Chapter XVI

IN THE WHITE HOUSE

INCOLN'S First Inaugural, notwithstanding the deep current of love for all mankind, whatever their differences, was no more than a feather on the tornado of passion that was sweeping over the country. Neither its frank intimacy nor its lofty idealism found lodgment in the minds of those who were already in arms against the Union. Its sanity awoke no echo in the hearts of the radical wing of the Republican Party, and its declaration expressing determination to maintain inviolate the rights of the states fell short of the desires of even the most conservative of the masses north of Mason and Dixon's Line.

His Cabinet to which he had brought such men as Seward, Chase, Cameron, Blair, Bates and Smith, had in its membership three Republicans and four Democrats. Only by wise and judicious appeal to their predominating virtues had he induced Seward and Chase to become members of one political family. Both had been ambitious for the office he held, and neither could comprehend the state of the public mind which had chosen him to represent it in their stead. He had given the portfolio of State to Seward and he had accepted it. Chase, when tendered the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, felt his pride rise at being tendered a secondary post by his old political rival, and only Lincoln's direct appeal to his

patriotism and sense of duty in a situation that called for the sacrifice of self upon the altar of the Union, had induced him to agree to serve. Even after Lincoln's arrival in Washington and before he had been inaugurated, a situation arose which threatened to break the slate Lincoln had prepared with so much sleepless anxiety. Seward's friends waited on Mr. Lincoln and urged him to withhold the appointment of Chase. This he declined to do. The delegation gloweringly retired. A little later Seward sent a brief and coldly formal note in which he asked "leave to withdraw" the acceptance of his appointment. Such a crisis on the eve of his administration might have caused a stronger man than Lincoln was supposed to be, to change his plans. But the great heart of Lincoln, bound up in his country's honor and his country's peril, counselled him wisely. Pondering over the situation for two days, he handed his answer to his Private Secretary, on the morning of his inauguration, with his homely smile and, “I can't afford to let Seward take the first trick."

The note was brief as that of Seward. Without touching upon the questions at issue, the message expressed a keen desire that Seward should not persist in his purpose. “It is the subject of the most painful solicitude to me," wrote Mr. Lincoln, "and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction. Please consider and answer by nine o'clock A. M. tomorrow."

Unable to withstand such a direct appeal to his higher sense of duty, Seward reconsidered his decision and the next day the cabinet appointments, as originally composed, were submitted to the Senate, "And," flashes Rothschild, “Seward's name, like Abou Ben Adhem's, led all the rest.

It is impossible to conceive at this time with a solidified Union, the disorganized state of the government when Lincoln was suddenly thrust into the heart of things and given the task of bringing order out of chaos. Sumter was besieged. For months the sympathizers with the resolve of the South to secede had been stripping the government arsenals of arms and munitions. Soldiers trained at Annapolis and West Point had retired and cast their lots with the new Confederacy. The treasury was bankrupt. Many of the Senators and Members of the House were disloyal. There was practically no standing army. Officers of the Army and Navy, resigning from the service in large numbers, turned their swords against the Government; treason paralyzed every department at Washington; civil government buildings, forts, arsenals, lighthouses, ships, marine hospitals, and navy yards had been seized by the rapidly organized Confederacy. Demoralization North, and impudent assumption of authority South, offered hardly a point of vantage for the new administration to lay hold upon. Proclaimed enemies to the Union gave to the President less anxious hours than the fearful and distracting elements in his own party. Even the Members of his Cabinet looked askance at the tall ungainly stranger from the Illinois prairies, as yet untried in the complicated duties of administration. Seward patronized him from the first. He considered himself far more capable of conducting the affairs of the Government than his Chief. He could not believe that one with the limited experience in public affairs, such as he knew Lincoln to have had could manage so tremendous a machine, already racked almost to demolition. Before a month went by, Seward had determined to win the consent of Lincoln to surrender his authority, and to permit him to pilot the Ship of State. He wrote to his wife,

"I have assumed a sort of dictatorship for defense; I am laboring night and day, with cities and with states. My hope, rather my confidence, is unabated."

Seward's activities were such that the opinion gained ground everywhere that Seward, not Lincoln, was the real President. Mrs. Lincoln, ever vigilant for her husband's honor, repeated to him the boast of the Secretary's friends that Seward was the power behind the throne and could rule the President as he willed. Lincoln answered her, "I may not rule myself, but certainly Seward shall not. The only ruler I have is my conscience-following God in it—and these men will have to learn that yet."

Meanwhile the Confederacy gained headway. Evacuation of Fort Sumter seemed inevitable. Major Anderson reported that his provisions were almost exhausted, that the batteries about the fort had grown so formidable and the post was, in many essentials, so weak, that it became daily less tenable. In a few weeks the garrison would be reduced to starvation. Not less than twenty thousand well diciplined men would be required to succor his decimated command. No such force appearing, Lieutenant General Scott, the Commander-inChief, advised the President to order evacuation. Lincoln stood firm. In his Inaugural Address he had declared that "The power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government." Should he be foresworn at the first threat of danger? He ordered General Scott to hold on. This brought protests from all the Members of his Cabinet except one, Postmaster General Blair, a Democrat of the Jacksonian school. Seward and Chase were both emphatic in their stand to give up the Fort. Still Lincoln refused to order a retreat.

Lincoln kept his own council, studied the maps, was inde

fatigable in his interviews with army men, listened to the advice of his Cabinet, gave every suggestion serious consideration, once in a while relieved the intensity of his feelings by a pat story, but surrendered no jot or tittle of his authority. Yet, because he did give courteous attention to their suggestions, because he did not openly proclaim his own slowly forming opinions, because he was a big man, big enough to bear his burdens in silence and deal kindly and generously with those who took little care to hide their feelings of superiority, because he did not attempt what he could not perform, but held judgment in abeyance until the hour should be ripe for action, they made false measures of his stature, discounted his powers, doubted his firmness and thought themselves the heroes of the hour.

Then pondering long on his superiority to the President and impatient with the times, no doubt urged by his followers, Seward at last determined to declare openly to the President his entire disapproval of the President's conduct of affairs. In "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," dated April 1, 1861, he declared:

"First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

"Second. This, however, is not culpable, and we must CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION or DISUNION.

"In other words, from what would be regarded as a Party question, to one of Patriotism or Union.

"The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a Party question is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free states, and even by the Union men in the South.