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as they went over their heads into the enemy's camp, which were fired with that rapidity which would indicate to a startled foe the presence of as many batteries as there were pieces. As soon as the fourteenth shell had passed on its mission of inquiry, those dismounted men rose and charged the enemy's camp with all the noise that could emanate from forty mouths with the dreaded rebel yell; and from forty well-handled repeating carbines; all of this conducted by old "vets who so well knew that what we lacked in numbers must be compensated for in noise and rattle.

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The night attack of the three hundred of Israel that put to flight the hosts of the Midianites was not more successful than this one. The enemy, routed, were driven from their camp in the greatest consternation. Many of them left their horses and equipments behind them, some mounting bareback, and all left with the greatest celerity. The charge was made so swiftly that we got to the house which was occupied by the officers in command as headquarters just as they were getting out of it; and Corporal Goodman, of Company F, had a personal encounter with a Yankee colonel, around the same corner of the house. Each was using the corner as a shield against the attack of the other. The colonel thrusting his pistol around the corner fired and carried off one of Goodman's fingers, and Goodman with his carbine fired and brought down the colonel, severely wounded in the breast.

When we had charged across the enemy's camp the dismounted men were reinforced by the remainder of the 1st North Carolina as a precaution against the enemy's return to the attack when they had time to form. But so thoroughly convinced were they of a large force on our part, that this apprehended attack was not made by them. This we gathered from the country people, who told us next day as we followed their line of retreat to the Old Church in New Kent county, that the enemy said they had been attacked the night before by 3,000 cavalry. The result of this affair, as to carnage and capture, was a loss to the enemy of twenty killed and wounded, 100 horses, 300 stand of arms, about the same number of saddles, and a great many blankets. The loss on our side during the charge was Captain Goodman, just mentioned, and Private E. Lipe, Company E, 1st North Carolina Cavalry, the latter shot through the lungs and disabled for the remainder of the war. All this had transpired by 3 o'clock Wednesday morning, when our and the enemy's wounded were started off for Richmond by a circuitous route lest they would fall in with the enemy if going by the most direct road.

When about a mile from the late scene of action the ambulances, under charge of surgeon Williams, of the 2d North Carolina Cavalry, were met by a column of troops. The driver of the advance ambulance, sharing in the elation of our victory, commenced to relate vociferously the events that had just transpired to the officer at the head of this column, supposing in the darkness that they were some of our own people. Dr. Williams coming up at this juncture, realizing from some cause, perhaps from pronunciation, as in the case just related, that he was in the presence of the enemy, remarked to the officer in command that he supposed that he and his train were captured. The officer asked him what command had done all this mischief. Dr. Williams discreetly replied that it was Hampton's Division. After a few remarks the officer dismissed Dr. Williams, telling him he did not wish to be encumbered with wounded, and thinking that he was doubtless in a very critical situation, marched no further in the direction of the camp-fires he had been seeking, but filed off by a left-hand road, making all possible haste to the Peninsula. This force was the 500 picked men, under Dahlgren, who had gone to the upper James, and being unable to cross, as was his first design, on account of continuous rains, was now seeking a junction with Kilpatrick, with a view of making a combined attack on Richmond at daylight next morning. The purpose of this paper is not to expand on the gallant Dahlgren and the tragic ending of his life next day-they are matters dilated upon at great length by both historians mentioned, when the causes that forced him into King and Queen county in such defenceless condition and that accomplished the failure of this dastardly enterprise, have been entirely ignored. But for Hampton and his little band of, shall I say, braves, Kilpatrick and Dahlgren would have combined their forces that night, and at dawn would have taken and burned the city, released the prisoners, and if all their designs were accomplished would have murdered the President and his cabinet. This was of easy accomplishment, because there were no troops in the city to defend it, and none could be gotten from Lee's army over the railroad the enemy had destroyed.

It is possible that these flourishing historians attribute the deliverance of the city to the cowardice of the enemy, because it would not sound grand to say that the capital of the Confederate States of America, and the capital of the great Commonwealth of Virginia, the mother of Presidents and generals, was saved from destruction by two hundred and fifty "Tar Heels," under a general who came

within one hundred miles of being one himself. Two hundred and fifty "Tar Heels" and only forty of them engaged, saved the city— oh, no! As the fellow who was dying said, I don't mind passing to to the realities of an unknown world; I contemplate that with the most perfect composure, but it does break my heart to think that I am dying and am summoned to the Great Bar from the butt of a blamed little goat. If this could have been the active force that guided the deliberation of these historians, they were more discriminating and less candid than the writers of proud, imperial Rome, who did not hesitate to give to the discordant honk of geese the credit of their city's deliverance.

N. P. FORD,

Captain Co. F., First N. C. Cavalry.

[From the N. Y. Sun, Feb. 28, 1897.]

DAVIS AND DAVIDSON.

A Chapter of War History Concerning Torpedoes.

The Correspondence that Passed Between Jefferson Davis and Captain Davidson in Relation to the Services of the Latter Officer.

A letter from Captain Hunter Davidson, formerly of the Confederate naval service, dated Villa Rica, Paraguay, December 14, 1896, places at the disposal of the Sun, a fragment of personal experience during the Civil War, which is also, in its way, a contribution of value to the literature relating to that period. It was originally published in the Buenos Ayres Herald, but will of course find an incomparably greater circle of readers in this country.

Captain Davidson entered the navy with Admiral Luce in 1841, and they were together at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, twenty years later, while their friendship was renewed after the Civil War. As to the correspondence with Jefferson Davis, it speaks for itself, although it should be added that Captain Davidson considers that Mr. Davis was somewhat prejudiced against the navy, and that he attributes the particular omission of mention which he discusses, to Mr. Davis' having been informed of his criticism of the latter's

prejudices, Mr. Davis' history thus ignoring events discussed in

many works on torpedoes.

BUENOS AYRES, December 5, 1881.

Hon. Jefferson Davis,

Sir, I write to ask that you will do an act of justice.

On pages 207-8, 2d vol. of your "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, you say: "This led to an order placing General G. P. Rains in charge of the submarine defences.

* * *

The secret of all his future success. * * * The torpedoes were made of the most ordinary material generally, as beer barrels fixed with conical heads. * * * Some were made of cast iron, copper, or tin, and glass demijohns were used. There were three essentials to success, viz: the sensitive fuse primer, a charge of sixty pounds of gunpowder, and actual contact between the torpedo and the bottom of the vessel."

You have thus gone into detail on the subject of torpedoes, and you continue at some length on the two following pages.

The inference to be drawn from reading your remarks on this subject, in days when you and I have passed away, and when it will be too late to correct errors, is that General Rains commanded the submarine defences of the South.

To him is due the success of this means of warfare. His "sensi

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tive fuse primer" was essential to success.

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As President, you could not be expected to know much of the details of torpedo operations during such a terrible war as that of our second revolution; but whatever may come from your pen will be received by the world as the highest authority, even upon torpedoes.

I know it is too late to correct, unless a second edition be published; but you can answer my letter, and my children will have it to read.

The facts of the case are briefly these, so far as I am personally concerned: In the summer of 1862 I relieved Commander M. F. Maury, in command of the submarine defences around Richmond, by written order of the Secretary of the Navy, the result of which was the organization of a department, the application of an electric battery of convenient size and sufficient strength to the explosion of submarine mines; the construction of a large number of wrought iron mines (at the Tredegar Works), holding 1,800 pounds of gunpowder, which were placed at a depth of seven fathoms; the importation of insulated cable to connect the mines and the electric batteries; the manufacture of the plantinum or quantity fuse, which alone

was used in the electrical defences around Richmond, and in those at Charleston.

The department was completely organized before the 1st of January, 1863, both in personnel and material, and occupied nine wellconstructed stations on the James River alone, connected by telegraph, and with the office of the Secretary of the Navy.

The effective work of this organization consisted in the partial destruction of the Commodore Barney, a gunboat, and the loss of many lives in August, 1863, and the complete destruction of the Commodore Jones, a large gunboat, and nearly all her crew in May, 1864.

These were the first vessels ever injured in war by any system of electrical defences.

In a long letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory, to me after the war, he says: 'The destruction of the Commodore Jones, the leading vessel of Admiral Lee's fleet, which was ascending the James river to co-operate with General Butler in the attack on Drewry's Bluff by causing the retirement of that fleet, undoubtedly saved Drewry's Bluff, the key of Richmond."

Again he says: "I always regarded the sub-marine department under your command as equal in importance to any division of the army."

About the same time I received the most flattering letters from General Robert E. Lee, Admiral Buchanan and others on the subject of my services in command of the submarine defences; and it is with painful surprise I find you have forgotten a long letter of the same nature written me by yourself, as you do not even allude to any act of mine in your work.

In March, 1864, I ran down the James river from Richmond to its mouth in a small steam launch, and attacked the flagship Minnesota with a "spar torpedo," doing her considerable injury, and returned to Richmond without the slightest loss of any kind.

This was the only instance during our war, and the first, of course, where the "spar torpedo" was used with effect and without the loss of the attacking party, and therefore the only instance to establish the efficiency of the method. On this occasion the Russian sulphuric acid, &c., fuse was used, the same that Captain Glassell used against the "ironsides."

I commanded the submarine defences as a regularly organized electrical system in all its details and requirements until near the end

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