as they are of the excellence of the judgments by which those proceedings are terminated, they would long since have demanded a searching reform of the entire system of procedure and practice. It is high time that our Courts of Justice, like other departments of the State, should give an annual account of their stewardship, and that we should be able to ascertain yearly the extent and efficiency of our judicial organization. At present we are, to a great extent, ignorant of the number of Courts in the United Kingdom, of the limits of their respective jurisdictions, of the nature and amount of the business they transact, of the number of their Judges and officers, of the extent to which such judges and officers are employed, and of the mode in which they are paid. Neither have we sufficient data to ascertain whether each Court discharges its duties in an efficient manner, whether some tribunals are over-tasked, while others have not sufficient to do, and whether the judicial strength assigned to each particular district keeps pace with the periodical changes in its population. Were statistical returns on these matters regularly furnished, we should be far better able to supply deficiencies on the one hand, and to lop redundancies on the other. One obvious advantage derivable from such returns would be the opportunity afforded by them for contrasting the comparative merits of different tribunals. Thus a knowledge of the number of plaints entered in any Court would of itself enable us to form a tolerable judgment respecting its popularity, while the relative efficiency of two Courts exercising the same jurisdiction, and adopting the same mode of procedure, might be tested by a comparison of the amount of business transacted by each. If, for instance, it were made apparent by returns, that suitors exhibited a marked dislike to any one of the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster, and that the writs issued out of that Court borc no comparison to the numbers issued out of the other Courts, we should be led naturally to the inference that the tribunal thus shunned was for some cause or other defective, and that either the Judges were inefficient, or the Masters dilatory or discourteous, or the Counsel feeble, or the fees disproportionately high. The precise nature of the defect would, of course, still remain

uncertain; but we should have gained one important step in knowing that the defect existed somewhere, and our special attention being thus directed to the subject, we should not be long before we discovered the real source of the evil, and applied the fitting remedy. Precisely similar observations would apply to the different Courts of Equity, were statistical returns made showing that while one Vice-Chancellor had more business to dispose of than he could possibly deal with in a satisfactory manner, another was enjoying, to a considerable extent, a dignified leisure. But this is not all; for the index of popularity afforded by the number of causes entered in any Court becomes all the more striking when two tribunals, adopting different modes of procedure, exercise concurrent jurisdiction over some particular subject-matter. Let us take, for example, the Court of Admiralty and the Superior Courts of Common Law, to either of which Courts suitors at their option may have recourse in certain cases of collision. Now, if it were shown by the returns that three-fourths of these cases were tried before Dr. Lushington, it would follow almost as a necessary consequence that either in the wisdom of the judgments, in the speed of the proceedings, or in the nature of the remedy, or in the amount of costs incurred, the tribunal in which Civil Law was administered afforded more satisfaction than those which adopted the principles and practice of the Common Law; but if, on the other hand, only a small proportion of these cases was brought before the Court of Admiralty, we might reasonably assume that that tribunal was not regarded by the public as dispensing justice in an efficient manner. Again, the relative merits of the Superior Common Law Courts and the County Courts might be fairly contrasted, if we had any authentic means of knowing how many actions to recover sums exceeding 201. and not exceeding 50l. had, within a given period, been entertained respectively by these Courts. At present we only know that, in the year 1854, 9,395 of such plaints were entered in the County Courts, out of which number 5,300 were tried; but our statistics fail us when we seek to ascertain how many cases of a similar character have, during the same year, been disposed of in Westminster Hall.

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A second advantage that we should gain from these returns would be this; they would afford us the means of forming a reasonable estimate of the comparative excellence of our differ→ ent Judges. Let us suppose that an annual return was presented to Parliament, showing what number of appeals had been brought from each of the Superior Courts of Equity, and what had been the result of these appeals. Is it not obvious that such a return would be of great service, not only because it would have the effect of keeping alive a spirit of honourable emulation among the Vice-Chancellors, but because it would materially assist both the Government and the country in discovering the existence of real judicial merit in the event of any vacancy occurring in the higher grades of the profession. A return of the number of new trials granted on the ground either of misdirection, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, would, for similar reasons, be a document of much value if the names of the Judges who caused the miscarriage of the former trials were given.

. Many other benefits which would accrue from these returns might be pointed out, but it will suffice here to state that a knowledge of the working capacity of our Courts of Justice, as tested by the arrears respectively left by each from year to year, would go some way towards preventing long delays, which so often constitute a source of public discontent.

. But although information on these subjects would undoubtedly be of the highest importance, it is singular enough that no department of the State has hitherto been intrusted with the collection of the necessary facts; and of the practical working of many of our tribunals we know next to nothing. It is true that certain returns have from time to time been obtained by Parliament; but they have almost uniformly been isolated, and, as it were, accidental. The items detailed in them have varied with the circumstances which called them forth, and with the taste, caprice, knowledge, or peculiar views of the Member who moved for them. On some heads the fullest information has been gathered, while on others nothing whatever has been asked. Hence no symmetry, no unity, and no comprehensiveness of plan is exhibited by these returns.

Nor have we any means of comparing the state of all the Courts at any one time, so as to test their relative, as well as their respective, efficiency; and, indeed, the information we possess respecting them is of the most vague and casual description, though the interests of justice imperatively demand that it should be characterized by uniformity of plan, universality of system, and certainty of publication. Moreover, the present mode of publication is not less troublesome or costly than if the statistics of our judicial organization were complete. Laying aside the actual loss we sustain from ignorance of existing evils, which are consequently overlooked and left without remedy, much time, labour, and money are unprofitably wasted in the few disconnected returns now given, without producing any proportional amount of substantial good.

In order to estimate the value of the information we possess, we will glance over some of the returns given by our Courts. The first we shall notice is a return to the House of Lords of the 27th March, 1855, giving the names of the Judges and Officers of the principal Courts, the amount of their salaries, the fund out of which each salary is paid, the gross total amount of fees collected from suitors, the purposes to which such fees were appropriated, and the fund out of which the expenses of each Court are defrayed. Important as such return is, giving in one view the personnel of a considerable portion of our judicial system, it is in many points greatly defective. For instance, the account refers only to thirteen Courts in England, three Courts in Scotland, and eight in Ireland, though many more Courts exist in the United Kingdom. The House of Lords, as the principal Court of Appeal, is not included; and without alluding to any omission with respect to Scotland or Ireland, it is sufficient to point out that no notice is taken of the Superior Courts of Law or Equity in Lancaster or Durham, or of the Court of the Vice-Warden of the Stannaries, or of the Courts of the Vice-Chancellors of our Universities, or of the Courts in the City of London, or of the numerous Borough Courts, or of the Courts of Quarter Sessions, or of the Diocesan or Peculiar Courts, or of any Ecclesiastical Courts in the Province of York, or of the Police Courts. In some of these Courts,

it is true, the Judges receive no salaries, while in others they are paid, not by the public, but by particular corporations; but still it is particularly desirable that a complete statement should be furnished, showing in one glance all the tribunals which in any form administer justice throughout the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding, however, these defects in the return, it contains most interesting information. For instance, we learn from it that the seven Equity Judges receive in the aggregate £39,000 a year, exclusive of £4,000 per annum to which the Lord Chancellor is entitled as Speaker of the House of Lords. Again, this high functionary has twelve officers immediately under him, who receive together £5,200 a year, while the Master of the Rolls has eight officers, whose united salaries amount to £3,200 a year. The circumstance, too, which is very remarkable is, that although the Master of the Rolls has two secretaries, the one receiving £1,200 and the other £1,000 a year, the Lords Justices have each but one secretary with the very moderate salary of £400 a year. We further learn from the Report that eight out of the eleven Registrars of the Court of Chancery receive salaries ranging from £1,500 to £2,000 per annum, that the two Examiners have £1,500 each, that the Chief Clerks of the Vice-Chancellors have £1,200 apiece, and that the six Taxing Masters have £2,000 a year each. We are inclined to mention these facts because they are probably not generally known, and because at the present time, when the question of the salaries of the County Court Judges is under the consideration of Parliament, it may be of service to know how other judicial officers are paid. Moreover, the Report tells us that the total amount paid to the Judges and Officers of the Court of Chancery is no less than £164,000 a year; a sum undoubtedly large in itself, but one the gigantic proportions of which become all the more striking when we remember that it exceeds, by more than £30,000 a year, the whole cost of all our judicial establishments in Scotland. With accounts such as these we are enabled to estimate not only the cost of our judicial organization collectively, but relatively with respect to the amount of work done by each Court.

Another return of importance was furnished to the House of