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General Sherman to Wade Hampton. HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, February 24, 1865.

cuted at once two of yours, giving, in all cases, preference to any officers who inay be in my hands.

In reference to the statement you make regarding the death of your foragers, I have only to say that I know nothing of it; that no orders given by me authorize the killing of prisoners after capture, and I do not believe my men killed any of yours except under circumstances

GENERAL: It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after capture, and labelled "Death to all foragers." One instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterville, and another of twenty, "near a ravine eighty rods from the main road," about three miles from Feastersville, I have ordered a sim-in which it was perfectly legitimate and proper ilar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

I hold about a thousand prisoners, captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are commit ted with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your confederates.

Of course you cannot question my right to "forage on the country." It is a war-right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions, therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I cannot permit an enemy to judge, or punish with wholesale murder.

Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war; but they were to be expected; and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow, and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our warright to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life."

I am, with respect,

Your obedientservant

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army. Lieutenant-General WADE HAMPTON,

Commanding Cavalry Forces, C. S. A.

Wade Hampton to General Sherman.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
February 27, 1865.

GENERAL: Your communication of the twentyfourth inst. reached me to-day. In it you state that it has been officially reported that your foraging parties are "murdered" after capture. You go on to say that you have "ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner;" that is to say, you have ordered a number of Confederate soldiers to be "murdered." You characterize your order in proper terms, for the public voice, even in your own country, where it seldom dares to express itself in vindication of truth, honor, or justice, will surely agree with you in pronouncing you guilty of murder, if your order is carried Before dismissing this portion of your letter, I beg to assure you, that for every soldier of mine "murdered" by you, I shall have exe

out.

they should kill them. It is a part of the system of the thieves whom you designate as your foragers to fire the dwellings of those citizens whom they have robbed. To check this inhuman system, which is justly execrated by every civilized nation, I have directed my men to shoot down all of your men who are caught burning houses. This order shall remain in force so long as you disgrace the profession of arms by allowing your men to destroy private dwellings.

You say that I cannot, of course, question "It is a your right to forage on the country. right as old as history." I do not, sir, question this right. But there is a right older even than this, and one more inalienable-the right that every man has to defend his home, and to protect those who are dependent on him: and from my heart I wish that every old man and boy in my country, who can fire a gun, would shoot down, as he would a wild beast, the men who are desolating their land, burning their homes, and insulting their women.

You are particular in defining and claiming "war-rights." May I ask if you enumerate among these the right to fire upon a defenceless city without notice; to burn that city to the ground after it had been surrendered by the inhabitants, who claimed, though in vain, that protection which is always accorded in civilized warfare to non-combatants; to fire the dwellinghouses of citizens after robbing them, and to perpetrate even darker crimes than thesecrimes too black to be mentioned.

You have permitted, if you have not ordered, the commission of these offences against humanity and the rules of war. You fired into the city of Columbia without a word of warning, after its surrender by the mayor, who demanded protection to private property; you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amidst its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the lurid light of burning houses; and in more than one household there is an agony far more bitter than that of death. The Indian scalped his victim regardless of age or sex, but with all his barbarity he always respected the persons of his female captives. Your soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.

In conclusion, I have only to request that whenever you have any of my men "murdered" or "disposed of "-for the terms seem synonymous with yon-you will let me hear of it, that I may know what action to take in the matter.

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GENERAL PLEASONTONS NARRATIVE.
MILWAUKEE, WIs., October 15, 1865.

To the Honorable B. F. Wade, Chairman of the
Committee on the Conduct of the War:
MY DEAR SIR: Agreeably to your request, I
submit for the consideration of your honorable
Committee on the Conduct of the War, some of
the prominent facts that came under my obser-
vation during the campaigns in which I was en-
gaged in the late war of rebellion, and which
had any bearing on their success or failure.

The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-62. It was most unfortunate, that with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies.

could not have been removed by twenty thou sand cavalry, properly supported by that army?

So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry, that it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy.

I served with the Army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and from what has since been done I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring; in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect of the cavalry, would not have been forced on us. McClellan dreaded the rebel cavalry, and supposed that by placing his army on a peninsula, with a deep river on each side, he was safe from that arm of the enemy; but the humiliation on the Chickahominy of having a few thousand of the enemy's cavalry ride completely round his army, and the ignominious retreat to Harrison's Landing, are additional instances in support of the maxim that a General who disregards the rules of war finds himself overwhelmed by the consequences of such neglect when the crisis of battle follows.

The highest military authorities have laid While the cavalry arm was thus neglected down, that in the proper organization of an in the organization of the army, the infantry army, the cavalry should form one fourth to one force, which was upward of one hundred and sixth of the infantry which compose it. This thirty thousand men, was kept in divisions unrelation of the cavalry to the infantry is so im- til the army entered the field in the spring, portant, in consequence of the necessary duties when the corps formation was adopted; but so assigned to each in time of war, that it may indiffierently, however, that the command of the fairly be said no army is fit to take the field corps fell upon officers of no higher grade than unless these two arms are properly organized, that of Brigadier-General. This carelessness of and bear the proper proportion to each other assignment, by rendering every high officer unwith respect to numbers. And it is also a strong certain of the position he held, was a fruitful fact, which the war has demonstrated, that the source of the jealousies and dissensions that more closely these proportions are observed afterward occurred among the commanders in throughout the campaign, the greater will be this army, and which did so much to retard and the success, and the greater will be the confi- frustrate the best-devised plans that were dence reposed by the troops of the different attempted to be executed, and taken in connecarms in each other, which greatly tends to lighten tion with the useless superabundance of artiltheir most arduous duties. It is a vicious organ-lery with which at that time the army was supization that requires the infantry to supply the deficiencies of service, for want of sufficient cavalry, or the reverse; or that imposes upon a small body of cavalry the arduous and ruinous service that should only be borne by thrice their numbers.

With eighty thousand cavalry on the payrolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas were unable to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring, before our army had started in pursuit.

Does any one now assert that those obstacles

plied, and which was without higher organization than that of the battery, added to the other causes mentioned, prevented that unity of action, compactness, confidence, mobility, courage, energy and enterprise, in the army, which is so essential in the prosecution of successful warfare.

General Hooker was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac to exhibit a correct appreciation of organization in an army. He consolidated and increased his cavalry, organized them into a corps, supplied them with artillery, and was rewarded by some distinguished service, that made the march of his army a triumph from Falmouth to Frederick City.

The campaign of Gettysburg which he commenced so brilliantly, was afterward conducted by his successor with such results as to produce the deepest mortification throughout the country. The doubt, hesitation, and fear of consequences displayed by General Meade was in striking contrast to the heroic valor 80 constantly and stubbornly exhibited by the army. Never did the cavalry, though few in numbers for the labors assigned them, perform more brilliant and successful deeds of arms than those which, after the battle of Gettysburg, brought to bay a shattered, baffled and beaten army at Falling Waters, on the banks of the Potomac, in July, 1863! The army was eager for the attack, they knew the end of the rebellion was within their grasp, but their commander, General Meade, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General Meade, caused the army to fall back from Culpepper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of generalship, and the Mine Run campaign showed so plainly that General Meade was deficient in the qualities required for a commander, that it was not surprising to see Lieutenant-General Grant, a short time after, assume the personal direction of the Army of the Potomac."

It is a very important fact, that the numbers of the cavalry in that Army were then more nearly in the proper proportion to those of the infantry than at any other time in its history; and the noble record of the cavalry and of the Army, while under General Grant, can consequently be accepted as one of the results of observing that important principle of war-the proper organization of an army.

The Government should now decide this question; and if responded to in the affirmative, make the necessary corrections to prevent similar evils in our military system hereafter.

CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.

In the campaign of the Peninsula_I_commanded the Second regiment of United States cavalry, until the Army arrived at Harrison's landing, when I was made a Brigadier-General of volunteers, and commanded a brigade of cavalry in the second action at Malvern Hill, on the fifth of August, 1862, and also covered the withdrawal of the Army from the Peninsula.

Throughout this campaign there was a decided want of vigor in the conduct of the Army, and the first great mistake was made in permitting the rebels to occupy and reinforce Yorktown, before taking possession of it. Some thirty days' delay occurred in laying siege to Yorktown, when it might have been taken by assault the first few days after the Army arrived before it. At all events the importance of time at that period was such as to make an attempt worthy of a trial.

The time lost at Yorktown, and on the Chickahominy, gave the rebels an opportunity to gather their forces to defend Richmond; and the error committed in placing the Army on both sides of the Chickahominy enabled the enemy to cripple first our left wing on Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, and afterward our right wing at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill; and by the moral effect of these partial actions caused the Army to retreat to James river. There appeared no disposition throughout this campaign to bring the entire Army into action as an army: there was no controlling spirit so decidedly strong as to effect the necessary concert of action in the different portions of the Army, and as a consequence the battles that took place re sulted, from the enemy's successively massing heavier forces on our detached corps, which were outnumbered, beaten in detail, and compelled to retreat.

It has been claimed that more troops should have been furnished the Army for the purpose of taking Richmond; but the facts of the case do not support this assertion, as the troops that were in the Army were never all used, and fought in connection with, and in support of each other, as should have been done. To have increased these large masses, without material change in the manner of fighting them from that which had been adopted, would not have changed the ultimate result from what it was, and would have only added to the embarrassments which already existed.

In reviewing this subject, it is well to observe that the success of the rebel army in Virginia, for the first two years of the war, was mainly due to its superior organization, and to the splendid corps of cavalry it was able to maintain. That army was not hampered with a surplus of artillery, and its numerous and efficient cavalry kept its commander well informed of our movements; but when the casualties of war reduced this cavalry faster than they could replace them-which was the case in the campaigns of 1863-the Army was soon thrown upon the defensive, from which it was never after able to recover. We, then, deduce the following facts: that the Army of the Potomac was better organized in the later periods of the war than at the beginning; while the reverse was the case with the rebel army. The Besides the causes already mentioned, there successes of either army bore a marked corre- were numerous oversights and neglects, bearing spondence to its superior organization to that of upon discipline, and which also had a serious its opponent, at the time of achievement. The influence upon the success of the campaign. question then recurs, could not the war have Very little was done to excite the energy, emubeen much sooner closed by giving to the Armylation, and enthusiasm of the troops, while some of the Potomac a proper organization at the beginning?

measures were adopted that had a decided tendency to diminish these necessary qualities in a

marked degree. At Yorktown, an order from the headquarters prohibited all music by bands, and all calls, by either drums or bugles; and they were not resumed until after the army had arrived at Harrison's landing.

When the large masses of men which composed the Army of the Potomac were moving among the swamps of the Chickahominy, without any of the enlivening sounds of martial music, or the various well-known calls of an army life, the effect was very depressing, and caused the soldiers to exaggerate the issue that required of them to lose the most agreeable part of their profession.

The army, however, had gone to the Peninsula very enthusiastic; the soldiers always earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties, and although the field for the campaign had been badly selected, and there were numerous drawbacks to disappoint their hopes, there were also several occasions won by their valor, when a bold, determined, resolute commander could have forced the result to a successful issue.

CAMPAIGN OF ANTIETAM.

In this campaign I commanded the cavalry division of the army, and took the advance from Washington City through Maryland, and until the field of Antietam was reached, when I fought my command in front of the bridge leading from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and held the centre of our army throughout the battle. The same mistakes were made in this campaign that characterized that of the Peninsula: the army was not moved with sufficient rapidity or vigor from the Peninsula, or through Maryland, and the enemy was again given time to prepare and concentrate. When the battle was delivered it was fought by detached commands, in such positions as to be unable to give or receive assistance from each other. Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner's corps were on the right, too distant to receive support from the rest of the forces, while Burnside's force was on the left, at least three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. Fitz John Porter's corps was behind my position, a mile and a half on the opposite side of Antietam creek, as a reserve, but it was never brought into action except in small squads.

guns could not reach them, and the battle ended so far as my command was concerned. On the next day, the army was not permitted to advance, and on the nineteenth the enemy had crossed the Potomac and escaped. The rebel army had suffered so much more than ours in this campaign, and their ammunition was so much exhausted, that I was convinced a rapid and energetic pursuit would have routed them, if it had not caused Lee himself to surrender. Colonel Davis, of the Eighth New York cavalry, had, before the battle, destroyed all the ammunition belonging to Longstreet's corps, and the heavy demands of the fight had nearly exhausted the supply for the rest of their army. This, with the disappointment of the rebel soldiers at the failure of their enterprise to invade Pennsylvania, were advantages which should not have been thrown away.

Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The rebel force was then divided. Longstreet, and A. P. Hill, with their corps, being at Culpepper, while Stonewall Jackson and D. H. Hill were in the Shenandoah valley, at Front Royal.

By crushing Longstreet at Culpepper, the army would cripple that of the rebels, and would cut it off from Richmond. Culpepper should have been occupied. It was at this time that General Burnside assumed command of the army, and unfortunately decided to march on Fredericksburg.

THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

The details of that campaign have already been so thoroughly examined by your honorable committee, as to leave nothing to be said in reference to it except, perhaps, that the cavalry bore no prominent part in it.

CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

In this campaign, my command was the First cavalry division of the Army of the Potomac, the First brigade of which, during the battle, was with General Stoneman on his raid toward Richmond, in rear of Lee's army. With one brigade, I preceded the Eleventh and Twelfth corps as far as Chancellorsville. The movements of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were very fine and masterly, and were executed Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army with such secrecy that the enemy were not labored under from these arrangements, a deci- aware of them. For, on the thirtieth of April, sive victory could have been won at four o'clock 1863, I captured a courier from General Lee, on the afternoon of the seventeenth of Septem- commanding the rebel army, bearing a despatch ber, if a strong attack had been made on Sharps- from General Lee to General Anderson, and burg from our centre. My command had cleared written only one hour before, stating to General the enemy from my front, and were in high spir- Anderson he had just been informed we had its, while the stubborn fighting of the army gen- crossed in force, when, in fact, our three corps erally had told fearfully upon the rebels. I had been south of the Rapidan river the night therefore recommended this attack, and request-previous, and were then only five miles from ed to be permitted to take the initiative in it. Chancellorsville. The proposition was not approved and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then so far off, falling back, my

The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression. gave General Hooker au undue confidence as to his

being master of the situation, and all the neces-
sary steps were not taken on his arrival at
Chancellorsville to ensure complete success.
The country around Chancellorsville was too
cramped to admit of our whole army being
properly developed there, and two corps, the
Eleventh and Twelfth, should have been thrown,
on the night of the thirtieth of April, to Spott-
sylvania Court-House, with orders to intrench,
while the remainder of the army should have
been disposed so as to support them. This
would have compelled General Lee to attack
our whole force, or retire with his flank ex-
posed a dangerous operation in war-or else,
remain in position, and receive the attack of
Sedgwick in rear and Hooker in front; a still
worse dilemma.

one of my regiments to charge the woods from which the rebels were issuing, and hold them until 1 could bring some guns into position; then, charging several squadrons into our flying masses, to clear ground for my battery, it was brought up at a run, while staff officers and troops were despatched to seize from the rout all the guns possible. The brilliant charge of the regiment into the woods detained the rebels some ten minutes, but in that short time, such was the energy displayed by my command, I placed in line twenty-two pieces of artillery, double-shotted with canister, and aimed low, with the remainder of the cavalry supporting them.

In an instant an aide-de-camp galloped out to ascertain the truth, when a withering fire of musketry was opened on us by this very gallant foe, who now dropped our ensign, displayed ten or twelve rebel battle-flags, and with loud yells charged the guns. I then gave the command, " Fire !" and the terrible volley, delivered at less than two hundred yards' distance, caused the thick, moving masses of the enemy to stagger, cease from yelling, and for a moment discontinue their musket fire; but they were in such numbers, had such an indomitable leader, and they had so great a prize within their reach, that they soon rallied, and came on again with increased energy and force, to be met by the artillery, served well and rapidly, and with such advantage that the rebels were never able to make a permanent lodgement at the guns, which many of their adventurous spirits succeeded in

Dusk was now rapidly approaching, with an apparent lull in the fight, when heavy masses of In the third day's fight at Chancellorsville, men could be seen on the edge of the woods, General Hooker was badly stunned by the con- having a single flag, and that the flag of the cussion of a shell against a post near which he United States, while at the same time they cried was standing, and from which he did not re-out: "Don't shoot, we are friends!" cover sufficiently during the battle to resume the proper command of the army. The plan of this campaign was a bold one, and was more judicious than was generally supposed, from the large force General Hooker had at his command. There is always one disadvantage, however, attending the sending off of large detachments near the day of battle. War is such an uncertain game, it can scarcely be expected that all of the details in the best-devised plans will meet with success, and unless a general is prepared and expects to replace at once, by new combinations, such parts of his plans as fail, he will be defeated in his campaign; and as these changes are often rapid, he cannot include his distant detachments in his new plans with any certainty, and the doubt their absence creates reduces the army he can depend on to the actual number of men he has in hand. If General Hooker had not been injured at the com-reaching. mencement of the final battle, I am not certain his splendid fighting qualities would not have won for him the victory. It was in this battle that, with three regiments of cavalry and twen-mortally wounded; and as the rebel authorities ty-two pieces of artillery, I checked the attack of the rebel General Stonewall Jackson, after he had routed the Eleventh corps.

Jackson had been moving his corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men through the woods throughout the day of the second of May, 1863, from the left to the right of our army, and about six o'clock in the evening he struck the right and rear of the Eleventh corps with one of those characteristic attacks that made the rebel army so terrible when he was with it, and which was lost to them in his death.

In a very short time he doubled up the enth corps into a disordered mass, which soon sought safety in flight.

This fight lasted about an hour, when a final charge was made and repulsed, when they sullenly retired to the woods.

It was at this time that General Jackson was

have published that he had been killed by his own men, I shall mention some facts of so strong a character as to refute this statement.

Soon after the last attack, I captured some of the rebel soldiers in the woods, and they told me it was Jackson's corps that had made this fight; that Jackson himself had directed it, and had been mortally wounded, and that their loss was very heavy.

I have since met rebel officers who were then engaged, and they corroborated the above statement, and they added that it was known and believed by Jackson's men that he had been Elev-mortally wounded by our fire. Again, one of my own officers, who had been taken prisoner in that engagement, told me, after he was exchanged, that he had been taken up to Jackson soon after his capture; that Jackson questioned him about our force, and that he was then not far from our lines. This clearly proves that Jack. son was on the field in command, and had not

My command of three cavalry regiments and one battery of six guns happened to be near this scene, and perceiving at a glance that if this rout was not checked the ruin of the whole army would be involved I immediately ordered

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