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by being exciting and interesting, suggests a cause, and that thus, not by a "possible probability," but by a positive certainty we have objective reality.

Again, p. 31: "It is my belief that the idea of externality, that is, of objects numerically distinct from ourselves, is given to us spontaneously by the senses of touch and sight." "When I look upon a tree, I cannot divest myself of the instantaneous belief that the tree and myself are distinct existences." "Unless this knowledge were thus given to us by the constitution of our mind, I know not how we should ever arrive at it. That this view of the subject is correct, is, I think, evident from what we observe of the conduct of the young of all animals. The lamb or the calf, of a few hours old, seems by sight to have formed a distinct conception of externality, of qualities, of position, and of distances as it ever obtains." The fact that these two senses, with the others, give externality, we believe, but the reason given is very singular, and is only liable to the objection that it proves too much. As authority to show that it proves too much, we refer to the chapter on the acquired perceptions, in which the author teaches that the knowledge of "distance" at least is not given spontaneously to man, but is acquired by experience. This appeal to the phenomena exhibited by the young of animals would render any and all of the acquired perceptions impossible.

The knowledge of externality given by sight is discussed more fully on page 70. "Sight gives us a conception of an unknown cause of a known effect; it also teaches us that this cause is numerically distinct from ourselves, and assigns to it its position in space. The existence of this function of vision has frequently been denied, and it has been affirmed that until aided by touch, sight gives us no idea of externality, any more than smell or hearing." He then adds that the principal authority for the opinion, is the statement of Cheselden, who reports that the young man whom he couched for a cataract, thought at first that every object touched his eyes. It is new to us that this statement should have been used to prove that sight does not give externality, nor can we understand how it could be used for such an object. It has been used to prove that sight does not give accurate knowledge of distance or place, and we can see why it should be thus applied. In reply to this difficulty made by his own fancy, Dr. W. remarks that if he did think that the objects touched his eye, still, as Sir Wm. Hamilton has happily remarked, "they appeared external to the eye." Just as though the question of externality related to externality to the body or to any of its organs, or as though

the body itself were not external to the mind, or as though the question of contact with the eye or distance from the eye had anything to do with that of externality. It is sufficiently unfortunate for Dr. Wayland to have a confused conception of the question at issue, and then to have cited a use of Cheselden's experiments to which it was never applied. But to quote Sir Wm. Hamilton as taking any similar view of the matter, is quite unlucky, especially in view of the fact that in the very first sentence of the note of Sir Wm. Hamilton, to which Dr. Wayland refers, when he seems to quote his language, Sir William gives the very distinct and pregnant caution, "we must be careful, not like Reid and philosophers in general, to confound the perceptions of mere externality, outness and the knowledge we have of distance, through the eye. The former may be and probably is natural, while the latter in a great but unappreciable measure, is acquired. In the case of Cheselden * * * the patient, though he had little or no perception of distance, i. e. of the degree of externality, had still a perception of that externality absolutely." So far have we followed Dr. W. on Perception. If it were necessary, we might cite other examples to justify the conclusion that his Theory of Perception is confused, inconsistent, and not thoroughly rethought from the materials to which he had access, and of which he made abundant use.

Conception comes next; and a place is strangely assigned to t in a short section under Perception, while it is entirely separated from memory, and still more remotely from imagination, to both of which the power in the usual English sense of the term has a most intimate connection. If there be the representative or reproductive power in man, then the three-fold modification of the power in the form of Memory, Conception or Phantasy, and Imagination, requires that they should be considered together, and not that these so-called faculties should arbitrarily assert each their separate functions, without acknowledging their relation or their indebtedness to each other. Dr. Wayland does indeed recognize this relation, but he does not develop it. Nor do we see how he could, with such a vague and generic meaning of the word, and such a varied application of it as he allows himself in his chapter on the subject, which is, if possible, more confusing than that of Reid himself, and is rendered more confusing still, reproducing all his errors, by misapplying Sir William Hamilton's attempts to correct this vagueness. [See Notes to Hamilton's Reid, pp. 360, 366, 407.] Hamilton makes the distinction between imagining and conceiving, and adds, "the words concep

tion, concept, notion, should be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination." Dr. Wayland shows that he had noticed the distinction between imagination and image, on the one hand, and conception and concept on the other; and yet applies concept "to something of the nature of a picture," which is precisely that to which Hamilton says it ought not to be applied.

But it is an ungrateful task to follow Dr. Wayland through the several chapters of his volume. The topics are treated with unequal thoroughness and ability; in some instances with greater, in others with less, acuteness and method. Memory is, as we might expect, treated with great fullness, and abounds with valuable facts and practical suggestions. Abstraction is handled in the ordinary way of books of logic and psychology. Reasoning is very fully explained in the usual way of unfolding the syllogism, and as the Formal Treatises on Logic and of Evidence treat of it. But there is not in our view a very thorough discussion of either of these processes and their results. Abstraction, with all the processes which it involves, is set down as the act of the so-called abstracting faculty; and Reasoning, in all its forms to the Reason, another faculty; but the relation of the one to the other, and to the so-called judgment, is not exhibited. Nor is the dependence of all these functions of the intellect upon the speculative principles which make philosophy possible, scarcely so much as recognized. It is true the author is full upon the notions given by "original suggestion," and demonstrates, in the manner of Reid, the necessity of "first principles," to made reasoning possible; but he does not even seem to be aware, in the very extended elucidation of the syllogism which he gives us, that the grounds on which the syllogism rests have been stoutly assailed, and that it is of as much or greater consequence that the solidity of a foundation should be proved, as that the details of the superstructure should be explained. Surely, it is not too much to ask or to expect, in a text-book of higher instruction, that the nature of the reasoning processes, and its relation to the other powers and beliefs of the mind, should be fully set forth.

We take no exception to the principles of this work on religious grounds. The philosophy of the author is Theistic and Christian. The philosophical principles which he advances are eminently safe and sound; and his teachings on all those principles which lie at the foundation of Christian Theism and Christian Theology, are exposed to no objection, except the very material one that they are not eminently philosophical.

Indeed, of the meaning of the word philosophy, in its modern sense, and of its intimate relation to the most important interests of man, he seems to be profoundly unconscious. We miss, throughout the work, the interest and the excitement which comes from independent, earnest, and, therefore, fresh and original investigation. There is an interest in the homely and inconsistent Locke, because he strikes out so much vigorous thought, and aims to explain all our "ideas." Reid, too, grapples so boldly with the metaphysical giants of his time, and follows their intricate subtleties with so much acuteness and good nature, that we are always instructed and refreshed by his very uncommon "common sense." Even the diffuse and languid Stewart is often acute and felicitous. We cannot expect to find in a manual arranged as a text-book for instruction, these merits, or to derive from it these advantages; but we desire to see as much freshness as is compatible with the condensed, and the necessarily fragmentary character of such a work. Dr. Wayland's work is more systematic and complete in the selection and arrangement of his topics, and upon several of these topics it is fuller in matter than the works of Locke, Reid, or Stewart, or the annotated abridgments which have been made from either; but his work, with all these merits, is deficient in exactness of statement, in vigor of logic, in acuteness of discrimination, and earnestness of style.

The author of "Empirical Psychology" deserves great credit for the earnestness and zeal with which he has devoted himself to philosophical studies, for the patient industry with which he has sought to master the repulsive technicalities of the German systems, and for the enterprise he has shown in bringing out three considerable volumes of abstract discussion, before the public, which, to say the truth, has not been trained to receive with any special favor, philosophical treatises, when written in such a style. The work before us is the last of the three. It proposes to realize the same object, and to serve the same use, with that of Dr. Wayland. It is designed to be a text-book in Colleges and High Schools; to introduce the student to the arena of psychological and philosophical studies. But it is a very different book from Dr. Wayland's. The author neglects almost entirely the so-called facts or phenomena of the mind, and gives instead, an enumeration of its powers with their relations to each other, so that what we have is little else than a dry and abstruse synopsis, couched in a very unusual English style. Dr. Wayland's book, without containing too much matter, has too little form. Dr. Hickock's is nothing but form. It contains scarcely any matter at all. It deserves well of all philoso

phers, for the attempts at system and thoroughness which the author exhibits; even though these attempts in our judgment lead to untenable distinctions and to a formal and apparent, but not a natural and living system. As an introductory treatise, we do not see how it can be used at all. We should be appalled at the attempt to teach it to a class of young ladies, and expect them to understand, to remember, or to apply it. An introduction to such studies ought to lead the student gently from the concrete to the abstract, and enliven and smooth the way by intelligible and oft repeated illustrations. This book has scarcely an illustration from beginning to end. An introduction should be brief, but its brevity should be the consequence of a few thoughts amply expanded and presented under various forms, even at the expense of repetition. Dr. Hickock's book is brief, but it has the brevity of a summary of technical distinctions, or of a table of contents to a technical treatise which presupposes an acquaintance with many extended disquisitions written upon it, and can have no possible interest for one to whom the subject matter and the nomenclature are not entirely familiar. The distinctions in this book are doubtless quite familiar to Dr. Hickock, for he has pondered over them for years, and their meaning and the value of some of them are obvious enough to any one who has given some attention to what is called German metaphysics. But it is one thing for the teacher to see distinctions, and another for him to make these distinctions clear to the learner. Nor is it enough that they are clearly defined. They must also be made familiar-must be repeated so often, that they become the possession of the mind, and so illustrated that they can be applied to the concrete and real. We do not object to sharp distinctions, nor to technical phraseology, even in an introductory treatise. We believe that they are important and necessary. But distinctions which are not clearly followed up and made familiar to the mind, only bewilder and vex the learner. Or if here and there one can master and use them, it should ever be remembered that a technical phraseology which is vaguely used, "puffeth up" but does not "edify" the aspirant for philosophical knowledge.

We need no other example of the defects which we have noticed, than is furnished under Chapter I, in the Preliminary Remarks to the Section on the Intellect. The first sentence is, "The mind, as Intellect, is inclusive of the entire capacity for knowing, whether in direct perception, concluding in judg ments, or comprehending in universal principles." This is designed to be a definition of the Intellect, and yet it contains four words-" concluding," "judgments," "comprehending," and

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