blinded by the passions of party or the prejudices of supposed interest; but that even these causes of perverted sentiment should make the men of the South callous to all sense of humanity, nay, of reason, and should not only repress every disposition to reprobate, but actually band them in an unnatural combination to approve, even to side with, the wrongdoer, to hail him with admiration, and exalt him into the position of their champion and hero, does seem so incredible a result as gives to the powers of popular delusion a novel aspect. Addresses were presented in this sense to Col. Brooks; meetings held to pass resolutions in admiration of his conduct; presents tendered to him with inscriptions referring to his offence, such as any man of honourable feelings, or of a manly spirit, would have disdained to receive; and some of the highest public functionaries actually set their names to those odious and despicable documents. It may fairly be questioned if Washington had a right in his address to represent all parts of the Union as having, "with slight shades of difference, the same religion." But when the multitude is excited and appealed to, nay, when the authorities of the State appeal to its most ignorant and unprincipled, and unreflecting members, and suffer themselves to be guided or controlled by their violence, even where they are not partakers of it, we greatly underrate the evil, if we say there is no government, nor anything deserving the name; there is a rule of the very worst kind, to which any regular form of polity, however bad, is greatly preferable; there is the despotic sway of the worst passions in their most violent excitement. The friends of humanity can only wish that this state of things may not end in a disruption of the American Union, which would leave one part of the continent permanently under the unmitigated dominion of such evil, such frightful passions. Above all, such a consummation being brought about by the controversy on slavery is to be deprecated, on account of the unhappy negroes, who most probably might be betrayed into revolt; and if that would be pernicious to them in settlements where they form the vast majority of the inhabitants, how much more dreadful must it prove where the whites, and free people of colour, are in greater numbers?

From the horrid prospect which such events present we

gladly turn away, and proceed to remark that the evils which have befallen the American States having their origin in the multitude's interference with the executive government, and more especially with the administration of justice, teaches us to reflect upon that which forms the great objection to all such interference, the permanent mischief of any power whatever being exercised where there is no responsibility, that is, no personal and individual responsibility. Public functionaries, intrusted more or less directly with the government of a country, are answerable in their own persons for their acts, whether of advising or executing measures, because they are known, and can be visited with punishment, from the lightest-that of mere censure and public odium-to the heaviest. Even in despotic countries, the tyrant and his servants are not safe; and the aristocracy, in some respects more free from risks, are so little exempt from them, that at Venice they had to court the popular favour. But the multitude is wholly irresponsible, because none can ever tell who caused its excesses; and hence the measures which found favour in its eye one day, may the next be the objects of its indignation, from this entire want of personal identity. So, judges are known and are responsible; juries are so, though in a somewhat less degree; but if causes are to be decided according to what is called public opinion, no one can tell who dictates the decision. In some parts of America the mob take the law into their own hands, and execute summary justice, as it is termed, but in truth gratify their own violent passions, and commit murder, in the name of law. There is no fear whatever of such excesses spreading generally even in those countries; in ours it is wholly impossible. Yet let us beware how we give encouragement to that which approaches, though only at a distance, to such a consummation; let us carefully guard against the interference of what is called public opinion, that is, the popular voice, the voice

It may be said that these remarks can hardly apply to the proceedings of the Pro-Slavery men, inasmuch as the actors in the mob-outrages, glorying in their shame, come forward in their own persons, and claim not merely impunity, but applause. But the present state of things is that of multitudes under the influence of permanent excitement from a fanaticism that lays their reason asleep. The mischief began long ago, and it then assumed a more retiring form: the mob power only has reached its present supremacy by slow degrees.

of those who have not by possibility any accurate knowledge either of the fact or of the law, and who are not in the calm state of mind which fits it for forming a dispassionate judgment.

We have lately, in several cases that excited great interest, observed a tendency to make the feelings of people out of doors bear upon the course of justice,-sometimes before trial; more frequently while the exercise of the prerogative of pardon was in suspense. The strong feelings, partly religious, of some sectaries, frequently lead them to extreme agitation against the infliction of capital punishment; and their strenuous efforts have not always been unattended with success. We know not if to this cause was owing the remission of punishment lately in the case of an atrocious murder, committed by a woman of perfectly sound mind upon her own daughter, with circumstances of aggravation; but assuredly, unless this mitigation of the sentence received the full sanction of the judge who tried the cause, it amounts to a virtual declaration that capital punishment is at an end, and that none hereafter shall undergo it.

The conviction of Palmer has given rise to somewhat of the same agitation, which, though much less extensive, was yet sufficiently remarkable. Several newspapers took up the subject, and a letter was addressed to Lord Campbell, the presiding judge at the trial, as written by a reverend clergyman, brother of the convict. This pamphlet, which was industriously circulated, and copied into one, at least, of the London daily papers, contained a violent, and in some particulars an indecent, attack upon the learned judge, whose conduct, as well as that of his two brethren, had been throughout marked with the greatest impartiality; and who had, so far as he gave any opinion to the jury, only given the same opinion which every unprejudiced person formed who had heard the evidence. The object of these attacks was to obtain a respite, in order to examine further evidence. But no one could read the pamphlet and doubt that it proceeded from a professional man; and the suspicion was strong that the reverend author had only lent his name. He afterwards came forward and denied that it had ever been published with his authority; but it must be observed that he forbore making this statement until it might be expected that the

use of his name had been serviceable to the cause. We ought to visit this misconduct, though of a clergyman, with our disapproval as gently as may be, regard being had to the cruel position in which his brother's crimes and his fate had placed his unfortunate family; but for the professional men who were guilty of this fraud there is no excuse, any more than there is for their slanderous attack upon the Bench. It is probable that no member of the profession would have come forward in his own person as the author of such a work; and this is only another instance of the mischief arising from the interference of unknown and irresponsible persons with the administration of justice. It may no doubt be urged that this case affords also a proof how another name than the author's might be used for the purpose of concealing him. But though in the peculiar circumstances of the parties here, there might be an impossibility of enforcing any strict enactment, fenced by severe penalties, requiring the disclosure of the real author as a condition precedent to the power of publishing, it is clear that in ordinary cases the use of a false name could be rendered next to impossible by the fact that the publisher would be at the mercy of the person, ex hypothesi a person of very indifferent character, who had lent his name, and practically the concealment of the true author would become impossible. Suppose, for example, that the author of the wholly inexcusable attack on the judges, aware of the risk he ran of losing all character in the profession, had obtained leave, for a sum of money, from some needy man to use his name; and suppose that, beside the penalty which the law might annex to this conspiracy, that loss of caste were the consequence of the plot being discovered, can any one doubt that the man of straw would, as long as the professional gentleman continued on the Rolls, or at the Bar, have the power of relieving at his expense those necessities which had induced him to lend his name? When the real author weighed all the risks to which he exposed himself, and contemplated the intolerable life he would lead, under the constant dread of exposure, and in the frequent purchase of temporary security at a heavy price, he would in all probability decline the step of publishing; and

VOL. I. NO. II.

20

the result would be, that the scandalous pamphlet would not

appear.

It is on no account intended to call in question the greatest freedom-if you will, even license-in commenting on the conduct of judges, as well as of all other public functionaries. But is it indispensably necessary to this freedom, that the assailants, or the critics of those eminent persons, should wear a mask; and while the objects of their vituperation, or censorial remarks, are exposed to the view of all mankind in their proper persons, without the least disguise, and in their own persons responsible to the world for errors and for faults, their assailants should lurk in the dark, and be very possibly such that the bare mention of their names would at once disarm their assertions of all credit, their opinion of all authority? The same may no doubt be said of other attacks, of censures pronounced upon public men in other—as in political-departments; and the argument is certainly general. Yet to the case of judicial proceedings it has a peculiar application, not only because of the extreme importance of maintaining the authority of courts of justice, and indeed of the law itself, more especially the Criminal Law, but because judges, from their position, are wholly unable to defend themselves against such attacks. A minister of state and a party leader have the constant opportunity of repelling whatever assaults may be directed against their public conduct. Even official persons in more obscure positions never fail to find defenders among their parliamentary friends. But it is certain, that whatever severity of censure may be shown towards judicial characters, there is a disposition to regard the whole discussion as a kind of incident to, if not part of, judicial proceedings, and to leave the judges undefended. This, indeed, is partly owing to the nature of the questions upon which their conduct is arraigned. Matters of a legal, indeed of a technical nature, are familiar to so few, that they are avoided in debate; and were they brought forward, would have very little chance of receiving attention.

There is, however, a further reason for making a distinction between judges and all other persons in respect of such discussions as we are now considering; and this reason appears to be decisive in favour of some restriction being imposed for their