one moved to Plymouth; and one at Macon, to replace the gun removed to Newbern. "Guns are burst, and otherwise crippled in active service," and there should be at this depot, at least one or two extra, for such contingencies. from attack at that time. The works referred to are those pronounced unnecessary by General Butler. In my correspondence, the belief is uniformly expressed that the Confederates would attempt to drive us from Eastern North Carolina. "The Southfield,' burst a one hundred pounder in extricating the Bombshell' on the In February, Pickett attacked Batchelor's Chowan. On the twenty-fourth Commander Flus- Creek, Croatan, Havelock, Newport, and other ser was expecting the 'iron-clad' and an attack places, threatening Newbern. Other plans were at Plymouth, and wrote to Commander Daven-interfered with, or delayed. The loss of Plyport, urgently, for a one hundred pounder rifle, mouth and Little Washington was promptly folfor the Southfield.' Had I an extra gun, I lowed by a cainpaign for Newbern. The followcould have served our naval friends at a time ing letter is pertinent and verifies my prediction. when it would have been appreciated. "If these considerations have any force at all, the number (seven) of guns asked for by the Ordnance Officer on the fourteenth instant. is quite as small as is proper. * * "What has been done are such modifications as seemed imperatively called for, in view of the public interests intrusted to me. Had they not been made, and disaster befallen us, the Government and the Major-General com manding the Department would not have excused me for delaying to communicate with the Engineer Officer at Fort Monroe." "Conclusion." May 3, 1864. GENERAL: I have just heard from Captain Cook, commanding the iron-clad Albemarle, who writes that he feels satisfied that the boat can stand the Sound, and will be with us. I will move at six o'clock to-morrow morning, and will communicate with you at Pollocksville, on the river bank, as soon as I reach that point. I desire you to move at six o'clock to-morrow morning, and proceed to Pollocksville, and while your column is resting there, you will construct a bridge over Mill Creek. You will have two miles less to march than my column, in going to Pollocksville. Respectfully yours, To General WALKER. R. T. HOKE, Hoke's forces, estimated at twelve thousand, left the vicinity of Newbern on the sixth of May, for Richmond, and Newbern is still ours. tract: The criticisms in the letter on "Fortifications and Armaments" are based upon principles, and are unanswerable. The views set forth on the twenty-ninth of March, have been verified in the clearest manner by the fall of Plymouth. The defenses on the left of Fort Williams (the central work) consists of open works, and are deGeneral Butler did not believe any demonpendent upon the gunboats. The gunboats were stration would be made upon my command, at any forced out of the river, the iron-clad' attacked time, and adhered to his theory up to my withthese works in rear, and they soon became un-drawal, as will be seen from the following extenable. The land forces entered the town on that flank. Had all the works been enclosed, the results would have been very different. When we were at Plymouth, I called your attention to this feature of the system of defence. I am, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, JOHN J. PECK, Major-General. To Major-General BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, Commanding Department Virginia and North Carolina, Fortress Monroe, Virginia. SYRACUSE, NEW YORK, May 23, 1864. General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, U. S. A: SIR: There is much in this report that the Honorable Secretary of War should see, and as I am no longer in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, I hasten to transmit the same with the request that General Butler may be furnished a copy. HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, FORTRESS MONROE, May 3, 1864. GENERAL: Your note of the twenty-fourth of April reached my hand to-day, and I hasten to reply. Your being relieved from Newbern by me in no manner implies any censure upon your action or disapproval of your administration, and was determined upon many days before the order was actually sent, and before it was known or believed that there would be any demonstration upon your command by the enemy. That order was delayed by the necessities of the service in other movements of the Department, which are solely subjects of explanation. With sentiments of respect and esteem, Your obedient servant, On the fourth inst., Colonel F. Beach, United States army, second in command at Plymouth, To Major-General PECK. reported to me in person, that General Hoke informed General Wessells and himself, that the works I had constructed, since Pickett's demon stration at Newbern in February, saved that place I am, respectfully, HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Major General J. G. Foster, commanding De- euing the garrisons at all the bridges, and making temporary headquarters at Mineral Point. From each station where there was cavalry, I sent scouting parties east and west, which returned by Monday morning, reporting no enemy north of Fredericktown. They brought, however, apparently credible rumors that Price was at Fredericktown with all his army. night of the twenty-fourth September, the Major-General commanding, having learned that Price's army had entered the Department by way of Poplar Bluffs and Bloomfield, ordered me to take a brigade of the Second divisOn the fifteenth instant I received a commu-ion, Sixteenth army corps, which was then at nication from Admiral Lee, United States Navy, Jefferson Barracks, and patrol and garrison the to the effect that the iron-clad on the Roanoke, Iron Mountain railroad-reporting to Major-Genat Elwards' Ferry, was nearly completed. eral A. J. Smith, who was to follow next day On the sixteenth I reached Plymouth, and had with the other brigade of the division. an interview with General Wessels and Captain At De Soto, leaving the rest of the brigade to Flusser. Some deserters had just arrived, and await further orders from General Smith, I went from them the following information was eli-on with the Fourteenth Iowa infantry, strengthcited in respect to Rainbow Bluff, etc., etc.: Three guns in embrasure to command the approach by the river from below. One, a rifled thirty-two pounder; others twenty-four pounders. One twenty-four pounder on field carriage in an angle of the fort, sweeps the land approaches. There are also two twelve-pounders, brass, and three six-pounders playing over the breastwork; rille-pits on bank below fort, two hundred yards At ten, Monday morning, I took companies B, long; five field-pieces artillery in Hamilton-C, D, E, and H, Fourteenth Iowa infantry, under Graham's battery; three companies, Pales' battal- Captain Campbell, and went to Pilot Knob. Maion, garrison the fort. At Butler's Bridge, two jor James Wilson, Third Missouri State militia miles from the fort, are intrenchments, with a cavalry, then commanded the Third sub-district place for one gun. of this district, with headquarters at that post. He had, under orders, withdrawn his outposts from Patterson, Centreville, Fredericktown, and Farmington, and collected at Pilot Knob all the available force of his sub-district except brigade guards. The force there present consisted of companies A, F, E, G, H, and I, Forty-seventh Missouri infantry, Captain Lindsay's company, Fiftieth Missouri infantry, which were raw troops, with an aggregate of four hundred and eighty-nine officers and men for duty; and companies A, C, D, H, I, and K, Third Missouri State Militia cavalry; company L, Second Missouri Camp of Seventeenth regiment (eleven hundred strong), near the fort, and the camp of the Fifty-sixth regiment about one mile from Hamilton, from fort, and from Butler's Bridge. At Whitney's Bridge (river road) the bridge is destroyed, road barricaded, and a breastwork one hundred yards above. Five thousand men at Garrysburg; five hundred men at Edwards' Ferry, guarding the iron-clad battery and ironclad in course of construction. These recent dispositions have resulted from your late raids, and will make it a matter of some difficulty to destroy the " iron-clad" at Ed-State Militia cavalry; company G, First Missouri wards' Ferry. For this enterprise, from eight hundred to one thousand good cavalry will be requisite. My plan would be to land the cavalry six or eight miles above Plymouth, and move by Windsor, on an intermediate road, Roxobel, etc., since this rout has been less used by our troops than the one via Winton. A demonstration from Norfolk via Winton upon Weldon, at the same time, would materially enhance the chances of success. I respectfully submit the above information and suggestions for your consideration. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Doc. 21. Major-General. State Militia infantry, and Captain Montgomery's battery, which, with the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa, made an aggregate of old troops for duty of five hundred. The entire command was one thousand and fifty-one volunteers, and one hundred and fifty citizensenough to man the fort. My instructions from Major-General Rosecrans were to have Major Wilson endeavor to hold Pilot Knob against any mere detachment of the enemy, but to evacuate if Price's main army should move against it. The village of Pilot Knob, which is the terminus of the railroad, and the Depot for supply of the lower outposts, is eighty-six miles south of St. Louis. It lies in a plain of about three hundred acres, encircled by Cedar and Rock Mountain on the North, Pilot Knob on the east, and Shepherd Mountain stretching around BATTLES OF PILOT KNOB AND LEESBURG, the valley on the south and west. Each bill is MISSOURI. GENERAL EWING'S OFFICIAL REPORT. HEADQUARTERS ST. LOUIS DISTRICT, Colonel J. V. Du Bois, Chief of Staff, Headquar- from five hundred to six hundred feet in height, and rises abruptly from the valley, with the sides towards it covered with rocks, gnarled oaks, and undergrowth. The southern and western slopes of Shepherd Mountain are accessible, and several roads lead over them to "the coalings" on its summit. Stout's Creek flows along the base of Shepherd's Mountain, and through a gap between it and Pilot Knob, into a larger valley of several thousand acres, encircled by a chain of hills, in the northern end of which, and about a mile from the town of Pilot Knob, is the village of Ironton. Through this gap runs the road from Pilot Knob to Frederickton, passing out of the larger valley by "the Shutin," a gap four miles south-east of Pilot Knob. The two valleys are called "Arcadia." Fort Davidson is a hexagonal work mounting four thirty-two pounder siege guns, and three twenty-four pounder howitzers en barbette. It lies on the plain south of the village of Pilot | Knob, about three hundred yards from the base of Shepherd Mountain, six hundred from the base of Pilot Knob and one thousand from the gap. From the Fort to the remotest summit of these hills visible from it, it is not over twelve hundred yards; while all parts of the hillsides towards the Fort, except the west end of Shepherd Mountain, are in musket range. The Fort was always conceded to be indefensible against any large army having serviceable artillery. Early last summer I sent competent engineers to select another site; but such are the difficulties of the position, no practicable place could be found any more defensible. I therefore had the roads leading up the hills obstructed, cleared the nearest hill-sides of timber, and put the fort in a thorough state of defence by deepening the ditches, strengthening the parapet, and adding two rifle-pits, leading north and south, commanding the best approaches. On reaching Pilot Knob at noon of Monday, September twenty-sixth, I found scouting parties had been sent the night before on all the main roads, but that the party sent towards Fredericktown had returned after going but six or eight miles. I forthwith sent two companies to make a thorough reconnoissance towards Fredericktown, and a small scouting party, under Captain Bowers, to cross the roads leading from the south to that place, and learn of the loyal people on them as much as possible as to the force of the enemy. Both commands met Price's advance in Arcadia Valley, near Shut-in Gap, and were forced back into the town of Ironton, where, with Captain Dinger's company, Fortyseventh Missouri volunteers, then on duty there, they made a stand. I reinforced them with the detatchment of the Fourteenth Iowa, under Captain Campbell, a section of Montgomery's battery, Lieutenant Simonton commanding, and all my available cavalry, placing the whole under command of Major Wilson, with orders to drive the enemy, if possible, through Shut-in Gap. He drove them to the Gap, but was unable to hold them there, and was being forced back gradually, when night and a rain-storm suspended the engagement. By midnight it was evident the enemy were in strong force, as their column could be heard coming into the valley in steady procession, and their encampment grew extensive. We still did not know positively that Price's main army was there, though all our information was decidedly to that effect. But the advantages of delaying the enemy two or three days in his march northward, and of making a stubborn fight before retreating, were so great, even though the defense should be unsuccessful and much of the garrison be lost, that I resolved to stand fast and take the chances. I immediately forwarded up the railroad all the Quartermaster and Commissary stores not needed in the fort, and all the rolling stock, and started the Quartermaster's wagons empty. Details were set at work constructing in the fort six platformed barbettes for the field artillery, four pieces of which were taken into it. Lieutenant David Murphy, Forty-seventh Missouri Volunteers, a most gallant officer and experienced artillerist, was assigned to duty on my staff as Aide-de-Camp, and given general control of the artillery. Major-General Smith, whose immediate command was at De Soto and Mineral Point, was kept fully advised by telegraph of my information, movements, and purposes, until eleven o'clock Tuesday forenoon, when the line went down. At daylight (Tuesday) the enemy pushed Wilson back through Arcadia Valley to the gap between Shepherd Mountain and Pilot Knob. While they were trying to force the gap, I ordered the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa to take position on the east end of Shepherd Mountain, and ordered Wilson to fall back with his cavalry along the side of Pilot Knob, thus commanding the gap from both sides, and opening a clear range from the fort. Wilson soon sent me word that the enemy were displaying a flag of truce. I knew it was a trick to effect a safe passage of the gap while parlying about a surrender, and therefore ordered him to renew the fight at once. A long and obstinate struggle ensued, in which the enemy lost considerably in an unsuccessful effort to pass the defile. During an hour of comparative quiet which followed, they threw a force around Shepherd Mountain and approached from the west, but that approach was too greatly exposed, and they were driven from it by our artillery, aided by two companies of skirmishers. An hour more, and my troops were summarily ejected from the points commanding the gap, the enemy following them along the hill-sides in strong force. When they had well advanced, we opened on them with all our guns and drove them back in disorder with heavy loss. We retook the gap-were again forced from it-and again with artillery drove them from the hillsides. They got two pieces in position on the east side of Shepherd Mountain, commanding a part of the side of Pilot Knob, which, being equally commanded by the fort, became neutral ground. We still held, with skirmishers, the sides of Shepherd Mountain, except next the gap, and the side of Pilot Knob not raked by their artillery. After an hour of lull, lines of the enemy were seen at exposed points on the summits of the two hills, moving down, and almost before we could open fire on them, another white flag gone from Fredericktown to Farmington. I had found myself unable, with my force intact, to hold the mountain sides so as to prevent his planting artillery there. My command was now reduced one-fourth in effective strength, as I had lost seventy-five killed and wounded, and more than double that number missing. I knew that next morning the enemy, having possession of the mountain top and sides, would place all his artillery in position to command the fort, which would make it certainly untenable. That morn was raised on a rock near the summit of Shepherd Mountain, where a group of officers had been taking observations under shelter. With the opening of a brisk cannonade on the group the flag was hauled down. The design was plainly to suspend the firing, so that their forces might approach to the assault in safety. I now ordered into the fort the section of artillery operating outside, but the horses stampeded and could not be got in. The section remained under cover of our fire, however, and was brought in before dark. Here the enemy opened on using, at the time when telegraphic communication with two guns from the Summit of Shepherd Mountain, at about seven hundred yards, and two from the side, at a less distance. The guns were well covered, and we could silence only one of them, the two nearest getting and keeping our range exactly. ended, two regiments of Major-General Smith's command were at Mineral Point, twenty-three miles north of us, and four miles east of Potosi. I thought they were probably there still, and that by getting a good start we could effect a junction with them, and fall back or stand, as the movement and force of the enemy might permit. I therefore determined to evacuate that night. The chief danger, was that the preparations for the retreat might be observed, and the garrison cut to pieces or captured, in the confusion incident to the exit. The works of the Iron Company, at the north base of Pilot Knob had been fired by the enemy, and the immense pile of charcoal glowed and flamed all night, The division on Shepherd Mountain was Marmaduke's, which, on the withdrawal of the white flag, and the opening of their artillery, moved rapidly down to the assault, his lines greatly broken by the rugged and steep descent, and by our fire, which told with marked effect upon them. On reaching the plain, the most of the assaulting force took cover in the deep bed of the creek, from which they opened and kept up an incessant fire. About one hun-making the valley as light as noonday. Moredred ventured on to the assault, but fell, or over, I learned Colonel Slayback's command held were driven back before they reached the ditch. the Mineral Point road just north of the town, Almost simultaneously with the movement of leaving the Potosi road the only exit not certainMarmaduke's division, that of General Fagan ly in the possession of the enemy. But, with marched over Pilot Knob in stronger force, and all its dangers, the policy of retreat was clearly less disturbed by our fire, sweeping back in best; and preparations for it began at midnight. disorder, or cutting off our companies which I had Colonel Fletcher arrange for having the held the town and part of the mountain sides. magazine, (which was large and filled with every His lines were greatly broken by the houses variety of ammunition) blown up two hours after and fences of the skirt of the town, but were we left, or as soon as our exit should be dishastily re-formed by him, and by General Cabell, covered by the enemy. We took possession of who led the assault, and swept upon the plain the town and valley, and drove thence, all in handsome style, yelling, and on the double- straggling rebels. The garrison was then quick. We opened on them when at four hun-aroused, knapsacks packed, haversacks and cardred yards from the fort, with musketry from the ramparts, and from the long line of the north rifle-pit, and with grape and canister from seven pieces of artillery. They rushed on most gallantly, but were broken, confused, and swept down by our rapid and well-directed fire, until the advance reached the ditch, when the attacking forces fled in dismay, leaving apparently almost half their comrades dead or wounded on the plain. Pending the assaults, the enemy threw a large cavalry force around the west end of Shepherd Mountain, to occupy the road north of us to Mineral Point. As they moved along the base of Cedar Mountain, just after the last assault was repulsed, a sortie was made from the north ditch, by which they were routed and lost considerably. A half hour of ineffective musketry and artillery firing ended the engagement with the approach of night. An examination of prisoners that evening convinced me that Price was there, with about twelve thousand men and ten pieces of artillery -Shelby's division, with eight pieces, having tridge-boxes well supplied, and everything destructible, which we could not take away, and the enemy might use, placed near or on the magazine. At three o'clock Colonel Fletcher silently led the infantry out of the sally-port, around the ditch and through the north rifle-pit, forming them under the cover of a deep shadow at the end of the pit. The drawbridge was then covered with tents to muffle the sound, and the cavalry and battery, marching out, formed column with the infantry, and took a by-way to the Potosi road. We left Slayback's camp on our right, and another rebel camp near the road on our left, both unapprised of our movement. The body of the rebel army was at Ironton; and, thinking us sufficiently hemmed in, were busy making fascines and scaling ladders, for an assault in the morning. They even failed to take the hint when the magazine, an hour before daylight, shook the hills with its explosion. At sunrise, I started Captain Hills, Tenth Kansas, Acting Aide-de-Camp, with twelve men, to Mineral Point, to acquaint the command there of my approach, and request it to march to join me. On starting, they fell upon about twenty rebels in the town of Caledonia, and routed them, kill ing one. We there learned that our forces had fallen back from Mineral Point, and that Shelby had taken Potosi the evening before; and I therefore at once left the Potosi road and took that through Webster towards Rolla. I afterwards learned that, after his repulse Tuesday, Price ordered Shelby's division down from Potosi to Pilot Knob, to take part in a second attack, and that the squad we routed at Caledonia was Shelby's advance. He waited several hours with his division, to give us battle two miles north of Caledonia, thus giving us a good start on the Webster road before pursuing. Marmaduke's division left Pilot Knob at eight that morning to overtake us, and joining Shelby in the pursuit at Caledonia. At sundown, we reached Webster, thirty-one miles from Pilot Knob, and rested until midnight. From information received there, I determined to go to Harrison (Leesburg), on the south-west branch of the Pacific railroad, because part of Colonel Warmuth's militia regiment was there, but especially because the road to Rolla was one on which we could be easily surrounded by a superior cavalry force,while that to Harrison led nearly all the way along a sharp spur of the Ozark range, separating the waters of the Huzza and the Courtois, and through the gorge of the Huzza, walled in with untraversable cliffs. To Rolla was fifty-five miles, to Harrison thirty-five. I here sent Captain Hills with ten men in advance to Franklin, with instructions to telegraph to the Major-General commanding at St. Louis, and to General McNeil, at Rolla, of our movements, and to arrange means for securing our safe and speedy withdrawal from Harrison to Rolla or St. Louis. The night was intensely dark and stormy; and we groped our way with great effort and little progress. We had just reached the ridge at eight o'clock Thursday morning, when the enemy charged upon our rear guard and drove it upon the column. I placed the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa infantry, company H, Fortyseventh Missouri, companies C, D and K, Third Missouri, State Militia cavalry, and Lieutenant Smiley's section of artillery, in the rear, all under command of Major Williams, Tenth Kansas, acting Aide-de-Camp, and with occasional halts to rake the woods with shell and canister, we made a good and successful march, the enemy almost constantly engaged with our rear guard, but unable to break through or flank it, until within four miles of Harrison. There the road debouches on a high sweep of gently rolling woodland, and from that we fought hard for every step we gained. The refugees, men, women and children, white and black, who clung to the command, nearly sacrificed it by their panics. I had to throw out the available fighting force, infantry and cavalry, as advance and rear guards and flankers, leaving in the body of the column the affrighted non-combatants and two sections of artillery, not often brought into action on the retreat. Repeated and stubborn efforts were made to bring us to a stand, and could they have forced a halt of an hour, they would have enveloped and taken us; but our halts, though frequent, were brief, and were only to unlimber the artillery, stagger the pursuers with a few rounds, and move on. We reached Harrison just after dark, having made the march of sixtysix miles in thirty-nine hours. We found Warmuth's militia gone. My The station is thirty-five miles from Rolla, forty-five from Franklin, and eighty-two from St. Louis. The position is naturally strong, being on the crest of a ridge, with no timber to obstruct the range for two hundred yards on either side. A cut for the railroad track gave shelter for the horses; a large number of ties were there, of which the militia had made breastworks, and the adjacent buildings were well situated for purposes of defence. command had just time to form and the artillery to unlimber when an assault was made; but, aided by darkness and our rude defences, we repulsed it. Just then the eastern train arrived with military stores for Rolla, and cars enough to move my troops. We got the command aboard, and were about to start for St. Louis, with the cavalry moving on a parallel road, when the nearest stations north and south of us were seen in flames. The command was at once taken off the cars, and the night spent in fortifying. At daybreak, Friday, the enemy appeared in force and prepared apparently for an assault. They kept up a demonstration throughout the day, accompanied with a heavy fire of skirmishers, which was well replied to from our defenses. Having less than thirty rounds to the gun we used our artillery but little, reserving it for the moment of assault, or the emergencies of a further retreat. The day passed in instant expectation of an attack in force and in unremitting labor on the defenses, which were extended and strengthened so they grew formida ble. Friday night another assault was repulsed, and the night passed in snatches of rest amid hourly and most harassing alarms. Hearing nothing of reinforcements, I at midnight dispatched a citizen messenger to Rolla, to ask help from there; and Lieutenant-Colonel Maupin to Franklin to advise the Major-General commanding of my condition, and endeavor to bring some mounted militia from Franklin county to my aid, if nothing better could be done-my now total want of serviceable cavalry, and the exhausted condition of the infantry, having made a further retreat extremely hazardous. The citizen got to Rolla, but Lieutenant-Colonel Maupin and Captain Schenck and Lieutenant Fletcher, who accompanied him, could not accomplish their errand, and barely escaped capture. Saturday morning the enemy appeared in increased force, thoroughly reconnoitred our position and made every preparation to take us. But the forenoon passed like the day before; in an incessant fire with their skirmishers, and constant expectation of an assault. I think our |