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THE NUMBERS AND LOSSES.

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ceeded in crossing the river after nightfall. Lee then turned again upon Hooker; but a great storm suspended operations for twenty-four hours, and the next night the National army all recrossed the Rappahannock, leaving on the field fourteen guns, thousands of small-arms, all their dead, and many of their wounded. In this battle, or series of battles, the National loss was about seventeen. thousand men, the Confederate about thirteen thousand. Hooker had commanded about one hundred and thirteen thousand five hundred, to Lee's sixty-two thousand (disregarding the different methods of counting in the two armies); but as usual they were not in action simultaneously; many were hardly in the fight at all, and at every point of actual contact, with the exception of Sedgwick's first engagement, the Confederates were superior in numbers.

CHAPTER XVI.

GETTYSBURG.

AFTER the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, public opinion in the South began to demand that the army under Lee should invade the North, or at least make a bold movement toward Washington. Public opinion is not often very discriminating in an exciting crisis; and on this occasion public opinion failed to discriminate between the comparative ease with which an army in a strong position may repel a faultily planned or badly managed attack, and the difficulties that must beset the same army when it leaves its base, launches forth into the enemy's country, and is obliged to maintain a constantly lengthening line of communication. The Southern public could not see why, since the Army of Northern Virginia had won two victories on the Rappahannock, it might not march forward at once, lay New York and Philadelphia under contribution, and dictate peace and Southern independence in the Capitol at Washington. Whether the Confederate Government shared this feeling or not, it acted in accordance with it; and whether Lee approved it or not, he was obliged to obey. Yet, in the largest consideration of the problem, this demand for an in

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THE TURNING-POINT OF THE WAR.

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vasion of the North was correct, though the result proved disastrous. For experience shows that purely defensive warfare will not accomplish anything. Lee's army had received a heavy reënforcement by the arrival of Longstreet's corps, its regiments had been filled up with conscripts, it had unbounded confidence in itself, and this was the time, if ever, to put the plan for independence to the crucial test of offensive warfare. Many subsidiary considerations strengthened the argument. About thirty thousand of Hooker's men had been enlisted in the spring of 1861, for two years, and their term was now expiring. Vicksburg was besieged by Grant, before whom nothing had stood as yet; and its fall would open the Mississippi and cut the Confederacy in two, which might seal the fate of the new Government unless the shock were neutralized by a great victory in the East. Volunteering had fallen off in the North, conscription was resorted to, the Democratic party there had become more hostile to the Government and loudly abusive of President Lincoln and his advisers, and there were signs of riotous resistance to a draft. Finally, the Confederate agents in Europe reported that anything like a great Confederate victory would. secure immediate recognition, if not armed intervention, from England and France.

Hooker, who had lost a golden opportunity by his aberration or his accident at Chancellorsville, had come to his senses again and was alert, active, and clear-headed. As early as May 28, 1863, he informed the President that something was stirring

250

LEE MOVES NORTHWARD.

[1863.

in the camp on the other side of the river, and that a northward movement might be expected. On the 3d of June Lee began his movement, and by the 8th two of his three corps (those of Ewell and Longstreet) were at Culpeper, while A. P. Hill's corps still held the lines on the Rappahannock.

It was known that the entire Confederate cavalry, under Stuart, was at Culpeper, and Hooker sent all his cavalry, under Pleasonton, with two brigades of infantry, to attack it there. The assault was to be made in two converging columns, under Buford and Gregg; but this plan was disconcerted by the fact that the enemy's cavalry, intent upon masking the movement of the great body of infantry and protecting its flank, had advanced to Brandy Station. Here it was struck first by Buford and afterward by Gregg, and there was bloody fighting, with the advantage at first in favor of the National troops, but the two columns failed to unite during the action, and finally withdrew. The loss was over five hundred men on each side, including among the killed Colonel B. F. Davis, of the 8th New York cavalry, and Colonel Hampton, commanding a Confederate brigade. Both sides claimed to have accomplished their objectPleasonton to have ascertained the movements of Lee's army, and Stuart to have driven back his opponent. Some of the heaviest fighting was for possession of a height known as Fleetwood Hill, and the Confederates name the action the battle of Fleetwood. It is of special interest as marking the turning-point in cavalry service during the war.

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HOOKER FOLLOWS.

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Up to that time the Confederate cavalry had been generally superior to the National; this actiona cavalry fight in the proper sense of the term, between the entire mounted forces of the two armies -was a drawn battle; and thenceforth the National cavalry exhibited superiority in an accelerating ratio, till finally nothing mounted on Southern horses could stand before the magnificent squadrons led by Sheridan, Custer, Kilpatrick, and Wilson.

Hooker now knew that the movement he had anticipated was in progress, and he was very decided in his opinion as to what should be done. By the 13th of June, Lee had advanced Ewell's corps beyond the Blue Ridge, and it was marching down the Shenandoah valley, while Hill's was still in the intrenchments on the Rapidan, and Longstreet's was midway between, at Culpeper. Hooker asked to be allowed to interpose his whole army between these widely separated parts of its antagonist and defeat them in detail; but with a man like Halleck for military adviser at Washington, it was useless to propose any bold or brilliant stroke. Hooker was forbidden to do this, and ordered to keep his army between the enemy and the capital. He therefore left his position on the Rappahannock, and moved toward Washington, along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Ewell moved rapidly down the Shenandoah valley, and attacked Winchester, which was held by General Milroy with about ten thousand men. Milroy made a gallant defence; but after a stubborn fight his force was broken and defeated, and about four