tenant for life, while in possession under the limitations, is required to a sale by the trustees, is in order to act as a check upon them, by rendering necessary the approval of a person interested either in preserving the property unsold, or, if he desires to sell it, in seeing that the best price is procured. Now there are many cases in which the premature exercise of the power might be very injurious to those interested in remainder. Suppose, for instance, the tenant for life, to whom the surrender has been made, is far advanced in years, not likely to outlive the previous tenant for life; he has obviously no interest in the preservation of the estate, although it may be increasing in value, and an immediate sale might not produce more than one-half of what it might be worth after the lapse of a few years. This being the case, it is merely begging the question to assume "that the value of the subject-matter is not in the slightest degree diminished by the power of the sale." In effect, the loss to the remainderman by a premature sale might be quite as great, nay, even greater than a charge prematurely made by a tenant for life before coming into possession; the same argument, therefore, which had so much weight with the Master of the Rolls in the latter case is equally applicable to the former.

12. IN THE MATTER OF E. H. DALTON (an infant), BY E. DALTON (her father and next friend); AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ACT FOR ENABLING INFANTS, WITH THE APPROBATION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY, TO MAKE BINDING SETTLEMENTS OF THEIR REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE ON MARRIAGE (18 & 19 VICT. c. 43). 6 De Gex, Mac. & G. 201. Settlement of Infant's Property under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43-Propriety of Marriage not considered by the Court.

The provisions of the above-mentioned Act do not impose on the Court of Chancery any other duty than that of looking to the propriety of the settlement made on the marriage of the infant concerning whom the application is made, though this may sometimes lead to an inquiry as to all the circumstances connected with the marriage. In accordance with this view, on a petition by a female infant under the Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, praying a reference to approve of a proper settlement, and stating that the intended marriage had the sanction and approbation of the infant's father, Lord Chancellor Cranworth made the order without directing any inquiry as to the propriety of the marriage.

13. FARINA V. SILVERLOCK. 6 De Gex, Mac. & G. 214. Trade Mark-Label—Injunction to Restrain Printing of, dissolved. In this case the Lord Chancellor (reversing the decision of Sir W. Page Wood, V.C., who granted an injunction) held, that where a trade-mark consisted of a label in a certain form, and it was shown that in very many instances labels the same or similar to it might be sold for a legitimate purpose, in the absence of proof of actual fraud, the printing and sale of such labels ought not to be restrained, until the owner of the trade-mark, who alleged that they were used for a fraudulent purpose, had established his case by an action at law. "The Vice-Chancellor," said his lordship, "put the case in a manner which struck me forcibly at first; but I confess I cannot quite go along with him. He says, that where a person may be making and selling something for a lawful purpose, or may be making and selling it for an unlawful purpose, it will not do for him to say that he is making it to use for a lawful purpose; but he must show, in some way or other, that it is not to be used for an unlawful purpose. I think I can imagine cases where that reasoning would very properly apply; if, for instance, the article here was one the demand for which, perhaps, would be of rare occurrence, and there was only one dealer in it in this metropolis, and the defendant was a person who was selling thousands of these labels, in such a case, having reference to the article manufactured, it would be a very fair observation to say, that as there could be but one person who could lawfully give an order for the labels, it could not be imagined that the defendant's purpose was lawful, and then the Court might interfere. If, however, there are dispersed over the country a hundred, or five hundred, or a thousand persons, for whom these labels might be legitimately made, I cannot think it reasonable to say, that the defendant's stock should be destroyed and his trade stopped, because he may sell to some person to whom he has no right to sell."

14. ORRETT V. CORSER, CORSER V. ORRETT. 21 Beav. 52. Trust-Breach of-Duty of Bankrupt Trustee to prove for Money due on account of, by himself-Certificate does not remove his Liability.

Sir John Romilly, M.R., decided in this case, that where a trustee, indebted to the trust, becomes bankrupt, it is his duty to prove the debt; and if he neglects so to do, he is liable for the loss, notwithstanding he may have obtained his certificate.

"Suppose," said his Honour, "a person owing money to a trust estate becomes bankrupt, and the trustee is a distinct and separate person; knowing of the bankruptcy, he is bound to prove the debt; if he does not, he commits a breach of trust, and would be held liable for all that he might have received under the commission, if he had proved the debt, as he ought to have done. Is the case altered because the trustee is himself the debtor? I think not. The original debt is no doubt barred; but the amount of dividends which the trustee might have received under the commission, is a liability subsequently attaching to the trustee in that character, and is not affected by the bankruptcy or the certificate."

v.

15. SCALES V. MAUDE. 6 De Gex, Mac. & G. 43.

Voluntary Assignment Invalid-Remarks as to Declarations of Trust. Although the decision in the above-mentioned case appears to be in accordance with authorities, there are certain propositions in the judgment which, it is submitted, are entirely at variance with them. The facts of the case are briefly as follows. Letters were written by the mortgagee to the mortgagor, and persons interested under him, containing the expressions, "I now give this gift to become due at my death, unconnected with my will . . I hereby request my executors to cancel the mortgage-deed, &c. . . . . I again direct that my executors shall comply with my former request, that is, to cancel all deeds and papers I may have chargeable on the Rycroft estate." It was held by the Lord Chancellor, that no effect could be given to such expressions. "In order," said his lordship, "to sustain the case of the defendants, they must make out that this is a valid declaration of trust. But I do not think it is a declaration of trust at all, for it was intended merely to be a direction to the executors. Though she speaks of a gift, there is, in fact, no gift, except in the direction to the executors. It was obviously revocable. . . . Even if it were a declaration of trust, it would be invalid for want of consideration. Mere declaration of trust by the owner of property, in favour of a volunteer, is inoperative, and this Court will not interfere in such a case. The case is different where there has been a change of legal ownership, and so a trust has been constituted, and then the Court will inquire what the trusts are."

With great deference, it is submitted that these propositions are not borne out by the authorities, the result of which seems clearly to be as follows; viz., that although there has been no actual transfer of the legal interest in property to trustees, yet

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if the settlor has constituted himself a trustee for volunteers, a Court of Equity will enforce the trusts. Lord Eldon, in the well-known case of Ex parte Pye, Ex parte Dubost (18 Ves. 145), lays down the law in these terms:- "It is clear that a Court of Equity will not assist a volunteer; yet, if the act is completed, though voluntary, the Court will act upon it. It has been decided, that upon an agreement to transfer stock, this Court will not interpose; but if the party had declared himself to be the trustee of that stock, it becomes the property of the cestui que trust without more, and the Court will act upon it." And in that case, although there had been no transfer of the legal interest from the donor, his lordship decided in favour of the donee, because the donor had committed to writing what seemed a sufficient declaration that he held that part of the estate in trust for the donee.- (See also Wheatley v. Parr, 1 Keen, 551; M'Fadden v. Jenkyns, 1 Ph. 153.)

To apply the observations of Lord Eldon to the present case: Suppose the mortgagee, in the above-mentioned case, had written a letter to A., saying, "I hereby hold the mortgaged estate called Rycroft, and the sum of 2,500l. charged thereon by way of mortgage, in trust for A." Although the legal

interest both in the estate and debt would remain vested in the mortgagee, she would clearly, according to the doctrine and decision of Lord Eldon, be held to have constituted herself a trustee for A., and a Court of Equity would act upon such trust, although A. were a volunteer. According to the doctrine laid down by the Lord Chancellor, A. would not be entitled to relief in Equity.

16. KNIGHT V. ROBINSON. 2 Kay & Johns. 503. Will-Construction-Gift of Securities for Money-Passes Legal Estate. A testator having by his will in 1832 given all his money, securities for money, household furniture, fixtures, &c., and all other the rest and residue of his personal estate and effects, subject to the payment of his just debts, and funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies, to his wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns, absolutely; it was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.C., that the legal estate of certain mortgaged hereditaments, which was vested in the testator at the date of his will, passed, as well as his beneficial interest therein, under the term "securities for money," and that the concurrence of the testator's heir was not necessary therefore to make an effectual conveyance of the mortgaged premises to a purchaser. "It appears to me," said

his Honour," that the view taken by Vice-Chancellor Parker in Re King's Mortgage (5 De G. & S. 646), is founded both upon principle and authority. The only distinction between that case and the present is, that in the former the gift was to the testator's wife, she paying thereout' all the testator's debts, while here the gift is subject to the payment of' the testator's debts and legacies.

"It is perfectly true, that where there is a general devise of all a testator's real, or all his real and personal estate, subject to debts and legacies, then, as in Doe d. Roylance v. Lightfoot (8 M. & W. 533) a dry legal estate in mortgage and trust estates will be held not to pass, because to hold the contrary would be, quoad such estates, to throw the debts and legacies upon a mere dry and naked trust estate. But when, as here, you get words such as 'securities for money,' then the observation of Sir John Leach, in Renvoize v. Cooper (6 Madd. 373), cited by ViceChancellor Parker in Re King's Mortgage (5 De G. & S. 647), applies." And after citing Doe d. Guest v. Bennett (6 Exch. 892), his Honour added, "To hold that the testator has given the legal estate in a case where, as here, he has given the security, subject to the payment of his debts, is not to throw such debts upon a mere dry trust estate, because the donce can pay such debts out of the moneys recoverable upon the security. Therefore, in my opinion, the circumstance of this gift being subject to the payment of the testator's debts and legacies, does not make against the construction for which the plaintiff contends.

"The strongest argument urged against that construction was that which was founded upon the circumstance of the enumeration of the securities and other subject-matters of this gift being followed by the words and all other the rest and residue of my personal estate and effects;' which point, it was said, to the inference that bonds and other securities short of the legal estate in a mortgage in fee, were exclusively intended by the testator. In answer to that, I refer to what Vice-Chancellor Parker says in Re King's Mortgage.

"It has been said, that the words 'securities for money' in this will were placed among words relating to personal estate; but that is the place in the will in which they might be expected to be found, the mortgage-money being in fact personal I agree with Vice-Chancellor Parker, that Galliott v. Moss (9 B. & C. 267) must be treated as overruled by the subseqent decisions. I also concur in what he says, that it cannot be reconciled with Ex parte Barber (5 Sim. 451), or Mather v. Thomas (6 Sim. 115; and see 10 Bing. 44)."

estate.