invasion of a right without proof of special damage—were cited in a former chapter; where, inter alia, reference was made to various decisions which establish that the fraudulent use and appropriation of a trade-mark is, per se, actionable. To what was then said upon this part of the subject, I would add, that, in close analogy to the principle just stated, it has been decided in the United States, that a coach-proprietor running carriages between a railway-station and a town has no right falsely to hold himself out as being in the employment or under the patronage of a particular hotel-keeper in such town, by affixing to his carriages, &c., the name of the hotel, this being done to the detriment of some other party lawfully entitled to the privilege in question. And, in the case just cited, it was further held, that the representation thus falsely made for the purpose of enticing passengers from the plaintiff's carriages, would be a fraud on him, and a violation of his rights, for which an action would lie without proof of actual or specific damage.

"Secondly. An action ex delicto may be founded on the violation of some public duty (i. e. of some duty towards the public), and consequent damage to the complainant. Now, here three different matters must be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict; viz., the existence of the alleged duty, its breach, and damage: the first of which items, viz., the existence of the public duty, must be shown, either by bringing the facts of the case within the reach and control of some acknowledged doctrine of the common law, or by showing that they are within the words, spirit, or purview of an Act of Parliament.

"Let us, under the term 'public duty,' include the duty of refraining from doing, as well as that of doing, acts of a particular kind or tendency, and we may then lay down the proposition above stated, thus, in a somewhat expanded form,— Wherever a duty has to be observed towards the public by an individual, and another is specially injured in consequence of the non-observance or non-discharge of such duty, or through misfeasance or malfeasance in its discharge, an action will lie at suit of the latter party against the former.

"As simple illustrations of the practical working of this proposition, I may at once refer to the cases below cited, which establish, that wherever an instrument, dangerous in its existing state, and calculated to inflict damage on those who may come in contact with it, is so placed as to be likely to cause injury, the person thus placing it is liable, if injury ensues, to the party injured.

"Let us pause here for a moment to notice one characteristic of the class of cases now under review. The breach of a public duty causing damage to an individual, in truth, combines two tortious ingredients, which are, according to circumstances, more or less clearly distinguishable from each other,the wrong done to the public, and the wrong done to the individual. That which is, in strictness, correlative to a public duty, is a right enforceable at suit of the public. But, then, the general rule of law is well settled, that individuals cannot enforce a public right, or redress a public injury, by suits in their own names. Where they suffer wrong or sustain damage in common with other members of the community, no personal right of action thence accrues. The private grievance is merged in that of the public, and the remedy (if any exists) will be by public prosecution, in order that the rights of the public may thus be vindicated. Even where one person sustains an injury in common with the public, and, from the circumstances in which he happens to be placed, suffers more frequently or more severely than others, he will not, on that account, have, as of course, a separate right of action. It is only where he suffers some special damage, differing in kind from that which is common to others, that a personal remedy accrues to him."

After this disquisition, the commentator proceeds to analyze and discuss some important modern cases on the subject before him; for instance, Ellis v. The Sheffield Gas Consumers Company (2 E. & B. 767), Brown v. Mallett (5 C. B. 599), Couling v. Coxe (6 C. B. 703), and thus proceeds :

"We may now, I think, conclude that a statutory duty towards the public may consist either in doing or in abstaining from doing some particular act,—that if the law casts any duty upon,

a person, which he refuses or fails to perform, he is answerable in damages to those whom his refusal or failure injures,'—that the non-performance of a legal obligation of this kind will not be actionable without special damage,-and further, that 'where any law requires one to do any act for the benefit of another, or to forbear the doing of that which may be to the injury of another, though no action be given in express terms by the law for the omission or commission, the general rule of law in all such cases is, that the party so injured shall have an action:' this last proposition being however subject to an important qualification, viz. 'that an action will not lie for the infringement of a right created by statute, where another specific remedy for infringement is provided by the same statute,' or, as remarked in Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges, 'where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specified manner,' it holds generally true that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner.'

"Thirdly, a right of action ex delicto may be founded on the infraction of some private compact, or of some private duty or obligation, and consequential damage to the complainant.

“Any duty, moreover, must in strictness be deemed 'private,' which is to be observed, not towards the community at large, but in relation to one or more of its members. The class of private duties is consequently extremely large,-it comprehends duties flowing from contract express or implied, from bailment, from the relation of master and servant, or of landlord and tenant, from the occupancy of land, &c. : as throwing some light upon the nature of such duties, the authorities infra may be consulted.

"Now, in any case referable to this class, the plaintiff must, in order to sustain his action, be able to prove some kind of contract or obligation out of which the specific duty, with a breach whereof the defendant is charged, will flow in legal contemplation, or he must adduce evidence of facts establishing such a relation between the defendant and himself, that such specific duty will thence result. Further than this, he must, of course, show a breach of the duty thus raised, and consequential damage to himself.

"A private as well as a public duty may exist by virtue of the statute or of the common law. Thus, it has been held that case will lie against a railway company for acts of wrongful omission of their statutory duty in regard to the transfer of shares, and for wrongfully declaring the same forfeited and selling them. 'The declaration,' said Lord Campbell, C.J., 'shows both injuria and damnum. The defendants have been guilty of a wrongful act of omission in not registering the plaintiff's name in their books, and also of a wrongful act of commission in declaring the shares to be forfeited, and in confirming that forfeiture. It is said that the plaintiff could sustain no injury; but he has been deprived of the ordinary privileges of shareholders, and contingently of any profits that might have arisen upon the shares. Those are clearly injuries, for which he has a right to bring an action.'

Again, a private duty may exist at common law, for breach whereof, coupled with consequential damage, an action will be sustainable."

Several important classes of cases are then brought under notice as belonging to the last of the divisions above particularized; viz., where a tort flows from the breach of a contract, -where there is a breach of a duty undertaken for the service of another,—where a right of action is founded on fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, whence ensues consequential damage; and, finally, where the right of action is founded on the malicious doing of an act also productive of consequential damage.

"A general survey of the various causes of action founded upon tort,—a minute examination of precedents, of declarations, and other pleadings available in such cases, will show that in most of them no difficulty can be felt in at once assigning to its proper class the right of action ex delicto, originating out of given facts."

After a few additional remarks upon the actions of trover, libel, and those founded on injuries done to the wife, child, and servant, with reference to the classification of torts, previously expounded, which we need not quote, the author thus concludes his chapter :

Having thus sufficiently investigated the nature of and ingredients in a right of action ex delicto, I shall in the ensuing chapters proceed to speak-1st, of Torts to the Person and Reputation; 2ndly, of Torts to Property, whether Real or Personal; 3rdly, of Torts not directly affecting the Person, Reputation, or Property.

"Besides the convenience of the arrangement just suggested for an elementary treatise, there is, to some extent, authority for its adoption; for instance, Sir Henry Finch tells us, that our law regards the person above his possessions,-life and liberty most,-freehold and inheritance above chattels,—and chattels real above personal."

But we cannot afford space to pursue the thread of subsequent chapters, and must now bring both our quotations and remarks to a close.

P. F.

ART. X.-STATUTE LAW COMMISSION.

OFFICER OR BOARD FOR REVISION OF BILLS.

1. Report of the Statute Law Commission.

2. Suggestive Letters on the subject of Statutory Reform, addressed to the Hon. P. J. Locke King, M.P. BY EARNEST JUNIOR. (Privately Printed.)

3. Ruins of Time, exemplified in Sir Matthew Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown. By ANDREW AмOS, Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge, and late Member of the Supreme Council of India.

HE Statute Law Commission has made a supplemental

THE report, containing two excellent but limited plans,

sanctioned by the signatures of twenty lawyers, occupying the most eminent legal positions in the country. The first plan is the appointment of an officer or a Board to revise and improve