We flatter ourselves that it will shortly be in our power to communicate more important intelligence from that quarter. We are, with great respect, Sir, Your most obedient and humble servants, WM. ALLISON. ROB'T R. LIVINGSTON. Col. Alex. Hamilton. HAMILTON TO A COMMITTEE OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS. GENTLEMEN: HEAD QUARTERS, Morristown, April 5, 1777. Since my last I have had the pleasure of receiving your reply to my two favors of the 29th ultimo and 2d current. I am happy enough to be able to inform you, that my indisposition, which was the occasion of my brevity when I last wrote, is now removed. The opinion I advanced respecting the enemy's not moving before the beginning of May, seems to be shaken, though not entirely overthrown, by some present appearances. We have received information that they are embarking about three thousand men on board of transports, which are lying at the Hook, by way of Staten Island. This, it is conjectured, is with a view to the Delaware; and the supposition is confirmed, by the circumstance of a confederacy lately detected at Philadelphia, who, among other things, were endeavoring, by the temptation of fifty pounds, to engage persons as pilots up that river. The extreme difficulties they must labor under for want of forage, and the infinite hazard they must run by moving with a small body of about five thousand men, with an enemy in the rear, incapable of sparing any considerable body of troops to form a post behind, and be an asylum to them in case of accident,these circumstances will hardly allow me to think they will be daring enough to make the attempt at this time. But on the other hand, as they know we are in a progressive state as to numbers, and other matters of importance, and as they have no prospect of early reinforcement, and are in a state of uncertainty as to any, from the bustling aspect of European affairs, it is probable they may conceive a necessity of making a push at all risks. Perhaps, however, this embarkation is intended for some other purpose; to make a diversion, or execute some partisan exploit elsewhere. On the whole, I find it difficult to believe they are yet ready for any capital operation. As to your apprehensions of an attempt up the North river, I imagine you may discard any uneasiness on that score, although it will be at all times advisable to be on the watch against such a contingency. It is almost reduced to a certainty, that the principal views of the enemy, in the ensuing campaign, will be directed towards the southward, and to Philadelphia more immediately; of which idea, the discovery before mentioned, with respect to pilots, is no inconsiderable confirmation. Philadelphia is an object calculated to strike and attract their attention. It has all along been the main source of supplies towards the war; and the getting it into their possession, would deprive us of a wheel we could very badly spare, in the great political and military machine. They are sensible of this, and are equally sensible, that it contains, in itself, and is surrounded by, a prodigious number of persons attached to them, and inimical to us, who would lend them all the assistance they could, in the further prosecution of their designs. It is also a common and wellgrounded rule in war, to strike first and principally, at the capital towns and cities, in order to the conquest of a country. I must confess I do not see any object equally interesting to draw their efforts to the northward. Operations merely for plundering and devastation can never answer their end; and if they could, one part of the continent would do nearly as well as another. And as to the notion of forming a junction with the northern army, and cutting off the communication between the northern and southern States, I apprehend it will do better in speculation than in practice. Unless the geography of the coun try is far different from any thing I can conceive, to effect this would require a chain of posts, and such a number of men at each, as would never be practicable or maintainable, but to an immense army. In their progress, by hanging upon their rear, and seizing every opportunity of skirmishing, their situation might be rendered insupportably uneasy. But for fear of mistake, the General has determined to collect a considerable body of troops at or about Peekskill, which will not be drawn off till the intentions of the enemy have acquired a decisive complexion. These will be ready, according to conjunctures, either to proceed northerly or southerly, as may be requisite. Every precaution should be taken to prevent the boats from being destroyed, by collecting them, at the first movement of the enemy, under cover of one of the forts, or into some inlet, difficult of access, and easily defensible with a small number of men. The loss of them would be an irreparable disadvantage. The enemy's attempt upon Peekskill is a demonstration of the folly of having any quantity of stores at places so near the water, and so much exposed to a sudden inroad. There should never be more there than sufficient to answer present demands. We have lost a good deal in this way at different times, and I hope experience will at last make us wiser. His Excellency lately had a visit from the Oneida Chief and five others. He managed them with a good deal of address, and sent them away perfectly satisfied. He persuaded them to go to Philadelphia, but they declined it, alleging their impatience to return, and remove the erroneous opinions of their countrymen, from the misrepresentations of British emissaries, which they were apprehensive might draw them into some rash proceedings. They parted, after having made the most solemn protestations of friendship and good will. His Excellency has been very busy all day in dispatching the southern post, which has prevented me giving him your resolve. It will, no doubt, be very acceptable; and it is with pleasure I inform you, that the zeal and abilities of the New-York Convention hold the first rank in his estimation. No news from France, save that the Congress have obtained a credit there, for which they can draw bills to the amount of £100,000 sterling. This will be extremely serviceable in carrying on a trade with the French. The new troops begin to come in. If we can shortly get any considerable accession of strength, we may be able to strike some brilliant stroke. I am, Gentlemen, with the greatest respect, Your most obedient servant, A. HAMILTON. P. S. We have been some time endeavoring to negotiate a regular cartel; but it has been lately broken off, principally on account of Major General Lee. General Howe will not allow him to be comprehended under the general idea of American prisoners. THE COMMITTEE OF CONVENTION TO HAMILTON. KINGSTON, 8th April, 1777. SIR: this day, and gave us The smallness of our Yours of the third came safe to hand great pleasure by certifying your health. numbers will not permit the loss of one useful citizen. It is, therefore, a determined point, that, sick or well, you are by no means to die. At this distance, it is impossible to determine what the enemy can, or what they cannot, do. But, certainly, if we can bring a respectable force into the field previous to their movements, it must be extremely difficult for them to advance or retreat. The latter, indeed, may be assisted by the works they are throwing up. Their attempt upon the Delaware is far from improbable. Howe is certainly a stupid fellow: but if he reasons so far, the taking of Philadelphia would give a splendid sight to their ma nœuvres in the eyes of Europe. This would be productive of advantage. The seizing that large city, would also afford him much benefit in the several ways which you suggest. But would it not be wise to permit his force to be thus divided, that one part after another might be cut to pieces? Since the affair at Peekskill, their views this way seem to be less probable. It was, doubtless, unmilitary to warn us of our danger. They will also soon learn that we are in this quarter, in a decent posture of defence; and that may decide their fluctuating councils. Perhaps, after all, they will find it more convenient to keep post at Amboy, with an advanced party at Brunswick, secure New-York, and carry on a kind of naval partisan war, till the further aid and order of their masters. You will take care, whenever you write to us matters which ought not to be seen by all, to direct to one of us only in a separate letter: while that which is merely indifferent, comes under your usual direction. The reason is, that sometimes, when we do not happen to be immediately in the way, your letters are opened by the President; and although no evil consequences have accrued from this as yet, it is nevertheless proper to guard against it. What you say relative to a cartel, reminds us of the case of Major Edminston, who was taken by General Schuyler at the same time with Sir John Johnson. This gentleman, as His Excellency will recollect, was sent into the enemy's quarters, with a letter to negotiate an exchange for one of three Majors, prisoners in their hands. He hath since returned, with a letter from Howe to General Schuyler, purporting that one of those Majors shall be exchanged for him, he being permitted to join his regiment in Canada. He was three weeks, or thereabouts, travelling from New-York to Albany; of which the Convention being informed, caused him to be made prisoner, and intend sending him to Head Quarters. He is well acquainted with the face of this country, and the disposition of its several inhabitants. He has sufficient interest with the Indians to accomplish an escape. Upon the whole (as it will not be prudent to confine him within |