action at law. The proposition taken without any qualification, might seem to imply that a married woman could not take proceedings in the Divorce Court or in a police court. Of course it is only to the form of expression used by Mr. Griffith to which we take exception; and in any case it is not so absurd, as the statement made a short time ago by a legal journal, that a married woman has no legal existence. Mr. Griffith's comments on the probable operation of the Act are, of course, of a purely conjectural character, as no decision of any moment has, so far as we are aware, been pronounced. With regard to the 12th section, which apparently gives a husband power, by marrying a lady of property without a settlement, to defraud his wife's ante-nuptial creditors, Mr. Griffith is of opinion that a Court of Equity would not tolerate any such proceeding. Mr. Griffith cites a dictum of Vice-Chancellor Stuart in Columbine v. Penhall, 1 Sm. & Giff., 228, 256, that "where there is evidence of an intent to defeat and delay creditors, and to make the celebration of marriage part of a scheme to protect property against the rights of creditors, the consideration of marriage cannot support such a settlement; and the case of Bulmer v. Hunter, L.R., 8 Eq., 46, where a man married a woman with whom he had been cohabiting, and settled property upon her, and thereby defrauded an ante-nuptial creditor. Vice-Chancellor Malins set aside the settlement as against the creditor. Mr. Griffith's arguments might very fairly be employed by counsel in argument, but, as Mr. Griffith is fully aware, they do not cover the whole of the proposition for which he contends. And it might fairly be urged on the other side, that for a Court of Equity to do what Mr. Griffith supposes it to do would be to alter the express words of an Act of Parliament. It may be said that this would not be a greater stretch of authority than the manner in which Courts of Equity have dealt with certain sections of the Statute of Frauds. But at the present day Courts of Equity would be more reluctant to over-ride the words of a Statute than at the time when the Statute of Frauds was passed.

We may observe, in conclusion, that though Mr. Griffith's work contains much with which legal readers will be perfectly familiar, it is a well-digested summary of the decisions bearing upon the subjects treated of in the Act, and is well worth perusal.

An Elementary View of the Proceedings in a Suit in Equity, with an Appendix of Forms. By Sylvester Joseph Hunter, B.A., of Lincoln's-Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Fifth Edition, by George Woodford Lawrence, M.A., of Lincoln's-Inn, Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworths, 7, Fleet Street. 1871.

EDITION rapidly follows edition of this little work.

As an excellent

introduction to the study of Chancery practice the book has established its position, and we think the editor has done wisely in merely introducing such amendments as the alteration in the law by Statutes and Orders requires, and abstaining from any attempt to make it a manual of practice.

The Law of Naturalization as amended by the Naturalization Acts, 1870. By John Cutler, B.A., Barrister-at-Law, Professor of Jurisprudence at King's College, London. London: Butterworths.

1871.

PROFESSOR CUTLER has published a useful little book on the "Law of Naturalization." He commences with a treatise on the law as it was, and then gives the Act of last year to show the law as it is. In this he considers, (1.) Who were aliens before the Statutes of last Session ? (2.) Who were British subjects? (3.) How a British subject could become an alien; and (4.) How an alien could become a British subject. On the subject of the maxim nemo potest exuere patriam, Mr. Forsyth, in his "Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law," gives a long opinion from Mr. Reeves, the author of the well-known legal history, which curiously illustrates the inflexibility of the old law of naturalization. In this Mr. Reeves maintains, apropos, we believe, of the case of Doe v. Acklam, that every citizen of the United States whose ancestor was under English allegiance remained still (circa 1818) under the allegiance of his sovereign lord, King George III., and that the recognition of American independence had not altered his position in the least. On one point connected with the law of allegiance we should be glad to receive information from any of our readers or from Professor Cutler. Would a Hanoverian born previous to the accession of our present Queen have been an alien? On the application of every principle deducible from Calvin's case he ought not to be so considered. The case must have occurred. Mr. Chisholm Anstey, whose singularly great knowledge of constitutional law is known to many, told the present writer that he believed that the case had come before the law officers of the Crown about 1840, and an opinion had been given in accordance with the decision in the case of the Postnati, but we have not been able to find any statement of the fact. Professor Cutler's book is a useful summary of the law, and of the changes which have been made in it. The Act is given in full, together with a useful index.

The American Law Review, October, 1870.

Brown, & Co.

Boston: Little,

THIS number contains, in addition to a lengthy summary of events, book reviews, and a selected digest of state reports, the following articles (1.)" Codes and the Arrangement of the Law." (2.) "The Trials of Troppman and Prince Bonaparte "-a very interesting article. (3.) "Degrees of Negligence." (4.) "Suits between Firms with a Common Member." Altogether the contents form an excellent part.

The Practice of the Court of Probate in Common Form Business. By Henry C. Coote, F.S.A., Proctor in Doctors' Commons; also a Treatise on the Practice of the Court in Contentious Business. By Thomas H. Tristram, D.C.L., Advocate. Sixth Edition. London: Butterworths. 1871.

WE regret that, owing to some mishap, the reviewer of this book had not sent in his copy on going to press. A notice will appear in

our next number.

The Albany Law Journal. Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons, & Co.

THIS nicely got-up weekly periodical continues to interest the profession with a series of amusing and well-selected reminiscences of the legal world, both at home and abroad. As a collection of anecdotes concerning law and lawyers, no publication hitherto has approached it in the great variety, and in many cases, originality, of its contents. Of late the journal has become, as was intimated that it would, less factious than formerly, but not the less pleasing on that account, as the pages devoted to legal literature are sprightly and ably written. The Digest of Decisions and Reports of Cases are not the least important part of the contents of this journal.

The Scottish Journal of Jurisprudence and Law Magazine. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

THE numbers for the quarter contain among the usual notes of cases, &c., a translation of the title of the pandects ad legem aquiliam; some remarks on that portion of the Report of the Scotch Law Courts Commission by the dissentient members of that body, chiefly concerning the Inner and Outer House; the Annual Addresses at the opening of the session of the Juridical Society and of the Scottish Law Amendment Society; and some well-timed observations on the administration of justice in Scotland as compared with some other systems.

The Law Times.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

The Irish Law Times.

The Law Journal.

The Canada Law Journal.

The Australian Jurist.

The United States Jurist.

VOL. XXX.-NO. LX.

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338

Events of the Quarter, &c.

RULES UNDER THE JURIES ACT.

THE following rules of Court, made by the Judges of the Superior Courts in pursuance of the Juries Act, 1870, are applicable to trials in London and Middlesex :

(1.) That a juror summoned to attend for the trial of common or special jury causes in London or Middlesex, not having had notice on a previous day not to attend, who appears in obedience to his summons and continues ready to serve during the day if required, shall be considered as having been within the meaning of “The Juries Act, 1870," in attendance, and as being entitled to be paid according to the provisions of the Statute.

(2.) That the sum of 37. shall be deposited with the associate upon the entry of every common jury cause in London or Middlesex by the party entering the same.

(3.) That upon the entry of every special jury cause in London or Middlesex, except as hereinafter mentioned, the sum of 12. 12s. shall be deposited with the associate by the party so entering the

cause.

Provided that where, before the entry of such cause for trial by any party, it has been made a special jury cause by the opposite party, then the party entering the cause may, if he think fit, give notice to such opposite party of his intention to deposit with the associate the sum of 31. only, and to enter the cause for trial by a common jury, and may thereupon enter the cause to be tried as a common jury cause and deposit with the associate the sum of 37. only; and in that case, unless the opposite party deposit with the associate the further sum of 91. 12s. within one day after such entry, the cause shall be tried by a common jury as a common jury cause, unless a judge otherwise order.

Provided also that where a party to a cause has obtained an order that a special jury be struck for the trial of a particular cause, he shall on or before giving notice to the sheriff of such order deposit with the sheriff the sum of 25l. 4s., otherwise the said order shall be of no avail, and the said cause shall be tried in the same way as if no such order had been made. The sheriff shall forthwith pay over to the associate the money so deposited with him.

(4.) Where a cause, after having been entered in London or Middlesex as a common jury cause, has been ordered to be made a special jury cause by rule or order, the sum of 91. 12s., being the difference between the deposit of 31. made at the time of entry and the sum of 127. 12s., shall be forthwith deposited with the associate

by the party obtaining such rule or order; and in default the cause shall, notwithstanding such rule or order, be tried by a common jury, unless a judge otherwise order.

(5.) That no second deposit shall be made on the re-entering of a cause for trial which has been withdrawn before commencement of trial.

(6.) That the deposits so made in London and Middlesex respectively in special jury causes shall form a fund for the payment of special jurors in attendance as aforesaid.

(7.) That the deposits so made in London and Middlesex respectively in common jury causes shall form a fund for the payment of common jurors in attendance as aforesaid.

(8.) That the funds aforesaid for London and Middlesex shall be kept separate and distinct for all purposes, and shall be applicable solely to the remuneration of jurors in London and Middlesex respectively.

(9.) That in every case in London or Middlesex in which the sum of 37. only has been paid on the entry of a cause, whether entered as a special jury cause or not, if the cause is afterwards tried as a special jury cause, the sum of 31. paid on entry shall form part of the special jury fund. And that in every such case in which the cause is afterwards tried as a common jury cause, the sum of 31. paid on entry shall form part of the common jury fund.

(10.) That in all causes, whether tried by a special jury or by a common jury, the sum of 3l., if deposited by the successful party, shall be recoverable as costs in the cause, if he be otherwise entitled to such costs.

(11.) In special jury causes, the further sum of 91. 12s., if deposited by the successful party, shall be deemed to be costs of the special jury, and shall be recoverable as costs in the cause if he be otherwise entitled to such costs, and the judge certify that the cause was fit to be tried by a special jury.

(12.) In all causes already entered and now standing for trial by special juries, the party who has made the cause a special jury cause shall forthwith, and before trial, deposit the sum of 127. 12s. with the associate, and if he make default the other party may pay the same sum; but if the party who has made the cause a special jury cause fails to pay the said sum of 12. 12s., the other party may pay the sum of 37., and thereupon the cause shall be tried as a common jury cause; and if the sum of 31. be not paid to the associate by either party, the cause shall be struck out unless the judge otherwise order. The following Regulæ Generales are applicable to trials in other counties and places than London and Middlesex :—

(1.) That on every day during the assizes on which any civil cause is to be tried, the judge presiding in the civil Court shall direct that a sufficient number of jurors be taken by ballot from the common jury panel, who shall be the jurors during that day to try civil causes, and shall not during that day be called on to try criminal cases unless needed and required to do so by the judge presiding in the criminal Court.