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to which so many other women had been forced to submit, the moment had come to give the weak that example of unconquerable firmness which he had so often demanded of others. But Julia was the daughter of Augustus. Could he call down, without the consent of Augustus, so terrible a scandal upon the first house of the empire, render its daughter infamous, and drive her into exile? Augustus, though he desired his daughter to be more prudent and serious, yet loved and protected her; above all he disliked dangerous scandal, and Julia dared to do whatever she wished, knowing herself invulnerable under his protection and his love.

To this hard and false situation Tiberius, fuming with rage, had to adjust himself. He lived in a separate apartment, keeping up with Julia only the relations necessary to save appearances, but he could not divorce her, much less publish her guilt. The situation grew still worse when political discontent began to use for its own ends the discord between Julia and Tiberius. Tiberius had many enemies among the nobility, especially among the young men of his own age; partly because his rapid, brilliant career had aroused much jealousy, partly because his conservative, traditionalist tendencies toward authority and militarism disturbed many of them. More and more among the nobility there was increasing the desire for a mild and easy-going government which should allow them to enjoy their privileges without hardship and which should not be too severe in imposing its duties upon them.

On the other hand Julia was most ambitious. Since, after the disagreements with Tiberius had broken out, she could no longer hope to be the powerful wife of the first person of the empire after Augustus, she sought compensation. Thus there formed about Julia a party which sought in every way to ruin the lofty position which Tiberius occupied in the state, by setting up against him Caius Cæsar, the son of Julia by Agrippa, whom Augustus had adopted and of whom he was very

fond. In 6 B.C., Caius Cæsar was only fourteen years old, but at that period an agitation was set on foot whereby, through a special privilege conceded to him by the senate, he was to be named consul for the year of Rome 754, when Caius should have reached twenty. This was a manœuver of the Julian party to attract popular attention to the youth, to prepare a rival for Tiberius in his quality as principal collaborator of Augustus, and to gain a hold upon the future head of the state.

The move was altogether very bold; for this nomination of a child consul contradicted all the fundamental principles of the Roman constitution, and it would probably have been fatal to the party which evolved it, had not the indignant rage of Tiberius assured its triumph. Tiberius opposed this law, which he took as an offense, and he wished Augustus to oppose it, and at the outset, Augustus did So. But then, either because Julia was able to bend him to her desires or because in the senate there was in truth a strong party which supported it out of hatred for Tiberius, Augustus at last yielded, seeking to placate Tiberius with other compensations. But Tiberius was too proud and violent an aristocrat to accept compensations and indignantly demanded permission to retire to Rhodes, abandoning all the public offices which he exercised. He certainly hoped to make his loss felt, for indeed Rome needed him. But he was mistaken. This act of Tiberius was severely judged by public opinion as a reprisal upon the public for a private offense. Augustus became angry with him. and in his absence all his enemies took courage and hurled themselves against him. The honors to Caius Cæsar were approved amid general enthusiasm and the Julian party triumphed all along the line; it reached the height of power and popularity, while Tiberius was constrained to content himself with the idle life of a private person at Rhodes.

But at Rome Livia still remained. From that moment began the mortal duel between Livia and Julia. (To be continued)

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Rear-Admiral, United States Navy (Retired). Author of "The Influence of Sea Power on History," etc.

[NLESS present expectation be greatly
NLESS present expectation des avo
events will have altered very materially
the territorial conditions which underlie
the capacity of the United States to exert
power at sea. Such changes on land in-
fluence materially the subsequent disposi-
tions of the Navy, enabling it to be more
effectively utilized. One of these events
will be the opening of the Panama Canal.
The other, already past, has been the war
with Spain, issuing in the independence of
Cuba from European control, and in the
territorial acquisitions of the United States
resulting from the war.

acquisitions have advanced the southern maritime frontier of this country from the Gulf coast to a line coincident with the south shore of Cuba, prolonged to Porto Rico; throwing into the second line the Gulf harbors, from Key West to the Mississippi. These are thus reduced to the order of purely defensive ports, instead of the primary rank of naval bases for offensive operations held by them twenty years ago, a change to which have contributed also the hydrographic difficulties of entrance and exit, consequent upon the greatly increased size of battleships. This new condition is summarized

From a military point of view, these in, and effected by, the cession of Guanta

namo as a naval base; provided, of course, that due measures are taken for the security of the base, so that ships may not be tied to the defense of a position the one value of which will be that the fleet can depend upon it for supplies and repairs, yet leave it for a measurable time to its own protection, sure of finding it and its resources safe upon return.


THE Occupation of the Canal Zone under conditions of complete sovereignty (with qualified exceptions in the cities of Colon and Panama) may be regarded accurately, from the military point of view, as a most helpful modification of our proper coast-line; making it, by the interposition of Guantanamo, practically continuous for a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It will be continuous, be

possessing throughout adequate points of support,-the one service which from the military point of view the land renders to the sea. To secure this condition, however, the Canal, like Guantanamo, must be fortified. There is unhappily much exaggerated talk on one side and the other as to the relative advantages of navies and fortifications for purposes of defense. Neither is secure without the other. As I have said, a fleet must be able to go away for a calculated time, with a reasonable prospect of finding its ports unsurprised, still its own, when it returns. The port must be able to spare the fleet for a similar period, confident that it can look out for itself till reinforced or supplied. The analogy is that of an army in campaign, which is crippled in movement if it has to garrison its bases as well as to carry on other necessary operations.

A number of eminent citizens, more actuated by a commendable desire for peace than instructed in military considerations, have lately put their names to a paper directed against the fortification of the Canal. In this they say, among other things, "with all the fortifications possible it is still apparent that . . . in time of war a guard of battle-ships at each of its entrances would be an absolute necessity, and equally apparent that with such a guard the fortifications would be unnecessary." I fear some naval officers, at home and abroad, dubbed in England the Blue

Water School, are partly responsible for this popular impression of the need of the constant presence of battle-ships. It is precisely in order that a constant guard of battle-ships may not be necessary that fortifications are requisite. Fortifications liberate a fleet for action, whenever elsewhere required; and, by preserving the Canal for use as a bridge between the two oceans, render unnecessary the maintenance of a big fleet in both.



THE maintenance of the Canal in effective operation is one of the large elements in the future development of Sea Power in the Pacific. No other nation has in the Canal the same interest of self-preservation that the United States has. Not only is this true as regards the Panama Canal, but no similar condition of dependence upon a canal exists anywhere else to near the same degree. The closest parallel is Suez, as compared with the Cape of Good Hope. Suez offers Great Britain an inside route to her great Australasian colonies, as well as to India; but the existence of the British Empire does not depend upon that route as vitally as the ability of our thickly settled Atlantic coast to come to the aid of the Pacific depends upon Panama, as compared with Magellan. This necessity is so urgent as to make the Canal, as before said, essentially a part of the coast-line of the United States.

The primary object of the Canal may have been commercial, or it may have been military. I doubt whether many of those conspicuous in its advocacy and inception analyzed to themselves which of these two obvious features was chief in their individual estimation. From either point of view, and from both, the opening of the Canal will conduce decisively to influence the development of Sea Power upon the Pacific. Its effect will be much the same as that of the construction of a new railroad judiciously planned, which opens out the new country through which it passes, or to which it leads, and thus not only renders it available to commerce, but by perpetual interaction of population and production increases both. More people, more wants; more people, more produc

tion. Both wants and production mean increased transportation.



THIS effect upon Sea Power of the Panama Canal will have two principal aspects; one civil, one military. The civil effect will be the more rapid peopling of the Pacific coasts of North and South America, with consequent necessary increase of commerce. The military effect will be the facility with. which the navy of the United States, and that of the government controlling Canada, can pass from one side to the other, in support of either coast as needed. I say somewhat generally, but advisedly, the government controlling Canada; for while Canada is a part of the British Empire, and therefore will receive the support of the British navy where its interests are concerned, and while Canada also, taken as a whole, is for the time present attached to the British connection, as the Thirteen Colonies were from 1732 to 1770, it is difficult, in view of current political discussions in Canada, especially those touching the question of support to the Empire, not to feel that the preponderant tone there does not in this respect reflect that of Australia, New Zealand, or even of South Africa. The strong opposition in the French provinces to the government proposals for the development of a Canadian navy, the apologetic defense of the measure by the Premier, himself a French Canadian, in which the assertion of Canadian independence of action is more conspicuous than that of devotion to Imperial interests, tend to prove a looseness of allegiance, which already simulates the independence of separation and may issue in it. Since these words were written, the inference contained in them receives support from the reported effect produced upon Imperialistic sentiment in Great Britain by the recent reciprocity agreement of Canada with the United States. short, there does not appear to be between Canada and Great Britain that strong dependence of mutual interest of defense, of which the British navy is the symbol and the instrument, and which binds together the other self-governing communities. I regret this, because I believe it the interest of the United States that Great Britain, by her relations to Canada, should be


strongly committed to the naval support of the North Pacific coasts. The ultimate issue will manifestly affect the question of Sea Power in the Pacific, according as it involves the British navy, or only a Canadian. Meantime, under present condi

tions, the opening of the Canal will bring the British navy six thousand miles nearer the Pacific coast of Canada.


THE greatest factor of Sea Power in any region is the distribution and numbers of the populations, and their characteristics, as permitting the formation and maintenance of stable and efficient governments. This stability and efficiency depend upon racial traits, the distinguishing element of which is not so much the economical efficiency of the individual citizen as his political capacity for sustained corporate action, action which, however marked by internal contentions, is in the main result homogeneous and organic. As a matter of modern history, so far, this capacity has been confined to nations of European civilization, with the recent exception of Japan. At times, it is true, great masses of men have for a period moved in unison, as by instinct, with an impetus that nothing for the moment could resist. The Huns, the Arabs, the Turks, are instances in point; but none would cite either the peoples or their governments as instances of political efficiency. At other times great personages have built up an immense sway upon their own personality alone; but the transiency of such is too proverbial for indication. The political aptitudes of the average citizen, steadied by tried political institutions, are the sole ground of ultimate national efficiency.

The most immediate, the foremost question of the Pacific, as affecting Sea Power, therefore, is the filling up of the now partly vacant regions, our own Pacific coast, with that of the British Empire in Canada and in Australasia, by a population. of European derivation. It is most desirable that such immigration should be from northern Europe, because there is found the stock temperamentally most consonant to the local institutions; but, from whencesoever coming, immigrants to all the regions named will find awaiting them settled forms of government, differ

ing from one another much in details and somewhat in ideals, but all derived ultimately from that which we call AngloSaxon, to which we who have inherited it are apt to attach peculiar value and virtue. Let us not forget that the roots can be traced to the old days when the Angles and the Saxons really dwelt on the east side of the North Sea, before they found a new home in England. Thus long continuity of existence, power of development, faculty to adapt themselves to many differing circumstances of environment, as well as to absorb and to assimilate alien elements, have given a proof of their excellence more decisive than the perhaps too partial estimate of those who live under them.

That the Panama Canal can affect the rapid peopling of the American Pacific coasts is as evident as it is to be desired. That a ship-load of immigrants can be carried through relatively quiet seas direct to the Pacific ports, without the tiresome and expensive transcontinental journey by rail, will be an inestimable contribution toward overcoming the problem of distribution and that of labor. It will disperse also the threatening question of Asiatic immigration to the northern Pacific coasts by filling up the ground, the only perfectly sound provision for the future. No European labor element thinks of emigrating to Asia, for the land there is already overcrowded. Were conditions reversed, Asiatic governments and working-men would feel the same objection as is now felt throughout the American Pacific to an abundant influx of laborers of wholly different traditions, who do not assimilate socially and cannot be assimilated politically. Here is no question of superiority or inferiority of race, the intrusion of which simply draws a misleading trail across the decisive reason, which is the fundamental distinctions of origin and of historical development. Already, although scarcely a month since the new treaty with Japan was confirmed, the attempt is again made thus to confuse the issue, if the quotation from a Japanese periodical is to be accepted. The question is one of age-long differences, proceeding from age-long separations, producing variations of ideas which do not

allow intermingling, and consequently, if admitted, are ominous of national weakness through flaws in homogeneity. The radical difference between the Oriental and the Occidental, which is constantly insisted upon, occasions incompatibility of close association in large numbers.


THE existing tendency of immigration to seek our Pacific coast is seen from the recent census, which shows that those States have progressed in population to a greater extent, proportionately, than most other parts of the country. While, however, such result is indicative of tendency, it must be remembered that ratio of increase does not prove corresponding absolute gain; fifty per cent. on one thousand only equals twenty-five on two thousand. The Pacific coast States are still scantily peopled. Thus Washington contains 17 persons to the square mile; Oregon, 7; California, 15; whereas New York has 191, and Ohio, 117.2 The result of such conditions, where no artificial obstacle intervenes, is seen in Hawaii. These islands geographically belong to the American continent, being distant from it only 2100 miles, whereas they are 3400 from Japan, the nearest part of Asia; yet a plurality of the population is Japanese, from an immigration which began only forty years ago. The political-international-result may not improbably be traced in the wellknown intimation of the Japanese government to that of the United States a dozen years ago that it could not see without concern the annexation of the islands. If the local needs which caused this condition had occurred after the opening of the Canal, the required labor could have been introduced from southern Europe, which is now furnishing an excellent element to Cuba. In such case Hawaii as a naval base would have received a reinforcement of military strength, in a surrounding population of European derivation and traditions.

The Hawaiian group is an outpost of the United States of first importance to the security of the Pacific coast; but its situation is one of peculiar exposure. During the eighteenth century, Great Britain.

1 The "Japanese American Commercial Weekly," quoted in the "New York Tribune," March 27, 1911. 2 Census of 1910. 3 As it is, there are over 15,000 Portuguese in the islands.


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