me for suggesting that, if papers like yours, which heretofore have persistently garbled and misrepresented what I have said, will now fully and fairly place it before their readers, there can be no further misunderstanding.”

Nevertheless, he was a careful observer of political events, as shown by his letters to Congressmen Kellogg and Washburne of Illinois. To the former, after the convening of Congress in December, 1860, he wrote:

"Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery. The tug has to come, and better

now than later".

To Washburne he said:

"Prevent, as far as possible, any of our friends from demoralizing themselves and our cause by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort on 'slavery extension.' There is no possible compromise upon it but which puts us under again, and leaves all our work to do over again. On that point hold firm as with a chain of steel."

There is nothing in his correspondence, during this period, more pregnant with meaning than his letter to the Hon. John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, well known as a conservative Southern man and Unionist, who had been mentioned as a possible member of Lincoln's first cabinet. To Gilmer, who had evidently written him in the spirit of some of the correspondents already referred to, Lincoln replied at considerable length. The following extracts are the most significant :

"I am greatly disinclined to write a letter on the subject embraced in yours; and I would not do so, even privately as I do, were it not that I fear that you might misconstrue my silence. Is it desired I shall shift the ground upon which I have been elected? I cannot do it. You need only to acquaint yourself with that ground and press it on the attention of the South. It is all in print and easy of access. May I be pardoned if I ask whether even you have ever attempted to procure the reading of the Republican platform, or my speeches, by the Southern people? If not, what reason have I to expect that any additional production of mine would meet a better fate? It would make me appear as if I repented the crime of having been elected, and was anxious to apologize and beg forgiveness. On the Territorial question I am inflexible.

On that there is a difference between you and us; and it is the only substantial difference. You think slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted."

There could be no clearer statement of the relative positions of Lincoln and his opponents, on the day of his inauguration, than this quotation. In his inaugural he defined the issue between the respective sections of the Union in almost identically the same terms; and, as a further negative definition of his policy, he said: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so"-which was a literal quotation from his first debate with Douglas at Ottawa in 1858. His attitude then was precisely what it had been from the organization of the Republican party; and that was entirely consistent with the views he had repeatedly expressed from the day he protested against the pro-slavery resolution adopted by the Illinois Legislature in 1837.

The beginning of the war, following closely upon the inauguration, forced upon Lincoln, as it forced upon the country, the recognition of a condition of affairs totally unprecedented in the nation's history. As he had previously endured every species of misrepresentation, calumny and detraction from his enemies without complaint, so now he was subjected to criticism and censure from those who had been his friends, but were impatient to have their favorite policy of emancipation adopted. Yet it was as true then that he had "an oath registered in heaven

to

preserve, protect and defend the Constitution," as it was on the day he was inaugurated; and, as he rightly construed. the Constitution, that protected the rights of the States until they were forfeited by acts of their citizens or compelled to give way before the higher obligation to preserve the Government and maintain the Union. Of the time when this step should become necessary-if at all-he was the judge; and, while it was no doubt painful for him to differ with the friends of freedom by overruling the emancipation proclamation of Fremont and the order of Gen. Hunter, he assumed the responsibility with the same courage

with which he had, at the outbreak of the war, dared to resist the scheme of secession. That he desired that "all men should be free" had been proved by his oft-repeated assertion to that effect; but he also believed "gradual, and not sudden, emancipation better for all”—for master as well as for slave for Government as well as for people-and he advocated the policy of allowing compensation for the value of liberated slaves as a matter of economy no less than of right to loyal slave owners. When, early in the second year of the war, the acts abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia and prohibiting it in all the Territories had been passed in succession and met his prompt approval, he made his last earnest appeal to the Congressmen from the border slave States in behalf of his favorite policy of compensated emancipation, but without effect. Had the South been wise enough to accept that policy, it would have saved hundreds of millions of treasure and hundreds of thousands of lives; besides this, the reconciliation of the warring sections and their recovery from the ravages of hostilities would have been most speedy. The Southern people were too much blinded by prejudice and passion to give the subject a moment's consideration, and thus they invited their own undoing.

It was at this time that Lincoln began to turn his attention seriously to the policy of emancipation in those portions of the rebel States which persisted in their resistance to Federal authority. On the 13th of July, 1862, he opened up the subject to Secretary Welles and Secretary Seward, and on the 22nd-three days after his last futile conference with the Congressmen from the border States-he brought the matter before the whole cabinet. Accepting the advice of Secretary Seward, who argued that the step at that time would be premature, he consented to postpone action until some success had been won in the field. The battle of Antietam furnished the occasion for which he had been waiting. Lincoln completed the second draft of his preliminary

proclamation, of which he had prepared the first in July, submitted it to the cabinet on Saturday, September 20-three days after the battle-revised it on Sunday morning, added two verbal changes suggested by Secretary Seward; it received the official signature on Monday following, and was given to the world. The step was taken without consultation with the cabinet, but avowedly and explicitly on the responsibility of the President himself, and, as he declared in the final proclamation in January following, “as an act of justice warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity." The diaries of members of the cabinet show that, at most, only two of the members of that body distinctly approved the measure as to time and manner, and one (Postmaster-General Blair), who objected on the grounds of political expediency, asked and obtained permission to file a protest with the document. One of Lincoln's most sturdy and sagacious friends, Secretary Gideon Welles, who was acquainted with every step taken by the administration, and whose Spartan firmness saved the Government from many a blunder, says of the proclamation:

"It was his (Lincoln's) own act, a bold step, an executive measure originating with him, and was, as stated in the memorable appeal at the close of the final proclamation, invoking for it the considerate judgment of mankind, warranted alone by military necessity. Results have proved that there was in the measure profound thought, statesmanship, courage and far-seeing sagacity--consummate executive and administrative ability, which was, after some reverses, crowned with success. The nation emerging from gloom and disaster, and the whole civilized world, united in awarding honor and gratitude to the illustrious man who had the mind to conceive and the courage and firmness to decree the emancipation of a race."

And yet there are those who profess to believe that, in taking this step, Lincoln acted with unjustifiable hesitation and reluctance. That the duty imposed upon him was unexpected and undesired is no doubt true, as the war which made it a necessity was undesired. How little of agreement there was among pronounced Union men in Congress, during the first year of the war, in reference to the manner of dealing with slaves and the question of slavery in the

rebellious States, is shown by the fact that a bill freeing the slaves of rebel masters failed in the House of Representatives in the last days of May, 1862, though a measure going even farther than this became a law, with the President's approval, on the 17th of July following. Thus it appears that Congress, no less than the administration, was "at sea" on this question, though progressing towards the final haven. What wonder, then, that the President, who was compelled to bear upon his shoulders the entire responsibility of his policy, should hesitate to take the most momentous step of his administration, when it was doubtful, not merely whether that step would be approved by the people -which was essential to the success of the Union cause— but whether it would be sustained by a Union Congress? The responsibility resting upon him, as Commander-inChief of the army and navy in such an emergency, was infinitely greater, and the task confronting him more difficult and delicate than that which any legislator was called upon to face. Even the Cabinet was not free from dissension, as proven by the secret history of that body coming to light in later years.

It is true that, in a conference held with advocates of immediate emancipation during the summer of 1862—notably with the Chicago clergymen on the 13th of September -Lincoln suggested arguments which implied opposition to the measure, as he also did in his famous letter to Horace Greeley, of August 22nd of that year, when he declared:

"My paramount cbject in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union."

In conclusion he impressively added:

"I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."

This undoubtedly expressed his whole creed, so far as

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