sundry "concussion of the brain," many "found dead," some "laudanum," "ulcerated wound," "fracture of neck," &c., &c. We therefore, give the numbers of deaths from natural causes and from accidents with great diffidence, and hope they are a fair approximation to the truth. The deaths from natural causes we give as 742, and from accidents as 847, making a total of 1,589; and if we suppose that of the 742 deaths from natural causes 500 were unnecessary, and one-third, or 282 of the accidental deaths were so also, we have 782 unnecessary inquests in the whole. We only wish that the table which lies before us were published; for we are convinced that no one could read it without being thoroughly convinced that a very large proportion of the inquests were wholly unnecessary. And it is quite clear that if coroners' inquests are to be continued, contrary to our very strong opinion, some measure ought to be taken to check the holding of unnecessary inquests. In their report, the committee also say— "The coroners all assume that their salaries were not to be reduced below the rates they received prior to the statute 23 & 24 Vict. We see no evidence for this; on the contrary, we believe the statute was intended to check unnecessary inquests." We entirely concur in this view, indeed, the clause expressly empowers the justices at the end of five years "to revise, and thereby increase or diminish any such salary." Besides, before the statute, the coroners were paid so much for each inquest, and consequently the more inquests they held, the more money they received; this had a direct tendency to induce them to hold inquests in every case where any pretence for holding them existed; but in this, as in other cases, it was thought that if the coroners received a fixed remuneration irrespective of the amount of work that might be performed, there would be no inducement to hold any inquests unnecessarily; and, no doubt, this would have prevented unnecessary inquests if it had stood alone; but then, unfortunately, the provision that the - salaries might be revised every five years, and fixed according to the number of inquests during the last five years, has a

directly contrary effect; and, if the payment for single inquests under the former state of the law was sufficient to induce the holding of unnecessary inquests, it is but reasonable to suppose that the present law offers a stronger inducement; for by holding unnecessary inquests during one five years, the coroner may obtain a permanent advance of his salary during all the next five years. It would be difficult to conceive any statute which has more completely failed in its operation.

The committee likewise observe that the words " average number of inquests held" in the 23 & 24 Vict., c. 116, s. 4, does not mean all inquests, but only inquests properly, that is not unnecessarily held. In this view also we entirely concur. At the time when this statute passed, it was clearly settled that the mere fact of a body lying dead did not give the coroner jurisdiction, nor even the circumstance that the death was accidental; but that, in order to give him jurisdiction, there ought to be reasonable suspicion that the party came to his death by violent or unnatural means; in other words, that there was reason to suspect that suicide, murder, or manslaughter had been committed. Now, an inquest holden without jurisdiction is, in contemplation of law, and in sound reason also, a mere nonentity; and nothing is better settled than that where a statute speaks of any matter, it means a lawful matter, and not a matter which is a mere nullity in law; unless, indeed, the contrary be expressed or necessarily implied from the language used. When, therefore, the 23 & 24 Vict., c. 116, s. 4., speaks of "inquests held," it clearly means inquests lawfully held, and not inquests held without jurisdiction. And the section itself plainly shows that this is so; for the salary the coroner is in future to receive is, " in lieu of the fees, mileage, and allowances, which, if this Act had not been passed, he would have been entitled to receive." Now, he would not have been entitled to receive anything for inquests unnecessarily holden. Again, suppose in the five years before the 29th December,

1859, the sessions had disallowed certain inquests, and the coroner had not been paid for holding them, it is clear that these could not have been taken into account by the sessions; for it is to be," the average amount of fees, mileage, and allowances actually received," which excludes the fees, &c., and inquests disallowed. A contrary construction would lead to the absurdity that the coroner might unlawfully hold as many inquests as he liked, and increase his salary accordingly. Indeed, it is possible that a coroner might hold an inquest under such circumstances as would render him indictable, and if he were to take into account all the inquests held, whether rightly or wrongly, such an inquest must be included.

At the time when the Act passed, it was clearly settled that the sessions were the judges whether an inquest ought to have been held, and that that discretion, if fairly exercised, would not be overruled by the Court of Queen's Bench.* It is quite plain that the 23 & 24 Vict., c. 116, has neither in terms deprived the sessions of this jurisdiction, nor vested it in any one else; and it is equally clear that the jurisdiction of the sessions over the coroner's accounts of expenses, under the 1 Vict., c. 68, s. 3, is still existing; and as these accounts are to be laid periodically before the sessions, and the coroner may be examined before them as to their correctness, they have then an opportunity of examining him as to the propriety of holding the inquest; and the question naturally presents itself, whether that is not the only time at which they can make such inquiry, and it would seem that much might be said in support of that being the only time. It is clear that it was the only time under the previously existing law; and it is certainly still the only time for examining the accounts under the 1 Vict., c. 68, and it is obviously the most convenient time, as at that time the facts must be fresh in the mind of the coroner. If under the old law the coroner's fees had been allowed at one sessions, they could not have been disallowed at a subsequent one, and,

* Reg. v. Gloucestershire, supra.

if the sessions allow the coroner's accounts under the existing law, without questioning the propriety of the holding of the inquest, it may well be urged that, when at the end of five years, the coroner claims to include such inquests in his calculation, the sessions have no right to object on the ground that they were improperly held. The only answer we can suggest is, that that which in its beginning was an absolute nullity cannot have obtained any validity by lapse of time, quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non convalescet, and perhaps this might be held to be the correct legal view; still it would seem to be more prudent that the sessions should, when the coroner presents his accounts, invariably examine into the propriety of the holding all inquests where the verdicts are either accidental death, or death by the visitation of God, and if they find that they were unnecessarily held, that they should make an entry of that finding. This clearly would place them in the best position for meeting the future claim of the coroner in respect of such inquests, and it would probably tend to check the holding of such inquests.

And this leads us to a very important question. Where an inquest is unduly held, are the sessions bound to allow the fees and allowances which are directed to be paid by the 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 89, and 1 Vict. c. 68? This question has been twice before the Court of Queen's Bench. In Reg. v. Carmarthenshire,* it was held that the coroner was not entitled to his fee of 6s. 8d., under the 1 Vict., c. 68, where the justices had held that the inquest was unnecessary, but that the allowances to medical men, &c., under the 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 89, and 1 Vict., c. 68, must be paid.. This case was reviewed in Reg. v. Gloucestershire, and the Court do not appear to have been satisfied with the decision; for they granted a mandamus as to the coroner's fee of 6s. 8d., in order that the question, not only. as to that fee, but also as to the allowance of the disbursements under the 1 Vict., c. 68, might be solemnly

argued.* It is plain, therefore, that the Court considered that the question as to the disbursements (as well as the coroner's fee) was not finally settled, but still deserved to be solemnly argued. It does not appear, however, that this case was again brought before the Court, and therefore it may be well to say a few words upon the question. No one can read the 6 & 7 Wm. IV., c. 89, without seeing that it plainly applies only to inquests where there is a suspicion of foul play, and the cause of death is uncertain. Besides, it is perfectly obvious that in order to give the coroner authority to summon medical men, he himself must have jurisdiction to hold the inquest. If he has not, he has no more authority to issue a summons, than a magistrate has in a case where no information has been made. And this is made perfectly clear by sec. 6, for under it a medical man is liable to a penalty for neglecting to attend in pursuance of a summons from the coroner; now no one can doubt that it would be a good defence that the coroner had no jurisdiction to hold the inquest. The whole of the reasoning in the judgment of the Court in Reg. v. Carmarthenshire proceeds upon the manifest fallacy that every one is bound to obey the mandate of a coroner, though he is acting without jurisdiction. Now it is perfectly clear that the acts of an officer who acts without jurisdiction are utterly void; in truth they are of no more validity for any purpose than if they were the acts of a person who was no officer at all. Suppose that a coroner held an inquest without jurisdiction, and that he summoned a surgeon, and ordered him to make a post mortem examination of the deceased, can any one doubt that the friends of the deceased might lawfully resist the surgeon, and that if any violence were inflicted on them by the surgeon, they might maintain an action against the surgeon and the coroner also, if the violence were inflicted in pursuance of his order? The case seems to be precisely like the case where a justice issued a warrant where he had no jurisdiction, and a constable' acted under it, in

* See the conclusion of the judgment of Crompton, J.

i 10 Q. B., 803, 804.