ade, under the construction claimed, no one will deny. Nor will any one deny that such could never have been the Executive intention. But, argued the advocates of a literal construction of the language of the proclamation, the well-settled rules of law do not permit a court, in the interpretation of a statute or public instrument, to look beyond the words and language actually employed-to interpolate or import into the statute or instrument words which are not to be found there-or to seek for the intention elsewhere than in the very words which have been employed to convey it. It was urged that this rule, as established by the authori ties, was thus faithfully expressed by Lord Denman (in the case of Green vs. Wood, 7 Q. B., 178): "We are bound to give to the words of the legis lature all possible meaning which is consistent with the clear language used; but if we find language used which is incapable of a meaning, we cannot supply one. It is extremely probable that the alteration suggested would express what the legis lature meant, but we, looking at the word as judges, are no more justified to introduce that meaning, than we should be if we added any other provision."

This was appropriate to the case before the court; but here there is no language used which is incapable of a meaning, nor any occasion, in order to avoid the construction contended for, of supplying a meaning, not fairly deducible from all the language employed.

The rule is tersely and better expressed by Vattel, thus: "It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation." (Lib. 2, ch. 17, § 262.)

But better still by the Court of Appeals of New

York, in the case of Newell vs. The People, 3 Selden, 97: "Whether we are considering an agree. ment between parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If thus regarded, the words embody a defi nite meaning, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the meaning of the instrument; and neither courts nor legisla tures have the right to add to or take away from that meaning."

And again, in the case of McClusky vs. Cromwell, 1 Kern., 601: "It is beyond question the duty of courts in construing statutes to give effect to the intent of the law-making power, and seek for that intent in every legitimate way. But, in the construction both of statutes and contracts, the intent of the framers and parties is to be sought, first of all, in the words and language employed; and, IF THE WORDS ARE FREE FROM AMBIGUITY AND DOUBT, and EXPRESS PLAINLY, CLEARLY, and DISTINCTLY the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and when the words

have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture, in order to restrict or extend the meaning."

Thus it is perceived, where the words are not free from ambiguity and doubt, and do not express plainly, clearly, and distinctly, that which is known to be the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is occasion, and it is proper, to resort to other means of interpretation.

A proclamation which announces a belligerent blockade "pursuant to the law of nations," and then proceeds to exempt from capture vessels which shall attempt to violate it-having full knowledge of its existence—can hardly be said to be free from ambiguity. Indeed, it is not easy to perceive how an instrument could, in its terms, be more ambiguous, or more obviously require judicial interpretation, to give it any force or effect whatever.

The language required to be introduced into the proclamation, in order to free it from ambiguity and give it any salutary force, is this, "and without knowledge thereof," so that it shall read, "if, there fore, with a view to violate such blockade, and without knowledge thereof;" and this is not an interpolation of words expressing an idea not found in the instrument-because the proclamation expressly declares that the blockade is to be "pursu ant to the law of nations," and without these words, the blockade would be repugnant to the law of nations, while with them it would be entirely consonant with that law, so that the words are really no interpolation whatever. They but express the manifest idea and intent of the proclamation when announcing a belligerent blockade.

But, it was further argued by the advocates of the claimant's construction of the proclamation, that the addition of the words "and without knowledge thereof," would annul the force of the immediately previous words, "if with a view to violate such blockade," upon the idea that a vessel could not have a view to violate a blockade without knowledge of it. And why not? If a vessel approach a blockaded port with the view to enter, she approaches with a view to violate the blockade, whether she knows of the blockade or not. It is the entry which is the violation, and the approach with a view to enter is an approach with a view to violation. A criminal violation, which is a violation with knowledge, is one thing. An innocent violation, which is a violation without knowledge, is another and very different thing.

The treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain, contains the following stipulation:

"Whereas it frequently happens that vessels sail for a port or place belonging to an enemy, without knowing that the same is blockaded, it is agreed that every such vessel may be turned away from such port, but shall not be detained nor confiscated, unless after notice she shall again attempt to enter."

The neutral commerce of Great Britain, more than that of all other nations, was to be affected by the belligerent blockade about to be established; and it would almost seem as if the framer of the proclamation had this treaty before him, and inadvertently omitted the insertion of the italicized words.

The flag-officer of the Atlantic naval squadron of

the United States, in announcing, eleven days after the proclamation was issued, that the blockade ordered was effectively established, supplied the omitted words by declaring that "All vessels, passing the capes of Virginia, coming from a distance, and ignorant of the proclamation, will be warned off," &c.

Although immunity from capture was urged by claimants upon the literal construction of the Exe cutive proclamation as here stated, in many adjudi cated cases the question seems to have been judicially determined, upon more full discussion, in the case of The Empress, decided in the Federal court of New York, and The Revere, decided by the Federal court of Massachusetts, and in the case of The Admiral, decided in the Federal court of Pennsyl vania, and afterward on appeal by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Third Circuit.

The learned judge of the District Court of New York, in deciding the former of these cases, says: "But it is contended by the claimants, that there can be no actual or intended violation of the blockade by a neutral vessel, subjecting her to capture, whatever may be her knowledge of its existence, and whatever the moral turpitude of her acts, until after she has had official notice of the fact that the port visited is under blockade indorsed on her register; that the offence to which the penalty attaches can only be committed by an effort of the vessel to enter the port after such formal warning has been received by her.

1 Vide the cases of The Hiawatha, The Hallie Jackson, The Lynchburg, The Crenshaw, The Hannah M. Johnson, The General Green. MS. Decisions U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Y.