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About sunset we descried in the distance a cloud of dust, evidently made by a part of the flying enemy. We spurred our horses to a furious gallop, and dashed down upon them. We soon found what they were some ten guns, I believe, encircling the black thirty-two pounder, called "Long Tom," which was to play such havoc with the Confederate ranks! The cannoneers and drivers made a desperate dash with their guns at Cub Run bridge, which was immediately in their front. But, crowding too rapidly on the bridge, it broke under the weight, and baggage-wagon, ambulance, caisson, and all fell through into the stream below, forming an impassable barrier, which blocked they way, and effectually prevented further passage. The cannoneers and drivers leaped from their guns and horses, and darted into the bushes on either side of the run, leaving everything an easy capture.


The temptation was too great for the average cavalryman, and Captain Davis himself, with most of his men, dismounted and commenced work on the tangled wreck. I myself was about to dismount, having an eye on a fine McClelland saddle which I wanted to secure, when Archie Smith, who was still at my side, turned to me and said: "Yonder goes the 'White Havelock,' Will!” “All right," I replied, and we dashed after Captain Scott, who was crossing the stream above the wreck and debris, waving to the men to follow him. About fifteen of Davis's men followed us, but most of them remained behind to work with the guns and secure horses, saddles, and other plunder. We joined Captain Scott on the other side of the run, and continued our wild ride faster than ever. We soon came to the foot of the hill upon which the little town of Centreville is situated. Crossing a small stream at the base, we rode rapidly up the slope, and on the crown of the hill came in immediate contact with a long, blue line of Federal infantry, drawn up in battle array. Riding up close to them, Captain Scott shouted, "Surrender!" For a few seconds they seemed to hesitate, but, hearing no sound of any advancing along the turnpike in our rear, an officer turned to his men and ordered them to fire. Our little band retreated at once, and dashed down the hill rather faster than we had come up, receiving as we went the whole fire of perhaps three hundred infantry. Not a man, however, was hurt, and we were soon out of sight, hidden by the shades of night.


I ascertained afterwards that the troops we encountered on the heights of Centreville were a brigade, under Colonel Miles, which had never been in the fight, but had been left to cover the retreat of the Federal army.

With reference to the capture of the artillery and spoil at Cuban Run bridge, the assertion that any command, except the Albemarle Troop, led by Captain Scott, had anything to do with it is without foundation. No other cavalry was in sight or hearing at the time, and had it not been for the headlong, furious charge of these sixty men, all these guns, undoubtedly, would have crossed the bridge in safety and been on their way to Washington long before any other command had reached the scene. To Captain Scott, therefore, and to him alone, the sole credit of the capture is due. The only part in the affair performed by Colonel Munford and his command was in manual labor, required in hauling the cannon out of the wreck, securing the horses, etc. Had the other cavalry leaders exhibited the same energy, daring, and enterprise which characterized Captain Scott, it is not at all improbable that the cavalry arm of the service alone might have ridden to Washington that night. But satisfied with what had been done, the army remained quiescent. * * *

W. F. R.


LYNCHBURG, VA., December 22, 1895.

To the Editor of the Dispatch:

Your last Sunday's [December 15] paper contained a brief communication from Colonel John Scott, of Fauquier, enclosing a long letter to the latter from "W. F. R.," dated "Greenville, August, 1895." This letter of W. F. R. seems to be in reply to one from Colonel Scott, soliciting W. F. R.'s opinion of my official report of the participation of my command at the First Battle of Manassas.

A reference to my report at page 534, of Series I, Volume II, of "The War of the Rebellion, Official Records," will show that I therein state that "I advanced and found that Major Scott, com

manding Captain Davis's Company, had proceeded to the bridge on Cub creek." There was no more gallant soldier or officer than Colonel Scott; and I neither there nor anywhere else during the war found any occasion to criticise him. But, as touching the contention raised by W. F. R., that no command, except the Albemarle Troop, led by Captain Scott, had anything to do with the capture of the artillery and spoil at Cub Run bridge, I am enabled to avoid the necessity, at all times unpleasant, of a laudatory mention of my own deeds, by introducing the following disinterested witnesses—namely, Colonel R. C. W. Radford, of the Thirtieth Virginia Cavalry, who on that day commanded the First Brigade, and Colonel John B. Kershaw, commanding the Second Regiment, South Carolina Volunteers. Colonel Radford's report will be found on page 532 of the same volume of "The War of the Rebellion, Official Records," to which I above referred. In that report he says:

"I have no hesitation in saying that the charge made by my own command, in connection with that made by the command under Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, composed of Captains W. H. Payne, Ball, Langhorne, and Hale, caused the jam at Cub creek bridge, which resulted in the capture of fourteen pieces of cannon, their ammunition and wagons, five forges, thirty wagons, and ambulances, and some forty or fifty horses. I base this opinion on the fact that we were in advance of all our forces, and by our charge the enemy were thrown into wild confusion before us, their vehicles of all sorts going off at full speed, and in the greatest disorder.”

Colonel Kershaw, in his report, at pages 524-522 of the same volume, says:

"Arrived at the house on the hill, which was occupied by the enemy as a hospital, having made many prisoners by the way, we found that a portion of our cavalry (Captains Wickham's and Radford's, and Powell's and Pitzer's), had had an engagement there with a battery of the enemy, which they had taken, but had retired after being fired on by the heavy reserve corps, which intervened between them and my command. This cavalry had come into the road by Lewis' Ford, below the stone bridge, and neither of us knew of the position of the other until some time after." *

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· Reluctantly, I ordered my command to return; but, directing Colonel Cash to remain, I went with a detachment of twenty volunteers from his regiment to the bridge, where I found LieutenantColonel Munford, with a portion of the Virginia cavalry, extricating

the valuable capture. They had arrived by the Sudley Ford road, having pursued the enemy from the battle-field, and came up to the bridge, when Captain Kemper ceased firing. Here I remained until 10 o'clock at night, aiding Colonel Munford, when I returned to camp."

I have ever deemed it an unseemly spectacle for the Southern survivors of the Confederate war to indulge in crimination and recrimination of one another, and shall content myself with the above response to the criticism of "Free Lance.”



[From the Daily Charlotte Observer, Nov 17, 1895.]


A Bit of Half-forgotten History.

The Story of a House which Deserters from Stoneman's Army Occupied and Fortified, and from which They Sallied forth and Ravaged the Surrounding Country-Four Lives Lost in the Effort

to Dislodge Them-The House Finally Fired and

Four of the Desperadoes Caught and Shot—
The Leader, However, Unfortunately
Escapes A Thrilling Recital.

Professor R. L. Flowers, of Trinity College, read before the last meeting of the Historical Society of that Institution a paper on Fort Hamby a piece of North Carolina post war history. A native of one of the counties scourged by the miscreants who made the name of Fort Hamby a terror in all the surrounding country, Professor Flowers is well qualified to write its history, and the Observer thanks him for his cheerful compliance with its request to furnish it for publication a copy of his paper. The story it tells so well is one of thrilling interest, and once begun, will be eagerly followed to the end.


In March, 1865, General Stoneman left East Tennessee, moving by the turnpike leading from Taylorsville, Tenn., through Watauga

county to Deep Gap, on the Blue Ridge. On the 26th of March he entered Boone, N. C., and on the 27th the column was divided, one division under General Stoneman marching towards Wilkesboro, while the other, under General Gillam, crossed the Blue Ridge at Blowing Rock and went to Patterson, in Caldwell county, and then joined Stoneman at Wilkesboro. Leaving Wilkesboro on the 31st, General Stoneman moved over into Surry county, going towards Mt. Airy. During the march through this section of the State, Stoneman's men committed many depredations, and after leaving Wilkesboro a number of the lawless element of his command deserted. Shortly after this a number of men, some deserters from Stoneman's command and other worthless characters, led by two desperate men, Wade and Simmons, completely terrorized a large portion of Wilkes county by their frequent raids.

In order to fully understand the situation, the condition of the country at that time must be taken into consideration. Almost every man fit for military service was in the army, and the country was almost completely at the mercy of the robbers. It was thought after Lee had surrendered and the soldiers were returning home that these depredations would be discontinued, but they were not.

These marauders were divided into two bands. One, led by Simmons, had its headquarters in the Brushy Mountains, and the other, led by Wade, had its headquarters near the Yadkin river, in Wilkes county. The bands at times operated together, but it is principally with Wade's band that this article is to deal. The house which Wade had chosen and fortified was situated near the road which leads from Wilkesboro to Lenoir, in Caldwell county, and about a mile from Holman's Ford, where the valley road crosses the Yadkin river. The house was situated on a high hill, commanding a fine view of the Yadkin valley, and of the valley road for a distance of a mile above and a mile below the ford. The house fronted the river on the south, while the rear was protected by the "Flat Woods" belt, in which there were sympathizers, if not aiders and abettors, of the band. From this position the Yadkin valley and the surrounding country for at least half a mile in every direction could be swept and controlled by Wade's guns. There is a legend that this point was chosen by Daniel Boone as a splendid military post to protect himself against the Indians. At any rate, it would have been almost impossible to have chosen a stronger location, both offensive and defensive, than this. The house was built of oak logs, and was two stories high. In the upper story Wade had

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