ments. For we may inquire, what, according to this scheme of Philosophy, are individual human persons? Wherefore do they exist? Whither do they go, "when they have played their brief part upon the stage," and "written their brief record upon the scroll of time?" Are individuals merely imperfect reproductions or manifestations of the genus Homo? And is the perfection of the race to consist in the eventual oneness of all in the perfect archetypal idea, in "the organic reproduction of the whole life and growth of the race?" Are they not simply phenomena, "transitory and perishing parts of the whole?" "Simple workmen engaged in chiseling and shaping the destiny of the generic man?"* Individuals? How are they "minished and brought low" by this Philosophy? How insignificant and worthless are they in comparison with the generic man? We wonder not that "History, which is the exhibition of the common generic nature of man, omits and rejects everything in the march and movement of human beings that is peculiar to them as selfish units; everything that has interest for man, but none for mankind; and inscribes upon her tablet only that which springs out of the common humanity. We wonder not that Mr. Bancroft represents the relative worth of individuals by comparing them to "the scoria that fly from the iron at the stroke of the artisan," "the clay which is rejected from the potter's wheel," and the "chips of marble that are thrown off by the chisel of the sculptor." [Tribune Edition.] Have they a destiny after death? And if they have, is it not lost or merged in the destiny of the race? If History ignores them as selfish units, will not God also ignore them at the last day? Tholuck has a criticism upon Strauss' Life of Jesus, the pertinence of which to the aspect of the subject now under consideration will be apparent to our readers. "As the Incarnation of God occurred not in an individual, but comes to pass only in the progress of the race, so the individual as a mere item of the race has fulfilled his destiny at the close of his earthly course, and the race alone is immortal. It is not we that enter a future world, the future world goes forward in this." "Humanity," says a writer in the London Quarterly of January, 1855, p. 53, referring to the opinions of Oken, Schelling, Hegel and others, " Humanity is a force in constant development; men are but the leaves which perish and are renewed, but humanity is the tree which ever

New York Evangelist, Jan. 4, 1855.

Bib. Sac., vol. xi, p. 347.

Princeton Theological Essays, 1st series, p. 679.

flourishes and perfects itself; as the tree cannot retrograde to the germ, neither can the various forms of the past state of man be reproduced. Progression to perfection is the watchword, destruction of the lingering monuments of the past, the means." And what, we next inquire, becomes of this generic man, when "a stop is put to human development," and "the time comes and the generation, and the single man exists in whom the entire exhibition closes ?" What is its condition in the eternal world of the future? If we judge of its destiny by that of the individuals of the race, and take the Bible for our guide respecting these, are we not compelled to the conclusion that Humanity, the Generic man, will be lost? If this is linked in the manner Prof. Shedd and Mr. Bancroft represent, with each and every individual, then if the individuals of the race perish under God's frown and curse, does not the genus Homo perish with them? If this is an "organic merit," "shaped and chiseled by the individual," and these busy workmen are themselves destitute of spiritual life and knowledge, totally depraved, how can we avoid the inference that it must be made and fashioned in the image of its makers'? And if they are destroyed, must not their work be destroyed with them? Or, may we believe with Strauss, "that impurity cleaves only to the individual, and in the race and its History, it is removed?"*

In order to avoid this dilemma, the Realistic Philosopher proposes a dogma, which, as we shall see, rather increases than lessens the confusion of ideas which his scheme has created. We are told that the Redemption by Christ has prime reference to the generic man.. Our Lord assumed not merely a "true body and a reasonable soul, but what is far more important and significant, Humanity, this Generic man itself. It was perfect in Adam as he came from his Maker's hand, comely

* Princeton Theological Essays, first series, p. 679.

In the earlier part of this Article we referred to the opinion of Anselm on this point. Neander, in his Church History, Vol. 4, p. 369, furnishes the following extract from his works. Qui non potest intelligere, aliquid esse hominem, nisi individuum, nulatenus intelliget, hominem assumptam esse a Verbo, non personam, id est aliam naturam, non aliam personam esse assumptam;" which Prof Toney thus renders: " for how can one (who is a nominalist) conceive a union of God with human nature? If there are no persons at all except human persons, the conception of human nature, of Humanity, is destitute of all reality." Dr. Schaff, in his work entitled, What is Church History? a vindication of the Idea of Historical development, p. 36, says, "Christ is not merely a single man among other men; he bears at the same time a universal character, as the Saviour of the world. Hence the Evangelist says, not, å doyos άνθρωπος έγενετο, which would denote merely a human individual, but σαρξ ἐγενετο, to show that he assumed humanity, or the general human nature."

and beautiful with the Divine image, full of spiritual life and power, but when Adam sinned and fell, it fell with him and became utterly depraved. The second Adam assumed it, imparting to it His Divine life, and redeemed it to God by His death. In the language of Prof. Schaff, "He became not a man, but man." Now if this is so, what are we to understand by the declaration that this generic humanity, which is solid with the substance of an actual being, exists distinct, though undivided, side by side in every human person? If the generic man is redeemed, and if individuals have any existence hereafter, does it not follow that they are all redeemed with it, and this in the same sense, i. e. effectually, actually through union to Christ? And are we not thus landed in simple Universalism? Or, if some individuals are actually driven from the presence of God in the judgment, what sort of persons are they thenceforth? Deprived of the common Humanity, what manner of men are they? But if this is inseparable from them, must we not deny the postulate of Prof. Shedd concerning the universality of the generic man, deny its unity, deny its organic wholeness, and yielding the dogma that Christ assumed the common humanity of the race, teach that He assumed only the common humanity of the elect, of the church? Indeed, does not Prof. Shedd distinctly affirm this to be his own view, notwithstanding the apparent contradiction it presents to his other statements? How else are we to understand the following avowals? "Had there been no fall of man, there would have been but one stream of History. The race would not have been broken apart. original unity of the race, so far as a common religious character and a common blessed destiny are concerned, is destroyed, and the two halves of our being, to borrow an illustration from the Platonic myth, are now and forever separated."*

*

* *

*

*

The

Again, look at this Philosophy in another aspect. What are its bearings on the great questions of moral agency, human responsibility, sin and holiness? Either the generic man forms and characterizes the individuals, or else the individuals give form and character to the generic man. While the latter in this alternative is manifestly necessary in order to the self-consistency of many of the statements of these addresses, the former is the natural result of the Philosophy which pervades them. Thus we are told that "the individual is but the nursling of Humanity:" and Prof. Shedd regards the mind of lu manity, with its vast stores of knowledge and its superior wis

Bib. Sac., vol. xi, p. 370.

dom, as the great Instructor and Inspirer of the individual. mind, and informs us that the person who will take lessons from the universal mind, will lodge in his own, "the highest intensity of mental life; the very purest and densest reason of the race."* If, as we said before, by Humanity was intended simply the common physical, mental, social, and moral qualities of the race, and if by the attainments and wisdom of the universal mind, were intended that truth which is reached (as Prof. Shedd expresses it) "by the successive and consentaneous endeavors of many individual minds, each making use of all the labors of its predecessors, and each taking up the standing problem where its predecessors had dropped it," if this was the meaning, we should see in such language only rhetorical modes of expressing universally recognized truths. We might object to it as adapted to mislead and confuse the unwary and trustful admirers of these gifted minds. We might object to it as a use of a terminology which is foreign to Christian truth, at least in the American church, and associated with speculations which cannot abide the tests of Revelation. We might object to it as out of place in labored, philosophical, and exact discourse. Still we should not differ in the doctrine itself which is taught. But when we take the definitions of these terms. which the discourses either formally give, or clearly imply, when we interpret them according to their avowed realistic signification, we confess our inability to comprehend them. The moment we attempt to literalize them, to impart distinct shape and form to them, we find ourselves in a "Transcendental mist," clouds and darkness are about us. If the generic man chisels and shapes the individual, and not the individual man the generic, if this wondrous wise and mighty subsistent "tries its power" upon, and moulds the character of the "selfish units," what part in the work have the individuals themselves? Are they passive recipients of the virtues or the vices of the generic man? are they intelligent, responsible moral agents? Does sin or holiness reside in the genus, or in the individual? Most assuredly the former is the responsible moral agent.

But we pause in this examination of modern Realism. It was our purpose to have shown more fully how completely the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ is abnegated by this scheme of Philosophy, and how sin and holiness are transcendentalized and transferred from the sphere of the individual to that of the universal man. We had also designed to unfold

*Bib. Sac., vol. xi, p. 364.

its bearings upon the doctrines of a Personal God eternally and necessarily independent of the creature, the Resurrection of the body, and the Immortality of the soul; and to trace its influence upon the interpretation of the Revealed Word of God. Our limits, however, do not allow the farther prosecution of our plan at present.

ART. III.—CONGREGATIONALISM: PAST, PRESENT, AND

FUTURE.

ABOUT two hundred and fifty years since, Virginia was settled by English Episcopalians. Thirteen years later, English Puritans found a home in New England. Not far from the same date, Dutch Presbyterians, and British Roman Catholics, took up their abode in the middle States. These four denominations had the start, in laying the foundations of society, and in shaping the future destinies of our country. The Baptists were not numerous enough, at that time, to form a single church, and the Methodists were not heard of in the world until more than a hundred years had passed away. Now, the number of Baptist churches is equal to the aggregate number of all the churches of the first four denominations named above; while the Methodists alone have, according to the census of 1850, twelve thousand four hundred and sixty-seven churches, or three thousand six hundred and seventy-five more than the Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Romanists united. If we take the number of communicants, the amount of church accommodation, the number of attendants on public worship, and the proportion of the community which is connected with the different denominations, the result would be somewhat different; but even then, it would be found that the Baptists and Methodists are far in advance of all other sects. Judging by these figures, we cannot avoid the conclusion, however humiliating to us, that-so far as numbers are concerned-the first have become last, and the last first.

But we have to do, at present, with the history of orthodox Congregationalism. Correcting the census returns where they are known to be erroneous, it will be found that there were, in 1850, not far from two thousand churches, of our denomina