approved of, but before it had been executed by the Master, an offer was made of an increased rent of 2201.; but the tenant, in the meanwhile, had laid out a very large sum in artificial manures for the farm. It was held by Sir J. Romilly, M.R., that the offer of so great an increase of rent could not be refused, but that the old tenant was entitled to an allowance for outlay. 3. EVANS V. BREMBRIDGE. 2 Kay & Johns. 174. Co-sureties-Execution of Deed by one only-Alteration of Position of Surety Equitable Relief. It is essential to the validity of the contract of suretyship, that perfect good faith should be adhered to by the parties to it. Whenever, therefore, there is any misrepresentation, or even concealment, from the surety, of any material fact, which, had he been aware of, he might not have entered into the contract of suretyship, it will thereby be rendered invalid, and the surety will be discharged from his liabilities. Thus, in the above-mentioned case of Evans v. Brembridge, a creditor having prepared a deed, containing a joint and several covenant by two co-sureties, and sent it to one of them for execution, but neither procured its execution by the other, nor informed the surety who executed the deed of this fact, but, on the contrary, wrote to him as "one of the sureties," the principal debtor having become insolvent, it was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.C., that the surety who had executed the deed was entitled in equity to be relieved from all liability on the covenant. "The only doubt," said his Honour, "I had was whether it might not be the proper course to order the deed to be delivered up upon some terms, as that the plaintiff should be bound to the extent of half the sum secured by his covenant; but looking to the other authorities, Leaf v. Gibbs (4 Car. & P. 466) and Rice v. Gordon (11 Beav. 265), which proceeded upon the equities of the parties, it seems to be decided that when once it appears that the instrument is not such as it was intended to be, this Court holds that the legal effect of the instrument is to be got rid of as against the surety. This Court, then, will look at the original agreement between the parties, to see if it appears that they all intended the obligation should be joint and several between the co-sureties. In this case the deed was in that form, and was prepared and framed by the covenantees, who sent it for execution to the plaintiff, thereby giving him the clearest intimation that his liability was intended to be joint and several. After that, it was the duty of the company to inform the plaintiff that the deed was not executed by his cosurety, as originally proposed, and to ascertain his view with respect to his altered position. It is impossible to say that it was not materially altered by the plaintiff becoming severally bound, especially in this case, considering the relation of the principal debtor to the other surety. The plaintiff may have calculated on the influence that person might have exercised together with himself in inducing the debtor to discharge his obligation. I am of opinion, on the whole, that the plaintiff is entitled to have this deed wholly set aside, and, as he was not informed of his altered position, with costs.' 4. THE LADY VICTORIA LONG-WELLESLEY V. THE EARL OF MORNINGTON. 2 Kay & Johns. 143. Fraud on Power of Appointment. It is a well-established principle, that a person having a power must execute it bond fide for the end designed, otherwise the appointment, though unimpeachable at law, will be held corrupt and void in equity. In accordance with this principle, in the above-mentioned case, where a father (Lord Mornington), having a power of appointing a sum of money among his children, appointed part of it to a son who had become a lunatic, and was in a very infirm and weak state of health in consequence of his excesses; and from the circumstances attending the preparation and execution of the appointment, it appeared, from the evidence, that the father intended it not for the benefit of his son, but of himself,-it was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.C., that the appointment was a fraud upon the power, and therefore void. "Holding," said his Honour, "as I do, that the appointment has been made by Lord Mornington, not for the benefit of his son, but for his own benefit, it seems to me consistent with the whole class of authorities, and to follow the principle of the class of authorities, in which the object of the power was capable of entering into a bargain with the father, which this unfortunate gentleman was not, to hold that this is a fraud upon the power, that it is an exercise of the power by which the father endeavoured to obtain a benefit for himself, which, of course, the Court will not allow him to retain; the consequence is, that the deed must be set aside, and Lord Mornington must pay the costs of this suit." 5. ROWLEY V. UNWIN. 2 Kay & Johns. 138. Husband and Wife-Separate Use-Restraint on Anticipation— Acquiescence in Use of Money by Husband. A wife being entitled to the income of settled property for her separate use, without power of anticipation, the trustees allowed the husband to use 1,000l., part of the trust funds, for four years. Soon afterwards, the wife separated from her husband, and then for the first time claimed interest on the 1,000l. for the four years. She admitted she "had allowed her husband to receive her income, so long as he behaved to her as a husband ought to do." It was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.C., that the wife was not entitled to the interest claimed. "Of course," said his Honour, "the wife could not beforehand consent to the husband receiving the interest, for she had no power of anticipation; nevertheless, during the period in question, the funds were constructively in the husband's hands. He had the use of money, for which he was bound to pay interest. Suppose he had given a mortgage for it, a state of circumstances which, I think, would be exactly the same as this, he would then have been indebted for interest to the wife de anno in annum. It is true, there would have been no money in his hands; but if the wife's trustees had appointed a receiver, who had paid the rent of the mortgaged property to the husband, it would then fall within the ordinary rule, which precludes a wife from recovering the past income of her separate estate, upon the ground of a supposed gift by her of such income to her husband. In Howard 'v. Lord Digby (2 C. & F. 634; S. C. 8 Bligh, N. S. 224), the Duchess of Norfolk's case, commented on by Lord St. Leonard's in his Treatise of the Law of Property, as administered by the House of Lords' (162, 170), lunacy intervened. In that case, therefore, the presumption of a gift or agreement on the part of the wife was excluded. In this case, the parties separated within a few months after the time when the interest accrued due, and the wife made no demand for interest up to the time of separation, although she did immediately afterwards. She admits she allowed her husband to receive the income of her property generally. I can draw no distinction between moneys in the hands of the husband, the interest of which the wife might have claimed, and moneys out on mortgage in the way I have supposed." 6. SHAW V. NEALE. 20 Beav. 157. Judgment--Statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110-Neglect to re-register-Effect of Re-registration. In this case it was held by Sir John Romilly, M.R., that if a judgment creditor neglects to re-register his judgment within five years, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, it becomes inoperative, as to purchasers, mortgagees, and creditors (both anterior and subsequent), until re-registration, from which period alone it then operates as against them. His Honour, in effect, observed, "that the judgment ceased to be any charge at all when the five years had elapsed; and it became, so far as regarded the interest of a subsequent mortgagee, exactly as if it had been paid off; and the registration again operated only as if a new judgment had been created, and a new charge had been put on the land." In Beavan v. The Earl of Oxford (23rd Nov. 1855), it was held by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Justice Knight Bruce dubitante), that the omission to re-register within five years did not give priority to an existing puisne judgment.-(See also 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 6; and Freer v. Hesse, 4 De Gex, Mac. & G. 495.) 7. ROOPER V. HARRISON. 2 Kay & Johns. 108. Legal Estate Equities-Priorities. "The whole doctrine of the Court of Equity, about the protec tion afforded by means of the legal estate is simply this:-A party getting the legal estate acquires no new right in equity in any way; but equity, regarding all the persons who have incumbrances according to their priorities, considering that the equitable interests pass, just as the legal interest does, by the effect of the deeds, finds itself checked at times, and an obstacle thrown in its way, by an incumbrancer's saying, 'I have got the legal estate interposed; I insist it is mine at law, and there must be a superior equity shown in order to deprive me of my legal estate.' It is merely staying the hands of the Court, by resting on that legal estate, which this Court will not deal with, unless a superior equity can be shown; and although the Court holds that priority will give equity, yet it does not hold that it gives so superior an equity, as between several incumbrancers, as to enable a person who has an anterior charge to wrest the legal estate from the person who has obtained it without notice of the anterior charge, and who has not parted with it, that is the whole effect of the doctrine, and none other."-(Per Sir W. Page Wood, V.C.) VOL. I. NO. I. -- 2 D 8. BLAKE V. BLAKE. 4 Ir. Ch. Rep. 349. Nun-Profession-Civil Death. It is perfectly clear that before the reign of Henry VIII., persons who entered into religious orders, and had become professed nuns or monks, were accounted dead in law; they could neither sue nor be sued. Immediately on their profession, they ceased to have any legal existence, and the Ordinary might treat them as dead, and might grant administration of their personal estate, and their heirs-at-law might enter into possession of their real estates. It has, however, been decided in Blake v. Blake, following the authority of M'Carthy v. M'Carthy (9 Ir. Eq. Rep. 620) and Evans v. Cassidy (11 Ir. Eq. Rep. 243), that the doctrine of civil death, in consequence of profession as a monk or nun, is not law at the present day. There a petition was filed by Eliza Blake against her sister Maria Blake, for an account of the personal property of the testator, and of the rents received by the respondent since his death, and for a partition of the real estate, which was not devised by her father's will. Maria Blake by her answering affidavit set up the following defence:-That the petitioner, who was of the Roman Catholic religion, had previously to the death of the testator entered into and become a professed member of a certain religious order, known as the Loretto Nuns, and bound by the rules and vows of the said order, and that she had continued and was a professed nun, and a member of the Loretto Convent, near Rathfarnham, in the county of Dublin, and therefore was not entitled to or capable of taking any portion of the testator's real or personal estate, or to obtain any account of the rents and profits, as sought by the petition. The affidavit further stated that the petitioner would not derive any benefit whatever, even if she were declared entitled to a distributive share of the testator's personal estate, or to a moiety of his real estate, inasmuch as it is an invariable regulation of the convent of which she was a member, and of all similar institutions, that all property which any of the professed nuns acquire or become entitled to after their profession, becomes and is the absolute property of the convent; and that by the vow of poverty taken by the said petitioner at the time of her profession, she had given up all interest therein. The Lord Chancellor, however, after an elaborate examination of the authorities, said that he had come to the conclusion that he ought not to refuse the prayer of the petition. His Lordship said that the doctrine of civil death was founded on the pre-eminence and the authority of the Pope |