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commanding the Army of the Tennessee, at of the Red River expedition. But on the first Huntsville, Major-General Thomas, command- of May the effective strength of the several ing the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanoo- armies for offensive purposes was about as folga, and Major-General Schofield, commanding lows: the Army of the Ohio, at Knoxville. We arranged, in general terms, the lines of communication to be guarded, the strength of the several columns and garrisons, and fixed the first day of May as the time when all things should be ready. Leaving these officers to complete the details of organization and preparation, I returned to Nashville on the second of April, and gave my personal attention to the question of supplies. I found the depots at Nashville abundantly supplied, and the railroads in very fair order, and that steps had already been taken to supply cars and locomotives to fill the new and increased demands of the service, but the impoverished condition of the inhabitants of East Tennessee, more especially in the region round about Chattanooga, had forced the commanding officers of posts to issue food to the people. 1 was compelled to stop this, for a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not Infantry.... feed the armies and the people too, and, of Artillery... course, the army had the preference, but I en- Cavalry.. davored to point the people to new channels of supply. At first my orders operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my course. At once the storehouses at Chattanooga began to fill, so that by the 1st of May a very respectable quantity of food and forage had been accumulated there, and from that day to this stores have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time, although the enemy has succeeded more than once in breaking our road for many miles at different points. During the month of April I received from Lieutenant-General Grant a map, with a letter of instructions, which is now at Nashville, but a copy will be procured, and made part of this report. Subsequently I received from him notice that he would move from his camps about Culpepper, Virginia, on the fifth of May, and he wanted me to do the same from Chattanooga. My troops were still dispersed, and the cavalry, so necessary to our success, was yet collecting horses at Nicholasville, Kentucky, and Columbus, Tennessee. On the twenty-seventh of April I put all the troops in motion toward Chattanooga, and the next day went there in person. My aim and purpose was to make the Army of the Cumberland fifty thousand men ; that of the Tennessee thirty-five thousand, and that of the Ohio fifteen thousand men. These figures were approxi.nated, but never reached; the Army of the Tennessee failing to receive certain divisions that were still kept on the Mississippi, resulting from the unfavorable issue

About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness. These armies were grouped on the morning of May sixth as follows: That of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga; and that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton.

The enemy lay in and about Dalton, superior to me in cavalry (Wheeler's), and with three corps of infantry and artillery, viz: Hardee's, Hood's and Polk's, the whole commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate Army. I estimated the cavalry under Wheeler at about ten thousand, and the infantry and artillery at about forty-five or fifty thousand men.

To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge known as the Rocky-Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost, through which lay the railroad and wagon-road. It was narrow, well obstructed by abatis, and flooded by water, caused by dams across Mill Creek. Batteries also commanded it in its whole length, from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at the further end, like a traverse, directly across its debouché. It was, therefore, necessary to turn it. On its north front the enemy had a strong line of works behind Mill Creek, so that my attention

was at once directed to the south. In that direction I found Snake Creek Gap, affording me a good practicable way to reach Resaca, a point on the enemy's railroad line of communication, eighteen (18) miles below Dalton. Accordingly, I ordered General McPherson to move rapidly from his position at Gordon's Mill, via Ship's Gap, Villanow and Snake Creek Gap, directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton, and to make a bold attack. After breaking the railroad well, he was ordered to fall back to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek, and stand ready to fall upon the enemy's flank when he retreated as I judged he would. During the movement, General Thomas was to make a strong feint of attack in front, while General Schofield pressed down from the north.

foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the fourteenth of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp creek, occupying the forts of Resaca, and his right on some high chestnut hills to the north of the town. I at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry, in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the Sixteenth corps, commanded by General Sweeny, to cross and

moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceeded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry; General Thomas to come up on his left and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General Mc Pherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their fortified lines and occupied a ridge of " bald" hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp Creek, General Thomas moved from Ringgold on the and General Schofield broke his way through seventh, occupying Tunnel Hill, facing the Buz- the dense forest to General Thomas' left. zard-Roost Gap, meeting with little opposition Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard and pushing the enemy's cavalry well through entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing saved the Gap; General McPherson reached Snake Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable Creek Gap on the eighth, completely surprising nature of the country, which made the passage a brigade of cavalry which was coming to of troops across the valley almost impossible. watch and hold it, and on the ninth General This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Schofield pushed down close on Dalton, from the Dalton along the comparatively good roads connorth, while General Thomas renewed his dem-structed beforehand, partly from the topographonstration against Buzzard Roost and Rocky-ical nature of the country, and partly from the Face Ridge, pushing it almost to a battle. One division, General Newton's, of the Fourth corps, General Howard's, carried the ridge, and turning south toward Dalton, found the crest too narrow and too well protected by rock epaulments, to enable him to reach the gorge or pass. Another division, General Geary's, of the Twentieth corps, General Hooker's, also made a bold push for the summit, to the south of the pass, but the narrow road as it approached the sum-threaten Calhoun; also the cavalry division of mit was too strongly held by the enemy to be carried. This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and although there were many good roads lead-its mouth, and made a lodgement close to the ing from north to south, endangering his left flank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell back and took strong position near the west end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the result, still appreciated the advantage gained, and on the tenth ordered General Thomas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to follow with another corps, the Fourteenth, General Palmer's, leaving General Howard with the Fourth corps to continue to threaten Dalton in front, while the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the same route, and on the eleventh the whole army, excepting General Howard's corps, and some cavalry left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west side of Rocky-Face Ridge for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next day we

General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down toward Rome, to cross the Oostanaula and break the railroad below Calhoun, and above Kingston, if possible, and with the main army I pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp creek near

enemy's works, on hills that commanded, with short-range artillery, the railroad and trestle bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp creek Valley, threw General Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down to it close on Resaca.

General Schofield came up close on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the fifteenth, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, captured a four-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned.

The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on his heels, General McPherson by Lay's ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. We found in Resaca

another four-gun battery and a good lot of


General McPherson during the sixteenth, got across at Lay's ferry. General Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Fue's and Fields' ferries across the Connasauga and Coosawattee rivers, which form the Oostanaula. On the seventeenth all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we could find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders, a division, General Jeff. C. Davis, along the west bank of Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day General Newton's division, in the advance, had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open, and well adapted to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositionsGeneral Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston, to be in close support. On the nineteenth, the enemy was in force about Cassville, with strong forts, but as our troops converged on him, again he retreated in the night-time across the Etowah river, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in com plete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah river.

Holding General Thomas' army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah bridge, I gave the army a few days rest, and also time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges across the Etowah river near Kingston, giving us the means of crossing toward the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold us in check at the Allatoona Pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence from our railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the twenty-third put the army in motion for Dallas.

General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas, via Van Wert. General Davis' division moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road via Euharley and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on General Thomas' left.

General Thomas' head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about Burnt Hickory,

and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he had detected the move, and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

On the twenty-fifth of May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin-vine creek, on the main Dallas road, he found a respectable force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed them across the creek, saving the bridge, though on fire, and followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove some distance, until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's other two divisions were on other roads, and he ordered them in, although the road he was then following, by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north of Dallas about four miles.

It was near four o'clock P. M. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions, and, by my order, made a bold push to secure possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three roads meet, from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought, and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church; but, having hastily thrown up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive the enemy from those roads. By the next morning we found the enemy well intrenched, substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. We were consequently compelled to make dispositions on a larger scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed toward our left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield General McCook looked to our rear.

Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work toward our left, and, when all things were ready, to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making our development before the enemy about New Hope, many severe, sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, details of which will be given at length in the reports of subordinate commanders. On the twenty-eighth, General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend still more to the left and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on Dallas.

Fortunately our men had erected good breastworks, and gave the enemy a terrible and

bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effect, I renewed my orders to General MePherson to move to his left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and Generals Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the first of June, and, by pushing our left well around, we occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east | end of the Pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. Both of those commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass.

Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the fourth of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church and move to the railroad about Ackworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily to Ackworth, and reached the railroad on the sixth of June. I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defence and garrison, and as soon as the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah our stores came forward to our camps by rail.

At Ackworth General Blair overtook us on the eighth of June, with two divisions of the Seventeenth corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.

On the ninth of June our communications in the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the north-east, terminating to our view in another peak called Brushy Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain and beyond it in the distance Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, form a triangle, Pine Mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal-stations. The summits were covered with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending.

The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war, but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy I found him occupying a line full two miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.

By the eleventh of June our lines were closed up, and we made dispositions to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the fourteenth, and on the morning of the fifteenth Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing our operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the seventeenth, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly.

From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay close up against his mountain town.

During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villanously bad, and the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow, wooded roads mere mud-gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing, galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy.

General McPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw, and working his left forward. General Thomas swinging, as it were on a grand leftwheel, his left on Kenesaw, connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all

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good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly, and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them.

It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strongly on the enemy's left; and on the first of July I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and to rapidly throw his whole army by the right down to and threaten Nickajack creek and Turner's ferry across the Chattahoochee, and I also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.

The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish lines (an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception), yet when he reached our line of battle he General McPherson commenced his movement received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, the night of July second, and the effect was inwounded, and many prisoners in our hands.stantaneous. The next morning Kenesaw was This is known as the affair of the "Kulp House." abandoned, and with the first dawn of day I Although inviting the enemy at all times to com- saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain mit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to top. General Thomas' whole line was then repeat them after the examples of Dallas and moved forward to the railroad and turned south, the "Kulp House," and upon studying the in pursuit toward the Chattahoochee. In perground, I had no alternative, in my turn, but to son I entered Marietta at half-past eight o'clock assault his lines or turn his position. Either in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacourse had its difficulties and dangers. And I cated the place. General Logan's corps of perceived that the enemy and our own officers General McPherson's army, which had not had settled down into a conviction that I would moved far, was ordered back into Marietta by not assault fortified lines. the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and

sion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong tele du pont at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta.

All looked to me to "outflank." An army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to exe-rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confucute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left centre; because, if I could thrust a strong head of column through at that point Here General Thomas found him, his front by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and covered by a good parapet, and his flanks beone half miles, it would reach the railroad hind the Nickajack and Rottonwood creeks. below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and Ordering a garrison for Marietta, and General centre from its line of retreat, and then, by Logan to join his own army near the mouth of turning on either part, it could be over- Nickajack, I overtook General Thomas at whelmed and destroyed. Therefore, on the Smyrna. On the fourth of July we pushed a twenty-fourth of June, I ordered that an strong skirmish line down the main road, capassault should be made at two points south of turing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and Kenesaw on the twenty-seventh, giving three made strong demonstrations along Nickajack days' notice for preparation and reconnois-creek and about Turner's ferry. This had the sance; one to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, and the other about a mile further south by General Thomas' troops. The hour was fixed, and all the details given in Field Orders, number twenty-eight, of June twenty-fourth. On the twenty-seventh of June the two assaults were made at the time and in the manner prescribed, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook; Colonel Rice and others badly wounded; our aggregate loss being near three thousand, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks. Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced VOL. XI.-Doc.


desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone, and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Pace's ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve; the enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochee. Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the fifth demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee river, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.

To accomplish this result I judged it would

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