what the Revisers have made of it. The first verse is thus rendered: Being therefore justified by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." The indictive exouer, "we have," is changed to the subjunctive and hortative your "let us have," on the authority of the majority of MSS. and other ancient sources; yet against the opinions of far the greater number of modern critics. Lange and his Amer. editor are decidedly in favor of the common reading, while Olshausen and those before him take no notice of the variation. As Dr. Riddle (Lange in loc.) remarks: "The hortatory meaning is not in keeping with the context." This peace with God is evidently the effect of justification through Christ, not of our voluntary effort. There is evidently a predisposition throughout, on the part of the Revisers, to make everything respecting salvation conditional on the part of man; and a variation suiting this notion is pretty sure to be adopted into the text. They never grasp the deeper thought of Paul's Epistles, namely: that salvation is the object of belief, the very fact offered to the belief; nor that salvation is the effect of belief. Let us examine briefly the new version of Rom. viii, 19–23: "For the earnest expectation of the creation," etc. The Revisers are consistent in rendering the Gr. xrious by "crea tion" throughout the passage. But they have given a different, a contingent sense to the whole paragraph, by a slight modification in the connection of the 20th, and 21st, verses, thus: "For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of Him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered," etc. Here, a comma is placed before in midi, "in hope," which is then attached to the 21st, or following verse, instead of to the preceding. The common version of the 21st verse is positive, thus: "Because (ott) the creature (creation) itself, also, shall be delivered," etc. This word o'r is a causal as well as demonstrative conjunction. As will be seen, between the old and new versions, the positive Universalism of the whole passage is effectually obscured. Our own idea of the original cannot be better expressed than in the following: "For (yag) the creation was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but by (dia) him who subjected it in hope; for (or) the creation itself, also, shall be delivered," etc. The simple particle, dia, does not refer to the reason of subjecting it, but to him by whom it was done. The connective, ort, is often rendered "for" in the sense of because, and it is properly so rendered in this place. Allusion has been made before to 1 Cor. xv, but other points require brief notice. The Revisers translate the 20th verse as follows: "But now hath Christ been raised from the dead, the first fruits of them that are asleep," instead of "them that slept," of the Com. Version. But the Gr. tov xexonuevo, is a perfect participle, involving the notion of past time instead of the present. So the Syriac has "them that slept," and other versions generally. The revised translation suits the notion of a future general resurrection; but this is not Paul's doctrine. Again, the 26th verse: "The last enemy that shall be abolished (c. v. destroyed) is death." The Com. Version puts the words that and is in italics, as not being in the original, but supplied in translating. The Revisors give us no such intimations. There is not the slightest ground for the use of either, except the prevailing system of belief. The Gr. Text is : *Εσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος ; "The last enemy shall be abolished;-even death" or "The death." Death, here is personified, as the king of Hades.29 The verb here is declarative, with no subjunctive sense; thus Doddridge paraphrases the whole: "The very last enemy, (even) death, shall be deposed and destroyed." The term εozatos means "the last, the uttermost, leaving no other, nothing remaining. Here, too, the New Version, as well as the Old, accommodates the translation to the traditionary system of interpretation. But we have already exceeded the proper limits of the present paper, although another of the same length might 29 See Robinson Gr. Lex. N. T. Sub. fárato5, d. poetic, ò fάvatos, personified death, as the king of hades." well be occupied with criticisms of individual passages of the character just noticed. On the whole, then, while there is much, very much of the highest value in this New Version, it is, especially as a translation, of unequal merit. Had it not been for the influence of the current theological system, upon the minds of the Revisers, an influence which we are willing to believe was wholly unconscious on their part, there is but little doubt that, for accuracy, the Revised Version would have been tolerably satisfactory throughout; although in the matter of style, and other minor qualities, more or less complaint may justly be made. As it is, it cannot be regarded as the best possible translation, nor can Universalist critics regard it in any sense as a finality. ARTICLE XXVIII. Religion vs. Modern Doubt.: The Unknowable. THE philosophical basis of modern skepticism is what is termed in recent metaphysical thought, the doctrine of the unknowable. In its more modern form and application, this doctrine is first presented by Kant, and from him it was appropriated by Sir William Hamilton, in his Philosophy of the unconditioned. It is elaborately stated, and logically applied to theology by Dr. Mansel, in his work on the "Limits of Religious Thought," written professedly in the interest of religious and theological truth. Mr. Spencer makes it the foundation of his whole system of philosophy. He thus presents it in his "First Principles," which contains an elaborate statement of the axioms that underlie the whole superstructure. This doctrine has received much brief criticism, but we do not know of but four works in our whole literature which have attempted to present anything like a complete review and refutation of the doctrine, as held and applied by Kant, Hamilton, Mansel and Spencer. Calderwood, in his "Philosophy of the Infinite," presents an able, elaborate, and exhaustive review of the doctrine in its philosophical, ethical, theological and religious bearings. Cousin reviews and replies to it in his "Psychology." Dr. Young assails it from the standpoint of philosophy, morals and religion, in a small work on the "Finite and the Infinite ;" and Prof. Bowne, of the Boston University, in his criticism of the "Philosophy of Herbert Spencer" gives it a most scathing review and conclusive reply. Kant attributes to man the power of reason in two different relations; the one as speculative reason, the other as practical reason, and the principles of both are adopted and applied by the judgment. Speculative reason is conversant with what man can know; practical reason with what man ought to do. According to Kant, speculative reason does not give to man a knowledge of the Infinite God, but on the contrary, expressly involves the impossibility of such knowledge. On the other hand he asserts that the practical reason "gives to man the recognition of God as a necessary postulate of proper moral action." Reason therefore, according to Kant, both denies to man the possibility of any knowledge of God, and at the same time affords him a knowledge of God. On the one hand it expressly affirms the impossibility of any conception, and on the other, palms upon man a certain fiction under the name of a conception of the Infinite God. It is thus taught that the human reason contradicts itself, and therefore destroys its trustworthiness as a faculty for the investigation of truth. This view of human reason sweeps away the foundation of all truth, and makes all knowledge impossible; for if all our practical knowledge is a fiction, how can we trust our speculative knowledge, and if the practical reason deceives us, what confidence can we have in the speculative reason? It is thus evident that any philosophy of man's nature which destroys the rational basis of religion, destroys the rational basis of all truth, and makes knowledge impossible. If Kant is correct, the speculative and practical reason mutually cancel each other and the end is universal skepticism. Sir William Hamilton says we can have no knowledge of the Infinite. The reason he gives is, that that which we do not know perfectly, in all of its parts and relations, we do not know at all. If this be true, it is the end of all human knowledge; for there is nothing we know perfectly. No particle of matter, no grain of sand, nor drop of water, nor blade of grass, no insect, bird, fish or quadruped, is known by us perfectly, in all its parts and relations; so, according to Hamilton's philosophy, we do not know anything in any sense. He thus assumes without proof, that all mystery is ignorance, and not partial knowledge, which is a contradition; for that which we do not know has to us no existence, and cannot therefore be known as mysterious. But his position involves another contradiction. If all knowledge of the Infinite is impossible to us, then to us it does not exist, and how can we predicate any thing of a being of whom we have no knowledge? This would be an unthinkable proposition. To say that the Infinite can not be known, is to make a very positive affirmation of a being who, according to Hamilton's philosophy, has no existence to our thought, intelligence or reason. We have the word Infinite, and language is the expression of thought, and not the expression of the negation of thought. From whence did we derive the word without the thought, if language is the body of thought, and words are the blossoms that reveal the beauty and exhale the perfume of human thinking. Is language possible in the absence of thought, or thought possible in the absence af all knowledge? Is it possible to have thoughts of the Infinite, when all knowledge of the Infinite is impossible? We know, without comprehending the Infinite, or we know it as a fact without knowing it as a thought. The child knows the sun as a fact, but not as a thought. To know it as a thought he must comprehend all that is implied in the existence of the fact. This he cannot do! We know God's existence as a fact; but we do not com |