therefore, it is worth while trying to get at the facts here, and when an investigation takes place the first point to direct attention to will be the question of the minister's illness. Much turns upon this, because, not merely does it help us to form some notion of the respective credibility of the parties, but it forms a guide to point to us what was the animus with which the second visit was paid. If the minister saw them and the interview was satisfactory, then the subsequent Lawa version, that a messenger arrived in the afternoon, inviting the uncle and his party to pay an evening visit, becomes probable. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that the minister was really ill and had been ill for some time, and that in consequence he was unable to have an interview with the uncle, then the Tonk version, that the uncle went away angry and discontented, and uttering threatening language, is exactly what, judging from the character of the Lawa party, one would have expected to find happening.

The evidence on this point is gone into in the papers before us, and without attempting to give it, it is impossible to help saying, that the facts brought forward are such as to throw the very gravest suspicion on the story that the minister received the uncle. The Tonk party assert distinctly that they can prove incontestably that the minister was ill, and unable to receive any visit whatever. This, then, is the first point which should come under judicial investigation.

Another curious and suspicious feature in the case is, that different versions are given of the affray by the Lawa party. In addition to the one we have already given, and by a man who is alleged to have been the sole survivor, a second version appears as having been given by a writer who, if he were telling the truth, must have been an eye-witness of the events he describes. He asserts that the attendants on the uncle were killed by a volley discharged by the minister's sepoys. The former version was that they were killed with swords. But we should weary our readers if we attempted to

point out the discrepancies in the account given of the final slaughter. As we have already said, they all point to the necessity of further inquiry-inquiry which should be full and searching. Upon the whole case it is impossible to help making this remark, that if the Nawab of Tonk be guilty, that is, if he induced his minister to bring about the massacre of his enemies in the way alleged, then the Nawab must be one of the greatest dolts living, for a more clumsy massacre was never devised. No one, with an average amount of sense, would dream of murdering a man's uncle and a few of his servants in order to get rid of a rebel chief, or having conceived such a project, would carry it into execution in the way alleged.

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DIGEST OF CASES IN COURT OF SESSION (SCOTLAND) ON QUESTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION.

1.-28 Jan., 1869.-Inglis v. Inglis.-41 Jurist, 234.

LEGACY-WIDOW.

By a settlement a sum of money was bequeathed to the testator's grandson in life-rent, and on his death one half to go to his lawful heirs. He died without children. His widow claimed the one half of the bequest as heir in movables to that extent. Her claim refused. Per Lord President (Inglis). "The question is whether a widow claiming her legal rights is in any sense the heir of her husband? I am of opinion that she is not, and that however loosely the term "heir " may be used in a settlement, it can never comprehend a widow claiming jure relicta on the death of her husband. The character of heir of every class, whether of heritable or movable estate, is based on a right of succession to the deceased in respect of the right of blood, and does not involve, in any sense or degree, a jus crediti."

2.-29 Jan., 1869.-Glasgow and South Western Railway Company v. Rain.-41 Jurist, 237.

RAILWAY RESPONSIBILITY.

A cattle dealer hired a truck, loaded it, and sent it without any one in charge. At Stafford some of the cattle were found dead, and others injured by overcrowding. There was no proof of negligence on the part of the company. Held not liable Per Lord President (Inglis). "The pursuer hired a waggon for a special purpose, and having loaded it himself he seems to have been very much in the same position as if the waggon was his own; this is an entirely different relation between the parties from that which ordinarily exists between the sender and the carrier in the conveyance of goods."

3.-30 Jan., 1869.-Lang v. Lang.-41 Jurist, 240.

PARENT AND CHILD.

Held that a father is not to be deprived of the custody of a pupil child merely because his wife has obtained a decree of separation on the ground of cruelty, but it has not been shown that the health or morals of the child will be endangered-per Lord Benholme. "It was pressed on us that the English judges have looked rather to the hardship which a wife separated from her husband, through no fault of her own, would suffer in being deprived of her chil

dren than to the interests of the children themselves. It may be quite true that in England the statutory powers of the Judges exceed their common law powers in regard to this matter, but it must be remembered that at common law the powers of the English Judges are very limited. With regard to ourselves, I cannot hold that under the statute (Conjugal Rights Act) we have any wider or more extensive powers than we have at common law. On the other hand, I do not think that our statutory powers are more limited than our common law powers. In this case we are not exercising our statutory, but our common law, powers, and it is, therefore, necessary to consider only the limits of the latter." "Our common law justifies an interference with a father's right to the custody of his pupil children only when it can be shown that the children's health, life, or morals will be endangered by their remaining in their father's custody."

4.-28 Jan., 1869.-McBride v. Williams.-41 Jurist, 241.

SLANDER-PRIVILEGE-MALICE.

Held on an issue of slander, false and calumnious, without malice, (but malice was alleged in the record) where the defendant raises in defence the plea of privilege, then the pursuer can meet it with proof of malice. Per Lord Ardmillan—“ In an action of damages for slander, where there may or may not be privilege, the question whether malice shall be put in issue depends on the Pursuer's averments. If he has himself brought out the privilege, he must meet it by putting malice in the issue. If privilege does not come out on the pursuer's record but is alleged by the defender, an issue is allowed without malice, but whenever privilege appears in the proof, malice becomes essential to the Pursuer's case. If he has not alleged malice in his record the case is gone; if he has alleged malice on the record then the issue, framed on the absence of privilege, did not contain malice, he is entitled to prove malice to meet the privilege. There is a certain amount of legal malice involved in every slander; where there is no privilege there legal malice is presumed. When privilege is instructed the presumption ceases and malice must be proved."

5.-2 Dec., 1869.-Straw v. Dow.

JURISDICTION-ARRESTMENT TO FOUND JURISDICTION.

A trader became bankrupt and arranged a settlement in a composition with his creditors. He took up his residence in England. A creditor who had accepted the composition raised an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud, and to reduce a conveyance of the Scottish Heritage made by the bankrupt, and for payment of his original debt. The jurisdiction was founded first on the heritage being really the bankrupt's property, and second on an arrestment of a debt of 11. 8s. 6d. due by a debtor in Scotland. Defence, no jurisdiction. The Court sustained the jurisdiction on both grounds. Per Lord President (Inglis)—" If the pursuer's allegations be true

314 Digest of Scotch Cases of General Application.

the defender is in reality the owner of the estate, which was apparently carried by this fraudulent disposition, and as it is herit able estate in Scotland that is sufficient to create jurisdiction against him. It seems to be thought that the arrestment is for a debt of too small an amount to found jurisdiction. The sum of 11. 8s. 6d. is a substantial sum of money, and it is no objection to the jurisdiction that if a decree be obtained that will be all the creditor can recover to satisfy a claim of 8001. Unless the thing arrested be of no value at all, I think the smallness of the amount is no relevant objection to the foundation of jurisdiction."

6.—5 Nov., 1869.-Executors of General Sir Thomas Menteath Douglas.—41 Jurist, 268.

SPECIAL CASE FOR OPINION OF COURT-LEGACIES.

Held that legacies to be paid out of certain funds were general legacies, and so payable out of residue, where the special fund was insufficient, the Court holding the direction as to the source of payments merely demonstrative and not taxative. (Authorities Lord Eldon in Deane v. Test, 9 Vesey, 146, and many other English cases.) Held that a bequest of "my swords, uniforms, and all other personalities, except such as I may specially bequeath to others," did not carry the residue of the testator's movable estate.

7.—6 Feb., 1869.—Wardrope v. Goseling.-41 Jurist, 280.

PARENT AND CHILD,

Trustees applied for the appointment of a factor to receive a sumu payable to pupils, on the ground that their father, their legal administrator, was in embarrassed circumstances. The Court refused the application. Per Lord Justice Clerk (Moncrieff)-"We are not in a situation in which we can say that the interests of the children require us to deprive a parent, against whom there is nothing said but that he is poor, of the rights which the law gives him."

8.-16 Feb., 1869.-Muir v. Bryden.-41 Jurist, 282.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

A party for a time acting as the seller's agent was held liable for other purchases, as the purchaser, because he received without challenge invoices wherein he was stated as the purchaser, and he did not divulge the names of the parties to whom he sold these goods. Per Lord Cowan-" Under the law where an agent sells goods to third parties, he is responsible for the price to his constituents, unless he timeously reveals the names of those to whom he sold them, so that recourse may be had against the true purchasers."