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DOCUMENTS.

imminent should we encounter an enemy in force beyond Ripley.

As to the slanderous charges with which the country is being flooded concerniug you personally, they are simply false, and beneath your notice or mine.

when defeat was evident, you did all that could
be done to prevent the disaster which followed.
I am confident that, owing to the force and
vigor of the enemy's pursuit, it was impossible
to save the train, or the artillery which was be-
hind it, on the retreat, and that any decided
stand made with the intention of rescuing the
infantry, which was last engaged, would have
resulted in the capture of the entire force. The
only plan by which any of the infantry could be
Captain, Aide-de-Camp, and A. A. A. G., U. S. A. saved, was the one which they instinctively

W. L. MCMILLEN,
Colonel Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, commanding.
To Brigadier-General S. D. STURGIS, U. S. V.
WILLIAM C. RAVALLE,

COLONEL WARING'S LETTER,

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION,
SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS, WHITE STATION, TENNESSEE,
June 23, 1864.

Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis :
GENERAL: I have received your letter of this
date, asking me to state my opinion of the man-
ner in which you conducted yourself in the re-
cent expedition into Mississippi, and of the ex-
tent to which the failure of that expedition is to
be attributed to your fault.

adopted that of taking to the woods and find-
ing their own way to our lines.

Had you taken the grave responsibility of turning back the expedition at Ripley, you would have avoided the disaster of the battle. Whether or not you ought to have done so, I cannot decide, not knowing what your information was; but I am sure, that if you had, the unfavorable comments of the discontented would have been tenfold more loud and annoying than they now are.

The rude character of the country through In reply, I beg to state, that while I was not which we moved rendered all tactical precauinformed of the precise orders under which you tions, except a simple advance guard, impossiproceeded, and had no means of knowing the ble, while it was so utterly barren that an imfull import of the information which you re-mediate advance or retreat was necessary to ceived of the position, strength, and intentions procure forage for teams and cavalry horses. of the enemy, so far as I was able to judge of the objects of the expedition, and of the forces opposed to us, I at no time doubted that it was your duty to go on and to engage the enemy wherever he might be found.

On the day of the battle of Brice's cross-roads, I commanded the head of the column, and found it impossible to get any but the most vague information concerning the rebel force in our front, until we actually reached the field where the battle was fought. Even here it seemed doubtful that we would meet with serious opposition.

It became necessary to send out patrols to procure fuller information. The patrol toward Baldwin almost immediately struck a strong picket of the enemy, and was reinforced before the numbers opposed to us could be known. We were engaged by a force which I thought, as did General Grierson, must be met by my whole brigade, and I at once took up the only good position for more than a mile to our rear. I think that you were right in desiring to hold this position, and nothing for the first two hours of the battle indicated that it could not be held until the whole infantry force came up. Indeed, it was held until my brigade was relieved by the head of the infantry column. Even when I fell back to a new position, I saw no reason why the battle should not be decided in our favor.

From this time until the retreat I was with you, and I had occasion to observe your management of the battle. Here, certainly, was no cause for the unjust criticisms which have been passed upon you. You were cool and energetic, and certainly did all that lay in your power to make the engagement successful; and,

Not turning back, you had but one course to pursue; to find the enemy where you could, and to fight him on his own ground and on his own terms.

This you did as well as you could, and I am ready to testify, with a full knowledge of the circumstances of the battle and the defeat, that you acquitted yourself nobly and well, and that you merit the commendation of all who have a right to express an opinion in the matter, as you have already received that of your comrades, who saw you under the trying circumstances of action and defeat.

I wish that any word of mine could arrest the slander that you were under the influence of liquor during the fight, but such calumnies travel too fast for honest refutation to overtake them; and on this score I can only offer you the modified consolation of saying, that I and my staff, who saw much of you before, during and after the battle, are ready to brand that falsehood as it deserves whenever it may appear before us.

Be good enough, General, to accept the assurance of my personal regard, and command my assistance whenever it may be of service to you.

Very respectfully and truly yours,
GEO. E. WARING,

Colonel Fourth Missouri Cavalry, commanding.

W. C. RAVALLE, A. D. C.

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roads, near Guntown, Mississippi, I, an eyewitness and participator in the engagement, with present facilities for full data and information in regard to the object, force, conduct, and management of the expedition, the valor with which our troops fought, and the manner in which the retreat was conducted, cannot refrain from submitting the following truthful narrative of events, just as they occurred, for publica

tion:

General Sturgis was ordered to strike the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at a point south of Corinth, destroy the same, and engage any forces of the enemy in that vicinity. The forces composing his expedition were four thousand seven hundred infantry, with sixteen pieces of artillery, in three brigades, under Colonel McMillen-three thousand three hundred and fifty white troops, and one thousand three hundred and fifty colored; General Grierson's division of cavalry: First brigade, under Colonel Waring, probably one thousand two hundred strong, with two rifled guns and two sections of mountain howitzers (attached to Fourth Missouri cavalry); Second brigade, under Colonel Winslow, numbering one thousand five hundred men, with two rifled guns; Tenth Missouri cavalry and two rifled guns; Seventh Wisconsin light artillery. About two hundred wagons, loaded with supplies and ammunition, composed the train.

The morning of the tenth of June found this little army, complete in organization, in good spirits and undoubted efficiency, encamped together at Stubbs' plantation, on the Ripley road. At 5:30 o'clock A. M., Colonel Waring's brigade took the advance on the Fulton road, Winslow's brigade following, the infantry and trains marching behind. Two miles beyond Stubbs' the army crossed a swamp, known as the Hatchie River, covered with water, and abounding in small creeks meandering the road in great diversity The artillery and train was moved into the swamp without any attempt being made by pioneers to render the crossing better, and before all of the train had made the passage the clearing through which the road ran was so badly cut up as to render a recrossage impossible. Two hours' work would have sufficed to construct a road upon which the artillery and train could have been recrossed with ease.

At ten o'clock, A. M., twenty-three miles from Ripley, about eighteen miles from Tupelo, and six miles from Saltillo, at the cross-roads at Brice's plantation, half a mile east of a deep creek, passable only by a bridge, and while the train was but in part across the Hatchie swamp, the advance encountered the enemy, which it immediately engaged.

At twelve o'clock the Second brigade of cavalry moved into position, half a mile in advance of the point of intersection of the Fulton and Pontotoc road, defending this position. The engagement had now assumed a general character, the enemy apparently in great force, pressing with vigor upon the whole line, while the

artillery was hotly engaged. At two o'clock P. M. the enemy had succeeded in forcing our cav alry back a quarter of a mile from its first position, but the retirement was made in good order, and the new line was steadily held. At this period the infantry, exhausted by a march of five miles during the heat of the day, at as fast a gait as it was possible to move them, arrived and relieved the cavalry, which was ordered by General Sturgis to fall back across the creek.

The infantry went into the fight with bravery and determination, but exhausted by their forced march, and outnumbered and outflanked by their fresher foe. Fresh batteries were placed in position, and added their thunders to the horrid tumult. The dead and wounded had been carried to the rear for several hours. Now the ghastly throng grew more numerous as the tide of battle surged with greater fierceness along the line. Stragglers, many of them wounded, came in numbers from our right, and from the approaching sounds and rebel cheers, it seemed certain that the rebels had turned that flank. General Sturgis had arrived upon the field at 1:30 o'clock P. M., yet, at the moment of which I write, numbers of our teams were occupying the bridge of the deep creek toward the enemy, and being parked in the field upon its eastern bank. At three o'clock P. M., the rebels made a fierce attack along the whole line, outflanking our troops to the right and left, and driving them back in disorder.

The Fourth cavalry, in the rear of the Second cavalry brigade, had not yet succeeded in crossing their horses over the crowded bridge, and perceiving the retreat of the infantry, they were dismounted and formed upon the crest of the hill upon the eastern bank of the creek. Here, with their carbines, under a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, they fought for thirty min utes, covering the retirement of their horses, and saving the fragments of two infantry regiments threatened with complete annihilation or capture by the victorious rebels. I wish to remark in this place that I was informed by an officer of prominence, that while our entire army was in full retreat, and a great portion had already crossed the creek, General Sturgis told him that Colonel McMillen was driving the enemy.

At four o'clock P. M., that portion of the army not killed, wounded, or captured, was west of the bridge retreating in disorder, the First brigade of cavalry taking the advance of the re treating column. The negro brigade formed first west of the creek, and gave the rebels a check, after which it fell back with the receding masses. General Sturgis now ordered the Second cavalry brigade to endeavor to get ahead of the column and stop the retreat, and it accordingly proceeded to Stubbs', two miles west of the Hatchie, and ten miles from the crossroads, formed line in front and to both flanks, effectually stopping all except the First brigade, which had gone on. In the meantime a remnant of an infantry brigade had made a stand four or

DOCUMENTS.

five miles west of the creek, effectually stopping the rebel pursuit.

About nine o'clock P. M. the Hatchie swamp was completely choked with artillery, caissons, wagons, ambulances, and dead animals, the débris of a broken army, and General Sturgis, two miles ahead at Stubbs', said that he did not expect to save any artillery, wagons, or supplies, and ordered all to move forward except the Second cavalry brigade, directing Colonel Winslow to halt at Stubbs' until all the army had moved past, and then take the rear of the column as far as Ripley, saying that at that point or just beyond he would reorganize.

At 2:30 o'clock A. M. of the eleventh inst., Colonel Winslow, supposing the army all past, moved his brigade slowly in the direction of Ripley, but hearing that a portion of the brigade which protected the rear the previous night was yet behind, the cavalry was halted at a creek east of Ripley, and waited for the infantry to come up and pass. Here, as the infantry moved past, the enemy made a vigorous attack upon the rear guard, which was gallantly, met by the Third and Fourth Iowa cavalry.

The column then moved slowly toward Ripley, at which place it was fiercely attacked by the enemy in the rear, while the roads north and south of the town were occupied in force.

Here, again, the Third and Fourth Iowa cavalry deploy, manoeuvring by squadrons and battalions, meeting the foe with volley for volley, and sending the bullets back into their ranks with a fierceness and rapidity more than equal to their own. The colored brigade was again pushed into action, but after firing a few volleys without checking the rebel advance, it retreated down the Salem road.

The column was then moved out of Ripley, and the Third and Fourth Iowa again took the rear, fighting severely for several hours. Twenty miles from Colliersville, the Second brigade, being out of ammunition, was relieved by the Second New Jersey, and at nine o'clock A. M. of the twelfth inst., having marched seventy-five miles in fifty-two hours-men without rest, and horses without forage-the remnant of the army arrived at Colliersville. The First cavalry brigade had saved its howitzers. The Second had saved all its artillery, ambulances and wounded, and accompanying the cavalry were a few infantry mounted on mules, horses, etc., and a few who had marched from the battle-field on foot.

Here General Sturgis said we would rest until the next morning, and collect stragglers, and as a reinforcement of two thousand fresh infantry met us there, and we were not attacked, I do not see why it was not done; but at dark the tired troops were marched seventeen miles to White Station, where they arrived at daylight the next morning. Here General Sturgis ordered a detail of his exhausted cavalry to proceed back to Colliersville and cover some stragglers reported to have arrived there.

Our loss in this battle was probably one thou

sand killed and wounded-most of the wounded
falling into the enemy's hands-sixteen pieces of
artillery, two hundred wagons, and one thousand
five hundred prisoners. After the abandonment
of the trains, most of the infantry was out of
All of
ammunition, and the cavalry had but a few
rounds left, with no source of supply
the troops under my personal observation
fought with valor and determination worthy of
more glorious results, and after the entire army
was defeated and running back, the men were
cool and collected, marching without organiza-
tion to be sure, but without panic. A little
judgment upon the part of the commander of
our forces would, in the opinion of all military
men present at the retreat, have saved our artil-
lery and trains; and I am satisfied that, with a
supply of ammunition, the Second brigade of
cavalry, which stood so stanchly when all else
was demoralized, could have protected the van.

rally of the entire force could, I think, have been made within four miles of the battle-field, enabling us to bring off the greater portion of our artillery and train, and saving from capture hundreds of our exhausted men.

I cannot close this narrative without awarding my meed of just praise to the lion-hearted commander of the Second cavalry brigade, who, amid the tumult of battle, the horrors of defeat, and the aggravation of horrors upon the retreat, was cool, collected, and ready for any emergency. His strong sense and ripened judgment never forsook him, and, better than all, he served to infuse his own spirit and devotion to duty into his gallant command.

I have no inclination to extend this narrative into a criticism upon the General commanding. I have made some plain statements plainly, without comment. They will, I think, prove as damning as the more labored denunciation could be. The Tenth Missouri was the only artillery that was brought safe to Memphis. The First brigade of cavalry was composed of the Second New Jersey, Fourth Missouri, Nineteenth Pennsylvania, Ninth Illinois, and Seventh The Second brigade, Indiana regiments of cavalry, Colonel Geo. E. Waring, commanding. Third and Fourth Iowa, Tenth Missouri, and Seventh Illinois cavalry, Colonel E. F. Winslow commanding.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

CAMP FIFTY-FIFTH U. S. COLORED INFANTRY,
FORT PICKERING,

MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.

SIR: I wish to give you some particulars of the defeat and disastrous rout of our forces in the expedition under General Sturgis-particulars that fell under my own observation, for I was in the midst of them during their occur rence.

On the tenth, the skirmishing in front became quite severe, but our cavalry slowly drove the rebels back, until they arrived within about two miles of Guntown, when their defence became more obstinate, and our cavalry was compelled

to fall back. Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry being in the advance, was immediately ordered to the front on a double-quick, and the day being very warm, many became over-heated and exhausted, and were compelled from faintness to lie down by the roadside. I have it from the lips of those who were in this brigade, that not more than two thirds of their men reached the battle-field. As soon as this brigade had formed in line of battle the rebels came down upon them with great fury in three lines of battle. They withstood this impetuous and overwhelming force bravely for over half an hour, when the enemy performed a flank movement, and their only alternative was to retreat or be cap-ing for no one but himself. We had been here tured. By this time, however, the Second brigade had arrived, and was brought immediately into action, and were successful in checking the assault of the enemy and in holding him at bay for nearly an hour. In the interim the train had been hurried up and corralled in an open field not more than half a mile from the battlefield. The Third brigade (colored) had in the morning been disposed along the train, four men to each wagon, as a guard; as fast as this bri-tre of the town. On came the rebels with most gade could be assembled by companies they were ordered to the front, and were soon confronting the enemy in deadly conflict.

that they will number over five hundred. Our loss in prisoners was considerable, as many of our men, after becoming panic-stricken, rushed to the woods in all directions, and were gobbled up by the rebel cavalry.

What was left of our army continued their march all night long, and what remained of our artillery and train becoming blocked and stuck in crossing the Tallahatchie river, was abandoned.

By the time this brigade had all arrived on the field, the other brigades were fleeing to the rear in considerable confusion and disorder, many throwing away their arms and accoutrements before they were fairly out of sight of the enemy.

About six o'clock the following morning we reached Ripley, and found that our fleeing forces had halted, apparently for a rest. Every man appeared to be going on his own hook, and carscarcely more than an hour when an ominous firing was heard on the south and east of the town, showing that the enemy were still in hot pursuit. At this indication the most of the cavalry started to the rear, together with the infantry, who were without arms or ammunition, and the wounded who were mounted. That portion of the infantry who had retained their arms prepared for resistance near the cen

hideous yells, and a severe fight ensued, which lasted nearly two hours, when our forces were completely routed and driven to the woods. While fighting at this place, large numbers of men and women secreted in the houses, fired upon our men from the doors and windows, and Colonel McCraig, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois, was shot dead in this manner while bravely urging on his men. Our men As soon as the panic was discovered the becoming enraged at the sight of this, poured a train was ordered to retreat; but as the ene- volley among them, killing and wounding sevmy's artillery had attained almost a perfect eral women. After this engagement, our forces range of the field where the wagons were cor-made no resistance as a body, but kept conralled and the road upon which the retreat was ordered, many of the teamsters unhitched their mules, and soldiers, mounting them, rushed frightened and panic-stricken to the rear, their pace being somewhat accelerated by the close proximity of shot and bursting shell. In this way the road became blocked, and at least two thirds of our supply and ammunition train was either destroyed or captured. The Third brigade held the enemy in check until the most of the artillery and the remainder of the train had succeeded in getting a mile or so to the rear; but they were soon overwhelmed and flanked on three successive lines of battle, and were compelled to retreat precipitously.

By this time our army was in a perfect rout, and every one who was not disabled rushed to the rear, while many of the wounded who could ride were mounted on inules and with difficulty pressed their way along with the crowd. Night now coming on, the enemy ceased their pursuit. Never was darkness more welcome or distance more enchanting to the view, than to that devoted army on this occasion.

It is imposible to give anything like a correct estimate of the number of killed or wounded in this engagement, as they nearly all fell into the hands of the enemy. It is supposed, however,

stantly retreating and skirmishing. I would say, however, that the Third Iowa cavalry made themselves very useful as a rear guard, and would compliment their coolness and bravery amid the heat and excitement of this disastrous retreat. The appearance of the road over which we retreated but too plainly indicated how serious was this disaster. It was completely lined with hats, boots, shoes, coats, saddles, and harness, while there was no end to arms and accoutrements.

A man would pick up an old horse or any. thing that was ridable, and mounting it, would soon ride it down and leave it by the road-side; another man being almost exhausted, seeing the animal, would mount it again, and by the assistance of a stick or spur would urge it along for a mile or two further, until finally the animal would drop by the road-side and was then left to die. In this manner the greater portion of what was left of our army fled for two days and nights without food or sleep, and reached Memphis on Sunday, the twelfth, having performed a march of one hundred and twenty miles in that time, which required ten days to accomplish when going out. Every day since, men have been straggling in, and the experience of some is almost heart-rending. A colored man from my

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