of the man who lay behind his woodpile to watch for a skunk. In place of the expected one, seven appeared. He fired, and killed one, but it " raised such a stink he decided to let the other six go."

As the winter wore on the dissatisfaction with McClellan increased. The President tried in vain to get him to move. He had all sorts of excuses. He saw always the Confederate, advantages and his own disadvantages, never the reverse. R. E. Fenton tells how he and Schuyler Colfax called on the President, December 18, and Lincoln said that sky and earth seemed to beckon the, army on, but that he supposed General McClellan knew his business and had his reasons for disregarding these hints of Providence. He advised Congress to take a recess for a few weeks, and then if McClellan had not moved, Providence would have stepped in and said it was impossible. That was true. Bad weather came and offered another excuse, for, as Lincoln said, McClellan believed the rain fell only on the just. The general also, like nearly everybody else, had a notion of finishing the war in one battle, for which he wished to get elaborately ready. That the real nature of the task was in no way understood so early is hinted by General Burnside's answer to a question by Colonel McClure, who asked why McClellan didn't move on Richmond. General Burnside said that it

would not be a difficult task for McClellan's army to capture Manassas, march upon Richmond, and enter that capital, "but," he added, emphatically, as if naming a conclusive objection, "it would cost ten thousand men to do it." McClellan's fear, however, was not of the great loss, but of defeat. He had the most exaggerated idea of the strength of the armies opposed to him. Lincoln bitterly said that if the commander had no use for his army, he would like to "borrow" it. "If McClellan can't fish," he observed, "he ought to cut bait at a time like this." Finally, he positively ordered a forward movement not later than February 22, which was to be made on a plan approved by him and some of his generals, and opposed by McClellan, who had one of his own; and the result was that McClellan had his way. The general opinion is that Lincoln showed remarkable intelligence in grasping the art of war on short notice, and that in his differences with some of his generals he was usually right on purely strategic matters, and always right on political grounds. There are some who think he interfered in too much detail, but they are few. His differences with McClellan on the purely military advantages of opposite plans are of interest mainly to military men. Some conclusions they reach about the President's character are: that he put an immense value on the safety of

his capital; that he was able to see very clearly all kinds of military arguments; and that he felt the one absolutely certain thing was that indefinite delay wearied the North and gained nothing. McClellan would not move, however, and on March 9 came the news that the Confederates had retired from their position on the Potomac, feeling unable to hold it. This proof of the needlessness of McClellan's caution enraged the North. Lincoln removed him from the command of the armies of the United States March 11, after the general had personally taken the field on hearing of the Confederate retreat. He retained command of the Army of the Potomac. For a time Stanton was practically the Commander-in-Chief, and a very bad one he is agreed to have been. Just as McClellan was about finally to meet the enemy, he heard that Lincoln, believing that Washington was unsafe, had retained for the defence of the capital a corps under McDowell which had been promised to McClellan for a particular purpose in the campaign. The excuse for the President's action is that McClellan had failed to carry out his agreement to leave Washington properly protected, and opinion is divided on the question of whether the President's act was justifiable. McClellan continued his tactics. May 3 the Confederates again withdrew just