, and their skirmishers were then actually engaged, and that the remainder of Hoke's division had come the night before to Wilmington, and were then on the march, if they had not already arrived. I learned, also, that these troops had left Richmond on Tuesday, the twentieth. Knowing the strength of Hoke's division, I found a force opposed to me, outside of the works, larger than my own. In the meantime the weather assumed a threatening aspect. The surf began to roll in so that the landing became difficult, At this time General Weitzel reported to me that to assault the work, in his judgment, and in that of the experienced officers of his command, who had been on the skirmish line, with any prospect of success, was impossible. This opinion coincided with my own, and much as I regretted the necessity of abandoning the attempt, yet the path of duty was plain. Not so strong a work as Fort Fisher had been taken by assault during the war, and I had to guide me the experience of Port Hudson, with its slaughtered thousands in the repulsed assault, and the double assault of Fort Wagner, where thousands were sacrificed in an attempt to take a work less strong than Fisher, after it had been subjected to a more continued and fully as severe fire. And in neither of the instances I have mentioned had the assaulting force in its rear, as I had, an army of the enemy larger than itself. I therefore ordered that no assault should be made, and that the troops should re-embark. While superintending the preparations for this, the fire of the navy ceased. Instantly the guns of the fort were fully manned, and a sharp fire of musketry, grape and canister swept the plain over which the column must have advanced, and the skirmish line was returning. Working with what diligence we could, it was impossible to get the troops again on board before the sea ran so high as to render further re-embarkation, or even the sending of supplies ashore, impossible. I lay by the shore until elven o'clock the next day, Monday, the twentysixth, when, having made all proper dispositions for getting the troops on board, I gave orders to the transport fleet, as fast as they were ready, to sail for Fortress Monroe, in obedience to my instructions from the Lieutenant-Gen.eral. I learned from deserters and prisoners captured, that the supposition upon which the Lieutenant-General directed the expedition, that Wilmington had been denuded of troops to oppose General Sherman, was correct. That at the time when the army arrived off Wilmington, there were less than four hundred men in the garrison of Fort Fisher, and less than a thousand within twenty miles. But the delay of three days of good weather, the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth, waiting for the arrival of the navy, and the further delay of the terrible storm of the twenty-first, twenty-second and twenty-third, gave time for troops to be brought from Richmond, three divisions of which were either there or on the road. The instructions of the Lieutenant-General to me did not contemplate a siege; I had neither siege-trains nor supplies for such a contingency. The exigency of possible delay, for which the foresight of the commander of the armies had provided, had arisen, to wit: the larger reinforcement of the garrison. This, together with the fact that the navy had exhausted their supply of ammunition in the bombardment, left me with no alternative but to return with my troops to the Army of the James. The loss of the opportunity of Friday, Saturday and Sunday, the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth, was the immediate cause of the failure of the expedition. It is not my province even to suggest blame to the navy for their delay of four days at Beanfort. I know none of the reasons which do or do not justify it. It is to be presumed they are sufficient. I am happy to bring to the attention of the Lieutenant-General the excellent behavior of the troops, both officers and men, which was all that could be desired. I am under special obligations to Captain Glisson, of the Santiago de Cuba, for the able and efficient manner in which he covered our landing; to Captain Alden, of the Brooklyn, for his prompt assistance and the excellent gunnery with which the Brooklyn cleared the shores of all opposers at the moment of debarkation. Lieutenant Farquhar, of the navy, having in charge the navy boats which assisted in the landing, deserves great credit for the energy and skill with which he managed the boats through the rolling surf. Especial commendation is due to Brigadier-General Graham and the officers and men of his naval brigade, for the organization of his boats and crews for landing, and the untiring energy and industry with which they all labored in re-embarking the troops during the stormy night of the twenty-fifth and the days following. For this and other meritorious services during the campaign since the first of May, which have heretofore been brought to the notice of the Lieutenant-General in my official reports, I would respectfully but earnestly recommend General Graham for promotion. The number of prisoner captured by us was three hundred, including twelve officers, two heavy rifled guns, two light guns, and six caissons. The loss of the army was one man drowned, two men killed, one officer captured, who accidentally wandered through our pickets, and ten men wounded while upon the picket line by the shells of the navy. Always chary of mentioning with commendation the acts of my own personal staff, yet I think the troops who saw it will agree to the cool courage and daring of Lieutenant Sidney B. DeKay, aid-de-camp, in landing on the night of the twenty-fifth, and remaining aiding in reembarkation on the twenty-seventh. rection, which, for weeks past, has been vaguely expected, commenced this morning. To Major-General Butler is exclusively due whatever credit shall result from the inception and execution of the plan. When, four weeks For the details of the landing and the opera- since, Lieutenant-General Grant, the actual comtions, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of mander of the armies of the United States, Major-General Weitzel, commanding the divi-visited Fortress Monroe, it was for the purpose sion landed. of ascertaining the views of General Butler Trusting my action will meet with the ap-respecting an advance upon the rebels by way proval of the Lieutenant-General, the report is respectfully submitted. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Doc. 77. OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. GENERAL BUTLER'S DESPATCH. OFF CITY POINT, VA., May 5, 1864. of the Peninsula, to be carried out in co-operation with the Grand Army of the Potomac. General Grant had considered the various plans proposed with this object in view, but had committed himself to none, and was inclined, therefore, to listen attentively to what General Butler might suggest. The project was to advance upon Richmond by the James river; get a foothold as near the city as possible, on the south bank of the stream; seriously interrupt the communications of the rebel capital southward, and eventually compel the evacuation by Lee's army of their strongly-fortified position on the Rapidan, thus forcing the rebels to give Grant battle, or press rapidly rearward to the walls of their capital. Lieutenant-General Grant, Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.: We have seized Wilson's wharf landing. A brigade of Wild's colored troops are there. At Fort Powhatan landing two regiments of the same brigade have landed. At City Point Hinks' division, with the remaining troops and battery, have landed. The remainder of both the Eighteenth and Tenth Army Corps are being landed at Bermuda Hundreds, above the Ap-eral W. F. Smith. In addition to these warpomattox. No opposition experienced thus far. The movement was apparently a complete surprise. Both army corps left Yorktown during last night. The monitors are all over the bar at Harrison's Landing and above City Point. The operations of the fleet have been conducted today with energy and success. Generals Smith and Gillmore are pushing the landing of the men. General Graham, with the army gunboats, led the advance during the night, capturing the signal station of the rebels. Colonel West, with eighteen hundred cavalry, made several demonstrations from Williamsburg yesterday morning. General Kautz left Suffolk this morning with his cavalry, for the service indicated during the conference with the Lieutenant-General, The first step toward organization was made some weeks since, by the concentration at Yorktown, from the various posts in the Department of North Carolina and Virginia, the great bulk of the Eighteenth Army Corps. To the command of these troops was assigned Major-Gen worn heroes from the coast of North Carolina and the posts in Virginia, nearly all the brave and gallant fellows in the Tenth Army Corps (under Major-General Gillmore), were sent to General Butler, to participate in the movement, forming their encampment at Gloucester Point, opposite Yorktown. That Yorktown and Gloucester Point, both at the mouth of the York river, should have been selected for the rendezvous of these troops, naturally led to the supposition that the advance was intended to be made up the Peninsula by the route which proved so fearfully disastro us to McClellan. But this show of force was merely a stupendous ruse de guerre, and circumstances indicate that it succeeded admirably in deceiving the rebels. Their journals have constantly spoken of these troops as destined to follow the path of 1862, and that the prison-assurance of their deception might be made doubly sure, a brigade of Union troops was despatched by General Butler even as late as yesterday to White House landing, where, at sunset, when we last heard from them, they were sedulously engaged in felling timber and constructing a wharf, as if preparing to facilitate the landing of a large army. To aid in this scheme of mystification, all the light-draft steamers were kept until the last moment at Fortress Monroe, whence, early yesterday morning, they were despatched to the York river, and the work of embarking the troops, whose arrangements for the purpose had been The New York, flag-of-truce boat, was found lying at the wharf, with four hundred ers, whom she had not time to deliver. She went up yesterday morning. We are landing troops during the night-a hazardous service in the face of the enemy. BENJ. F. BUTLER, A. F. PUFFER, Major-General Commanding. Captain and A. D. C. A NATIONAL ACCOUNT. STEAMER GRAYHOUND, OFF FORT POWHATAN, |