in spiritual matters; and as that was no longer recognized by the law of England, it followed that the doctrine was at an end. That to give any effect to profession, would be, to some extent, to ascribe authority to the Church of Rome. That there was no Act of Parliament which prohibited in express terms the establishment of nunneries in general. After referring to 28 Hen. 8, c. 13, s. 7; 3 & 4 Ph. & M.; 2 Eliz. c. 1, s. 7, and 9 W. 3, c. 1, s. 8, his Lordship added that it might be inferred that profession had no existence at the time of 2 Eliz. c. 1; that between the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth it had ceased to exist; but there was no doubt that for many years the course of legislation had been directed against the establishment of religious communities. That the 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 38 (the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act), put an end to the future establishment of such communities. The part of that Act which it was most important to attend to was that which exempted certain communities from the operation of the Act. The 37th section specially provided that nothing in it shall be construed to extend to religious orders of ladies bound together by monastic vows; that section recognized the possibility of such communities existing in this country; and it must be presumed that the Legislature understood what was meant by being bound by religious and monastic vows, and had reference to the old law on the subject. That the question was, to what extent did that Act of Parliament recognize the existence of nuns? The case of Evans v. Cassidy was the only authority on the subject. That case decided, that the only effect of that Act was to exempt nuns from the penalty of it, but did not recognize their existence. That the doctrine of civil death was expressly denied by some of the authorities; others only tended to show that the application of it was now impossible.-(Ley's case, Roll. Abr. E. tit. Grant, p. 430; Co. Litt. 132 a; Chomley's case, 2 Co. 51; The King v. Partington, 1 Salk. 162.) That it was decided in some of those cases, and contended in this case, that profession could not now exist, because it was not triable. That argument was not conclusive, although supported by some very high authorities. There was no doubt that the fact of profession was usually tried by the certificate of the Ordinary. But even in the old state of the law, when the doctrine of disability existed in its fullest force, it was sometimes tried by other means than by the certificate of the Ordinary. His Lordship was of opinion that the doctrine of civil death was put an end to by the statute 2 Eliz. c. 1, and that the enactments of the Emancipation Act did not warrant him in holding that the Canon Law of the Church of Rome as to profession was restored or recognized by it. His

Lordship said he saw nothing against public policy in allowing these communities to acquire property. He had occasion to

observe on that in M'Carthy v. M'Carthy.

This suit was afterwards compromised by consent, which was made a rule of Court on the 17th of May, 1854.

Assuming the law as decided in Blake v. Blake to be incontrovertible, viz. that at the present day the doctrine of civil death is no longer applicable on the profession of a nun, it becomes important to consider whether the Legislature ought not to interfere and restore the old law. Nunneries are now allowed to exist-they are not considered contrary to public policy; ought we not therefore to afford the same protection to persons and the relatives of persons who join those communities, as experience has shown in most Roman Catholic countries to be, if not absolutely necessary, at least expedient?

It does not seem to follow as a necessary consequence, as laid down by the Lord Chancellor in the above-mentioned case, that by recognizing the doctrine of civil death, we should recognize the pre-eminence and authority of the Pope, any more than we do so by allowing the existence of such communities. It is true, that if we were obliged to try the fact of profession by the means of the certificate of a Roman Catholic bishop, there might be better grounds for the opinion of the Lord Chancellor; but his Lordship admits that profession was formerly, and of course might be now, tried by other means than by such certificate. His Lordship's objection, therefore, appears to fall to the ground; for if by allowing the existence of nunneries, we do not recognize the pre-eminence of the Pope, we certainly should not do so by proving, without the intervention of one of his bishops, that a person has joined one of such communities-the only step necessary in order to lead to the consequences of civil death, if it were now the law of the land.

According to the law as it now stands, whatever property a nun may obtain, will, by virtue of her vows of obedience and poverty, almost invariably fall into the possession of the community she has joined.

The old law of France was much wiser: according to that, the estates of persons who were professed religious did not go to the monastery, but to their heirs, or those to whom they were pleased to give them; and they could not dispose of them for the use of the monastery.-(1 Domat. by Strahan, p. 25, n.) The old law of England was similar.-(Littleton, s. 200.)

The present law is unjust, inasmuch as it gives monasteries an unfair advantage over individuals; for monasteries will doubtless succeed to the possessions of many individuals; but no

individuals can succeed to the possessions of monasteries. It is impolitic, as it has a tendency (which we have seen illustrated in this country) to cause the inmates of such communities to retain as a votary within their precincts, the heiress whom they were to educate for the duties of active life, but who, in their moments of religious enthusiasm, may have been urged to forget the ties of home and natural affection.

9. ROBINSON V. ANDERSON. 20 Beav. 98, 102. Partnership for limited Purpose-Solicitors-Share of Profits in the Absence of Contract.

"Where two solicitors undertake a matter of business on behalf of a client, the same rule follows in that as in any other undertaking where two persons carry on a business jointly on behalf of themselves, or as agents for other persons. It is, in point of fact, a limited partnership for a particular sort of business. Assuming nothing to have been said as to the manner in which the profits were to be divided, it appears to me to follow, as a necessary consequence of law, that they are to be divided equally between them. And although one may do more business, and have exerted himself more than the other, yet, if nothing is said upon the subject of profits, the presumption is, that they are to be equally divided between them." (Per Sir J. Romilly, M.R.; see also Webster v. Bray, 7 Hare, 159; M'Gregor v. Bainbrigge, Id. 164, n.)

10. WING V. HARVEY. 5 De Gex, Mac. & G. 265. Principal and Agent- Insurance Company-How far bound by Statement of Local Agent.

A person assured his life in "The Norwich Union Society," and the policy contained a condition making it void if the assured went beyond the limits of Europe without license. He afterwards assigned the policy, and the assignee, on paying the premium to the local agent of the society at the place where the assurance had been effected, informed him that the assured was in Canada. The agent stated that this would not avoid the policy, and received the premiums until the assured died. It was held by the Lords Justices, that the society was precluded from insisting on the forfeiture, and consequently that the policy ought to be treated as still subsisting.

11. HINDSON V. WEATHERILL. 5 De Gex, Mac. & G. 301.

Solicitor and Client-Gift to Solicitor by a Will drawn by himself, not set aside on ground of Presumptive Fraud.

It seems well settled, that a gift inter vivos from a client to an attorney may be set aside upon the ground of presumptive fraud; it being the policy of the Courts of Equity to guard against any advantage which the solicitor may take of the influence which he may acquire over his client; the actual exercise of which it would always be most difficult to prove. By a strange anomaly, however, by no means unfrequent in our law, which often delights in a distinction without a difference, it has been held in the above-mentioned case, not, indeed, inconsistently with the authorities, that a solicitor may take a gift under the will of his client, although the solicitor may himself have drawn the will; the onus of proving fraud, or undue influence, being thrown upon the persons contesting the validity of the gift.

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This anomaly appears to arise from the fact that Courts of Equity, with respect to gifts inter vivos, act upon their own principles; in respect to testamentary dispositions, they consider that their validity is to be determined in other courts; that is to say, with respect to personalty, in the Ecclesiastical Courts; with respect to realty, in a Court of Common Law before a jury: and neither Ecclesiastical Courts nor Courts of Common Law presume fraud from the mere relation existing between the ties (as that of solicitor and client), although, if such relation exist, a slighter degree of proof of fraud may be requisite. The law is well stated by Dr. Lushington in Jones v. Godrich (5 E. F. Moore, 20), where he makes the following observations: "The law of England has prescribed no restrictions upon testamentary dispositions, as to who may be the legatees. Where that power is exercised in favour of guardians, trustees, solicitors, medical attendants, or persons standing in a similar relation to the deceased, the degree of proof required will be greater or less according to the circumstances; but if the Court be satisfied that there was adequate capacity, testamentary intention, untainted by fraud, and a due execution, the instrument is valid. Fraud cannot be presumed; but the circumstances may render fraud so probable, that the Court will require stronger proof than in cases where all natural presumptions are in favour of the disposition, and the free will of the testator."

If the matter were considered independently of all authority, most persons would probably come to the conclusion that all

the reasons which might be urged against the validity of a gift inter vivos, conferred by a client upon his solicitor, would apply with still greater force in the case of a will, especially if the will were drawn by the solicitor himself.

By the Roman law, a person qui se scripsit hæredem could take no benefit under the will (Dig. lib. 34, tit. 8); and the same result follows in our own law, if the person be a witness to a will. Independently, then, of any peculiar relation between the testator and legatee, which may give the latter undue influence over the former, it certainly appears rather absurd that, while we have altered the law so as to render the evidence of an interested party admissible, we nevertheless allow a witness to take no interest under a will, while, at the same time, contrary to the Roman law, where a person has written the entire will of another, and may have given to himself the bulk of the property, he will be permitted to retain it, in absence of proof of actual fraud on his part.

12. TRUTCH V. LAMPRELL. 20 Beav. 116.

Trustee-Breach of Trust-Liability of acting Trustee, though not an active Trustee.

A person acting as trustee will not be able to escape from liability, upon the ground that he is not an active trustee, when by acting for conformity's sake he has put it in the power of his co-trustee to commit a breach of trust. Thus, where two trustees properly sold out trust-money standing in their names in Consols, and one of them handed a cheque for the proceeds to the other, who misapplied it, it was held by Sir J. Romilly, M.R., that both were liable for a breach of trust. "It is constantly," said his Honour," argued by counsel, but the conclusion is as constantly rejected by the Court, that a person who acts is not an active trustee, and is not liable, because he has acted for conformity's sake. It is a contradiction in terms to say that a trustee who acts is not an active trustee : by taking upon himself the office of trustee, and acting, he becomes, in that transaction at least, an active trustee, and is bound properly to perform all the duties appertaining to his office."

13. MANSON V. BAILLIE. 2 Macqueen, 80.

Trustee acting as Solicitor-Professional Remuneration.

In this case, which was heard upon appeal from the first division of the Court of Session in Scotland, it appeared that six trustees had appointed one of their own body, a solicitor, to act,