which time the head of the post-office department has been considered a regular member of the cabinet. During Washington's administrations there were only three principal departments-the state, treasury, and the war and navy. Since that period, Congress has increased the number of departments, commensurate with the necessities of the government. It was the practice of Washington to send for any one of the heads of the departments, to consult with, singly, about questions pertaining to their especial branch of the service; but it was not usual for him to consult with the whole of them assembled together. We have no evidence that he held what is, at the present day, styled cabinet meetings, though he occasionally assembled the three secretaries together as a council; but these consultations had not the formality nor the force common to the cabinet meetings at the present time. The secretaries of the departments were looked upon merely as assistants to the president; and they were held to be of very subordinate importance as compared to the position now accorded to those officials. Jefferson, who was a member of Washington's cabinet, was of opinion that neither branch of Congress had a right to call upon the heads of the departments for information or papers, except through the president. But this formality faded away; and the settled practice, for many years past, is to call upon them for information and papers, by a mere resolve of either branch of Congress; and a failure to comply would be considered an indignity.

During the first presidential terms, Congress occasionally requested the presence of the heads of the departments, to explain verbally some especial question; but

this custom has long since been abandoned; and all communication between the houses of Congress and the departments, is by correspondence. It was the practice of Washington and Adams, to deliver their messages in person to the two houses of Congress in joint session; but during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, in 1801, the rule was changed, on account of the inconvenience of assembling the two branches of Congress together in the same room. Since that date the president has never delivered his annual message in person.

Thus it was, step by step, that the executive department of the government drifted into the present mode of action. The House of Commons of the British parliament may pass a vote of a want of confidence in the heads of the departments of the government: when this takes place, the ministry resign, and the sovereign appoints another ministry, or heads of the departments, who are known to be of opinions in harmony with the majority in the House of Commons. This produces a change of government; and may take place every year, or oftener. There is no such proceeding known in the system of the United States' government. If Congress were to pass a vote of want of confidence in the president or his cabinet, in whole or in part, it would be an exercise of excessive authority; and, practically, in violation of the constitution. There are times when the president and his whole cabinet do not command the confidence of either branch of Congress; but there is no remedy for such a misfortune. Within six months after Mr. Tyler became president, in 1841, a vote of want of confidence could have been passed, almost

unanimously, by both houses of Congress; and, in fact, during the whole of his presidential term, neither the president or his cabinet had the confidence of either branch of Congress; hence the administrative term of Mr. Tyler has been vulgarly called a parenthesis in the governmental annals.

If Congress were resolved upon the removal of either of the heads of the departments, it could be done by enacting a law abolishing the office, and merging the duties into another; or by the establishment of a new organisation. In that case the president might re-nominate the objectionable man; but the senate could refuse to confirm the appointment; and then the president would have to continue nominating, until the senate agreed to the person proposed.

From the preceding facts, the reader will observe that "the cabinet" is unknown to the constitution and laws of the United States; that it is an informal meeting of the president and his secretaries; that the action of the meeting is not binding upon either of those present; and that the president can act in the administrative affairs of the government conformably to the opinions of his secretaries, or he can totally disregard them; and further, he can, if he wish, require the secretaries to conduct their respective departments according to his own directions: and if they should refuse, as was the case with Mr. Duane, in 1833, the president has only to say, "Your services, Mr. Secretary, are no further required by the government;" and the successor takes possession of the department immediately; or perhaps he may be the bearer of the dismissal letter of his predecessor.

CHAPTER X.

History of the Apportionment System for Representation in the House of Representatives.

HISTORY OF THE APPORTIONMENT SYSTEM.

THE representation of the people in the lower house of Congress, is, and has ever been, regarded with the most anxious sectional solicitude. In the confederation Congress, the representation was to consist of not less than two, nor more than seven, members from each state. All voting was done by states, each being equal to the other. We learn from Curtis on the Constitution, that when the articles of confederation were framed and adopted in Congress, a valuation of land, and the other property enumerated in the states, as the rule of proportion of taxation, was adopted instead of numbers of inhabitants, in consequence of the impossibility of harmonising the different ideas of the northern and southern states, as to the rate at which slaves should be counted; the northern states, of course, wishing to have them counted in a near ratio to the value of white labour; and the southern states wishing to diminish that ratio. If the slaves had been counted in full, the tax upon the southern states would have been very heavy compared with the ratio of whites. To reduce their taxes, the southern states opposed the counting of the slaves as the equals of white labour. Those

states would have preferred a numerical ratio, instead of a valuation of lands and other property, if they had been allowed to count the slave as but equal to half a white. But the eastern states were opposed to this rule of reduction; and if the slaves had been reckoned as equals to the whites, the taxes would have been less in the northern states. In 1783, when it was proposed to change the rule of proportion of taxation from land to numbers, the first compromise, suggested by a delegate from Connecticut, was to include only such slaves as were between the ages of sixteen and sixty. This was found to be impracticable, because, in many cases, the ages could not be established; though the proportion would have been satisfactory to the south, as the number under sixteen would have been about one-half of the 440,000 slaves then supposed to be in the south. It was finally agreed, on all sides, that instead of settling the proportion by ages, it would be better to fix it in absolute numbers, and that the rate should be three-fifths. The southern states agreed to the proposition, to pay into the national treasury a tax levied upon them according to the white population, and three-fifths of the slaves; that is to say, if Virginia had, as was supposed, 280,000 slaves, and 252,000 whites, Congress could have levied a tax upon the state for the 252,000 whites, and 168,000 of the slaves -being three-fifths of the 280,000. If the tax were one dollar per head, Virginia would have been debtor to the national government the sum of 420,000 dollars.

In 1781, Congress levied a tax upon the thirteen colonial states, amounting to 8,000,000 dollars, which was apportioned among the colonies; of which Pennsylvania