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ment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south. Several showers during the afternoon, and roads very bad.

Wednesday, June 8.-Received information at four o'clock A. M. that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River, and sent him five hundred men and two howitzers for reinforcements. Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved six miles on the Fulton road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road. Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting the return of Colonel Karge, who joined him at five o'clock P. M., having swum the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.

Thursday, June 9.-Sent back to Memphis four hundred sick and worn-out men, and fortyone wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to Stubbs', fourteen miles from Ripley; issued five days' rations (at previous camp); rained two hours in the evening.

Friday, June 10.-Encountered the enemy at Brice's cross-road, twenty-three miles from Ripley, and six miles from Guntown.

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been successfully carried forward. All I could have presented would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would naturally do under the circumstances, and these would have availed but little against the idea that the enemy was scattered, and had no considerable force in our front. Under the circumstances, and with a sad foreboding of the consequences, I determined to move forward, keeping my force as compact as possible, and ready for action at all times, hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did not, yet our losses might, at most, be insignificant, in comparison to the great benefits that might accrue to General Sherman by the depletion of Johnston's army to so large an extent. On the evening of the eighth, one day beyond Ripley, I assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps, keeping their troops always in hand, and ready to act on a moment's notice; that it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved us to At Ripley it became a serious question in my move and act constantly as though in his presmind as to whether or not I should proceed any ence; that we were now where we might enfurther. The rain still fell in torrents-the ar- counter him at any moment, and that we must, tillery and wagons were literally mired down, under no circumstances, allow ourselves to be and the starved and exhausted animals could surprised. On the morning of the tenth, the with difficulty drag them along. Under these cavalry marched at half-past five o'clock, the incircumstances I called together my division fantry at seven-thus allowing the infantry to commanders, and placed before them my views follow immediately in rear of cavalry, as it of our situation. At this interview, one brigade would take the cavalry a full hour and a half commander (Colonel Hoge) and two members to clear their camp. The habitual rules of of my staff were incidentally present also. I march were as follows, to wit: Cavalry, with called their attention to the great delay we had its artillery, in advance; infantry, with its artilundergone on account of the bad condition of lery, next; and lastly, the supply train, guarded the roads, the exhausted condition of our ani- by the rear brigade, with one of its regiments mals, the great probability that the enemy at the head, one near the middle, and one, with would avail himself of the time thus offered, to a section of artillery, in the rear. A company concentrate an overwhelming force against us of pioneers preceded the infantry, for the purin the vicinity of Tupelo, and the utter hopeless-pose of repairing the roads, building bridges, ness of saving our train of artillery in case of &c. defeat, on account of the narrowness and general bad condition of the roads, and the impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the animals. All agreed with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however, (and with some propriety, too), that inasmuch as I had abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before, and given as my reason for so doing, "the utter and entire destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we were again sent through this same country, it would be ruinous on all sides, to return again without meeting the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General Washburn had acquired, there could be no considerable force in our front, and all my own information led to the same conclusion. To be sure, my information was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory, and had I returned, I would have been totally unable to present any facts to justify my course, or to show why the expedition might not have

On this morning I had preceded the head of the infantry column, and arrived at a point some five miles from camp, where I found an unusually bad place in the road, and one that would require considerable time and labor to render practicable. While halted here to await the head of the column, I received a message from General Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few minutes more I received another message from him, saying the enemy numbered some six hundred, and were on the Baldwin road; that he was (himself) at Brice's cross-roads, and that his position was a good one, and he would hold it. He was then directed to leave six hundred or seven hundred men at the cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its arrival, on its march toward Guntown, and with the remainder of his force to drive the enemy toward Baldwin, and then rejoin the main body by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time, and I rode forward toward

DOCUMENTS.

the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back, directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advanced brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, I found nearly all the cavalry engaged, and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides, and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage.

Finding that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the The enemy's artillery soon enemy's reserves. replied, and with great accuracy-every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns. Frequent calls were now made for reinforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had, of course, none to give. Colonel Winslow, Fourth Iowa cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Guntown road, a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him, in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads-thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point, because, through some misunderstanding, that I am unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, that I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about one hundred of the Nineteenth Pennsylvania cavalry. This handful of troops, under the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Hesse, behaved very handsomely, and held the line until the arrival of the infantry.

About half past one the infantry began to arrive. Colonel Hoge's brigade was first to reach the field, and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry, as "it was exhausted and well-nigh out of ammunition." This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it, and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear, and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the meantime I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll, near the bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left.

I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed, and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon train. I found the section properly posted, and supported by the Seventy-second Ohio infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the Ninth Minnesota. While

here the wagon train, which had been reported
still a mile and a half in the rear, arrived. It
was immediately ordered into an open field near
where the cavalry were reorganizing; there to
be turned round and carried further toward the
The pressure on the right of the line was
rear.
now becoming very great, and General Grierson
was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to
that point. At this time I received a message
from Colonel Hoge that he was satisfied the
movement on the right was a feint and that the
real attack was being made on the left. Another
section of artillery was now placed in position,
a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bear-
ing on the left of our main line; and a portion
of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers.
The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme
right began now to give way, and at the same
time the enemy began to appear in force in rear
of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen
required reinforcements in the centre. I now
While
endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade,
which formed the guard to the train.
travelling the short distance to where the head
of the brigade should be found, the main line
began to give way at various points. Order
soon gave way to confusion, and confusion to
panic. I sent an aid to Colonel McMillen, in-
forming him that I was unable to render him
any additional assistance, and that he must do
all in his power with what he had to hold his
position until I could form a line to protect his
retreat.

On reaching the head of the supply train,
Lieutenant-Colonel Hesse was directed to place
in position in a wood the first regiment of col-
ored troops I could find. This was done, and it
is due to these troops to say here that they held
their ground well, and rendered valuable aid to
Colonel McMillen, who was soon after compelled
to withdraw from his original line, and take up
It was now five
new positions in the rear.
For seven hours these gallant men
o'clock P. M.
had held their position against overwhelming
numbers, but at last, overpowered and exhausted,
they were compelled to abandon not only the
field, but many of their gallant comrades who
had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Every-
where the army now drifted toward the rear, and
was soon altogether beyond control. I request-
ed General Grierson to accompany me, and to aid
in checking the fleeing column and establishing
a new line. By dint of entreaty and force, and
the aid of several officers whom I called to my
assistance, with pistols in their hands, we at
length succeeded in checking some twelve or
fifteen hundred, and establishing a line, of which
Colonel Wilkins, Ninth Minnesota, was placed in
command. About this time it was reported to
me that Colonel McMillen was driving the ene-
my. I placed but little faith in this report, yet
disseminated it freely for the good effect it might
produce on the troops.

In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived and reported his lines broken and in confusion.

The

ance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the General commanding the district by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station; accordingly, at nine P. M. the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning.

This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for them to the sub-reports herewith enclosed.

new line, under Colonel Wilkins, also gave way
soon after, and it was now impossible to exercise
any further control. The road became crowded
and jammed with troops; the wagons and artil-
lery sinking into the deep mud, became inextri-
cable, and added to the general confusion which
now prevailed. No power could now check or
control the panic-stricken mass, as it swept
toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow, at
the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who
never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten
miles in rear. This was the greater pity, as his
brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and
might have offered considerable resistance to the
advancing foe. About ten o'clock P. M., I
reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel
Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him
that his was the only organized body of men I
had been able to find, and directed him to add to
his own every possible force he could rally as
they passed, and take charge of the rear-re-
maining in position until all should have passed.
I also informed him that, on account of the
extreme darkness of the night, and the wretched
condition of the roads, I had little hope of sav-
ing anything more than the troops, and directed Second Brigade
him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery
which he might find blocking up the road and
preventing the passage of the men.
In this way
about two hundred wagons and fourteen pieces
of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being
burned, and the artillery spiked and otherwise
mutilated; the mules and horses were brought
away. By seven o'clock A. M., of the eleventh,
we had organized at Ripley, and the army pre-
sented quite a respectable appearance, and
would have been able to accomplish an orderly
retreat from that point but for the unfortunate
circumstances that the cartridge-boxes were
well-nigh exhausted. At seven o'clock the col-
umn was again put in motion on the Salem road,
the cavalry in advance, followed by infantry.
The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and
there was now nothing left but to keep in motion
so as to prevent the breaking up of the rear, and
to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could
reach them, as the command was in no condition
to offer determined resistance, whether attacked
in front or rear.

First Brigade..

Total

First Brigade.

Second Brigade.
Third Brigade..

Total

Killed..

At eight o'clock A. M. on the twelfth the column reached Collierville worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights, without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing wounded.. some two thousand infantry, commanded by Missing.. Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until the next day, for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the roadside through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening that the command at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resist

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Total Infantry and Cavalry.

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Total Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

Officers.
Enlisted Men..

75

2,165

It is difficult to furnish any accurate estimate of the losses of the enemy, but they are sup posed, by the principal officers of my command, to be fully as great as our own in killed and

were held in reserve.

DOCUMENTS.

some

cuted at all times, and often under trying and
hazardous circumstances.

I am, Major, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

A. A. G., Headquarters District W. T.,

Memphis, Tenn.

SURGEON DYER'S ACCOUNT.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTY-FIRST ILLINOIS,
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 6, 1864.

At my request Dr. Lewis Dyer, of the Eightyfirst regiment Illinois infantry volunteers, and Acting Surgeon-in-Chief, division Seventeenth Army Corps, on the expedition, has prepared a paper on the late retreat of General Sturgis' command from Guntown, Mississippi, to Memphis. I am taking notes and sketches of persons and things, for a permanent history of the regiment in particular, and of the war in gen

wounded, and by many supposed to largely exceed ours. need hardly add, that it is with feelings of the most profound pain and regret, that I find myself called upon to record a defeat and the loss and suffering incident to a reverse at a point so far distant from the base of sup- To Major W. H. MORGAN, plies and reinforcements. Yet there is consolation in knowing that the army fought nobly while it did fight, and only yielded to overwhelming numbers. The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by the most intelligent officers, at from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured, and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged to have been twelve thousand, and that two divisions of infantry It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity, and we be ignorant of the fact; but the surprise will exist in the minds of those only who are not familiar with the difficulty (Ieral. may say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them; but we, as everybody knows who has any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy, and his numbers, by actually fighting for the information That our loss was great, is true, yet, that it was not greater, is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Colonel W. L. McMillen, of the Fifty-Rev. William S. Post, D. D., Chaplain Eightyninth Ohio infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him.

While I will not prolong this already extended report by recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of many brave officers and men who deserve mention, but will respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by that excellent and dashing officer, Colonel Joseph Karge, of the Second New Jersey volunteers, in his reconnoissance to Corinth, and his subsequent management of the rear guard during a part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during one whole afternoon, and throughout the entire night following.

This article was written for my own personal use and benefit; but being prepared with so much care and ability, I have no doubt you will gladly insert it in your journal, which circulates extensively among the friends of our pet regiment in Southern Illinois. Yours truly,

W. S. POST, Chaplain, Eighty-first Illinois.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTY-FIRST ILLINOIS INFANTRY
VOLUNTEERS, MEMPHIS, TENN., June 30, 1864.

first Illinois Infantry Volunteers:

DEAR SIR: You have of course heard of our defeat under General Sturgis at Guntown, Mississippi, the other day. I wish I could give you some idea of the scenes enacted on that occasion-the awful fight, the repulse, the defeat and rout. It was a new chapter in the history of the Eighty-first-a new and bitter expeNever before, in all rience to both officers and men-and as they believe, a needless one. their deadly conflicts with the enemy, had they suffered defeat. And the recollection is all the more bitter now that the day was lost to us, not by the numbers or prowes of the enemy, but by-well, it might be as safe not to say.

In speaking of the Eighty-first, the coolness and self-possession of its officers, and the bravery and desperate fighting of its men, I have no inTo the officers of my staff-Lieutenant-Col- tention of intimating the least thing in disparonel J. C. Hope, Nineteenth Pennsylvania cav-agement of other troops. The regiment was alry, commanding escort; Captain W. C. Ravalle, marched upon the field and placed in position A. D. C. and A. A. A. G., whose horse was killed under a general and vague order, and finding it under him; Captain W. C. Belden, Second Iowa needlessly exposed to the enemy's deadly fire, cavalry A. D. C.; Lieutenant E. Caulkins, Sev- with no adequate support, its commanding offienth Iowa cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieutentant Samuel cers changed it for a better position, which posiOakford, Nineteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, A. tion it held until entirely out of ammunition, D. C.; Lieutenant Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieu- when, being harassed by a galling flank fire, it fell tenant W. H. Stratton, Seventh Illinois cavaly, back some three hundred yards, to a line with A. A. C. S.-whose names appear in no other the artillery, when, being replenished with amreport-I am especially grateful for the prompt- munition, it continued the fight for hours, and ness and zeal with which my orders were exe- until it was almost surrounded by the enemy.

The precision with which the order to take the new position was executed, the determined valor of the men, the seizing and bearing off a stand of the enemy's colors, and finally the manner in which the regiment was retired from the field, afforded a fine exhibition of military discipline and soldierly bearing.

In this battle, the infantry especially engaged the enemy at the greatest disadvantage. The troops were hurried upon the field, having already marched all day at a rapid pace for miles, under a broiling sun; and before reaching the scene of conflict, they were shorn of half their strength from heat and exhaustion. As I rode along from regiment to regiment, and saw the numerous cases of sun-stroke and the scores and hundreds of men, many of them known to me as good and true soldiers, falling out by the way, utterly powerless to move forward, it was a sad, a fearful reflection that this condition of so many would ensure defeat and terrible disaster. The cavalry had been for hours hotly engaged with the enemy, who was in strong force and occupied a well-chosen position. Although they had behaved nobly, they were now in urgent need of support, and hence the order despatched to commandants of regiments five miles in the rear, to "hurry up;" and on that memorable day-a hot summer's day in a Southern climethey did "hurry up." Our troops did all that troops could do under the circumstances fought bravely, desperately, but were compelled to give way to fall back. And it was now obvious that no preparation had been made in anticipation of a possible defeat. Two hundred and fifty wagons had been permitted to crowd far to the front, greatly endangering their own safety in case of a repulse, blocking up the road against the running of ambulances, and interfering with any necessary movement of the troops to the rear.

tion as it was possible to do under the circumstances. In less than thirty minutes, however, we found ourselves under the necessity of moving again. And so, lifting the poor mangled fellows into the ambulances once more, the drivers were directed to fall into the retreating column, and follow on until further orders.

All efforts to form a new line of battle that day were unavailing, except for a few minutes, once or twice. The army was now rapidly retreating-marching to the rear-I should say, changing front, and with rapid strides seeking to go the furthest possible in the shortest space of time. Every body seemed to be in a hurry. The road was not wide enough-it was filled up to overflowing from fence to fence, with wagons, ambulances, artillery, horsemen, and footmen - everybody trying to get ahead of everybody else, as though everbody else were in their way. Then, there were two columns of cavalry to the left, moving parallel to the road, their files not very well dressed, to be sure, but still making good time. The infantry, poor fellows, seemed light of foot, by the way they plodded along on either side of the road, dodg ing through the brush, over logs and gulleys, constituting a dense body of flankers to the column that filled the road. But there was a sad deficiency of arms among them, having left their guns at Guntown.

to some distant place before anybody else did!

This rapidly-moving army of living creatures, consisting of men, horses, negroes, mules, wagons and artillery, would every few minutes receive a fresh impetus from the shot and shell of the enemy, as they came crashing and screeching over our heads and bursting among us. Good heavens! what a spectacle! Five thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, four batteries, two hundred and fifty wagons, and all the appurtenances thereunto belonging Most of the commands, on falling back, inter-every man, horse and wagon bent on getting mingled with the great number of those who had been unable to reach the field, and being greatly disorganized, all turned their faces to the rear, and joined in a common retreat. And now began the difficult task of wheeling around the teams and wagons. You have heard teamsters yell at their mules, crack their whips, and sometimes swear, haven't you? Well, they did all these things on this occasion, and whatever else teamsters properly may do. At all events, Bedlam let loose could hardly excel in the noise and commotion you would have witnessed had you been there, in their efforts to get out of range of the enemy's guns.

But O, the roads! They had been well-nigh impassable in places when we were advancing toward the enemy, and now, while advancing from him, and just as night was throwing her dark mantle around us, these horrid roads must be travelled over again. No stopping to repair them now. O, no! our errand was too pressing for that. Well, perceiving no advantage in staying behind, but a strong probability of some disadvantage, and being well mounted, I proposed to my ever faithful "John" that we go forward. He quickly responded that "he would stick by me if I would by him," and with this understanding we pushed on-travelled all night, amid such darkness, some of the time, as only dwells in these benighted regions of the Prince of Darkness.

Stretcher-bearers and ambulances could now reach the gory field no more, and although comparatively few of the fallen had been brought off, there now remained no alternative; the dead and wounded alike must be abandoned to We arrived at Ripley, thirty miles distant the victors. Our hospital being under fire, the from the battle-field, soon after daylight. Not enemy having flanked us, our suffering men doubting but we had pretty much led the van, were taken to a new location three fourths of a you can imagine my surprise on finding there a mile further back, and again laid upon the green brigade of cavalry, as well as many of the artilgrass, while the Surgeon bestowed such atten-lery and infantry. They might truly be called

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