"But Burnside is the better house-keeper."

"Mr. President, you are not in search of a house-keeper or a hospital steward, but of a soldier who will fight, and fight to win."

"I am not so sure, Mr. Kelley, that we are not in search of a housekeeper. I tell you that the successful managemeut of an army requires a good deal of faithful house-keeping. More fight will be got out of well-fed and well-cared-for soldiers and animals than those who make long marches on empty stomachs. (")

The words were kindly spoken, and the three gentlemen assented to them. Mr. McPherson and Mr. Moorhead took their departure, and Mr. Kelley and the President were once more alone.

"Mr. President," said Kelley, "you know that at Antietam Lee was in a cul-de-sac, with only one road by which he could retreat across the Potomac; that his ammunition was exhausted; that McClellan had Fitz-John Porter's corps fresh, with an abundant supply of ammunition; and yet Lee was allowed to get across the river with no molestation."

"I know it, Kelley. Victory was within McClellan's grasp. I know his unfitness to command; but let me say to you that I restored McClellan to the command of the army to reorganize it. He owed his command quite as much to Lee as to me; for while the work of reorganization was going on, Lee crossed the Potomac into Maryland, and compelled McClellan to move and check his advance."

Mr. Kelley noticed a smile lighting up the sad face, but did not quite understand its meaning. The President continued:

"Whatever the people and the troops may think or say of his failure to capture Lee, my censure would be tempered by the consciousness of the fact that I did not restore him to the command for aggressive fighting, but as an organizer and a good hand at defending a position. McClellan, by his constant and unfounded complaints, had done much to impair confidence in the Secretary of War and myself. He had wantonly sacrificed Pope. I admit that to employ him to rescue the army from its demoralization is a good deal like 'curing the bite with the hair of the dog.' But we must not forget the position of affairs, which furnish a striking illustration of the danger to which republican institutions are subjected by a great war, which may produce ambitious and rival commanders. The civil power in September was in reality subordinate to the military. I was commander-in-chief, but found my self, in that season of insubordination, panic, and demoralization, consciously under military duress. McClellan, while fighting battles which

should produce no result but the expenditure of men and means, had contrived to keep the troops with him by charging each new failure to some dereliction of the Secretary of War and the President; had created an impression among them that the Administration was hostile to him, and withheld what should have been accorded him, and which in some instances he falsely represented as having been promised him. The restoration of McClellan to command, in the face of his misconduct, was the greatest trial and most painful duty of my official life. Yet, situated as I was, it seemed to be my duty, and, in opposition to every member of my Cabinet, I performed it, and I feel no regret for what I have done. To-day, Mr. Kelley, I am stronger with the Army of the Potomac than McClellan. The supremacy of civil power has been restored, and the Executive is again master of the situation. The troops

know that if I made a mistake in substituting Pope for McClellan, I was capable of rectifying it by again trusting him. They know, too, that neither Stanton nor myself withheld anything from him at Antietam, and that it was not the Administration but their own former idol who surrendered the just results of their terrible sacrifice and closed the great fight as a drawn battle, when, had he thrown Porter's corps of fresh men and other available troops upon Lee's army, he would have driven it in disorder to the river and captured most of it before sunset."

The month of October was closing. For a period of six weeks the army had idled the time away encamped on the bank of the Potomac. It was east of the Blue Ridge. General Lee was west of it, in the Shenandoah Valley.

McClellan was nearer Richmond. The President urged him to make a rapid march on the interior line for the Confederate capital, but the army did not move. The patience of the loyal people of the country was exhausted. President Lincoln knew that every member of his Cabinet had lost faith in McClellan. He had issued a peremptory order for a movement which had been disregarded.

Slowly, during the last week of October, the army crossed the Potomac; slowly it moved a few miles each day southward. More swiftly marched the army of Lee, crossing the mountains and reaching Cul-peper, ready to confront McClellan on the bank of the Rapidan.

The patience of the President was exhausted. He had resolved to remove him from further command if he allowed Lee to cross the mountains and block the advance to Richmond. A messenger Nov. 7. came with an order relieving McClellan of the command and appointing General Burnside as his successor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVIII.

(1) "Century Magazine," January, 1889.

(2) Warden's "Life of Salmon P. Chase," p. 459.

(3) Gideon Welles, "Lincoln and Seward," p. 194.

(4) Schuyler Colfax, "Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln," p. 337.

(5) "Century Magazine," August, 1889.

(6) Ibid.

(7) "Century Magazine," January, 1889.

(8) Ibid.

(2) Gideon Welles's Diary, "Century Magazine," January, 1889.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Gideon Welles, "Galaxy Magazine," December, 1882.

(12) Isaac N. Arnold, "Life of Lincoln," p. 300.

(13) William D. Kelley, “Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln,” p. 271.

THE

CHAPTER XIX.

DARKNESS BEFORE THE DAWN.

HE Army of the Potomac was at Warrenton. Its new commander, General Burnside, had rendered excellent service in North Carolina. He reluctantly accepted the command conferred upon him by President Lincoln. He doubted his ability to handle so large a body of troops. The country demanded aggressive action. He must plan a campaign. The advantages which existed after Antietam had been lost. The Confederate army was behind the Rapidan, at Gordonsville. A new movement must be planned. General Halleck advised Burnside to make a direct attack upon the Confederate army. Burnside thought it would be better to march south-east to Fredericksburg, and cross the Rappahannock at that point. It would necessitate the reopening of the railroad from Aquia Creek to Fredericksburg. Pontoons would be needed. They could be taken down the Potomac and up the Rappahannock by steamer. Burnside would conceal his intentions by making a demonstration towards Gordonsville with a portion of the army while the boats were on their way. At the right moment he would make a quick march to Fredericksburg. Halleck would see that the pontoons were there at the appointed time. The plan was approved by the President.

Day was dawning on November 15th when the troops under General Sumner folded their blankets and moved eastward from Warrenton. They reached the Falmouth hills opposite Fredericksburg. The Confederate regiment of cavalry and four companies of infantry holding the place saw with amazement the hills across the Rappahannock swarming with Union soldiers. The pontoons had not arrived. Colonel Brooks, commanding a brigade, saw a steer come down the southern bank and wade across the stream. He sent word to Sumner, who despatched a messenger to Burnside, asking permission to cross the river and seize Fredericksburg. He had 40,000 men. Burnside hastened to Falmouth, but thought the risk too great, as the pontoons were not

there. Two days passed, and Lee's army was upon the hills behind the city. Through want of co-operation or inefficiency at Washington the well-laid plan had miscarried. Burnside was confronted by the

1862.

army of Lee, intrenched upon frowning hills. The country was Dec. 12, demanding a battle. He must make a movement. He decided to cross the Rappahannock, capture the town, and then attack Lee in the intrenchments. It was done, resulting in failure, the loss of 12,000 men, and the withdrawal of the troops to Falmouth.

No language can adequately describe the emotions of the President upon hearing of the terrible slaughter and the disastrous results. Day by day the lines deepened upon his brow.

The elections held in November had resulted in the choice of a large number of Democratic members of Congress, and the election of Horatio Seymour as Governor of New York. Mr. Seymour was a Democrat, opposed to the war, and Mr. Lincoln could no longer turn to the chief of that great State for support. He had good reason to look with apprehension into the future. But in his message to Congress, upon its reassembling for its last session, there was no swerving from his conviction of what was right, or what ought to be done to maintain the Union. There is dignity, grandeur, and touching pathos in his closing sentences:

"I do not forget the gravity which should characterize a paper addressed to the Congress of the nation by the chief magistrate of the nation. Nor do I forget that some of you are my seniors, nor that many of you have more experience than I in the conduct of public affairs. Yet I trust that in view of the great responsibility resting upon me you will perceive no want of respect to yourselves in any undue earnestness I may seem to display. The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disinthrall ourselves, and then we shall

save our country.

"Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. . We, of this Congress and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We-even we here-hold the power and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave we assure freedom to the free-honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed, this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just-a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless."

Mr. Lincoln was carrying burdens which were not apparent to the public. The country was holding him responsible for all the failures.